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A system—any system, economic or other—that at 
every given point of time fully utilizes its possibilities 
to the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior 
to a system that does so at no given point of time, because 
the latter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the 
level or speed of long-run performance.
joseph a. schumpeter
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
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Most adults in the United States and much of the industrial-
ized world today can vividly remember as children playing their way through
marathon Monopoly games. Few have come close, however, to challenging the
length of the longest Monopoly game in history (which dragged on for 1,680
hours, or seventy straight days).1
Although the board game involves key market institutions—money, a bank
and banker, deeds, trades, and wealth accumulation—only a modicum of busi-
ness savvy is required to win. Accordingly, ten-year-old kids can beat their par-
ents, who may be astute, seasoned business people, mainly because the compe-
tition among the players is highly constrained by detailed rules, the layout of
the board, and elements of luck that are introduced through required tosses of
the dice and draws of the “cards of chance.” The game’s popularity is probably
attributable in no small way to the fact that it taps into twin passions: to win
and to acquire wealth (even play wealth).
Each player’s best strategy for winning is often to buy up all properties of
given colors—for example, all the green properties of Pennsylvania, North
Carolina, and Paci‹c Avenues—and then add (plastic) houses or hotels to
them. We can only surmise that the game is called Monopoly because the rent
that property owners can charge when another player lands on any particular
property escalates both with the number of properties of a given color owned
and with the number of houses and hotels that owners buy for each property.
Market dominance translates into a form of “monopoly rents,” loosely de‹ned.
The player who is able to buy both Boardwalk and Park Place (the only two
blue properties) and put the maximum of four hotels on each has a good chance
of winning, given that the rents on those properties are then the highest on the
board. Of course, the owner of those two properties can be assured of their
monopoly in the game because the players are trapped: They each in turn must
throw the die and must follow in lockstep the route, square by square, around
the board, which means that players must run the risk of landing on the
monopolized properties. However, winning by developing monopolies on
properties of given colors is never assured, mainly because of the properties’
costs and the several elements of chance.
Economists play another monopoly “game” in their textbooks (and class-
room lectures) that is not totally unlike the board game. Like the board game,
the economists’ textbook monopoly game is also highly constrained—not, of
course, by the printed surface of a piece of cardboard, but by an underlying,
explicitly stated set of assumptions. Economists start by loosely attributing the
status of monopoly to any ‹rm that has “market power,” that is, the ‹rm is
suf‹ciently dominant in its market and suf‹ciently protected by barriers to the
entry of potential rivals that the monopoly can raise its prices and capture
“economic rents” or “monopoly pro‹ts” by restricting output below the ideal-
ized competitive output level.2 The assumption underlying the economists’
monopoly game that lines up best with the Monopoly board game is that the
more control a ‹rm has over a carefully de‹ned, given market (or the greater
the ‹rm’s “market dominance,” often de‹ned as percentage of all market sales)
and the more the ‹rm is protected from market entry of rivals, the more eco-
nomic rents the monopolist can earn.
But there is another way the two games align: The prospects for creativity
and improvement in both games are nil. In the case of the board game, the
board and the properties on the board are given. That is to say, they are not
created by the players in the course of the play. Their market values are also
predetermined and ‹xed. The rent to be made on each property is also given
and ‹xed, which is to say that the rent is merely extracted by the property own-
ers, as opposed to being created by them. No new properties can be added, and
neither can the existing properties be subdivided and recon‹gured to enhance
the value of all properties. It follows that a player’s rent from becoming a
“monopolist” over Boardwalk and Park Place will never affect the creation of
new properties by others, which, of course, means that players have every rea-
son to charge what the game (and market) will bear at the time of play. Because
nothing is created or destroyed by the play of the Monopoly, the game can
always be used again, with everything (rules, property values, and rents)
remaining exactly the same.
In the case of the economists’ monopoly game, the monopolized good is
also given to the textbook (and blackboard) analytics. That is, by assumption,
the monopolist has nothing to do with its own emergence as a monopoly or the
creation of its good and its market. The monopoly and its good and market are
simply assumed into existence. With the shapes and locations of the monopo-
list’s demand and cost functions also given, again by assumption, there is not
much more for economists to do in playing their model-building games other
than move around their “boards” and deduce the monopoly’s output and price
levels that maximize economic pro‹ts (or rents).
In the narrow context of the model, because the monopolist necessarily
restricts output below the (idealized) competitive level, a self-evident inef‹-
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ciency exists in the allocation of resources mandated by the underlying
assumptions and the rules of the monopoly model. The monopoly rent is
merely extracted from the consumer surplus that is presumed to exist indepen-
dent of whatever the monopolist may have done in the past or proposes to do
in the future. Under such conditions, the fairness of the rent extraction is, at
best, suspect. Again, this is because the monopolist, by assumption, had
absolutely nothing to do with the creation of the monopolized good, the
good’s market, the protective entry barriers (which, under the model, serve
only a negative economic function, that of permitting a curb in output), and
the resulting consumer surplus and (hence) the monopoly rent that is
extracted. Prices above marginal cost of production, of course, serve no value-
creating function.
The welfare consequences of the play of Monopoly are harmless. Every-
thing about the game (all the properties, money, and pieces) remains ‹xed, no
matter how many monopolies the players are able to create. If anything, the
development of monopolies adds to the players’ received value from play.
Obviously, public policies are not subject to change because of the Monopoly
game’s rules or the manner in which the game is played. Monopoly is a game
that simply would not sell if consumer gains from play (and the development
of monopolies among the various properties) were absent.
That is hardly the case with the monopoly game economists play out in
their models. This is because the economists’ monopoly game carries a direct
and powerful lesson: Monopolies everywhere are “bad.” They are bad in terms
of what they fail to do in the production of goods and, consequently, in terms
of what they do to the allocation of countries’ scarce and therefore valuable
resources. They are also bad because of what they do to countries’ income dis-
tributions. Monopoly rents can only be construed as an unnecessary grab on
consumers’ (not the monopolist’s) surplus by ‹rms that have absolutely no prior
or justi‹able claim on the surplus value. Monopolies everywhere, in other
words, have no redeeming virtue (a central lesson all too frequently exposited
with only minor and easily dismissed quali‹cations).
Because judges, journalists, politicians, policymakers, bureaucrats, and
researchers (and economists) thoroughly absorbed the monopoly model in
their college classes, it should surprise no one that welfare-destroying monop-
olies are seen everywhere.
• Microsoft is a monopolist because its Windows operating system and
Of‹ce suite of productivity applications for personal computers are used
on nearly all of the world’s personal computers (i.e., those that use Intel-
compatible microprocessors).3
Preface xv
• Clear Channel has monopoly power because it has more than 1,200
radio stations (of the 10,000-plus stations in the country) in its network. 
• Intel has market power because its Pentium chips dominate the micro-
processor market.
• The Irvine Company, a major property owner in Southern California,
has monopoly power simply because of its large size and the strategic
locations of its properties in a high-growth area of the country. 
• Even J. K. Rowling, author of the Harry Potter series, has been accused
of having a monopoly presence in the book market because she has sold
so many books (hundreds of millions), which obviously gives her pub-
lisher the option of selling fewer than could have been sold to charge
higher than competitive prices (Blais 2005). 
Indeed, the economists’ model has been learned so well by many commen-
tators that they are able to nimbly reverse the model’s logic: Any ‹rm that
makes a lot of money—or more than is required to keep the ‹rm doing what it
is doing—must have monopoly market power. Otherwise, the excess earnings
would have been eroded by competition. Hence, people’s riches (Bill Gates’s
billions) are prima facie evidence of an unseen inef‹ciency in the allocation of
resources—a welfare loss that need not have been. Never mind that Gates’s
fortune may amount to a small fraction of the societal welfare gains that have
been, and will continue to be, realized because of key decisions he made with
regard to the development of Microsoft years ago.
The public policy implication from the “play” of the economists’ monop-
oly game is equally clear: When the cost of antitrust action is lower than the
monopoly’s deadweight loss imposed on its market, monopolies should be
abolished wherever and whenever sighted. When the cost of such antitrust
action is higher than the expected ef‹ciency improvement, monopolies must
be endured, but only as a “necessary evil.” Monopolies should never be wel-
comed for what they contribute to the development of human welfare. This is
because, to restate our point, monopolies cannot be seen as bene‹cial, on bal-
ance, to human welfare—at least not from the perspective of the standard sta-
tic monopoly model.
As economists over the past two hundred years have lamented the almost
complete absence of any real-world market matching their competitive ideal
market structure, “perfect competition,” and as economists have bemoaned the
prevalence of monopolies, oligopolies, monopolistic competitors, and monop-
sonies in the economy, something very curious has occurred: The American
economy has prospered as no other economy has prospered before in human
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history. This is because the past two hundred years have stood witness to a
record of discovery, invention, and innovativeness not matched in earlier
epochs. Moreover, three-quarters or more of the welfare gains from all the
innovativeness have been garnered not by the innovators (and all the ‹rms
built around the innovations) but by the consuming public.4 It is no exaggera-
tion to suggest that economists’ myopic focus on monopolies’ wrongs is com-
parable to observers of the play of the Monopoly board game stressing how
unreasonable the rent on Boardwalk is without ever recognizing that the play-
ers are having a lot of fun and that the prospects of each player acquiring the
rights to the rent on Boardwalk is very likely one of the forces that inspires
their continued play.
In this book, we develop at length two arguments that represent a frontal
assault on conventional economic wisdom as related to monopolies: First,
economists’ conventional, widely accepted, and parroted static model of
monopoly greatly exaggerates the economic harm done by real-world monop-
olies in real-world markets, which are necessarily evolutionary, dynamic, cre-
ative processes that do not square well with the static, noncreative nature of
economists’ monopoly model.
Second, contrary to conventional wisdom among economists (for reasons
that are explored at length in this book), some degree of monopoly presence in
an economy is “good” because without some monopoly presence no economy
can ever hope to maximize human welfare improvement over time. In this
regard, we argue that a perfectly ›uid, perfectly competitive economy, ideal-
ized and idolized by economists, must be decidedly inferior to an economy that
is beset with some degree of market entry and exit restrictions (or costs). In
making these points, we repeatedly defer to the wisdom of the late Harvard
economist Joseph Schumpeter, who observed succinctly and prophetically in
his classic work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy more than six decades ago
that market imperfections can be a source of an economy’s long-term progress
(see the epigraph to this volume). Readers who appreciate the wisdom in that
passage need not read on. However, we have written this book on the pre-
sumption that many economists and professionals in related ‹elds (e.g., law
and public policy) will view the passage with some skepticism. As documented
throughout this book, much conventional criticism directed at monopoly
ignores this Schumpeterian insight.
Our purpose in this book is to expound and then to extend Schumpeter’s
key insight in ways that he failed to develop as fully as he could have. We seek
to explain why we believe Schumpeter was actually too timid in making his
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point. Our essential position is stronger: An economic system’s failure to
ef‹ciently allocate its resources at all points in time is a necessary precondition
for the maximization of the system’s long-term performance.
Our reasoning is at times complex, but more often it is elementary. In the
main, much of what we write in this book reduces to the proposition that an
economy is unlike a board game in which players compete for a limited num-
ber of given properties. It is unlike the blackboard games in which economists
develop their monopoly models. In real-world economies, goods and services
are not given, as is the case in both the board game Monopoly and in econo-
mists’ treatment of monopoly in their blackboard games. Goods and services
are created, and the process by which goods and services are created and
enhanced requires competition, but any process involving truly creative pro-
duction also requires the prospects of gains beyond a “normal competitive
rate of return.” In no small way creative production drives, in unheralded
forms and to an unheralded extent, Schumpeter’s much-heralded “creative
destruction.”
Monopolies (and their built-in monopoly rents, as well as their entry and
exit barriers that inspire the rents) are an underappreciated inspiration for the
development of new goods and services that enhance human value and, at the
same time, undermine their (the monopolies’) own existence. This is to say
that, unlike the board game Monopoly, monopolies in real-world economies
can inspire new and more valuable properties and can give rise to players mov-
ing off the beaten path around the board and into uncharted territories. Even
when given monopolies are said to be bad in their markets (as Standard Oil and
Microsoft have been found to be by antitrust authorities and the courts),5 they
can contribute much to the advancement of human welfare, primarily because
they inspire others in close-by and far-removed markets to try to become like
them, monopolies with above-competitive returns. The long-run improve-
ments in human welfare from a greater variety of and higher quality products,
inspired by the “bad” monopolies’ pro‹ts, can easily exceed any short-term loss
in welfare due to “bad” monopolies’ restrictions on output.
Moreover, monopolies and their pro‹ts are absolutely essential and
expected in real-world markets beset with risk and uncertainty, which make
business failures not only a possibility but also a persistent fact of market life.
In order for individuals and ‹rms to venture forth in such real-world markets,
they must have a realistic prospect of temporary monopoly pro‹ts just so that
in an array—or a portfolio—of ventures, at least a competitive rate of return
can, on balance, be expected.
Besides, in a world beset with risk and uncertainty, good luck is bound to
happen, with the luck revealing itself in monopoly pro‹ts, enabled by natural
xviii preface
and unexpected barriers to entry that emerge with the development of prod-
ucts. No doubt, J. K. Rowling never expected to sell hundreds of millions of
books, and to have the degree of reader royalty that her Harry Potter series
inspired among young and adult readers. Similarly, Apple could not have
known that its iPod would become the standard for digital music players and
would, for so long, dominate its market segment. In an imperfect world, the
prospects of monopoly pro‹ts, from anticipated or unanticipated sources,
surely inspires more risk taking than would otherwise occur, which should be
expected to pay off in an economy that, over the long run, is more innovative
than it could otherwise be.
So what if ‹rms’ allocative ef‹ciency in every product line is not achieved
with perfection, when the resource base is expanded at the same time that con-
sumer value is enhanced because of the incentive effects built into the prospects
of monopolized markets? Clearly, as we shall argue repeatedly in this book, if
antitrust enforcement were “perfect” in all regards, wiping out all monopolies
and returning all markets to perfectly competitive market conditions, innova-
tion and long-term prosperity would surely be undermined since we would
replace an economy that is more productive over time with one that is as pro-
ductive as possible at every point in time.
Before they take up monopoly in their classes, economists often review
with their students Adam Smith’s clever metaphor, the “invisible hand,” which
he used to explain how people’s drive to serve their own private ends results in
the advancement of society’s ends. Our arguments represent an extension of
Smith’s profound point, for we see monopoly as a crucial activating force
behind the invisible hand. Take out the prospect of monopoly (and the atten-
dant monopoly pro‹ts) from a market economy, and the invisible hand will
likely go limp, a position that appears to be ironic only because of how monop-
oly has been caricatured for so long in economic models.
Our analysis leads to another transparent conclusion: The world of per-
fectly ›uid, perfectly competitive markets (or any close approximation) is ‹rst
of all unachievable (because of the unattainability of perfection) and further-
more undesirable even if it were achievable. The kind of competition in real-
world markets is far superior to the competition in perfectly competitive mar-
kets precisely because the competition is not restricted solely to price
competition. Rather, competition in real-world markets is multidimensional,
with the avenues of competition constantly being created and rede‹ned with
the advent of new products and production processes, a point fully appreciated
by Schumpeter, who asserted the far greater importance of nonprice competi-
tion over price competition in determining the allocative ef‹ciency of
resources over time.6
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Clearly, if the good that is subject to monopolization is given—that is, not
actually created by the monopoly—nothing much can be said about the moral-
ity of any distribution of the surplus value from the good’s production and sale.
This is true even when, assuming constant cost of production, the surplus value
would go entirely to consumers, under conditions of perfect competition. So
what if consumers get all of the gains from trade? There is no necessary
justi‹cation for the monopoly getting any of the net gains, because the monop-
oly had no role in creating the good and bringing the net value into existence.
However, if the good is actually created by the monopoly, then surely the
monopoly’s claim, on fairness or justice grounds, for a portion of the net gains
is strengthened, while the consumers’ claim to all of the gains is undermined.
Because successful real-world economies are advancing evolutionary processes
marked by innovations developed by individuals and ‹rms, we argue in the fol-
lowing pages that monopoly pro‹ts have far more moral merit than they are
commonly accorded when viewed from the perspective of static models. And,
we should never forget, above-competitive pro‹ts are the incentive that inno-
vators need to innovate, and they are the cause of far more intense and mean-
ingful forms of competition than price competition isolated from all other
forms of competition.
Economists make much to-do about how competitive market prices are
important signals to ‹rms as they try to decide what to produce and what
resources to employ (and pull away from other uses). Prices supposedly lead
entrepreneurs as if by Adam Smith’s invisible hand into an ef‹cient allocation
of resources and maximization of human well-being. We ask in this book, fol-
lowing the lead of Paul Romer (1994), how can that be, given that, as econo-
mists themselves stress, the prices set in perfectly competitive markets only
re›ect goods’ marginal values, which means that prices in such markets do not
and cannot re›ect the full consumer value of the goods that are produced?
That question is irrelevant when the goods are given, that is, do not need to
be created. However, if the goods need to be created and produced, perfectly
competitive prices can lead to impaired incentives to create new and superior
goods and improve old products and, hence, to an underallocation of resources
toward economic progress that bene‹ts us all. The failure to develop new and
improved products that cost less than they are worth is a market inef‹ciency
that easily goes unrecognized (it is dif‹cult to recognize the lack of something
that has never been available) and surely one that is as important as the short-
run deadweight loss economists focus on in their static models of markets. To
paraphrase Romer, a new good not produced is as easy (perhaps easier) to over-
look as the dog that did not bark—and apparently for economists, far more
dif‹cult to conceptualize than the units of given goods that are not produced in
xx preface
monopolized markets.7 True competitive prices are particularly problematic
when the marginal cost of production is close to zero, if not zero, as is the case
for the burgeoning array of digital (or electronic) goods and services today.
Our arguments, in other words, lead to the observation that monopolies
might create one form of short-run inef‹ciency, deadweight loss, but they also
lead to a more-than-offsetting improvement in the ef‹ciency with which goods
are created and improved over time. Again, this is the point Schumpeter had in
mind when he suggested that short-run inef‹ciencies could establish the con-
ditions for improving “the level and speed of [an economy’s] long-run perfor-
mance.”
From our reexamination of monopoly theory, we can only deduce that
human welfare is today superior to what it would have been had policymakers
followed, over the past couple hundred years, more assiduously the monopoly
teachings of economists. At the same time, the world today would likely have
been superior to what we see around us had more policymakers over the past
six decades read carefully Professor Schumpeter’s seminal tract on the required
market foundation for progress in free-market economies.
To avoid any misunderstanding and to be clear, we hasten to add that our
arguments do not lead recklessly to the conclusion that all monopolies are
good or that the more monopolies an economy encourages, the better. We can
easily imagine that some level of monopolization of markets can be, on bal-
ance, welfare destroying. Our point is that not all monopolies and not all lev-
els of monopolization are welfare destroying, a perspective that suggests econ-
omists should pay more attention to the institutional conditions for what
might be called optimum monopoly. We acknowledge that optimum monopoly
(discussed later) lacks the level of analytical precision that economists’ market
models have. Nevertheless, we are proposing that the issue of monopolies of all
kinds in a market economy should be addressed analytically, in the way that the
terms for copyrights and patents have historically been addressed: Those forms
of market protection are needed to inspire greater creativity than would other-
wise exist, but the extent and term of the protection need not be unlimited. We
suggest that optimum monopoly is no less relevant to public policy than opti-
mum pollution or optimum crime rate.
In completing this book, we are deeply indebted to Tyler Cowen, Kenneth
Elzinga, and Thomas Sullivan for their incisive and very helpful reviews of




“The Wretched Spirit of Monopoly”
Historically, monopoly has, with limited exceptions, been
seen by economists as a bane of markets, one of the more prominent forms of
so-called market failure. Across time, economists have equated the “evils” of
monopoly with theft and taxation, given that monopoly can impair an econ-
omy’s vigor just as theft and taxation can. Unfortunately, countries have, either
all too willingly, with malice or political intention, created and nurtured
monopolies, or else inadvertently, from ignorance of monopolies’ economic
consequences, allowed them to arise and persist.1
In contemporary economics, monopoly is treated as a source of “inef‹-
ciency,” or “deadweight loss.” That is, monopoly forces a misallocation of
resources, with too few resources being used in the monopolized industries
and too many resources used to lesser advantage in other competitive markets.2
The chief modern standard of comparison for assessing the welfare loss of
monopoly is “perfect competition,” a hypothetical market structure, developed
mainly for analytical purposes, in which all potential gains from trade are real-
ized—all resources are allocated among alternative uses with “perfection” (by
assumptions of the model).
At the same time, many economists as far back as Adam Smith have
doubted that the economic damage done by monopolies could long endure
without the protective arm of government heeding the monopolies’ political
demands for market protections. The main change in economists’ overall
appraisal of monopoly through history has been the growing formalization of
the monopoly model that shows ever more clearly the economic harm monop-
olies cause, a point that can be seen with a review of the treatment of monop-
oly by classical economists (covered in this chapter) and their more contempo-
rary neoclassical counterparts (covered in the following chapters).
In this book, our central goal is to undertake a critical and extensive (but not
exhaustive) reexamination of contemporary monopoly theory, though not with
an eye toward dispensing with the theory altogether. We would be the ‹rst to
argue that the monopoly model that economists widely employ has many good
uses. However, we suggest that the model has been overused and abused, given
that it has almost everywhere been employed to show that monopoly power—
or the capacity of ‹rms to affect market price and ‹rm pro‹ts (or “monopoly
rents”)—is prima facie evidence of a “market failure,” or a sign of
“inef‹ciency” and consumer “welfare loss,” which amounts to the same thing.
On the contrary, we suggest that there is much wisdom in a widely unappreci-
ated position taken by Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950) in his classic 1942
work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, in which he observed, partly in an
effort to explain why capitalism would not survive, that an economic system is
necessarily an imperfect evolutionary process of “creative destruction,” which
makes it ill-suited for ultimate appraisal by the static analysis of conventional
economic theory.
Since we are dealing with a process whose every element takes considerable
time in revealing its true features and ultimate effects, there is no point in
appraising its performance of that process ex visu of a given point of time;
we must judge its performance over time, as it unfolds through decades or
centuries. A system—any system, economic or other—that at every point of
time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long
run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point in time, because
the latter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-
run performance. (1942, 83; emphasis in the original)
In taking a page from Schumpeter, we suggest that monopoly, or the
prospect of monopoly, is an engine of creative production, which necessarily
undergirds economic progress, in contrast to much ingrained wisdom that sug-
gests that monopoly is a drag on economic progress. Take monopoly, and con-
comitant monopoly rents, out of a market economy—that is, convert all mar-
kets to ones of perfectly ›uid (and perfectly ef‹cient) competition, or some
close approximation, eliminating all prospect of economically signi‹cant
monopoly rents in the process—and the system will likely stagnate. Any short-
run ef‹ciency gains achieved by such a conversion, even if such were possible
without massive disruption in economic relationships, would likely be
swamped by the long-term losses from the absence of what Schumpeter con-
sidered the far more potent force of “creative destruction.”
In short, we suggest that market economies need some optimum level of
monopoly presence to achieve maximum growth in consumer welfare over
time. The concept of optimum monopoly, albeit ill-de‹ned, could better
direct policy-level discussions on copyrights, patents, and antitrust than the
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current view that elevates “perfect competition” (or, again, some close approx-
imation) and the intentional destruction of all monopoly vestiges as a societal
goal of the highest order. “The only good monopoly is a dead one” is a quip,
in other words, that contains a mountain of fallacies.
As will be seen, we extend our criticisms of current monopoly theory by
showing that monopoly pricing can increase consumer surplus under speci‹ed
market conditions (e.g., network effects) at the same time that it spawns the so-
called deadweight loss (a concept that needs to be discarded in much economic
analysis as irrelevant). Of course, our analysis leads inexorably to the conclu-
sion that market entry barriers can be welfare enhancing, in spite of their giv-
ing rise to a deadweight loss, as described in conventional analysis.
We show that even when the conventional monopoly model is taken as the
basis for analysis, the monopoly pro‹ts and deadweight loss of monopoly are
not nearly so large as economists’ blackboard models indicate, simply because
conventional analysis does not recognize that achievement of the monopoly
objective of restricting sales to raise price and pro‹ts is a managerial problem
of major proportions. It is a coordination problem, differing from the coordi-
nation problems faced by cartels of independent producers only in degree.
Moreover, conventional analysis in which a fully competitive market is
somehow magically cartelized does not consider an obvious problem, that the
individual producers who are brought under a cartel’s umbrella of market con-
trol can switch roles, from being independent entrepreneurs, or principals, to
being employees (or bureaucrats), or rather agents, the net effect of which is to
change dramatically their incentives to produce ef‹ciently. This means that
much monopoly “rent seeking” (or the pursuit of monopoly pro‹ts through
government-backed restrictions) must be revised. If monopoly rents are
reduced by so-called principal-agent problems in managing monopolies, then
less rent seeking must be the consequence, which implies less inef‹ciency than
conventional monopoly rent-seeking theory suggests.
In the conventional analysis of monopoly, consumers would never want to
be subjected to monopoly pricing. They would pay higher prices as well as
transfer a portion of their consumer surplus to the monopoly owners. We sug-
gest this is only the case in static analysis, when the product is a given and when
there is no interplay between the actual, or anticipated, consumption of the
good and future consumer demand for the product over time. Indeed, we sug-
gest that under some realistic market conditions, consumers would actually
want to face the prospects of monopoly pricing at some future point in time, as
such prospects can affect the monopolist’s pricing decisions between now and
when the monopoly rents are actually extracted. This isn’t to say that con-
sumers aren’t worse off from monopoly pricing. On the contrary, they are
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when it occurs, but a producer’s initial pricing policies that lead to the monop-
oly prices can more than compensate consumers for the costs they incur from
the so-called future monopoly prices.
All of these points, understandably, lead to a need for a revamping of mod-
ern antitrust thinking that is heavily guided (and misguided) by the conven-
tional microeconomic theory of monopoly under which so many legal scholars
and judges have mistakenly equated market dominance with monopoly—
monopoly as a problem that requires a government-imposed solution.3
Finally, we point out that the theory of monopoly on the buyer’s side of the
market—monopsony—is as defective as monopoly on the seller’s side. For rea-
sons we will explain, it is hard for us to imagine how a monopsony would ever
be able to emerge in labor (or other input) markets without paying above what
were, before the monopsony emerged, competitive wage rates. Hence, from
the perspective of arguments marshaled in chapter 7 of this book, monopsony
should more correctly be viewed as expanding labor’s employment and income
opportunities, not contracting them. In chapter 8, we expand on our discussion
of problems with monopsony theory with a discussion of how the NCAA, an
acclaimed monopsony of collegiate athletic (mainly football and basketball)
talent, could be actually improving the welfare of those athletes whom other
economic and legal scholars presume are being exploited. If this view is correct
(or to the extent it is), any proposal that would force the NCAA to pay market
wages for college and university athletes would have the exact opposite impact
of the one intended.
To put these points in historical context, we begin in this chapter an exam-
ination of the monopoly views of key economists in history, starting with
Adam Smith and going through Schumpeter. This review of monopoly think-
ing is intended to be indicative only of how economists’ thinking on monopoly
has evolved over time. It is not intended to be exhaustive of all positions taken
by economists on monopoly. In the following chapter, we will present the con-
temporary monopoly model in some graphical detail with the purpose of lay-
ing the foundation for critiques of monopoly theory developed by Donald
Dewey (1959) and John McGee (1971) on which we expand in a variety of ways
in following chapters. In the main, however, our critique follows in the Schum-
peterian tradition (Schumpeter 1942).
smith, bentham, and ricardo on the 
“evils” of monopoly
The venerable Adam Smith (1723–90), the recognized founder of economics
as a discipline, viewed monopoly not much differently than contemporary
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economists now do, although, as might be expected, Smith was less exact in the
way he chose to discuss the economic harm done by a monopoly. In his Wealth
of Nations, he used the term monopoly to describe a range of market structures,
with the critical feature being the capacity of a ‹rm or ‹rms within a protected
industry to raise the selling price above the competitive—or “natural”—price.
More speci‹cally, he equated the grant of a monopoly with a trade secret that
allowed the producer to control supply and, hence, price (Smith 1776, bk. 1,
chap. 7).
By controlling supply—or “keeping the market under-stocked, by never
fully supplying the effectual demand”—Smith reasoned that monopolists can
“sell their commodities much above the natural price, and raise their emolu-
ments, whether they consist in wages or pro‹t, greatly above their natural rate”
(1776; bk. 1, chap. 7, ¶ 26). On the one hand, the monopolist’s price “is upon
every occasion the highest which can be squeezed out of buyers, or which, it is
supposed, they will consent to give.” On the other, the “natural” or competi-
tive price “is the lowest which the sellers can commonly afford to take, and at
the same time continue in business” (bk. 1, chap. 7, ¶ 27).
To Smith, as well as to other early economists, the word monopoly was not
exclusively used to characterize a single seller of a good or service protected by
barriers to entry, as is often the case in modern discussions of monopoly.
Rather, monopoly applied more loosely to any ‹rm that was capable of elevat-
ing its price above cost and that could generate monopoly rent, or an income
over and above what was required to keep the resources in their current
employment. This meant that Smith used monopoly to describe any ‹rm
capable of restricting sales with the intent of raising its price, but it also applied
to ‹rms that were protected by, say, import restrictions and that, as a conse-
quence, were able to elevate their prices above competitive levels, as well as
expand their sales. (Our discussion of monopoly will follow Smith in this
regard. We will talk about monopolies as being ‹rms that have some control
over price through control over market supply, even though they may not be
the only seller in their market.)
Accordingly, Smith was concerned with the monopoly consequences of
mercantilism, which gave rise to a host of trade restrictions designed (mistak-
enly) to build the nation’s economic well-being. The British Navigation Act of
1660 speci‹ed that “no merchandise shall be imported into the plantation but
in English vessels, navigated by Englishmen, under the penalty of forfeiture”
(Little 1886, ¶ 3693). Another law prohibited the importation of all European
commodities into the colonies except in British ships manned by Englishmen.
There were other times in which kings used patents and exclusive franchises as
revenue sources. For example, Charles I, circa 1630, issued a patent on soap to
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a “company of soap-makers” on the condition that the soap-makers pay him
£10,000 and £8 per ton of soap they sold (¶ 3689). In the Act of 1672, New
England producers were forbidden to compete with the English on the pro-
duce from Southern plantations. Moreover, American ‹rms were forbidden to
manufacture goods that would compete with English goods in foreign markets
(¶ 3699).
Among monopoly’s many vagaries—which caused Smith to summarize
them as the “wretched spirit of monopoly”—Smith cited how the creation of
monopoly by, say, import restrictions oppresses the poor, and, at the same
time, the oppression of the poor invariably gives rise to “the monopoly of the
rich, who, by engrossing the whole trade to themselves, will be able to make
very large pro‹ts” (1776, bk. 1, chap. 9, ¶ 15). He also noted how monopolies
are “a great enemy to good management” because, protected as they are,
monopolists don’t have to work as hard at improving, as a matter of market
self-defense, their management ways in response to “free and universal com-
petition” (1776, bk. 1, chap. 11, ¶ 14).
Moreover, whereas monopolies might well improve the pro‹ts of the pro-
tected industry, they necessarily undercut state tax revenue precisely because
aggregate national income is diminished (1776, bk. 4, chap. 7, ¶ 143).4 And
then there is the one ›aw of every monopoly that Smith characterized as
“fatal”: “The high rate of pro‹t seems every where to destroy that parsimony
which in other circumstances is natural to the character of the merchant.
When pro‹ts are high that sober virtue seems to be super›uous and expensive
luxury to suit better the af›uence of his situation” (1776, bk. 4, chap. 7, ¶ 147).
Because the protected “owners of great mercantile capitals” are often political
and commercial leaders of communities and, hence, set examples for others by
how they act, a monopoly can also cause the masses of workers to be less par-
simonious than they would be otherwise.
Accumulation is thus prevented in the hands of all those who are naturally
the most disposed to accumulate, and the funds destined for the mainte-
nance of productive labour receive no augmentation from the revenue of
those who ought naturally to augment them the most. The capital of the
country, instead of increasing, gradually dwindles away, and the quantity of
productive labour maintained in it grows every day less and less. (1776, bk.
4, chap. 7, ¶ 147)
Finally, Smith is well known for having written,
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or
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in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consis-
tent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of
the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do noth-
ing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary. (1776,
bk. 1, chap. 10, ¶ 82)
Smith is also well known (and revered) for his emphasizing the value of mar-
kets freed of government interferences—aside for a short list of potential inter-
ferences, including certain goods, like roads, characterized as “public goods” in
modern literature. What is not so widely appreciated is that Smith argued for
public provision of cross-country roads in part because they would ease the
›ow of trade across local markets and thereby would make cartels more
dif‹cult to maintain.5
Because Smith presumed that privately organized cartels would be short
lived, due to the forces of competition that would arise, his major concern in
the Wealth of Nations was with monopolies that were either directly approved
by the state or those that arose in the domestic economy because of govern-
ment-imposed restrictions on international trade that gave the protected
domestic ‹rms a degree of monopoly pricing power (a concern we share in
spite of our defense of monopolies that arise from unfettered market forces).
Smith recognized that “country gentlemen and farmers” have a more dif‹cult
time than merchants and manufacturers in colluding against the general pub-
lic. As a consequence, “they accordingly seem to have been the original inven-
tors of those restraints upon the importation of foreign goods which secure to
them the monopoly of the home-market” (1976, bk. 4, chap. 2, ¶ 21). The
monopoly pro‹ts to be garnered with the trade restrictions are all the “encour-
agement” domestic ‹rms need to press for the protection, which, in the
process, distorts the allocation of resources, especially the employment of
labor.6
In this regard, Smith seemed to understand economic tenets that, in mod-
ern times, form the basis of public choice economics, which uses economic
theory—including monopoly theory—to understand governmental policy
processes. Monopoly, in other words, was an important engine of interest
group politics, or what has come to be called, following the work of twentieth-
century economists Gordon Tullock (1967) and Anne Krueger (1974), rent
seeking, the political search for monopoly pro‹ts from government-imposed
market restrictions or other forms of government-provided largess with the
added pro‹ts being the motivation, or what Smith called “encouragement.”
Ultimately, the problems of monopoly, according to Smith, are com-
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pounded by government being made “subservient to the interest of monopoly”
(1776, bk. 4, chap. 7, ¶ 190), and the restrictive laws, passed at the urging of
monopoly-seeking interest groups, are “written in blood.”7 So what if the
import taxes encouraged smuggling that, in turn, reduced government rev-
enues from what they would have been had a lower import tax been imposed?
Smith understood that tax revenues were not the point of the import restric-
tions; monopoly privileges were.8
Of course, protected industries would like nothing better than to have their
domestic monopoly extended to markets in foreign countries, Smith mused.
However, any government’s jurisdictional boundaries necessarily limit the geo-
graphical reach of any monopoly protection, which is why the protected indus-
tries have pressed for export subsidies that can be expected to have the same pro-
duction and pro‹t effects for the favored domestic ‹rm or industry as the import
restrictions. In Smith’s view, ‹rms that bene‹ted from export subsidies were no
less monopolies than the ‹rms that were favored with import restrictions. Both
sets of favored ‹rms received monopoly rents that were, in some sense, unearned
and that gave rise to the misallocation of resources, as well as to all the other
harms Smith noted that ›owed from the presence of monopoly.9
Contrary to what might be deduced from reading about Smith’s hostility to
market protections in general, he was not totally opposed to all monopolies
under all circumstances. According to Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), Smith
once wrote (in a publication Bentham did not identify),
When a company of merchants undertake at their own risk and expence to
establish a new trade, with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not
be unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint-stock company, and to
grant them, in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain
number of years. It is the easiest and most natural way, in which the state
can recompense them, for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experi-
ment, of which the public is afterwards to reap the bene‹t. A temporary
monopoly of this kind may be vindicated, upon the same principles, upon
which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that
of a new book to its author. (Bentham 1787, Letter 13, ¶ 38)
Bentham scolded Smith for being inconsistent, given that Smith had in
other forums denounced all other monopolies. Bentham added, “Private
respect must not stop me from embracing this occasion of giving a warning,
which is so much needed by mankind. If so original and independent a spirit [as
Adam Smith] has not been always able to save itself from being drawn aside by
the fascination of sounds, into the paths of vulgar prejudice, how strict a watch
ought not men of common mould to set over their judgments, to save them-
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selves from being led astray by similar delusions?” (¶ 39). Bentham suggested
that Smith could use his logic for his monopoly exception to support usury
laws, which Smith, Bentham noted, had opposed (¶ 44).
David Ricardo (1772–1823) added to Smith’s view of monopoly in only
marginal ways. In his Principles of Political Economy, Ricardo noted, like Smith,
that the monopoly price “is at the very highest price at which the consumers
are willing to purchase it,” but this monopoly price could change from time
period to time period and product to product. However, that price, according
to Ricardo, “is nowhere regulated by the cost of production” (1817, chap. 17,
¶ 8). Ricardo’s main concern was elaborating on an argument pushed by
Smith, Thomas Robert Malthus (1776–1834),10 and others, that private prop-
erty in land was a source of monopoly, that the price of land is necessarily a
monopoly price, and that the prices of crops—barley or wheat, for example—
produced on the land contain monopoly rent that, if taxed away, would fall
totally on the landlord, or so argued Ricardo: “If all rent were relinquished by
landlords, I am of opinion, that the commodities produced on the land would
be no cheaper, because there is always a portion of the same commodities pro-
duced on land, for which no rent is or can be paid, as the surplus produce is
only suf‹cient to pay the pro‹ts of stock” (1817, chap. 20, ¶ 12).
Ricardo corrected Smith, and others who adopted Smith’s position on trade
restrictions as a source of monopoly rents, in one substantial way. He stressed
that trade restrictions do not afford domestic producers the power to charge
monopoly prices and to garner monopoly rents as Smith had maintained. This
is because such restrictions do not cut out domestic competition, which could be
intense. The “real evil” from such restrictions, Ricardo argued incisively, is not
that the restrictions enable the supposed “monopolies” to charge more than the
competitive price, but that the restrictions actually raise the “natural price”
(meaning competitive, cost-based price) because they increase market
inef‹ciency: “By increasing the cost of production, a portion of the labour of the
country is less productively employed” (1817, n. 54).11 Ricardo seemed to
understand a point often overlooked in even modern treatments of monopoly,
namely, that monopoly rents can be capitalized in the market value of tradable
monopoly, rent-producing assets (e.g., land or franchise), the effect of which can
be to hike implicit opportunity costs and to drop pro‹ts net of the value of trad-
able asset prices, returning rates of return on investments to competitive levels.
bastiat and marx on monopoly as “plunder”
French economist Frédéric Bastiat (1801–50) is renowned for his incisive satir-
ical opposition to import restrictions, as in his “petition” to the French Cham-
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ber of Deputies on behalf of his country’s “Manufacturers of Candles, Tapers,
Lanterns, Candlesticks, Street Lamps, Snuffers, and Extinguishers, and from
the Producers of Tallow, Oil, Resin, Alcohol, and Generally of Everything
Connected with Lighting.” In his petition, he urged his fellow deputies to pass
laws that would require people to block out the sun during the entire day for
no higher purpose than to increase the demand for candles and everything else
his supposed clients produced. Such laws would have essentially the same
effects as all other laws designed to thwart the free ›ow of trade founded on
cost advantages.12
Obviously, Bastiat had no more respect for monopolies, especially govern-
ment-created ones, than did Smith and Ricardo. We will consider in some
detail Bastiat’s views on monopoly in chapter 10 (when we consider how writ-
ers have equated, wrongly, property rights with monopoly privileges). Here we
can note that in various publications, Bastiat placed monopoly among a chang-
ing list of “evils of society,” along with war, slavery, unethical practices, theoc-
racy, colonialism, impostures, inequitable taxation and excesses of govern-
ment, frauds of every kind, and privilege (1850, chap. 1, ¶ 32; chap. 8, ¶ 9;
1845, ser. 2, chap. 2, ¶ 12). Bastiat saw government-sanctioned “plunder” as a
common denominator of his “evils”: “Plunder not only redistributes wealth; it
always, at the same time, destroys a part of it. War annihilates many values. Slav-
ery paralyzes many capabilities. Theocracy diverts many energies toward
childish or injurious ends. Monopoly too transfers wealth from one pocket to
another, but much of it is lost in the process” (1845, ser. 2, chap. 1, ¶ 21).
When Bastiat wrote about monopoly, he was most concerned about the
then widely expressed contentions that (1) private property gave the owners
monopoly power and (2) “Liberty begets monopoly,” along with “Oppression
is born of freedom” (1850, chap. 1, ¶ 87). With regard to the latter, what he
called a “socialistic pretext,” Bastiat scoffed that the argument is “fatal” for
human history because the claim implied that for people “to learn to choose is
to learn to commit suicide” and then there would be no satisfactory govern-
mental means of correction, given that government would have to call upon
human beings who are, by the nature of the claims, fatally ›awed.13 Bastiat
maintained that the “laws of competition” would see to it that there is no “per-
manent monopoly,” “since the product of their labor, by an inevitable dispen-
sation of Providence, tends to become the common, gratuitous, and conse-
quently equal heritage of all mankind” with the result “in mankind a basic
tendency toward equality” (1850, chap. 16, ¶ 110). By this he seemed to mean
that any temporary market advantage, owing to some unique ability, would
dissolve with the emergence of competition from the spread of the advantage
with duplication.14
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With regard to the claim that private property affords owners monopoly
privileges, Bastiat ‹rst quoted a number of prominent writers of his time,
including Smith, Ricardo, Considerant, and Jean-Baptiste Say (1767–1832), as
well as lesser known individuals, all of whom maintained that land is produc-
tive in and of itself, independent of what owners do to it, and hence gives rise
to unearned returns, treated synonymously with monopoly pro‹ts and monop-
oly rents. According to pre-Bastiat scholars, when crops are sold, the workers
get paid for the value they add to what is produced, but landowners are paid for
what is rightly the contribution of the land, not the owner.15 No economic
purpose was seen to be served by the payment to property, just as there is no
positive societal economic purpose served by the rent of monopolists who are
able to control market supply. Bastiat points out that any value contributed by
the land, which is truly “gratuitous” (an adjective that seems to be synonymous
with “unearned”) will be competed away: “Land as a means of production, in
so far as it is the work of God, produces utility, and this utility is gratuitous; it
is not within the owner’s power to charge for it. The land, as a means of pro-
duction, in so far as the landowner has prepared it, worked on it, enclosed it,
drained it, improved it, added other necessary implements to it, produces
value, which represents human services made available, and this is the only thing
he charges for. Either you must recognize the justice of this demand, or you
must reject your own principle of reciprocal services” (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 111;
emphasis in the original). Bastiat continues by arguing that the landowner
receives a return only for the improvements he has made.16
With regard to the claim that scarcity of resources or goods affords their
owners monopoly power, which is destructive of social welfare, Bastiat
acknowledges that nature’s scarcity enables the resource and good owners to
extract higher prices than otherwise. However, he dispenses with the argument
by drawing a distinction between “natural monopoly” (that which emanates
from nature) and “arti‹cial monopoly” (that which is contrived by ‹rms or
government). Bastiat notes that “the favors bestowed by Nature do no harm to
society. At the very most we could say that they bring to light an evil that
already existed and can in no way be imputed to them. It is too bad, perhaps,
that tokay wine is not as plentiful, and therefore not as cheap, as ordinary red
wine. But this is not a social evil; it was imposed on us by Nature,” to which he
adds, “Mankind would be childish indeed if it became upset, or if it rebelled,
because there is only one Jenny Lind, one Clos-Vougeot, or one Regent [tal-
ented people of Bastiat’s era]” (1850, fn. 13).
For Bastiat, what should be of major concern is when people impose an
arti‹cial scarcity on themselves through governmental grants of monopoly
privileges, which can only add to social and economic impoverishment, espe-
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cially as monopoly privileges are widely extended to industry groups.17 When
monopoly privileges become widespread, Bastiat saw a form of creeping social-
ism with ever more monopoly privileges, as well as other forms of government
largesse—“education, employment, credit, assistance, at the people’s ex-
pense”—provided to the “masses.” The “masses” understandably justi‹ed their
political press for government bene‹ts by all the other extant government-
based privileges and largesse. Although Bastiat never used the expression Pris-
oner’s Dilemma,18 he certainly saw that dilemma at work as the political
process helped one group after another, with the end result being a loss for
(practically) everyone: “But how the people, once they have won their battle,
can imagine that they too can enter as a body into the ranks of the privileged,
create monopolies for themselves and over themselves, extend abuses widely
enough to provide for their livelihood; how they can fail to see that there is
nobody below them to support these injustices, is one of the most amazing
phenomena of this or any age” (1850, chap. 12, ¶ 28).
Karl Marx (1818–83) had much to say, of course, about how capitalism
favored the capitalists over the workers, given that the capitalists got rich by
extracting a “surplus value” from the productive contributions of labor. How-
ever, according to Marx, Malthus’s dreadful population theory was much to
blame. People’s sexual proclivities would ensure a supply of labor that would
press worker wages toward, if not exactly to, subsistence levels, except for short
periods of time. Capitalists could take the differential between the market
value of what the workers produced and what they were paid. Marx had little
to say about monopoly per se.19 However, he shared Smith’s and Ricardo’s
complaint that many ‹rms were able to extract more than a competitive sur-
plus value because they were often protected from competition.
Manufacturing was constantly protected in the domestic market by protec-
tive tariffs, in colonial markets by monopolies, and in foreign markets, to
the maximum extent possible, by differential tariffs. The processing of
domestically produced materials (wool and linen in England, silk in
France) was favoured, the export of raw materials generated at home was
prohibited (wool in England) and the [processing] of imported materials
was either neglected or suppressed (cotton in England) . . . In general, man-
ufacturing could not dispense with protection, because the slightest change
occurring in other countries can cause it to lose markets and be ruined.
(1845, 162–63)
Elsewhere, Marx chided the political parties in England for not having an ade-
quate explanation for the “pauperism” of the masses. Each of the two dominant
parties, Whigs and Tories, considered the other party the cause, with the
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Whig Party pointing to the “large-scale ownership and the prohibitive legisla-
tion against the import of corn,” and the Tory Party claiming that the “entire
evil lies in liberalism, in competition, in a factory system that has been carried
too far,” points that allowed Marx to note that neither party understood that
the source of poverty lies in politics in general and that the solution lies in “the
reform of society” (1844, 100). In this regard, Marx shared with Bastiat a
healthy disrespect for the conduct of politics.
marshall on the “net revenues” of monopoly
Alfred Marshall (1842–1924) is widely recognized for having formalized much
of the economic theory of his time in his textbook, Principles of Economics, ‹rst
published in 1890. In that work, he introduced the concepts of supply and
demand curves, equilibrium, price-elasticity of demand, consumer surplus, and
producer surplus. Moreover, he made full use of marginal analysis (which dates
to the work of Stanley Jevons [1835–82], Leon Walras [1834–1910], and Carl
Menger [1840–1921], the three economists generally credited with explaining
prices with reference to marginal utility and, thus, founding the “marginal rev-
olution”). Marshall explored market adjustments under three periods: the
“market period,” the amount of time in which the amount of a good cannot be
varied; the “short period,” or the amount of time in which labor and other
inputs can be changed but capital cannot; and the “long period,” or the amount
of time in which all resources, capital included, can be varied.20
With respect to monopoly, Marshall accepted the general view that a
monopoly was any ‹rm able to “‹x an arti‹cial monopoly price; that is, a price
determined with little direct reference to cost of production, but chie›y by a
consideration of what the market will bear” (1890, bk. 5, chap. 1, ¶ 17). He
then set about describing in some detail, with the aid of graphs (relegated to
footnotes), how a monopolist, which disregards the interests of society, includ-
ing consumers, would choose its price-output combination in order to maxi-
mize “net revenues,” or monopoly pro‹ts, which he de‹ned to be revenues
minus all explicit and implicit costs, including risk cost, and “normal pro‹ts.”
This means that he de‹ned monopoly pro‹t in much the same way it is de‹ned
in contemporary economics.
Marshall also pointed out that the monopolist’s pro‹t-maximizing price
would be left unaffected by a change in the ‹rm’s ‹xed costs or by a tax applied
solely to “net revenues.”21 Of course, a change in variable costs or a tax applied
to total revenue (or the “amount produced”) or to book pro‹t (not “net rev-
enue”) would cause the monopolist to reduce its output and raise its price.22
Marshall recognized that the monopolist’s pricing could be tempered by a
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number of factors, not the least of which is that the monopolist might be duty-
bound to be concerned about the welfare of consumers.23 However, it might
also be concerned with how its pricing decision could affect the entry of com-
petitors, which led him to suggest an early, albeit brief, form of the more con-
temporary theory of “limit pricing,” that is, “of a monopoly limited by the con-
sideration that a very high price would bring rival producers into the ‹eld”
(1890, bk. 4, chap. 11, ¶ 16)—a theory of monopoly pricing brought back into
vogue among economists in the 1940s and 1950s by Joe Bain (1949, 1956) and
Franco Modigliani (1958) in the form of “entry forestalling prices.”24 How-
ever, Marshall also suggested that the monopolist might temper its current
price demands in order to develop its market and the future demand for its
product that would, at that time, allow the monopolist to charge a higher price.
But, in fact, even if he [the monopolist] does not concern himself with the
interests of the consumers, he is likely to re›ect that the demand for a thing
depends in a great measure on people’s familiarity with it; and that if he can
increase his sales by taking a price a little below that which would afford
him the maximum net revenue, the increased use of his commodity will
before long recoup him for his present loss. The lower the price of gas, the
more likely people are to have it laid on to their houses; and when once it
is there, they are likely to go on making some use of it, even though a rival,
such as electricity or mineral oil, may be competing closely with it. The
case is stronger when a railway company has a practical monopoly of the
transport of persons and goods to a sea-port, or to a suburban district
which is as yet but partly built over; the railway company may then ‹nd it
worth while, as a matter of business, to levy charges much below those
which would afford the maximum net revenue, in order to get merchants
into the habit of using the port, to encourage the inhabitants of the port to
develop their docks and warehouses; or to assist speculative builders in the
new suburb to build houses cheaply and to ‹ll them quickly with tenants,
thus giving to the suburb an air of early prosperity which goes far towards
insuring its permanent success. This sacri‹ce by a monopolist of part of his
present gains in order to develop future business differs in extent rather
than kind from the sacri‹ces which a young ‹rm commonly makes in order
to establish a connection. (1890, bk. 5, chap. 14, ¶ 20)
In making these observations about the interconnectedness of demand over
time, Marshall was anticipating more involved theories that came nearly a cen-
tury later and will be considered in following chapters in this volume: the the-
ories of experience goods (Nelson 1970), rational addition (Becker and Mur-
phy 1988), lagged demand (Lee and Kreutzer 1982), and network effects
(Arthur 1996). However, Marshall obviously failed to consider in his textbook
that consumers might anticipate how current pricing could affect the future
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monopoly power of the ‹rm achieved from lowering its current prices and,
therefore, how consumers’ current purchases might be tempered without some
assurance by the ‹rm that it would not act like a monopolist in the future.
Modern re‹nements on monopoly theory in the form of imperfectly com-
petitive or monopolistically competitive market structures developed by
Edward Chamberlin (1933) and Joan Robinson (1933) have not given rise to a
fundamentally different treatment of the way ‹rms facing a downward sloping
demand can curb production and give rise to a misallocation of resources. The
difference in the distortion is a matter of degree, not of kind. The principal dif-
ference is that imperfect monopolies cannot count on earning monopoly rents
in the long run. Still, such ‹rms have excess capacities. The issue of whether
the product variations spawned under imperfect monopoly market structures
compensate, or more than compensate, for the supposed resource misalloca-
tion is left as a question that economists cannot answer, and should not pretend
that they can (or so conventional, contemporary economic thinking holds).
schumpeter on the vital role of 
the “monopoloid specie”
When Joseph Schumpeter said that any economic system that is fully ef‹cient
at every point in time will likely be inferior to a system that is ef‹cient at no
point in time, he was dramatically parting ways with what had, through time,
developed into the conventional view of monopoly, or what he tagged as the
“monopoloid species”25 (1942, 106): Any level of monopoly (or any market
structure “less perfect” than perfect competition) should be the object of econ-
omists’ scorn (with the degree of scorn related to a ‹rm’s “monopoly power,”
or ability to hike prices above marginal cost). In Schumpeter’s view, “monop-
oly had become the father of almost all [market and societal] abuses—in fact it
became his [the economist’s] pet bogey” and had become “almost synonymous
with any large-scale business” (1942, 100). He noted that Adam Smith had
“frowned” on monopolies with “awful dignity” (1942, 100). By using perfect
competition as the standard of market ef‹ciency, or cost-based competitive
pricing, Schumpeter argued that “literally anyone is a monopolist that sells
anything not in every respect, and wrapping and location and service included,
exactly like what other people sell; every grocer, or every haberdasher, or every
seller of ‘Good Humor’ on a road that is not simply lined with sellers of the
same brand of ice cream” (1942, 99). To him, “pure competition” was no less
than a “hallowed ideal,” and its use by economists to divine policy positions
(especially relating to antitrust policy) was “futile” (1949, 358). Because of vir-
tually all economists’ myopic focus on perfect competition, Schumpeter con-
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cluded that an economist could be “a very good theorist and yet talk absolute
nonsense whenever confronted with the task of diagnosing a concrete histori-
cal pattern as a whole” (1942, 83, fn. 3). Edward Mason reports that Schum-
peter once con‹ded that “he [Schumpeter] was anxious to clear existing work
out of the way in order to undertake a study of the question whether anything
could be said about the ‘monopoly problem’ that was anything other than
‘sheer ideology’” (Mason 1951, 141), a study on which, by the time of Schum-
peter’s death, he had already drawn strong conclusions.26
Schumpeter reasoned that economists’ static models of markets—whether
competitive or monopoly—were directed narrowly toward explaining how
‹rms in markets “administer” existing known and available resources,
“whereas the relevant problem is how it [capitalism] creates and destroys
them” (1942, 84). In his “creative destruction” process of long-term economic
improvement, price competition or its absence, the focus of standard compet-
itive and monopoly models, is not inconsequential, but price competition obvi-
ously pales in comparison with the importance of actual competition, or the
threat of competition, from innovations, which can cover new products, new
technologies, and new types of organizational structures. Competition from
these sources strikes “not at the margins of the pro‹ts and the output of the
existing ‹rms but at their [the ‹rms’] foundations and their very lives” (1942,
84).27 According to Schumpeter, without including an analysis of this type of
nonprice competition, any discussion of markets, even though technically cor-
rect, is as empty as a performance of “Hamlet without the Danish prince”
(1942, 86).
Schumpeter’s “perennial gale of creative destruction” can easily, although
mistakenly, be viewed solely as a positive commentary on the role of ‹rms in
highly competitive market environments, not monopoly, under capitalism.
Schumpeter, however, saw the market process in more complex and complete
terms, which ultimately made monopoly a strategically important force for
social good in any dynamic, or would-be dynamic, economy. Firms that are
able to charge above-competitive prices might indeed earn, for a time, monop-
oly pro‹ts.28 However, if ‹rms could not hope to earn more than “normal
pro‹ts” (or the minimal return capital must have to stay in place), they might
not emerge with the same frequency that they do, because they would have
drastically impaired incentives to innovate (1942, 102).29 Besides, monopolies
“largely create what they exploit. Hence, the usual conclusion about their
in›uence on long-run output [that overall economic growth should be choked]
would be invalid even if they were genuine monopolies in the technical sense
of the term” (1942, 101).30
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Moreover, the monopoly pro‹ts “might still prove to be the easiest and
most effective way of collecting the means by which to ‹nance additional
investment [i.e., expansion]” (1942, 87), a line of argument that underlies the
granting of monopoly privileges through copyrights and patents.31 Surely,
Schumpeter also understood (as did Smith) that the prospects of monopoly
pro‹ts would make the ‹nancing of initial forays into markets all the easier and
cheaper. Just as surely, he understood that the probability of monopoly pro‹ts
over a range of entrepreneurial ventures—whether taken up in a single ‹rm or
across an array of entrepreneurial investments—could encourage the develop-
ment of investment portfolios, which can reduce investment risks and, thereby,
encourage investments and innovations.
In an important way, Schumpeter appears to be arguing that the instances
of monopoly, or market power, in a broader economy are an unheralded force
behind Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” Monopolies actually energize “creative
destruction.” In seeking to create monopolies and earn above-competitive
pro‹ts, new ‹rms are forever destroying existing monopolies. In the process,
these new entrants may, by accident or direct intention, be giving rise to new
and improved products, technologies, and organizational forms, or over time
the economy is able to grow faster because at each point in time, monopolies
are holding it back. Put another way, monopolies are a “necessary evil” (1942,
106).32 In drawing what many might see as a paradoxical conclusion, Schum-
peter suggests, “There is no more paradox in this [case for monopolies] than
there is in saying that motorcars are traveling faster than they otherwise would
because they are provided with brakes” (88; emphasis in the original).
But then, Schumpeter could rest comfortably in what he believed to be the
reality of market life: Monopolies were short-lived practically everywhere—at
least when unprotected by governments, precisely because of the “gale of cre-
ative destruction”: “The power to exploit at pleasure a given pattern of demand
. . . can under the condition of intact capitalism hardly persist for a period long
enough to matter for the analysis of total output, unless buttressed by public
authority” (1942, 99). In contrast to Smith and others, Schumpeter doubts that
even ‹rms protected by signi‹cant entry restrictions can long endure if they do
what monopolies are supposed to do, restrict their outputs to raise their prices
(99).33
Schumpeter concludes, “Perfectly free entry into a new ‹eld may make it
impossible to enter it at all. The introduction of new methods of production
and new commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect—and perfectly
prompt—competition from the start. And this means that the bulk of what we
call economic progress is incompatible with it” (1942, 104–5; emphasis in the
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original). That is to say, economic progress is compatible only with the 
existence of monopoly pro‹ts of some (unstated) degree. It follows that entry
barriers have social value, at least up to a point.
Why, then, is there so much talk about the “evils” of monopoly? Schum-
peter suggested that it is largely unrecognized demagoguery at work: “Econo-
mists, government agents, journalists, and politicians in this country obviously
love the word because it has come to be a term of opprobrium which is sure to
rouse the public hostility against any interest so labeled” (1942, 100). At the
same time, he clearly believed that monopolies’ ease of movement among mar-
kets and of arising in new markets, and thereby destroying others, would
inevitably cause large ‹rms with market power to be frequently subjected to
“vindictive harassment” by antitrust authorities (Mason 1951, 144).34
But then, Schumpeter was not the ‹rst to focus on the destructive side of
markets or the integral role monopolies play in that process, a point most
recently stressed by Michael Perelman (1995). David Wells (1828–89)—a
chemist by training but acclaimed as one of the more important economists of
the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Ferleger 1977), in spite of working
for the federal government as Special Commissioner of Revenue—saw compe-
tition pushing capitalism to the brink of self-destruction. The source of the
self-destructive competition was rapid technological advances, spawned princi-
pally by “great industrial enterprises,” pushing the economy relentlessly
toward excess capacity, overproduction, and de›ation (and the country’s price
index did fall by nearly half during the last third of the century). Wells saw an
integral connection between progress and the destruction of wealth, which he
characterized as an “economic law,” which has all the markings of Schum-
peter’s “perennial gale”: “All material progress is affected through the destruc-
tion of capital by invention and discovery, and the rapidity of such destruction
is the best indicator of the rapidity of progress” (1889, 146).35
For Schumpeter, monopolies were collectors of investment funds, which
made them a wellspring of new innovations that ultimately fuel the creative
destruction process, a part of which was the dethroning of existing monopo-
lies by new ones. Wells also saw monopolies as a wellspring of inventions and
discoveries. However, he also saw in them another source of social value, the
only potential check on overproduction: “There appears to be no other means
of avoiding such results than that the great producers come to an understand-
ing as to the prices they will ask; which, in turn naturally implies agreements
to the extent to which they will produce” (Wells 1889, 74), an advantage of
monopoly that Schumpeter speci‹cally rejected (1942, 106). Like Schum-
peter, Wells worried that antitrust laws would have the opposite effect of the
one intended. In Wells’s case, he feared that antitrust enforcement would
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ensure the continuation of self-destructiveness (through overproduction) of
supracompetitive markets (unless they were used to thwart trusts, such as
Standard Oil, that have used their ability to raise capital to drive up output and
drive down prices).36 Schumpeter, on the other hand, emphasized how the
indiscriminate pursuit of trust busting would undermine the innovative vital-
ity of the economy (1942, 91).
the schumpeter hypothesis
If Schumpeter had left his assessment of the relative merits of competitive and
monopoly markets totally conceptual, without concrete direction on the
nature of the testable facts, he would have certainly retained his honored status
within the annals of economic thought. However, just as surely, the genera-
tions of economists and policymakers who followed him would not have seen
Schumpeter’s thinking subjected to as much following econometric work, nor
cited as frequently. Over the past sixty-some years, econometricians have cre-
ated a nonconsequential competitive industry of their own as they have sought
to test the so-called Schumpeter hypothesis, which was best stated by Schum-
peter in this way: “As soon as we go into the details and inquire into the indi-
vidual items in which progress has been most conspicuous, the trail leads not
to the doors of those ‹rms that work under conditions of comparatively free
competition but precisely to the doors of the large concerns” (1942, 82).
The Schumpeter hypothesis has, of course, been reformulated by a series
of economists for their own research needs.37 Econometricians have also pro-
duced a sizable number of studies that have attempted to draw statistically val-
idated connections between various measures of, on the one hand, ‹rm size,
industry concentration, market power, or retained business earnings and, on
the other hand, various input measures of innovativeness of ‹rms (e.g., their
R&D expenditures) and output measures of their inventiveness (e.g., patents
awarded ‹rms). The statistical deductions drawn have been, unfortunately, all
over the econometric map, with some studies showing a growth in R&D
expenditures or patents awarded with growth in ‹rm size, and other studies
showing the opposite (Baumol 1990; Scherer 1965; Hamberg 1964; Horriwitz
1962; Jennings 1989; Jennings and Lumpkin 1995).38 Then, more studies have
shown an initial increase in input and output measures of the innovativeness
and inventiveness of ‹rms with growth in size, only to be followed by a
decline.39
Of course, the researchers have also found that the relationship between
‹rm size and measures of innovativeness and inventiveness differs by industry
(Worley 1961; Schmookler 1959; Mans‹eld 1963, 1964).40 However, econo-
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mists who have reviewed this literature have found the Schumpeter hypothesis
wanting at best. Moreover, Scherer (1970, 377) deduced from all the work
done through the late 1960s that “new entrants contribute a disproportionately
high share of all really revolutionary new industrial products and processes,”
although he had earlier cautioned that “perhaps a bevy of fact-mechanics can
still rescue the Schumpeterian engine from disgrace” (1965, 1122). In their
extensive review of the studies on the Schumpeter hypothesis through the early
1970s, Kamien and Schwartz concluded that “the evidence indicates that
research output intensity does tend to increase and then decrease with increas-
ing ‹rm size” (1975, 3).41
Link (1980) could have been one such “fact-mechanic,” given that he has
argued that the rate of return on ‹rms’ R&D expenditures is a far better test of
the Schumpeter hypothesis than, say, R&D expenditures and patents awarded.
After all, the payoff from innovative activity is of greater interest to owners
than the absolute real level of their expenditures or the count of patents (whose
worth can vary greatly). In his study of ‹rms in the chemical and allied prod-
ucts industry using 1975 data, Link found substantial economies of scale on
R&D expenditures, as measured by their rate of returns. Small ‹rms (those
with less than $300 million in sales) had a rate of return on their collective
R&D expenditures of 30 percent. Large ‹rms had a rate of return of 78 per-
cent, which should imply greater innovative activity among larger ‹rms—at
least in the chemical industry (and Link chose the chemical industry to study
because the industry’s R&D expenditures were affected only to a limited extent
by government funding).42
A number of empirical problems arise in testing the Schumpeter hypothe-
sis. For example, we can’t be con‹dent that measured variables—for example,
‹rm size measured by sales or industry concentration ratios—are reasonable
surrogates for the kind of market power Schumpeter had in mind. Moreover,
R&D expenditures are hardly the only use to which large ‹rms can put their
(monopoly) pro‹ts (Markham 1965; Fisher and Temin 1965; Cohen and Levin
1989). After all, Schumpeter stressed that innovation could come in the form
of changes in ‹rm organization or, for that matter, advertising campaigns. In
addition, it is not altogether clear whether the R&D expenditures were the
result or cause of ‹rm size and market dominance. Indeed, as Nelson and Win-
ter (1982) have argued, the market structure is endogenous to Schumpeterian
competition, suggesting that R&D expenditures and ‹rm size emerge
together.
Finally, the full impact of large ‹rms, or ‹rms with measures of monopoly
power, may be more indirect than researchers have imagined. With technol-
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ogy in product and process development progressing along so many avenues,
the top 100 or 500 largest ‹rms in an industry, or even the entire economy,
which are the focus of a number of econometric studies, can hardly be expected
to investigate all avenues of innovation. They must pick and choose their inno-
vation avenues (and their risks), often with an eye to how their R&D work will
complement their existing product line, leaving much for outsiders to do that
breaks with existing product lines.43 Top ‹rms’ own bureaucracies can hold
them back on the range and depth of their entrepreneurial activities. They can,
however, set themselves up as cherry pickers, that is, they can wait and see what
products emerge from much smaller and newer ‹rms and show signs of
becoming successful. They can then step in and buy up the successful smaller
‹rms, with the larger ‹rms using their well-established distribution systems to
make the newly developed products and processes more successful than they
otherwise would be. The existence of the large ‹rms, along with their willing-
ness and ability to pay supracompetitive prices (because of their market power)
for demonstrated successful innovations, can inspire much entrepreneurial
activity among smaller ‹rms—and, hence, can be viewed as an important force
for innovation among small ‹rms and new entrants.
Having said all of this, it is important to note that Schumpeter was careful
to stress that any assessments of the impact of the monopoly power of large
‹rms could be properly made only over a long stretch of time, covering
decades, at the very least, and perhaps a century or more. Even then, he was
careful to add addenda to his so-called hypothesis: (1) that “mere size is neither
necessary nor suf‹cient for the superiority of the monopoly ‹rm” (1942, 101)
and (2) that the critical dependent variable would be some variant of the over-
all “standard of living,” not some narrowly conceived measure of ‹rm size or
industry concentration.44
Researchers have done their studies, apparently assuming that Schumpeter
was ‹xated exclusively on ‹rm size. Although he often wrote about large ‹rms
in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, his principal concern throughout his
major book-length works was really the “character and quality” of entrepre-
neurship and leadership within ‹rms, large or small, as McNulty (1974) has
argued in some detail.45 Indeed, as Chamberlin (1951) argued early in the
debate, Schumpeter practically dismissed altogether economies of scale per se
as a source of ‹rm size (and therefore didn’t give much credence to the theory
of monopolistic competition). If there was any initial fall in long-run average
cost, the source was the lumpiness of plant and equipment, not any technical
advantage that ‹rms achieve from expanding all factors of production. In
Schumpeter’s world, ‹rms might appear to face decreasing long-run cost func-
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tions, which might appear to be the source of their size, but appearances can be
deceiving. The ongoing pace of innovation in production processes, which
lower ‹rms’ cost curves, is a key cause of lower costs with expanded size.46
concluding comments
Obviously, the word monopoly has been used in a variety of contexts through-
out the history of economic thought. The term has been used to describe (if
not denigrate) the inherent privileges of property owners, given that no one
else has access to the owners’ rights without dealing with the owner. Monopoly
has been used to characterize large business ‹rms (without regard to their mar-
ket shares), as well as ‹rms that are the dominant, if not the only, producers in
their markets. A key unifying feature of ‹rms tagged as monopolies has been
the ‹rms’ ability to signi‹cantly affect total market supply of their products,
enough at least for them to have some choice over their selling prices. This
choice gives them the capacity to seek maximum pro‹ts, within the constraints
of their cost and demand schedules. Of course, monopoly and cartel have been
used synonymously, because a cartel can supposedly do, once it has been orga-
nized, what a single (or dominant) producer can do with almost the same facil-
ity (which, as we will argue later, is not likely to be the case).
However, monopoly has also been used to describe ‹rms that have been able
to raise their prices, as well as production levels, because of imposed govern-
mental restrictions on competition, for example, through copyrights, patents,
tariffs, and quotas, or, for that matter, trade secrets, trademarks, and brands.
Such ‹rms are said to be monopolies because with the market protections, they
all can sell their goods above cost.
In the views of the economic masters covered in this chapter, except for
Schumpeter (and, to a lesser extent, Wells), one feature stands out: No matter
how the term has been used, monopoly has been viewed at best as a “necessary
evil,” as in the cases of land property rights, and at worst in other cases (with
few exceptions, such as in Smith’s argument that monopoly might be a useful
device for encouraging especially hazardous market ventures) as a drag on
consumer welfare, disposable income, and economic progress. At the same
time, all writers covered appear to be uni‹ed on an important point: Absent
government support, monopolies that endure for long are likely to be rare,
which implies that any damage done is not likely to persist, mainly because in
raising their prices above costs, monopolists inspire competitors to enter their
markets.
Schumpeter clearly agrees that monopolies that spring solely from market
strategies, unsupported by government protection, are likely to be relatively
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short-lived. Indeed, he suggests that the only market structure likely to be
rarer than perfect competition in the world outside economists’ classrooms is a
‹rm that persistently behaves like a monopoly, that is, restricts its sales to push
up its prices, and then survives.47 That claim allows Schumpeter to stress the
largely unheralded role of monopolies in fueling the “capitalist achievement,”
not so much price competition, in which consumer values remain constant, but
rather in promoting nonprice competition, in which the value of available
goods is constantly being upgraded, but with price competition ever-present,
albeit derivative factors that make innovations accessible to the masses.48 So
what if the monopolist doesn’t produce with the ef‹ciency of a perfectly com-
petitive market? That idealized standard is unachievable. Moreover, even if it
were achievable, any harm done by any monopoly’s restriction on output must
be juxtaposed with the gains from product and production process improve-
ments. Otherwise, reconciling the growth in human welfare in the latter part
of the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century (if not
beyond), a time when many companies were expanding rapidly and gaining
control over price, is dif‹cult, as Schumpeter stressed.49
Although much is to be gained from using perfect competition for evaluat-
ing price competition and from standard monopoly models, which help illus-
trate the standard negative assessment of monopoly that extends back to Smith
and forward to the prevailing sentiment among modern textbook writers, it is
the Schumpeterian view of monopoly that drives the development of this book
and, to the extent adopted, forces a change in the perception of policies related
to monopoly.50 Under the Smithian view of monopoly, all trade restrictions,
regulations, and private efforts to monopolize markets have a single policy
solution: Get rid of them.51
From the Schumpeterian perspective, however, the solution is not so easy.
Hidden in Schumpeter’s analysis is a theory of optimum monopoly required for
maximum economic growth.52 Such a theory necessarily implies that a “deli-
cate” (Schumpeter’s word) balance be struck not only in matters of antitrust
enforcement but also in all other government policies relating to market
restrictions and regulation, whether they spring from private or public
sources.53
We take up in this book a largely Schumpeterian view of monopoly—per-
haps more accurately dubbed and widely known as Schumpeterian competi-
tion—in part because his view has been lost on many economists and policy-
makers, especially in the antitrust area, as seen in monopoly presentations in
modern textbooks that we lay out in the following chapter. We also take up the
Schumpeterian perspective because Schumpeter was, in our view, actually
overly conservative in his criticisms of monopoly theory as it existed in his day,
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and as that theory has been brought forward with updates and extensions. A
critique of modern monopoly theory should include a reexamination of the
impact of the emergence of monopoly on the net inef‹ciency—and extent of
failure—in markets. This reexamination acknowledges that price changes, up
or down, affect the marginal value of the last unit buyers consume, but reex-
amination directly challenges the conventional microeconomic claim that
price changes have no effect on the schedule of consumers’ marginal values of
various units, a claim that necessarily implies that price changes do not affect
market demand.54 The adjustments we propose in basic monopoly theory have
been all the more relevant because of the emergence of many modern goods,
the value of which is founded on such considerations as networks, experience,
and trust.
Moreover, there has been a long-term decline in the marginal cost of pro-
duction in many industries relative to total cost. Today, a growing number of
goods can be reproduced at zero or close to zero marginal cost (as in the case
of electronic goods: e-books, e-music, e-movies, and so on). These cost factors
force a reconsideration of the social value of monopolies and their protective
entry barriers, as we will argue at practically every step in this book. This
means that our critique of monopoly theory stands on, but then moves beyond,
Schumpeter’s key insights.
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Chapter 2
Deadweight-Loss Monopoly
Contemporary economists’ classroom and textbook consider-
ations of monopoly are formal and precise, subject to exacting mathematical
speci‹cations. However, informal and legal discussions of monopoly among
economists and those who use monopoly theory (e.g., antitrust lawyers) are
typically no more precise than Adam Smith’s and David Ricardo’s views.
The word monopoly is used in various venues to refer to a single seller of a
product; a producer that has an overwhelming market share; a ‹rm that is just
large (perhaps with substantially less than half of market sales); or any ‹rm
with “market power” (meaning any ‹rm other than a “price taker”). All these
treatments of monopoly have one unifying feature, however: The monopolist
is capable of in›uencing market price by substantially affecting market supply
via its own production decisions.
The monopolist is seen to impose harm in two ways: It gives rise to a form
of market inadequacy or failure, and the monopolist extracts consumer surplus
for the bene‹t of its owners.
The widely touted inef‹ciency of monopoly is necessarily judged in almost
all settings, to one extent or another, explicitly or implicitly, by an independent
theoretical standard, perfect competition. Hence, we must start our critique of
monopoly theory by laying out this market standard by which monopoly is
evaluated and, often, condemned, with an eye toward theoretical corrections
and market insights. We will see that it is not at all dif‹cult to condemn any
real-world market, monopoly or otherwise, that necessarily emerges in an
imperfect world to solve pressing real-world problems, if the criterion is per-
fection. However, we will also press the case for a renewed appreciation for the
net gains to be had from the emergence and persistence of monopoly under
some real-world market conditions, in spite of any imagined inef‹ciency that
might remain, given the extreme standard for judgment.
We fully understand that both perfect competition and monopoly are the-
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oretical constructs, which are not intended to mirror real-world market condi-
tions. As economist Milton Friedman pointed out decades ago, the test of an
economist’s model is, or should be, the validity of the predictions, not the cor-
respondence of the model’s assumptions with real-world market conditions
(1953, 3–43). That said, the problem with the perfect competition/monopoly
dichotomy is the common assumption that any monopoly that exists is neces-
sarily a net drag on the economy. Thus, an improvement would necessarily be
forthcoming were an identi‹ed monopoly subjected to competition, or more
accurately more competition. Also, from the perspective of conventional treat-
ments of monopoly, no amount of collusion could conceivably result in a mar-
ket improvement. Likewise, all market entry and exit barriers give rise to a
form of market loss.
Our reassessment of monopoly goes to the heart of monopoly theory
because our central conclusion is that these tenets are all wrong, at least to one
degree or another. To see these points, we need to lay out how economists see
perfect competition and, therefore, assess monopoly. (Those readers steeped
in standard microeconomic theory can skip or quickly skim the following two
sections.)
the efficiency of perfect competition
The perfection of perfect competition is created through ‹ve notable market
characteristics: (1) numerous producers are in the market; (2) all producers
produce the same product, meaning all producers’ products are identical in all
regards; (3) the cost of entry into and exit from the market is zero; (4) the cost
of information about the prices and products, both current and future, is also
zero to both producers and consumers, which implies that everyone in the
market is perfectly informed; and (5) no costs and bene‹ts can be externalized
to parties not involved in the market transactions.1 The effect of these market
features is, not surprisingly, a market that operates with unblemished perfec-
tion—by de‹nition. Although we question the perfectly competitive model
later, all trades that are mutually bene‹cial to consumers and producers are
exploited. Producers are necessarily price takers. This means that the produc-
ers have no ability to charge more than the going market price and have no rea-
son to charge less, since they can sell all they can justify producing at the going
market price.2
All these results mean that the marginal value of the last unit sold to con-
sumers just equals the marginal cost of its production to producers, which also
just equals the market price. Hence, net welfare gains are maximized, meaning
that the consumer and producer surplus combined cannot be exceeded by any
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conceivable market restructuring or resource reallocation. The complicated
details of the ef‹ciency of perfect competition can be left to textbooks (e.g.,
Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005, chap. 8).
For our purposes, we can hold the discussion to the basic supply and
demand model (which is built on an assumption of an underlying perfectly
competitive market) as captured in ‹gure 2.1. The downward sloping curve,
the demand, captures how much all consumers are willing to buy from all pro-
ducers at all prices indicated on the vertical axis. The curve that is upward slop-
ing to the right, the supply, re›ects the horizontal summation of all ‹rms’ mar-
ginal cost curves, or how much the producers are willing to provide in the
aggregate at all prices indicated, again on the vertical axis. Because of the
extreme degree of competition, the price necessarily gravitates toward the
intersection of the two curves, or equilibrium.3
The producers are not able to hold the price above the intersection, given
all the other forms of perfection embedded in the perfectly competitive model
(that is, zero cost of movement in and out of the market and zero cost of infor-
mation). At the same time, producers would face prohibitively high transaction
costs in forming and maintaining a producer cartel intent on operating like a
uni‹ed monopoly, which is one way of restricting the aggregate market supply
for the purpose of raising their market price and the ‹rms’ individual and col-
lective pro‹ts.
Moreover, if by some odd chance a cartel were ever formed, it would
immediately dissolve as the producers cheated at zero cost on the cartel’s
restrictive production rules. In addition, zero cost of entry would ensure that
‹rms outside the market would enter to take unexploited pro‹table production
opportunities, which would leave the quantity of the good on the market at the
intersection (equilibrium) level, leaving the price at the intersection level. The
problems of making a cartel work are so overwhelming under perfect compe-
tition that no ‹rm would even contemplate forming one, which means the per-
fection of perfect competition would not be sullied by cartel costs.
If the price ever happened to be below the intersection, a market shortage
would emerge, resulting in competition among buyers, which would drive the
price up to, not just toward, the intersection price. If the price were not quite
up to the intersection level, some of the throngs of consumers, who would then
value additional units of the good more than the price charged, would demand
more and would, through competition, press the price to the intersection
price.
As was true of the producers, consumers would not be able to form a
buyer cartel, which in the consumers’ case would be intent on suppressing
their collective demand, holding the price below the intersection level. As
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true of producers, consumers would face prohibitive transaction costs in
organizing and maintaining the buyer cartel; the prospects of cartel cheating
would be rampant.
Interestingly, if transaction costs for forming supplier or buyer cartels were
zero, perfect competition would not necessarily be so perfect, in the terms that
economists hold dear. This is because collusion would be rampant on both
sides of the market, and the market outcome would be indeterminate. The
market outcome would then be a consequence of the bargaining skills of the
two cartelized sides of the market. In short, if bargaining costs are zero, “per-
fect competition,” to have this type of settled and determinate outcome,
requires this one consequential imperfection, nonzero transaction costs in the
formation of collusive efforts on either side of the market.4
Nonetheless, this extreme competitive process can be shown to maximize
market outcomes, following Gary Becker’s elegantly simple classroom peda-
gogy (1971, lecture 19). He starts by noting that all price-quantity combina-
tions on the demand curve in ‹gure 2.1 are acceptable to consumers, by
de‹nition. It follows that all price-quantity combinations below the demand
curve are acceptable to consumers. After all, consumers should be willing to
pay lower prices for any given quantity that is indicated by the price on their
demand curve.
Similarly, all price-quantity combinations on the supply curve are accept-
able to producers, by de‹nition. Hence, all price-quantity combinations above
the supply curve are acceptable to the producers. After all, if producers were
willing to accept a price for a given quantity that is on the supply curve, then
surely they would be willing to accept higher prices for the same quantity.
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Figure 2.1. Market efficiency
Notice that the price-quantity combinations within the triangular area
ABC are acceptable to both producers and consumers. Of all those combina-
tions, the one selected by the intense competition of perfect competition is the
one furthest right, Qe. This means that perfect competition maximizes output,
given the consumer value and producer cost constraints underlying the supply
and demand curves.
Moreover, notice that for every unit produced and sold up to Qe, the point
on the demand curve for that quantity, which indicates the unit’s marginal
value, is above the point for the same quantity on the supply curve, which indi-
cates that unit’s marginal cost. Put another way, for each unit of the good up to
the intersection quantity Qe, the marginal value of the unit exceeds its marginal
cost, with the difference being the gain to be had from trade, that is, from pro-
ducing and selling that unit.
Since the marginal cost of each unit indicates the value of what could have
been done with the resources used to produce the unit, this gap between points
on the supply and demand curves indicates the added value from using the
resources in the production of this good over the value that could have been
realized from using the resources in the production of some other good (the
next best alternative). The triangular area ABC is the maximum aggregate gain
to be obtained from production and trade of this good. That triangular area is
the net welfare gain—surplus value—from having an unobstructed, perfectly
competitive market.5
If production were (for purposes of argument) to fall below the intersection
level, then mutually bene‹cial trades would be left unexploited. A part of the
triangular area ABC would be lost. More precisely, ABC would not be fully
realized. For example, if output was restricted to Q1, the welfare gain from
trades would be limited to the trapezoid ABDE, meaning that the triangular
area EDC would be unrealized. This smaller triangular area EDC is the
inef‹ciency or the deadweight loss of producing at Q1.
6
In a similar manner, if the production were above the intersection/equilib-
rium quantity, say Qn, the net welfare gain from all trades would be undercut.
The ABC triangular area would be realized, but this gain would be offset by
another triangular area on the other side of the intersection output level, CFG,
which would capture the extent to which the marginal cost of producing the
units beyond Qe exceeded the consumers’ assessed value of the goods. This
means that something more valuable could have been produced by the
resources used to produce any units beyond the intersection level.
All in all, perfect competition leads to the market price being as low as it can
be (given the constraint of marginal cost), resources being perfectly allocated
(given what consumers value), and ‹rms’ realizing zero economic pro‹ts (as dis-
tinct from normal pro‹ts, or the minimum return on capital for the owners) at
Deadweight-Loss Monopoly 29
all times. If economic pro‹ts were positive, then ‹rms outside the market
would move in the market at, of course, zero entry costs. Outside ‹rms would
have no justi‹cation to stay out of the market. Accordingly, the market supply
would expand as ‹rms moved in, the market price would fall, and the economic
pro‹ts would evaporate. Maximum ef‹ciency would once again be the out-
come.
the inefficiency of monopoly
Microeconomic textbook authors always follow their presentations of perfect
competition with discussions of the polar opposite market structure: pure
monopoly. The pedagogical purpose of using pure is to simplify the analysis,
sharpen the contrast, and crystallize the meaning of a key attribute of a pro‹t-
maximizing monopoly, the market structure’s inef‹ciency.7
A pure monopoly is a market that is served exclusively by a single producer
whose market position is protected by barriers to entry that are prohibitively
costly to surmount for would-be competitors. The pure monopolist, unlike the
perfect competitor, faces the downward-sloping market demand curve for its
product, meaning it can choose any price combination along the demand
curve. If its intent is to maximize pro‹ts, it will necessarily weigh off the mar-
ginal (or additional) revenue of each unit with the marginal (or additional) cost
of producing each unit to determine its output level. After all, if the marginal
revenue of any unit is greater than its marginal cost, ‹rm pro‹ts can be raised
by producing the unit. Production should expand as long as that is the case, or
up until the marginal revenue of the last unit equals the marginal cost of the
last unit. Production beyond equality of marginal cost and revenue will mean
that pro‹ts decline, since marginal revenue on all additional units will then be
below the units’ marginal cost of production.8
If the pure monopoly is able to make a pro‹t (by which we mean, strictly
speaking, economic pro‹t, or that part of book pro‹t above normal pro‹t),9 it
does not have to worry about its market ever being eroded by the entry of com-
petitors. Other producers can’t get in the pure monopolist’s market, which is
to say that the entry costs are prohibitive. Technically, this means only that the
costs of entry exceed the present discounted value of the future stream of
monopoly pro‹ts that entering ‹rms could possibly garner.
To see all these points and others, let’s simplify the monopoly model as
much as possible. First, we consider only the monopolist’s position in the long
run (meaning it has worked its way through the nontrivial problem of optimiz-
ing its scale and scope of production), an assumption that allows us to count all
costs as variable. Second, we assume for simplicity’s sake that the marginal cost
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of producing each unit is positive and constant (the same for every unit). This
means that average cost equals marginal cost at all output levels. We can make
these simplifying assumptions because they do not disturb the central points
we wish to make, and which are often made in conventional textbook discus-
sions of monopoly.
These assumptions are embedded in the curves in ‹gure 2.2. The monop-
olist’s demand curve takes on its normal downward slope in ‹gure 2.2. The
monopolist’s marginal revenue curve is, thus, downward sloping and inside the
demand curve. That is to say that marginal revenue is below the price at every
output level.10 The assumption of constant cost is re›ected in the horizontal
curve, tagged as MC = AC, to signal the equality between marginal and average
cost.
The central question the monopolist faces is, what price-quantity combi-
nation on its demand curve will maximize pro‹ts? It can answer the question
by weighing off the marginal cost of production against its marginal revenue,
or by comparing points on the MC and MR curves in ‹gure 2.2. As long as the
points on the MR curve are above the points on the MC curve, the monopo-
list’s pro‹ts rise by extending production. That is, the monopolist should
extend production up to Qm for maximum pro‹ts. Beyond Qm, pro‹ts fall,
because MC is then above MR.
The monopolist’s economic pro‹ts are equal to the area bounded by
PcPmXZ. Its total revenue is Pm × Qm, or rectangular area 0PmXQm. Its total cost
is AC × Qm, or the area bounded by 0PcZQm. The economic pro‹t is, of course,
total revenue minus total cost, or the difference between those two identi‹ed
areas.
The inef‹ciency of the monopolist’s restricted output level can be repre-
sented by the shaded triangular area XYZ. This inef‹ciency occurs because
perfect competition would lead (according to conventional treatment of per-
fect competition) to a production level of Qc at a price of Pc. As we saw earlier,
a perfectly competitive market would yield a production level at the intersec-
tion of supply and demand, or the industry’s marginal cost curve and the
demand. This area of inef‹ciency attributable to production at Qm is the dif-
ference between the total additional value and total additional cost of the units
produced under perfect competition and not produced by the monopolist, or
Qc – Qm. The area of total value of these (Qc – Qm) units is bounded by QmXYQc.
The area of total cost of these units is bounded by QmZYQc. The difference
between those two areas is the inef‹ciency XYZ.
Consumers lose consumer surplus equal to the area bounded by PcPmXY, of
which PcPmXZ is shifted to the monopolist in the form of pro‹ts. The differ-
ence between those two areas is, again, the inef‹ciency, also dubbed dead-
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weight loss of monopoly. This deadweight loss is the net amount of value lost
because of a monopoly-induced underproduction of the good—and, hence, a
misallocation of resources.
When the monopolist doesn’t produce Qc – Qm units, resources are released
to be employed elsewhere. The problem of resource misallocation—sometimes
characterized as the market failure of monopoly—occurs because the value of
the resources released to their next best line of production is less than their
value in the production of the monopolist’s good. In short, the monopoly
problem has universally been characterized as one of too little of the monopo-
lized good. It could just as easily be characterized as one of too much of goods
produced elsewhere in other competitive markets.
This basic monopoly model is extended with a number of re‹nements for
real-world, less than fully competitive markets in a number of ways. Firms can
have more or less monopoly power. It all depends on the count of competitors,
the extent to which goods in a market are substitutes, and the cost of entry.
The greater the count of competitors and the closer the substitutes, the greater
the elasticity of demand (beyond some point) of any monopolist (or any ‹rm
with market power), the lower the pro‹tability of the monopolist, and the
lower the inef‹ciency caused by the monopolist.11 The lower the entry costs,
the lower the so-called limit prices (or market-forestalling prices) the monop-
olist can charge without attracting competitors (Bain 1956). Such adjustments
in theory, however, only affect the extent of the damage done by monopoly;
they do not, in any way, suggest that monopoly could conceivably be a positive
(or neutral) force for growth in human welfare.
Under monopolistic competition (a market structure in which there may be a
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Figure 2.2. Monopoly model basics
number, but not numerous, other ‹rms in the market, which can be selling an
identical or differentiated product), each ‹rm with monopoly power can still
charge a monopoly price, but only in the sense of the price being above mar-
ginal cost, by restricting sales. However, the ‹rm may not be able to make an
economic pro‹t or produce at its long-term minimum average cost.12 Under
oligopoly (a market structure that may contain only a handful of competitors, so
few in fact that competitors’ pricing and output decisions are said to be inter-
dependent), outcomes are necessarily somewhat indeterminate, mainly
because the oligopolists must react sequentially to each other’s unspeci‹ed but
evolving strategies.13
Of course, monopoly theory lends itself to an analysis of cartels, or collu-
sive efforts of would-be competitors to act as if they were a monopoly. Indeed,
the basic cartel theory holds that competitors, as long as they are few in num-
ber, can act exactly like monopolists with no change in the cost curve. That is
to say, competitors who collectively have cost curves equal to the MC = AC
curve in ‹gure 2.2 can cartelize their market to reduce market output from Qc
to Qm. With the cost curves held in place with cartelization, the underlying
presumption is that the restricted output can be achieved without any shift in
incentives within the industry to conserve and ef‹ciently allocate ‹rm
resources, a theoretical treatment that is surely subject to challenge (and we
undertake such a challenge in the next chapter) because of the problems cartels
have in controlling cheating among cartel members on cartel production and
sales quotas. The conventional presumption is that the greater the number of
colluders and the lower the entry barriers, the more dif‹culty cartels have in
hanging together and achieving monopoly market outcomes.
Still, under all less-than-pure-monopoly markets, the key attribute of the
pure monopolist model—that the ‹rm (or ‹rms) with monopoly or market
power kills off some consumer surplus at the same time that it transfers con-
sumer surplus to itself—almost always is said to hold. Only the extent of dam-
age done varies across less-than-pure market models. By the construction of
the model, consumers do not attribute any additional value whatsoever from
price increases, which means that market entry barriers that can inspire higher
prices can mean only two things, some market inef‹ciency and loss by con-
sumers of their surplus value. If for some reason, a monopoly ‹rm decides not
to maximize pro‹ts, the market price of a ‹rm’s stock will be suppressed below
what it could be, meaning the monopoly ‹rm is subject to takeover by
investors willing to do what is necessary to maximize monopoly price and the
‹rm’s stock price.
Understandably, people who use the monopoly models see the potential
for monopoly-induced market inef‹ciency whenever self-evident barriers to
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entry exist. These might come in the form of government regulations, but they
can also come in the form of privately developed entry barriers such as may (or
may not) be the case with scale economies, or just market dominances, ‹rst-
mover advantages, frequent buyer (or ›yer) programs, branding, and long-
term contracts—because all such devices increase the entry costs for would-be
competitors and reduce the elasticity of demand by increasing the switching
costs of consumers. Needless to say, building on Schumpeter (1942) and
McGee (1971) at various points in this book, we intend to challenge the valid-
ity of the underlying arguments, stressing again and again that such privately
erected entry barriers could be a boon to the development of markets—and
long-term growth in human welfare.
Of course, economists have introduced a couple of caveats that under some
market circumstances, monopoly has the potential for being welfare enhanc-
ing. If an industry is beset with external costs (pollution, for example), the
restricted output of monopoly can be welfare enhancing, on balance. The
monopoly restriction on output can curb the overproduction that results from
negative externalities. More generally, while a monopoly in the production of
a “good” can be construed as “bad” (welfare destroying), a monopoly in the
production of a “bad” (e.g., a criminal good, such as heroin), can be viewed as
good. As Buchanan has argued (1973), there is a defense of the Ma‹a to be
made from monopoly theory, since the monopoly can restrict production of
criminalized goods (thus aiding and abetting the work of the police).14
the locus of market failure: firms?
If all (or virtually all) markets in an economy suffer from various degrees of
competitive imperfections, realized in all ‹rms facing downward sloping
demand curves, we must wonder, from the perspective of economists’ treat-
ment of monopoly in their models, how it is that an economy can progress over
time. The simple point is that, given the limitations of the monopoly model, an
economy can’t advance because of any mechanism for the creation of new and
improved goods and services. The goods and services are, again, given.
The so-called monopoly problem, captured by the deadweight-loss or
Harberger triangle (named after economist Arnold Harberger), is almost
everywhere considered to be a serious, consequential problem—elevated to a
market failure—caused solely by the monopoly (Harberger 1954). This is the
case because there is no chance for the market inef‹ciency to be juxtaposed
against any other social good (e.g., goods creation and enhancement) that the
monopoly might provide apart from the pricing decision it makes in econo-
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mists’ monopoly model.
Perhaps this view is justi‹ed when the monopolist, as an unmitigated
source of economic harm that is assumed into existence, has actually erected
and maintained the barriers to entry, whatever those barriers might be.15
Indeed, if monopoly is founded on the entry barriers, and the entry barriers are
costly to erect (and have no value to consumers, an assumption to be critically
evaluated later in the book), the triangular area XYZ in ‹gure 2.2 clearly
understates the inef‹ciency of monopoly, because it doesn’t account for the
cost of constructing entry barriers. That is, XYZ doesn’t include the value of
resources diverted from producing valued goods to erecting and maintaining
entry barriers.
However, if the entry barriers are just there, or have their source in nature
and are not the product of the monopolist’s efforts, then it might be said that no
inef‹ciency exists (as Bastiat recognized more than a century ago). This is
because entry barriers invariably translate into costs. Seen from this perspective,
the problem is not a consequence of what the monopolist does—that is, restrict
sales—but rather is a consequence of nature. By this we mean simply that entry
costs for outside ‹rms are higher than the expected gains from market entry.
When deals between buyers and sellers are not made because the sellers’
resource costs are higher than what the buyers are willing to pay, economists
never suggest that the absence of the trades is a mark of the inef‹ciency, or fail-
ure, of the market. Indeed, the conclusion generally drawn is that inef‹ciency
would result if the trades were ever actually consummated. This inef‹ciency
occurs because the goods that would then be traded would be worth less than
the goods that could have been produced with the resources devoted to sur-
mounting entry barriers.
Such a monopoly problem has no conceivable solution, short of having
government insist that ‹rms in such market settings not pro‹t-maximize or
that the ‹rms’ prices and/or output levels be regulated, which can be no solu-
tion at all. As economists have long argued, the imposed regulations have their
own costs both in terms of government’s monitoring the regulated ‹rm and in
terms of abating entrepreneurial incentives to ‹nd and create such pro‹table
opportunities (Stigler 1975).
So, we have here our ‹rst problem with conventional monopoly theory: In
the case of natural (as distinct from created) barriers to entry, the theory leads
inextricably to a form of “inef‹ciency” that is inappropriately labeled as such.
It would be inef‹cient if outsiders incurred the costs of entry, expanded mar-
ket supply, and pushed the price down to the (imagined) competitive level that
cannot and should not exist (if the ultimate goal of the economy is that which
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is at the foundation of monopoly theory, to rationally allocate resources only
to the point where the gains from the allocation are greater than the costs, with
both gains and costs all-inclusive). In a sense, monopoly theory can be said to
be founded on wishful thinking, or a pretense that entry costs either are not
real or are irrelevant.
Some products spring into existence with fully formed entry barriers that
are in the minds of many (if not all) consumers who associate the product with
its creator. Picasso paintings are valued for their intrinsic worth as art, but they
carry at least some value in the minds of consumers because they were done by
Picasso, who had exclusive control of how many paintings were available. The
treatment of monopoly in economic literature is tantamount to condemning
Picasso for not supplying more paintings even though he had a long and
proli‹c career. Why? No one other than Picasso could satisfy consumer
demand for Picasso paintings. It is hard for us to imagine even economists
drawing such a deduction, that Picasso was a negative force in the art world, on
balance, because he refused to work as long and hard as the competitive equi-
librium would dictate he should to maximize his buyers’ welfare. Nevertheless,
branding is seen as a source of monopoly inef‹ciency. Apple’s iPod can be
thought of as a source of inef‹ciency because a sizable majority (over 75 per-
cent at this writing) of consumers want iPods and do not view alternative MP3
and MP4 players as a perfect substitute, a truly strange deduction for any the-
ory founded on the value assessments of individual consumers for model build-
ing. In this regard, the inef‹ciency of at least some monopolies amounts to a
contention that consumer values are not what they should be, a truly remark-
able position for economists who insist that their analysis is positive and who
object to theorists imposing their own evaluations on their model building.
the locus of market failure: consumers?
The source of the monopoly problem could also be laid on consumers. They
could, in a manner of speaking, collectively bribe the monopolist to extend its
production beyond Qm, say, all the way to Qc in ‹gure 2.2. Consumers would
merely have to pay the monopolist more than the monopolist incurs in cost for
the additional units (which for Qc – Qm units equals, as noted before, QmZYQc ).
Consumers certainly value additional units more than those units cost the
monopolist (or else there would be no deadweight loss). Conceptually speak-
ing, consumers should be willing to pay for Qc – Qm units as much as the area
under the demand curve, or the area QmXYQc. The reason they don’t buy off
the monopolist is the presumed transaction cost of their getting together to
strike a deal and to collect apportioned payments from all consumers. The
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likely free riding among consumers on such a deal would make such a cartel-
like consumer buyoff prohibitively expensive on many goods. By prohibitively
expensive we mean only that the transaction costs would exceed the triangular
area XYZ, which makes such a deal a nonstarter.16
Seen from this perspective, the monopolist’s curb in production results in
what we see as nothing more than an imagined inef‹ciency, which is imaginary
because the triangular area does not account for the full costs of consumers
moving the monopoly from Qm to Qc. Granted, if consumers could get
together to buy off the monopolist, and have more produced, all without cost,
or very little cost, then the world would be a better place. However, such a
claim is no less ›awed than a claim that the world would be better fed if bak-
ers didn’t have to incur the cost of their ›our. Transaction costs are no less
real, or no less a market constraint, than the costs captured in the MC cost
curves of either ‹gure 2.1 or 2.2. Transaction costs must be accommodated in
any complete assessment of market ef‹ciency or lack thereof. In short, econo-
mists can claim that monopolies are everywhere inef‹cient only because key
costs are ignored.
Of course, if we assume away transaction costs to enable consumers to buy
off the monopolist, then consumers have no reason to stop with bargaining for
the Qc – Qm on some mutually bene‹cial terms. They should be expected to
bargain for the lower, competitive price on all Qc units, which means the
monopolist would lose its pricing power. In such a world, monopoly would
cease to be a problem.
If we assume zero transaction costs for consumers, then we would have to
assume, for consistency’s sake, that the monopolist had no transaction costs (or
encountered far fewer such costs than it does). However, that would surely
mean that ‹gure 2.2 grossly overstates the monopolist’s production costs, since
so much of production is caught up in dealing with and minimizing transaction
costs. The outcome that must then be imagined could easily be better than
perfect competition, as captured in ‹gure 2.2. By such a comparative standard,
perfect competition, as normally constructed on the assumption of positive
transaction costs, could easily be seen as inferior (implying a deadweight loss)
when compared to a monopolized market with transaction costs assumed away.
the added waste of rent seeking
Granted, monopolies can be created by governments through the erection of
arti‹cial entry barriers at the behest of the would-be monopolies, in which case
the inef‹ciency of the created monopolies can have real meaning. The govern-
ment would then be preventing mutually bene‹cial trades, those for which the
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all-inclusive costs (as assessed by would-be producers of the additional units)
would be less than the all-inclusive bene‹ts (as assessed by would-be con-
sumers).
But such market restrictions are not what is at stake when monopoly the-
ory is developed in textbooks and on blackboards and when that theory is
developed for policy purposes, such as antitrust policy and enforcement (Sulli-
van and Harrison 1988; Hovenkamp 1985). In those textbooks and blackboard
venues, the monopoly is typically discussed as already existing, protected by
barriers to entry that often have unspeci‹ed sources. The monopoly exists as if
by magic. Granted, sometimes textbook treatments note that the monopoly
may have been created by the establishment of entry barriers, for example, by
government through an exclusive franchise, patent, or copyright. Another
acknowledged possibility is a ‹rm’s growth, through mergers, to market dom-
ination or monopoly because of economies of scale and scope or by the ‹rm’s
cornering of some critical resource that it doesn’t make available to other
‹rms. Clearly, such entry barriers can exist and give a ‹rm monopoly power,
or the ability to price above marginal cost.
The problem with such lines of argument is twofold.
• First, the presumption is that the ‹rm that acquires the monopoly pow-
ers does so at no cost. That is to say, the cost curves and demand curve
in ‹gure 2.2 do not shift as a consequence of a movement from a com-
petitive to a monopoly market structure. Hence, the monopoly pro‹ts
remain equal to PcPmXZ. That cannot be the case, as we stress in this
chapter and in the following chapter. 
• Second, the presumption is that any ‹rm that acquires its monopoly
power always imposes a net loss on the world equal to the deadweight-
loss triangle. The point made toward the end of the last section is that
private monopolies—for example, those that emerge because some new
product is developed—give rise to the deadweight loss because they are
protected by barriers to entry that can be nothing more than a superior
product that no one has yet been able to duplicate. In such cases, the sup-
posed inef‹ciency of monopoly is blown all out of proportion. Indeed,
without more attention to the supposed barriers (and we give entry bar-
riers more attention in a later chapter), we have good reason to believe
that the “natural” emergence of some monopolies under some condi-
tions gives rise to welfare gains, in spite of any deadweight loss that
might be identi‹ed on a graph that doesn’t properly and fully account for
all costs and bene‹ts.
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Now, when monopolies are the product or consequence of rent seeking,
what amounts to competitive efforts of ‹rms to acquire monopoly privileges
through government, the actual inef‹ciency of monopoly, typically identi‹ed
as triangle XYZ in ‹gure 2.2, is understated. This is because the rent seekers
will employ real resources in political lobbying, and in other ways, to acquire
the monopoly privileges, as Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), and others
(Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock 1980) have made clear. Indeed, if the
monopoly pro‹ts of a government-created monopoly are equal to the area 
PcPmXZ in ‹gure 2.2, rent seekers should be expected to expend in their com-
petitive rent-seeking efforts that amount discounted for the time lag and by the
probability that the monopoly rents will actually be realized. The competitive
rent-seeking process can result in competitors for the monopoly privileges
escalating their bids for the monopoly privileges, the net result of which is that
the resources expended can equal (if not exceed) the actual monopoly pro‹ts.17
Of course, this means that the total drag of monopolies on the economy is
a function of just how open government is to conferring monopoly privileges.
The more open government is to extending monopoly privileges, the greater
the deadweight loss from restricted production and from rent seeking. The
welfare loss, it needs to be stressed, is then a product of government failure,
not market failure.
This could also mean that the total drag of monopoly on the economy is a
function of how effective the government is in responding to any and all inter-
est groups; by way of devising policies to redistribute income to, say, poor
people, it can open itself to exploitation to monopoly interest groups that can
shroud their claims for monopoly privileges in the pursuit of some greater
public good. From this perspective, the drag of monopoly on the economy
from contrived government entry barriers can be viewed as an unavoidable
cost of government pursuing the broader good under imperfect democratic
institutions, a line of argument we have explored in an earlier work (Lee and
McKenzie 1987).
the imperfection of perfection
In his presidential talk to the Southern Economics Association, James
Buchanan began by quoting a passing comment that Lord Acton made in one
of his many letters to Mary Gladstone, daughter of the famous British prime
minister: “It is not the popular movement, but the traveling of the minds of
men who sit in the seat of Adam Smith that is really serious and worthy of all
attention” (1964, 213). Buchanan’s intention was to use the Acton comment
to launch a critique of economic thinking that has relevance to our reassess-
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ment of monopoly theory. Buchanan noted how Lionel Robbins, through his
highly successful 1930s book An Essay on the Nature and Signi‹cance of Economic
Science (1946), converted economists to think of their discipline as a science
that deals with the problem of the allocation of scarce resources that have
competing uses. Thus, the discipline deals with the “science of choice,”
according to Robbins.18
Buchanan has several problems with characterizing economics the way
Robbins’s followers (not so much Robbins himself ) have, not the least of which
is that the person or entity doing the allocating is often not made clear. More-
over, the criteria for assessing any given allocation are uncertain. If the crite-
rion is society’s wants, then we run headlong into an old conundrum of econ-
omists, that of de‹ning and computing a social welfare function. If we use
individuals’ valuations of goods, then the problem of assessing any allocation of
resources doesn’t go away because individuals’ wants are not given to anyone.
Moreover, people’s wants often emerge in the process of their determining
what resources are available, how the available resources can be used, and what
(eventually) will be produced. Adam Smith’s key insight is especially important
at this juncture because, as Buchanan noted, Smith suggested that what an
economy accomplishes “is not originally the effect of any human wisdom,
which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion”
(1776, bk. 1, chap. 2, ¶ 1), a point familiar to students of Frederick Hayek’s
work (1945). Do we judge the allocation of resources by the standards of what
people can’t originally imagine? By the standards of that which emerges?
Compared to what?
Economists—“men who sit in the seat of Adam Smith”—have developed
ef‹ciency as the standard for assessing market systems. However, the standard
set forth is not just any kind or level of ef‹ciency. It is that level of ef‹ciency
that emerges from the allocation of resources when it is assumed that people
know from the start what they want, what resources are available, and how to
use the resources in the best possible ways. All they have to do, within the Rob-
bins construction of the discipline, is choose how to move the available known
resources to the production of goods and services that satisfy extant wants. But
this construction of the discipline is contradictory, as Buchanan has insisted.
No real choice is involved in such an allocative scheme. Everything is already
determined going into the so-called choices, which means the end allocation is
predetermined by the conditions set beforehand for the allocation.19 In fact,
everything is settled instantaneously, as if by mathematical computation, or by
the static nature of the analysis. But meaningful real-world choices are carried
out in real time, and require time.
No possibility exists that the outcome of the allocative system could ever be
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“not originally the effects of any human wisdom,” that is, could be better (or
more ef‹cient) than what people could imagine before the allocative process
commences. There certainly is no “free lunch,” as virtually all economists
always insist is the case in real life. However, when economists repeat that
familiar refrain, they are hardly doing so from the vantage point of the chair
that Smith used, for his whole book was about the “free lunch” of markets, or,
rather, the “general opulence” that no one can foresee from the way markets
actually do operate, as distinct from the way economists have come to describe
them. The free lunch is in the palm of Smith’s “invisible hand,” but that lunch
is no less invisible, beforehand, than the palm of the hand itself.
Buchanan suggests that economists should discard Robbins’s characteriza-
tion of the discipline as hopelessly ›awed. He makes a case for those who sit in
Smith’s chair to take up the more interesting problem of catallactics, or the
process by which people try to solve their mutual problems through economic
and political systems of exchanges.20
We don’t wish to sidetrack our discussion by becoming embroiled in a
debate over what economists should do. We simply note that it is certainly
venturesome of economists to judge the ef‹ciency, or lack thereof, of monop-
oly by the standard of perfect competition. Certainly, perfect competition is
ef‹cient, perfectly so—or so economists like to think. The model is not
intended to describe the real world. Indeed, it is intended to describe a world
that cannot exist, because it is founded on a degree of perfection—totally
unblemished, even by one missed trade—that can exist only in the minds of
economists or their mathematical models. Why? Very simply because the
model itself grew out of a system of thought that starts with all-pervasive
scarcity. In such a world, no one would want any market to be perfect any more
than they would want any product to be perfect in all evaluative dimensions.
Such a perfect product would cost too much, meaning other, more valuable
things could be done with the resources devoted to achieving perfection in any
given market, if perfection were not assumed.
Then again, economists who tout the importance of cost in restricting
behavior on every dimension have no problem assuming away entry and exit
costs or costs of information for purposes of setting up a standard by which
real-world monopolies would be judged. If any costs were involved in moving
the real-world markets to match the dictates of perfect competition, they no
doubt would stop short of going that far (and incurring as many costs as would
be required) to achieve perfect competition. That is to say, they would at some
point have to agree that some degree of imperfection—some degree of
monopoly—in markets is to be preferred to perfect competition. In those
terms, perfection can’t spring from scarcity. This necessarily implies that per-
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fect competition is not perfect, meaning it must be suboptimal to most real-
world markets.
Put differently, perfect competition as a market structure would, if ever
realized, be defective, assuming any rising costs at all to the achievement of a
perfect state of a market. Perfect competition is very likely more defective than
a state of real-world markets in which price is above marginal cost and in which
deadweight-loss triangles arise, as conceived by economists in their textbooks
and on their blackboards. The achievement of perfect ›uidity in any given
market would very likely restrict the array of markets in any given economy.21
It is all too easy to deduce that we are proposing the trashing of supply-
and-demand-curve analysis, because the analysis is based on an underlying
assumption of perfect competition. That is not the case. We readily admit the
usefulness of such curves to illustrate central price and output tendencies of
many real-world markets. We also agree that they can be used to discuss direc-
tional changes in market price and quantity, given exogenous changes in mar-
ket conditions (e.g., a change in production costs or the imposition of an excise
tax). We are, however, highlighting the dif‹culties encountered when econo-
mists begin to use the underlying perfectly competitive model to evaluate less
than perfect markets in terms of perfect ef‹ciency, when that construct has no
real-world counterpart. The damage done is doubled when economists pro-
pose corrective actions, such as making markets more competitive, when in
fact the competitiveness of the imperfect real-world markets may be, as the
saying goes, “as good as it gets.”
zero economic profits
A presumption of perfect competition is that a market state in which ‹rms
everywhere and at all times earn zero economic pro‹ts is the best of all possi-
ble worlds. Why? Because if ef‹ciency is maximized, then surely that means
that the limited available resources are used to the greatest possible extent.
Hence, monopoly can be condemned because of inef‹ciency and because of
the presumably unnecessary transfer of consumer surplus from where it
belongs—with the consumers—to the monopolist. At the very least, the con-
sumer surplus transfer has no consequence other than, perhaps, its harboring
the potential for another market negative, the waste of resources in counter-
productive rent seeking by political competitors.
In standard blackboard and textbook static analysis, the implied presump-
tion that economic pro‹ts (as distinct from normal or book pro‹ts) are simply a
sign of inef‹ciency suggests that they cannot possibly serve a productive pur-
pose. After all, the goods in economic models that are the subject of analysis are
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given. That is, they do not have to be created, and no one needs an incentive to
create them. They exist, and the entire purview of the analysis is limited to
exactly what the equilibrium conditions will be in that narrow, static framework.
Such a framework allows for no risks, no uncertainty, and no array of entrepre-
neurial opportunities that must be appraised and pursued by would-be entre-
preneurs who are constrained by the most pressing of all constraints outside the
static models and inside the real world of markets: imperfect information.
If the world were completely covered with perfectly competitive markets—
with all the attendant ef‹ciency attributes contained by completely costless
mobility of resources that resulted in instantaneous adjustments with no hope
of earning supranormal pro‹ts—entrepreneurs would have absolutely no
incentive to move off their proverbial dimes. Economic pro‹ts would emerge
only in an in‹nitely small ›ash in time because market supplies would instanta-
neously adjust with costless resource movements, which brings us to an internal
contradiction embedded in the perfectly competitive model, an assumption of
resource movements when little (actually, absolutely no) incentive exists for
anyone to move resources.22 For the sake of argument, we might imagine that
economic pro‹ts would emerge, but if they did, they would be wiped out so
quickly that people might as well stay where they are. That means no economic
development would occur at all. The world would remain as it is, a point cen-
tral to Schumpeter’s critique of perfect competition (1942, 104–5).
This matter of lack of incentives is particularly pressing when we consider
the predicament of the entrepreneur who is contemplating the creation of one
or more new products. A new product can’t come into existence under perfect
competition because individual competitors could reason, given the perfect
›uidity of resource movement implied in zero entry and exit costs, that the cre-
ation of the new product would lead only to more of the same—with instanta-
neous adjustment to zero economic pro‹ts. Why bother?
One might think that a perfect competitor could reason that if he or she
does not create new products (or new, less costly ways of doing things), then
someone else might do just that and run competitors who don’t engage in such
product development out of business. Granted, if a new, improved, and
cheaper product were to spring into existence as if by magic (or in the same
way any product in a perfect competitive market is assumed to come into exis-
tence), without any development on the part of anyone being incurred, and there
were no costs associated with developing the market for the product, then
competitors would have to adopt the new and improved product. The reason
is that under the two conditions just speci‹ed, there would be no costs of
developing the product, and its product and market development costs would
not need to be recovered. This would suggest that absolutely no reason would
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exist for anyone to hesitate developing the product and its market. And there
would be one very good reason for developing the product and its market:
Each competitor could reason that if he or she didn’t adopt it, someone else
would, and the competitors who failed to follow suit would be run out of busi-
ness. Note, however, that everything is critically dependent on the magical
appearance of the product along with its well-developed market (which is so
well developed that information costs about the product are zero).
On the other hand, if the availability of the product required that some
‹rm develop the product, incur costs of adopting the product, and incur addi-
tional costs to develop the market for the product, then the new, improved,
and cheaper product would never emerge in a world of perfect competition
that is characterized by zero entry costs. The ‹rm developing the product and
making a market for it would not be able to recover its up-front or sunk devel-
opment costs.
Hence, as recognized by John McGee (1971), absent the prospects of eco-
nomic pro‹ts (that which is over and above what is necessary to keep a ‹rm in
the market after the product and its market are well developed and exploitable
by all competitors), each individual competitor has zero incentive to develop
the product and its market. Each competitor can rest comfortably in the (per-
fect) knowledge (obtained at zero cost) that a perfectly ›uid state of market
affairs means that no one inside or outside the market has any more incentive
than anyone else has to innovate. As a consequence, each individual competi-
tor can rest assured that there will be no innovation—no new products coming
onto the market and no new and less costly production processes (other than
those products that descend as if from heaven, that is, without the energizing
force of economic incentives).23
Even if readers don’t completely buy our vision of perfect competitive
markets as a stagnant state of affairs, surely we are right to conclude that per-
fect competition would lead to less innovation than would be the case if durable
economic pro‹ts were a reality or a real prospect. The economic pro‹ts would
energize entrepreneurs to create added consumer value as well as added
inef‹ciency (as represented by the hypothetical Harberger, deadweight-loss
triangle), with the latter form of lost value being potentially (and probably
more than) offset by the former form of added value.
To see this point (and others), consider ‹gure 2.3, which duplicates the
demand and cost curves of ‹gure 2.2, but adds a higher demand, the curve
labeled D2. This higher demand results from the monopolist being inspired by
the potential of added economic pro‹ts to improve in some way the quality of
its product, as far as consumers evaluate the product. Hence, the demand rises
from D1 to D2. Cost also rises, but only from MC1 to MC2, or by less than the
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vertical shift in the demand curve.24 To make the further development of the
product pro‹table, the increase in the price consumers would be willing to pay
must exceed the monopolist’s added cost.
Discussions of monopoly are almost everywhere narrowly focused on the
inef‹ciency or Harberger triangle XYZ when demand is D1. What is too often
missed is the net welfare gain that consumers receive from actually having the
product in the ‹rst place, which is that area above the monopolist’s economic
pro‹ts rectangle and below the demand curve D1, or area P1XPm1—an area
dubbed the Dupuit triangle (for Jules Dupuit who in an 1844 article ‹rst rec-
ognized its importance). We point out that net consumer surplus area because
it must exactly equal the deadweight-loss triangle (assuming straight lines for
the cost curves, or a constant marginal cost, an assumption we make for sim-
plicity). This means that consumers are not worse off by having the monopo-
lized product. Indeed, they are better off to the extent of the Dupuit triangular
area P1XPm1. They just aren’t as well off as they could be, hypothetically speak-
ing—if the monopolist were not out to maximize its economic pro‹t.
Is there a defect in the system? It all depends on perspective. If we could
assume that the product in question could come into being independently of
the economic pro‹t motive, the answer is yes. But we are hardly persuaded that
Deadweight-Loss Monopoly 45
Figure 2.3. Monopoly model basics—extended
such products could magically appear (in great numbers) under alternative
real-world systems that rely on nonpro‹t motives. Consider the development
of the Soviet Union, and its ultimate collapse under the weight of monumen-
tal economic stagnation inspired largely by the absence of private entrepre-
neurial leeway and pro‹t, economic or otherwise. If the volume and value of
created goods and services are unrelated to economic pro‹t, then innovation is
the only market outcome to which economists do not apply their upward slop-
ing supply curve.
Similarly, as posited for ‹gure 2.3, the pro‹t motive leads to the increase in
the cost and demand curves, the net effect of which is that the monopoly price
rises from Pm1 to Pm2 as the quantity of the product produced rises from Qm1 to
Qm2. The deadweight loss rises from XYZ to RST. However, the consumers’
aggregate leftover surplus (the Dupuit triangle) rises from P1XPm1 to P2SPm2.
This means that the world is a better place because of the pro‹t motive, because
of the actual economic pro‹ts that are extracted, and, therefore, because of the
inef‹ciency.
Here, we interject that much is made in textbook discussions of how eco-
nomic pro‹ts induce would-be competitors to surmount the walls of the entry
barriers to get at the economic pro‹ts. We don’t wish to detract from such a
line of analysis. Rather, we wish to stress that monopoly pro‹ts can have moti-
vational content even if the walls of the entry-barrier protection of a particular
monopoly cannot be surmounted. This is because the existence and persistence
of economic pro‹ts in any identi‹ed monopolized industry can encourage
entrepreneurs to search out other, similar monopoly opportunities in other
product lines (not just the product line that is the subject of the monopoly
model), which implies that an inef‹ciency in one monopolized product line
can give rise to added consumer value in other product lines, with the added
value in these product lines potentially (and, we suspect, very likely) far exceed-
ing the inef‹ciency of the monopolized line.
Schumpeter and many other economists who have followed in his footsteps
have argued that monopoly unsupported by government market protections
would not long endure. This is because by restricting sales to raise prices and
pro‹ts, a monopoly created by private devices alone sows the seeds of its own
destruction, given the incentive of the economic pro‹ts for other ‹rms to enter
the market. Schumpeter sees the “creative destruction” of monopolies, or their
nondurability, as something of a market blessing. Private entrepreneurs would
diligently ‹nd ways to surmount or circumvent any existing monopoly. But he
also acknowledged and held dear the creative force of economic pro‹ts, how-
ever long they might endure.
We recognize that we tend to agree with Schumpeter at every step, but
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with a caveat. Having a privately created monopoly that endures, if it ever hap-
pens, cannot be summarily dismissed as necessarily a net loss for the economy.
This is because the permanent monopoly, with its long-standing economic
pro‹ts, can inspire greater creative production—more product creation and
development—by other entrepreneurs who would like nothing better than to
duplicate the market position of the permanent monopoly in another product
line.25 If a permanent monopoly were never realized, it is not at all clear that
economic development—and growth in human welfare—would be higher. It
could be. The imagined prospect, as opposed to the reality, of a permanent
monopoly could have motivational content. But certainly the reality of a per-
manent monopoly would have more motivational content. Without the actu-
ality of monopoly, it is doubtful that the prospect of monopoly would be a
meaningful concept, or a motivation to do anything. Obviously, the matter of
the net damage or net gain from the presence of monopoly in an economy is
something economists have shied away from considering, given their narrow
focus on the damage done by monopoly when compared with a nonachievable
market outcome. We insist that economists have been dead wrong to argue
without quali‹cation that monopolies, durable or not, can only be welfare
destroying.
transitionary economic profits
Granted, many economists raise in their lectures (as Schumpeter did in his
writings) the prospects of transitionary economic pro‹ts, resulting from, say, a
shift in consumer preferences. However, in making that admission, they are
necessarily stepping outside the strict con‹nes of their perfect competition
model. That model allows no prospects of such pro‹ts even in transition,
because no time is allowed for transitions of any sort. The perfectly competi-
tive model has no time dimension. It is static by design. In addition, such an
admission of transitionary economic pro‹ts plays to the point that we seek to
make here, which is that some level of economic pro‹ts is good for the econ-
omy. This means that some level of inef‹ciency is, on balance, good for the
economy—and this, it must be stressed, means that some prevalence and
degree of monopolized markets, with their required entry barriers, is on bal-
ance good for the economy.
The admission also plays to Schumpeter’s key and unheralded insight
noted in the epigraph, an insight that summarizes our point better than we
could: “A system—any system, economic or other—that at every given point of
time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long run
be inferior to a system that does so at no given point in time, because the lat-
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ter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-run per-
formance” (1942, 83).
In our way of thinking, Schumpeter’s use of may be is overly guarded. We
are arguing here that some inef‹ciency is a necessary condition for the “level
and speed of long-run performance.” From our perspective, the only relevant
and contestable issue is how much monopoly presence in an economy is a good
thing, or how much is too little and too much. That is to say, for the people
who sit in Smith’s seat, the relevant question is, or should be, what is the opti-
mum presence of monopoly (in terms of prevalence and durability) for maximum
long-run performance of an economy? That question is as relevant as the scope
and length of copyright terms for artistic works and patent terms for inventors.
Indeed, such debates presume that maximum human welfare growth requires
some optimum prevalence of monopoly.
And we insist that monopolies must actually exist, and must actually
impose inef‹ciencies on their market, for monopoly to have its desired incen-
tive effect. This means that monopoly pro‹ts cannot simply be an illusion.
Otherwise, the notion of economic pro‹ts cannot have any motivational con-
tent. Illusory pro‹ts would understandably and necessarily be discounted by a
100 percent probability of never being realized, which means their expected
discounted value would be zero.
economic profit as a source of capital
Under conventional models of perfect competition, the product already exists.
The market for the product also exists. This means that the required capital
has already been raised in some unstated way. Any monopoly pro‹ts in any
product line can do only two things: give rise to an inef‹ciency and extract
consumer surplus. However, consider the real-world predicament of investors.
They often have grossly imperfect knowledge of their markets. They are never
sure what it is that consumers really want before they go to market with their
product or products. They can develop educated assessments, but such assess-
ments will often be no more than informed hunches, which means that the
probability of product failure looms large for any ‹rm. One way that ‹rms
solve their risk and uncertainty problems is to go to market with an array of
products, knowing full well that most (if not almost all) of the products they
put on the market will fail to cover the ‹rm’s costs for those products.
To remain in business, the ‹rm must cover its economic losses on most
products with economic pro‹ts on one or more products. It must anticipate
achieving a monopoly position—with all the attendant attributes of higher-
than-competitive prices, market entry barriers, and deadweight loss—in some-
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thing, just to go into the market with its range of products. The prospect of a
true monopoly position in the market at a later time is what the ‹rm counts on
to raise its required up-front capital as well as the capital it needs to expand its
array of product offerings.
We understand that many economists—especially those who specialize in
portfolio analysis—would concede that such realized monopoly results can be
ef‹ciency enhancing for the ‹rm. Besides, the ‹rm might not make more than
a competitive rate of return across all product lines. However, that is the point
we seek to push for the economy as a whole: To have an array of ‹rms to
develop a far greater array of products, monopoly positions are absolutely
essential in a world beset with risk and uncertainty. This is because such a
world is bound to have product (and ‹rm) failures. Such a world must also have
monopolies just to ensure that across all markets, entrepreneurs can expect to
earn, at the very least, normal pro‹ts.
Besides, monopolies are absolutely unavoidable in a world in which a mul-
titude of people are doing an even greater multitude of things, all with an eye
toward making a pro‹t or just pursuing the betterment of humankind. This is
because of the prevalence of uncertainty in economic events. The problem with
uncertainty is that, by its very nature, it can’t be accounted for in any anticipa-
tory sense. Things just happen that cannot be known beforehand. In such a
world, people are bound to stumble upon monopoly market positions. In short,
luck is bound to happen, and to the extent that luck is a fact of life, entrepre-
neurs can be counted on to count on luck in their investment decisions.
Are such monopoly positions a source of economic losses? We suggest not.
Suppose that all prospects of monopoly positions were radically reduced, or
wiped out, by antitrust policy and enforcement. The relevant question is,
Would the world be a better place on balance? Identi‹ed markets might have
less inef‹ciency and economic pro‹ts, as blackboard models suggest, but such
a policy stance would do nothing but increase the prominence of failures in
venture capitalists’ portfolios. They would have to have higher rates of
return—higher normal pro‹ts—for all nonmonopoly ventures. This would be
the case because of the risk of greater net losses across all product or business
lines, given that any prospects of making supranormal pro‹ts from monopolies
that develop would have been eliminated. To undertake an array of ventures,
without the prospect of monopoly pro‹ts in some of them, ‹rms would have to
have higher returns in the ventures undertaken just to keep the capital
resources in the array of ventures.26 Production costs in nonmonopoly endeav-
ors would rise, resulting in a constriction of output levels sought in even per-
fectly competitive markets. The deadweight loss of monopoly must be
weighed against these welfare losses, even though they might not be tagged by
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economists (or policymakers who carry out the antitrust enforcement) as a
source of market inef‹ciency.
market efficiency and the count of competitors
Before closing this chapter, we need to consider brie›y what may be consid-
ered extraneous issues. We take them up because we seek to develop in this
book a fairly comprehensive review of conventional monopoly theory. Discus-
sions of market ef‹ciency never get more confused than when the specter of
the count of competitors, or the dominance of producers, is raised. The confu-
sion is understandable, given the emphasis on the competitors’ count embed-
ded in the de‹nition of the two market extremes, perfect competition and pure
monopoly. The former is de‹ned as a market structure of numerous (or innu-
merable) competitors, whereas the latter is de‹ned as a market structure with a
solitary producer. Given those de‹nitions, it is all too easy to conclude that (1)
a market must operate with less than perfect ef‹ciency if that market has fewer
than “numerous” competitors, and (2) a market is necessarily monopolized if
only one producer exists (or if one producer dominates any given market).27
The so-called natural monopoly is everywhere, supposedly, a monopoly.
In the case of perfect competition, the confusion, and resulting misunder-
standing, are grounded in an often unrecognized goal of specifying the exact
market characteristics, including speci‹cation of “numerous producers”: That
purpose is to spell out those market conditions that would necessarily ensure,
with mathematical certainty, the heralded market outcome of marginal cost
pricing along with perfect resource allocation and zero economic pro‹ts. That
is not to say that such a market outcome cannot be achieved with less stringent
speci‹cations, for example, with fewer than “numerous producers” in the mar-
ket. Far fewer competitors could prevail in a market with the outcome being
tolerably ef‹cient, with price close to marginal cost, the idealized competitive
level.
Experimental economists have addressed the issue of how the count of
competitors affects the actual market outcome, in terms of price and quantity
traded, as compared with what is known to be the equilibrium price and quan-
tity. Surprisingly, Charles Holt and his colleagues in experimental economics
have found that with as few as ‹ve traders on each side of the market, the equi-
librium price and quantity realized over a sequence of trading periods will
come close to (but will not exactly match) the equilibrium price and quantity
predicted from the known supply and demand functions.28 This line of exper-
imental research suggests that just because real-world markets diverge from
the perfectly competitive markets in important ways—having a limited num-
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ber of producers who provide differentiated goods behind entry barriers of
some sort—it does not follow that the ‹rms in real-world markets generate
anything close to the level of deadweight losses that might be expected from
textbook models.
In the case of monopoly, the supposed market power to destroy and trans-
fer consumer surplus value to a single seller (or a few sellers) can be tightly
constrained by potential competition, with the extent of potential competition
affected by the ease of entry. This means that a natural monopoly, which in
textbooks is shown to emerge as a single seller when economies of scale are
rampant, is not necessarily the monopoly implied by its name. Granted, some
natural monopolies are protected by barriers to entry. Municipal water systems
can be just that, monopolies, because of their exclusive franchises or prohibi-
tions against having more than one water main running under city streets.
Other single sellers need not be accurately described as natural monopolies,
because of the absence of entry barriers. Indeed, many natural monopolies may
be more accurately labeled natural single competitors because they may be the
only sellers in their markets but are unable to restrict production to set a
monopoly price and garner monopoly rents. They can’t do this because of the
threat of potential competitors that can enter the market if the single producer
tries to act like a monopoly to any signi‹cant extent, or else such single sellers
may be able to price above marginal cost only to the extent they have produc-
tion ef‹ciencies that other ‹rms are unable to develop. If that is the case, pro-
duction is being carried on as ef‹ciently as possible. This is doubly true when
economists, courts, and policymakers don’t possess the requisite knowledge
and skills to reorganize markets on a more cost-effective basis. Just requiring
natural monopolies to expand production or lower price can be no solution at
all to the so-called inef‹ciency if such mandates are founded, as they must be,
on cost information from the natural monopoly that is under the control of the
natural monopoly, which means that regulations of the natural monopolist’s
production and pricing decision can give rise to costs that are greater than they
have to be. The regulated natural monopoly might rightfully think, Why incur
only minimal costs when revelation of those costs causes an expansion in pro-
duction and a lower price? To put it another way, natural monopoly markets
may not be perfectly ef‹cient, using economists’ standard notion of ef‹ciency,
but they can possess “competitive effectiveness,” to use McGee’s instructive
turn of words (1971, 130).29
Schumpeter’s “perennial gale” is of crucial importance to understanding
the behavior of monopolies, even those who see their market positions as
secure. They can see how the gale force has undermined a sequence of monop-
olies around them and through history, with many of the monopolies once
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thinking they were secure. Schumpeter must have chosen his words carefully,
for gale has a connotation of persistence and force. Surely that means that not
only must market systems be judged by history but also that history can affect
just how insecure monopolies must feel and how forceful any continuing gale
will be.
Admittedly, these points about natural monopoly and the importance of
“potential competition” are not unrecognized and unacknowledged. However,
we make them here for purposes of completeness of analysis, in case some
readers have not encountered them. We also note them because of our larger
purpose, that of suggesting that real-world market outcomes need not be con-
strained by the dictates of economists’ speci‹cations for their models of mar-
ket structures.
concluding comments
Perfect competition (or some close approximation) is a ‹ne model for static
analysis of static markets. That is, addressing the question of what can happen
to the static equilibrium price and output can be very useful when the product
under analysis is assumed to exist and nobody is interested in taking the analy-
sis further to, say, an exploration of how markets develop over time. A theme
of this chapter is that one cannot infer from such a static market analysis any-
thing about the emergence of a totally new product market or the dynamic
development of a product or its market over time. The speci‹ed conditions of
perfect competition simply will not allow for product development that is nec-
essarily costly and that is, we’d like to think, the raison d’être of a real-world
market economic system. Resource allocation for known goods and services
through prices is important to markets, but hardly the whole story—not by a
long shot, from Schumpeter’s perspective.
Our purpose in this chapter has been to suggest anew that Schumpeter was
right on one key and unheralded issue: Any system that is perfectly ef‹cient at
every point in time will likely lag behind any system that is not perfectly
ef‹cient at any point in time. (That is easy to say because a system of perfect
ef‹ciency implies no economic progress.) To have less than perfect ef‹ciency,
we emphasize, there needs to be at least some monopoly or market control
over price. That means there need to be entry costs, or entry barriers of some
sort and to some degree, in order that ‹rms can anticipate the present dis-
counted supranormal pro‹ts that motivate innovation and product develop-
ment.
Hence, an important theme of this book is that for optimum economic
development and growth in human welfare, some optimum amount of monop-
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oly power must be present in a market economy. We would be the ‹rst to
admit that we, at this point, have little idea of what that optimum amount
would be, but we are convinced that the ‹rst step in coming to grips with the
issue of the optimum monopoly presence is professional recognition that eco-
nomic pro‹ts above absolute zero, along with some amount of static
inef‹ciency, are prerequisites to the ›uid functioning of a dynamic and devel-
oping market system. After we agree on that point, we can then debate what
the optimum should be.
As odd as it might seem, our line of argument developed in this chapter and
pursued in the remainder of the book does not imply that we wish to dispense
altogether with the perfectly competitive model. We agree that the model has
its classroom and textbook uses, for example, to explain how the price system
works to aid in the allocation of resources and how it can adjust to changes in
exogenous market conditions. The model is hardly perfect for doing that, but
neither should we seek perfect pedagogical tools (for the same reason that we
should not seek the development of perfect products or perfect competition in
real-world markets). Tools are tools. We do with them what we can—until we
can come up with better ones for the purposes at hand. In addition, as we have
found in this chapter, the perfectly competitive model has been for us, oddly
enough, a useful device for pointing to attributes of well-functioning real-
world markets. We will continue to use the model in chapters that follow sim-
ply because it helps us highlight points that we could not make as clearly with
other known devices at our disposal.
In the next chapter, we take up an issue not considered in most monopoly
discussions: how monopoly is a coordination, or management, problem, a fact
that imposes a necessary check on any monopoly’s market power and therefore
curbs the monopoly’s ability to extract monopoly rents and impose inef‹ciency
on its market. Anything that limits monopoly rents requires, of course, adjust-
ments in rent-seeking theory, as we will show. Later, we will consider con-
sumer switching costs, as a market counterpart on the consumer side to entry
barriers on the producer side, which are widely seen to be a source of monop-
oly power, economic pro‹ts, reduction in consumer surplus, and market
inef‹ciency. We will argue that some market conditions exist, well known to
economists, under which switching costs can be welfare enhancing, not welfare
destroying. Indeed, we will show why consumers would want to be locked in to
certain types of products. That is to say, they would gain on balance from fac-




Monopoly as a 
Coordination Problem
The traditional theory of monopoly leads to a set of theoreti-
cal deductions widely accepted by economists. As explained, a monopolist (no
matter how imperfect), protected by external barriers to entry, will reduce out-
put below the level achieved under idealized, perfectly competitive market
conditions. The purpose of the output restriction is, of course, to raise the
market price above competitive levels and to generate monopoly rents. The
consequence is a deadweight loss resulting from the failure of the monopoly to
produce units worth more to consumers than they cost the monopoly. Implicit
in the graphical depiction of the extent of the deadweight loss is the assump-
tion that the competitive supply curve is the same as the monopolist’s marginal
cost curve. This traditional view of a monopoly market is typically devoid of
any consideration of the institutional setting of a monopolistically organized
market as compared to a competitively organized market.
As explained in chapter 2, the potential social cost of a monopoly is now
commonly accepted to be greater than indicated by the traditional theory.
Monopolies, and the rents they create, are often the creations of government
restrictions on entry. These monopoly rents are created and allocated in
response to rent seeking, and the social cost of this rent seeking adds to the
deadweight loss associated with monopoly restrictions on output, as explained
in the last chapter. A guiding presumption in discussions of monopoly is that
the only meaningful barriers to achieving monopoly price, output, and pro‹t
objectives are external to the monopoly.1 This means that the only meaningful
constraints on what a monopolist does are its competitors, those already in the
market and potential competitors outside the market that could enter. Con-
ventional takes on monopoly also mean that the extent of rent seeking relevant
to the welfare costs of a monopoly position is unrelated to organizational and
managerial problems within the monopoly ‹rm.
In this chapter, we seek to extend our challenge to the conventional view of
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monopoly output and pricing behavior by taking account of the required insti-
tutional shift when a market is monopolized. Our point is a simple one: Aside
from one-person ‹rms, in which the residual claimant-principal and agent are
one and the same, the achievement of monopoly rents is itself a coordination
problem—that is, one of bringing about restrictions on output with agents (or
employees) inside the ‹rm whose incentives are imperfectly aligned with the
interests of the principals (or owners). That is to say, as opposed to viewing a
monopoly as a single-minded entity within which everyone is driven exclu-
sively by the goal of maximum ‹rm pro‹ts, a monopoly is best viewed as a
group of individuals who are pursuing their own advantage through internal
rent seeking that can reduce the monopoly pro‹ts below that implied by the
standard monopoly model.2
We posit that achieving monopoly results is limited by both external and
internal constraints, a fact that makes monopoly output restrictions less likely,
and less severe, than the conventional theories of monopoly and rent seeking
would indicate. This perspective on monopolies leads to conclusions that stand
in sharp contrast with conventional implications: Even if production technol-
ogy remains the same, the monopolist’s marginal and average cost curves will
not be the same as the competitive supply curve, contrary to textbook discus-
sions. That is, contrary to what might be thought, the industry cost structure
is bound to change. Indeed, the average cost faced by the monopolist will be
higher than the average cost faced by independent competitors (again, assum-
ing that production technology is the same), yet the monopolist’s marginal cost
curve is lower than the competitors’ marginal cost curves. Because of the
higher average cost, the monopoly pro‹ts will necessarily be smaller than is
conventionally assumed at every output level. Because of the lower marginal
cost, the monopoly output will be greater than in the conventional monopoly
model. The reduced monopoly rents mean less political rent seeking to achieve
monopoly ends and fewer government-protected monopolies than would be
implied by conventional monopoly theory.
At the same time, following Schumpeter, innovation still can easily be
higher under monopoly than under perfect competition, simply because, as
argued in the last chapter, innovation that requires up-front costs is likely to be
nil under perfect competition. Again, to repeat a theme of the book, maximum
innovation requires some optimum degree of market power.
Our arguments lead to the conclusion that in seeking to achieve monopoly
pro‹ts, the monopolist must be concerned not only with external entry barri-
ers but also internal constraints in the form of agency costs that can reduce the
degree to which output can be restricted and pro‹ts generated and retained by
the monopoly ‹rm. High agency costs can, in other words, have the same
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impact on monopoly production decisions as can low entry barriers. Improved
systems of internal control of agents’ behavior can lead to several outcomes not
fully appreciated in the literature: greater restrictions on output and higher
prices and pro‹ts in monopolized markets; more rent seeking; and more gov-
ernment-imposed restrictions on market entry.
the conventional view of monopoly
Figure 3.1 shows the usual way by which the ef‹ciency of monopoly and com-
petitive markets are compared (chap. 2, this vol.). In that illustration, for sim-
plicity of exposition the long-run marginal (and average) cost curve for the
monopolist is assumed to be horizontal. For purposes of making welfare com-
parisons between monopoly and competitive markets, we assume that standard
production technology is the same for the monopolist as it would be if the
industry were perfectly competitive. The underlying presumption of conven-
tional theory is that the monopolist has as much incentive to minimize its pro-
duction costs as do competitors, and that agency costs are unaffected by the
market structure. After all, if the monopolist is intent on maximizing pro‹ts,
then it has every incentive to hold costs down to the minimum. As is conven-
tional, Michael Jensen and William Meckling (1976) have concluded that it is
wrong to presume that monopolization of markets will lead to less “value max-
imization” than would be observed in competitive markets: “Since the owner
of a monopoly has the same wealth incentives to minimize managerial costs as
would the owner of a competitive ‹rm, both will undertake that level of mon-
itoring which equates the marginal cost of monitoring to the marginal wealth
increment from reduced consumption of perquisites by the managers” ( Jensen
and Meckling 1976, 329–30 ).
As a consequence, a monopolist that takes over a once-competitive market
will, according to the standard analysis, reduce output from Qc to Qm in order to
raise the price from Pc to Pm and reap pro‹ts equal to the shaded rectangle 
PcPmac, which sets an upper limit on the amount of rent seeking to achieve the
monopoly pro‹ts. As discussed in chapter 2, the inef‹ciency of the monopoly
takeover is represented by the Harberger triangular area abc plus some portion,
if not all, of the pro‹t rectangle that is dissipated through political rent seeking.
Along much the same line, conventional analysis holds that competitors are
unable to achieve monopoly results through the creation of a cartel because the
pro‹t incentives that might lead them to consider curbing output will under-
mine the curbs that are agreed upon. Once the cartel agreement is in place,
each competitor can improve its individual pro‹ts by not restricting output. It
can do even better by expanding output to make up for the curbs in output of
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other cartel members and in response to any price above the competitive level,
if such ever occurs. The openness of competitive markets further destabilizes
cartels simply because openness increases the number of competitors, actual
and potential, who can enter and charge less than the cartel price.
an unconventional view of monopoly
Clearly, conventional theory is asymmetrical in its conception of competitive
and monopoly markets. The theory presumes that free riding (or the threat of
it) is rampant in competitive markets, so much so that those competitors in
perfectly competitive markets need not even try to cartelize their market. Yet,
conventional theory presumes implicitly, if not explicitly, that once a monop-
oly ‹rm has been established through the erection of barriers to entry, then the
Prisoner’s Dilemma and free-riding temptations are no longer problems worth
analytical consideration (or, at least, standard analysis is silent on such mat-
ters). All that the monopolist needs, in order to achieve maximum monopoly
rents, is the protection of entry barriers. The extent to which the market is
closed to entry will determine the extent of the monopoly pro‹ts, given the
minimum cost structure.
However, production, or lack thereof, is a coordination problem that nec-
essarily involves the principals (owners) somehow getting the agents (managers
and line workers) to do their bidding, which involves maximization of the prin-
cipals’ wealth through a maximization of the ‹rm’s long-run net income ›ow.
As commonly recognized among economists, the principal-agent problem is a
real problem simply because both the principals and the agents have con›ict-
ing personal objectives. The principals want to maximize their wealth from the
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Figure 3.1. The standard monopoly model once again
‹rm, while the agents want to maximize some combination of their own wealth
and security, perquisites, and prestige of their jobs with their ‹rm. The con›ict
in the interests between principals and agents becomes acute because the prin-
cipals, in any complex ‹rm, must hand over to their agents at least some con-
trol over ‹rm resources. The agents can, within limits, use the ‹rm’s resources
to further their objectives at the expense of the principals.
The extent of the agency problem is typically assumed to grow with the
size of the ‹rm, following Ronald Coase (1937) and Mancur Olson (1965) (and
graphically illustrated in Gurbaxani and Whang 1991). This is in part because
with ‹rm growth in terms of number of employees, the principals are less able
to monitor the agents, which means that the agents can get away with more
misuse of ‹rm resources at lower (expected) personal cost. Growth in the size
of a ‹rm can also reduce the impact of the individual on the overall perfor-
mance of the ‹rm, which makes contributions of individual workers more
dif‹cult to assess. Besides, when an agent misuses ‹rm resources, the costs are
shared with—or are externalized to—other agents, as well as the principals
(who can also be greater in number in a larger ‹rm). Any common goal (of
minimizing ‹rm costs or maximizing ‹rm pro‹ts) that the principals and
agents might have shared becomes less controlling.
The solution to the principal-agent problem for the principals is straight-
forward: to align, in one way or another, the interests of the agents with their
own. The alignment might come through monitoring and various payment
and penalty schemes that make the agents’ wealth dependent on the growth in
the wealth of the principals.3
However, from the perspective of principal-agency theory, cost minimiza-
tion, which is at the heart of competitive and monopoly models, is never
assured for any given ‹rm. Competitive markets can only pressure ‹rms, and
their principals and agents, to ‹nd cost-minimization strategies or else be run
out of business by ‹rms that do.
When tenets of principal-agency theory are applied to monopoly theory,
the monopoly results are not likely to be achieved so costlessly as is conven-
tionally posited. When a market is converted from being fully competitive to
pure monopoly, the market participants within the production units change
their economic roles rather dramatically as they shift from being
principals/residual claimants of the individual competitive (relatively small)
‹rms and become members of a much larger group of stockholders and/or
become managers and line workers (agents).4 Accordingly, the residual
claimants have less of an incentive to devote themselves to the objective of
pro‹t maximization in the monopoly ‹rm than they had when they were in
independent competitor-‹rms.
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If the formerly competitive market is assumed to be composed of idealized
one-person ‹rms, the principals and agents are one and the same, with no
prospect of misalignment of incentives—and no incentive for ef‹ciency-
impairing shirking or misusing of ‹rm resources, given that any costs incurred
would be fully internalized.5 However, when the industry is monopolized,
many (of the potentially numerous) principals would surely become agents
with the prospect of externalizing a share of the costs for their own actions.
Alternatively, the principals would switch from being single proprietors to
shareholders with minor stakes in their companies, and, again, with impaired
incentives to monitor ‹rm costs.
If the formerly competitive market were made up of ‹rms with owners and
agents separated into distinctly different groups, the problems of separation
and control as well as agency costs would still be increased by the shift from a
competitive to a monopoly market. Many former principals would become
agents within a much larger organization, and the actions of each principal and
agent would become less consequential in the context of the total monopoly.6
They have more of an incentive to shirk and engage in opportunistic behavior
because the costs of such behaviors are spread over a larger number of stock-
holders.
Moreover, the pressure on both principals and agents to minimize agency
costs will not be nearly so great in a monopoly ‹rm, simply because the
monopolist’s position is less threatened (because of the entry barriers) than is
the case in competitive markets. Perfectly competitive ‹rms face imminent
elimination when agency costs exceed minimum levels; monopoly ‹rms do
not. Those agents who absorb some of the monopoly rents through, for exam-
ple, shirking and excessive salaries and perks, are more likely to survive, if for
no other reason than that these activities would make survival absolutely
impossible under perfect competition.7
The rent created by monopoly restrictions should be expected to give rise
to efforts by the monopoly ‹rm’s employees to capture some of the rents—and
the greater the monopoly rents, the greater the effort.8 Clearly, ‹rms devise
policies and structures to reduce organizational rent seeking that reduces
pro‹ts.9 Such efforts imply that the more the monopoly ‹rm restricts output
back toward the idealized monopoly output level (Qm), the greater the rents
and the greater the attendant agency costs in the form of internal rent seeking
and the ‹rm’s attempts to monitor and reduce rent seeking. Necessarily, there-
fore, the average cost curve facing ‹rms in a perfectly competitive market and
in a monopolist market cannot be one and the same even though the standard
technology-based production function and costs remain the same. If the aver-
age cost curve looks like AC1 (which equals MC1) in ‹gure 3.2 when the mar-
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ket is competitive, it will look like, for example, AC2 under monopoly. The
exact position and shape of the new average cost curve will depend on exactly
how monopoly pro‹ts change as output is restricted and on how agency and
monitoring costs change with the monopolization of markets. That is, the new
average cost curve will depend on the technology of monitoring and pay
arrangements that align the interests of principals and agents.
The marginal cost curve also changes, but in an unexpected way. Rather
than being identical to the higher average cost curve and diverging from the
average cost curve in the conventional way, the marginal cost curve for the
monopolist (with agency costs associated with restricted output) is below AC2
and upward sloping, and asymptotic to the old AC1 curve, as illustrated by MC1
in ‹gure 3.2. (Because the mathematics are relatively simple, proof of the shape
of the curve is relegated to the appendix to this chapter.) The MC1 curve is
shaped the way it is because of the presence of agency costs that mount pro-
gressively with the contraction in output toward Qm. This means that expansion
of production from, say, Qm toward Qc implies, accordingly, a marginal cost
that is now lower than the old marginal cost under competitive conditions
without agency costs. This is the case because the new marginal cost is the
same as the old marginal cost minus the agency costs that are no longer
incurred when production is expanded by an additional unit. As the monopoly
rents decrease with expanded output, the marginal agency costs go down, which
implies an increase in the overall marginal cost until Qc production level is
achieved. In the case of ‹gure 3.2, the new marginal cost curve MC1 leads to
the monopoly maximizing pro‹t at output level Q1, not Qm.
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Figure 3.2. Monopoly as coordination problem
Our discussion leads to the proposition that a monopolist that simply takes
over a previously perfectly competitive market will necessarily face the prob-
lem of coordinating the activities of a number of previous competitors that
may differ in size and be scattered geographically. The previous owners and
residual claimants of the previous individual ‹rms will then be agents of the
monopolist, with the new agents taking on decidedly different roles with dra-
matically different incentives. Each agent will want to use discretion to maxi-
mize the agent’s own welfare at the expense of the principal/monopolist. The
central problem that the monopolist confronts is similar—but of course not
identical—in structure to the problem faced by a cartel: overcoming the ten-
dency of individual producing units to free ride and sacri‹ce potential collec-
tive gain for local or individual pro‹ts. The lack of independence of individual
producing units within a monopoly no doubt mutes somewhat the free-riding
problem, but the hierarchy itself superimposed over the various producing
units within the monopoly to overcome free riding necessarily comes at a cost,
mainly because the chain of command and control will be longer. The requi-
site incentive and monitoring systems will drain, to one extent or another, ‹rm
resources—and the ‹rm’s economic pro‹t.
Admittedly, the hierarchical system’s costliness cannot be determined con-
ceptually and is actually irrelevant to the challenge to conventional theory
mounted here. All we need note is that an effective monopoly replacement for
an otherwise competitive market structure implies some system of cost moni-
toring, or else the restriction on output cannot be coordinated with any better
pro‹t results than would be expected under a truly competitive market made
up of independent producers. The free riding within a cartel, if left unchecked,
will cause the cartel to collapse; the free riding within a monopoly, if left
unchecked, will drain the monopoly of all rents.
If free riding cannot be controlled at all, except at considerable cost
(which is the case in perfectly competitive markets), restrictions on output
through monopolization of the market would never be attempted. Hence,
the extent of monopolization depends on more than external barriers to
entry. It also depends on coordination or, what amounts to the same thing,
agency costs.
Hence, the monopolist’s economic pro‹ts will be something less than is
conventionally believed for two reasons: First, the real resource costs associ-
ated with excessive perquisites and with monitoring will soak up some of the
pro‹ts as well as divert production from Qm. In this case, the waste of monop-
oly is larger than traditionally speci‹ed by the inef‹ciency triangle, with the
added inef‹ciency equal to the value of the real resources soaked up in coordi-
nation of the output restrictions. Second, to achieve cost-effective coordina-
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tion in restricting output, the monopolist will likely have to share some of the
potential rents with the agents in the various producing units.
Although measured ‹rm accounting costs may go up because of the agents’
gains in the form of higher salaries or shirking, no necessary ef‹ciency loss
occurs because some of the rents are simply transferred from the pockets of the
monopoly’s owners to the pockets of the agents. Of course, even socially cost-
less transfers are important because they signify the existence of less in the way
of rents to be realized by the monopolist from rent seeking. Therefore, less
political rent seeking (and the associated loss from the waste of resources
involved in political rather than productive activity) should result than is com-
monly posited. Also, fewer monopoly restrictions should be achieved through
government policies. Fewer monopoly pro‹ts will be transferred to those who
can provide monopoly privileges. Hence, the prospect of rent absorption
within a monopoly, once forti‹ed, should reduce the prevalence of monopo-
lies, given the lower return on rent-seeking investments.
changes in agency costs
A major tenet of principal-agency theory is that agency costs retard ef‹ciency
in markets. Conversely, reductions in agency costs translate into improved
ef‹ciency. The view of monopoly presented in this chapter leads to a
signi‹cantly different, more complicated conclusion: Firm agency costs can
impair external rent seeking and reduce the monopolization of markets. They
can also reduce the extent to which output is restricted and the extent to which
the price is raised by monopolization. This implies that, given our revised per-
spective, a reduction in agency costs, through, for example, technological devel-
opments (such as computers and communication systems) that lead to more
productive monitoring systems, can result in greater monopolization of mar-
kets, lower outputs, and higher prices.10 These results occur because the
monopolist can more cost-effectively coordinate restrictions on output, moni-
tor agents, and curb the costs imposed by the agents on the ‹rm.
In terms of ‹gure 3.2, a reduction in agency costs will lead to an upward
shift in the monopolist’s marginal cost curve. With the shift in the marginal
cost curve from MC1 to MC2, the pro‹t-maximizing output level falls (from Q1
to Q2) while the price rises (from P1 to P2). (At the same time, the average cost
curve falls and monopoly rents grow because of the greater curb in production
and the elimination of coordination and agency costs, which we omit from the
‹gure to simplify the exposition.)
Whether the inef‹ciency loss goes up or down because of improved mon-
itoring is uncertain. On the one hand, because of the improved monitoring,
62 in defense of monopoly
output is further restricted, increasing the size of the deadweight-loss triangle.
On the other hand, the real waste from monitoring and excessive perquisites
goes down. Nevertheless, the expected greater monopoly rents garnered by
the ‹rm can increase external rent seeking and result in more monopolized
markets.
innovation
The impact of prospective agency costs within a monopoly is hard to deter-
mine. If Schumpeter was right when he argued that monopoly pro‹ts can spur
innovation, then agency costs that limit a monopoly’s ability to restrict output
and hike its price and pro‹ts can have a negative impact on innovation. The
monopoly ‹rm won’t have the monopoly rents to put toward research and
development. At the same time, with agency problems, the monopolist has a
clear incentive to innovate in ways that better align principals’ and agents’
interests through better, more cost-effective monitoring and pay schemes,
which can drive up monopoly pro‹ts and innovation, following Schumpeter’s
line of argument.
We noted in chapter 1 how ‹rms in perfect competition have no incentive
to innovate so long as the innovations require incurring up-front costs. Such
costs cannot be recovered because of instantaneous duplication of successful
products by existing ‹rms and/or new entrants. It seems as though Adam
Smith recognized the agency problems we have noted in this chapter and
might have added that principals also lose their competitive drive as monop-
oly rents rise (see note 8, this chap.) . We see no reason that there could not
also be a compromise position, that innovation might rise and then fall as an
industry moves from a perfectly competitive structure to a fully monopolized
one.
concluding comments
Conventional monopoly theory implicitly, if not explicitly, presumes that
pro‹t maximization of the monopoly ‹rm is virtually automatic, that the mere
existence of the ‹rm implies that the agents will do what the stockholders tell
them. Hence, it should be no surprise that discussions of incentives within the
‹rm are totally absent in conventional analysis. However, this standard theory
is sorely in need of correction. If monopoly is seen as a problem in coordinat-
ing the work of agents who do not “naturally” follow the dictates of the princi-
pals, the monopolist’s marginal cost curve cannot be equivalent to the industry
supply curve under competitive market conditions.
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A central conclusion of this chapter is that more than external entry barri-
ers count in the ability of monopolies to extract monopoly rents and, for that
matter, for ‹rms to seek monopoly positions. Agency costs, which necessarily
arise because monopoly must be a coordination problem, also matter. Agency
costs will impair the ability of a monopoly to profitably restrict output pre-
cisely because agency considerations change the cost structure of the monop-
oly and, therefore, the pro‹t-maximizing output level.
Our line of analysis also leads to the conclusion that the inef‹ciency of
monopoly can be, but is not necessarily, less than conventionally thought. Two
consequences of market monopolization affect the market ef‹ciency of
monopoly in opposite ways: On the one hand, the prospects of monopoly
agency costs that involve the use of real resources will add to the inef‹ciency of
the monopolization process; on the other hand, the agency costs associated
with restrictions on the monopoly output level will cause output to be higher
than is conventionally thought. The rent available to shareholders will thereby
be lower than conventionally thought, and the amount of rent seeking is likely
to be lowered because of the agency costs.
Conventional principal-agency theory suggests, without quali‹cation, that
any improvement in the ability of ‹rms to monitor their agents will increase
productivity and ef‹ciency. Our analysis introduces a major quali‹cation.
Although improvements in monitoring might reduce agency costs that are cre-
ated in the process of monopolizing a market, the improvements also ease the
coordinating and monitoring problems that the monopolist faces in curbing
the output level. Reductions in monitoring and agency costs, in other words,
can be expected to lead to a reduction in the output of the monopolist, an
increase in monopoly rents, an increase in the inef‹ciency triangle, and an
increase in rent seeking to obtain monopoly protection.
appendix: agency costs and cartels
The implications of agency costs for a monopoly can be highlighted with a
simple model. Let P(Q) be the downward-sloping inverse demand curve facing
the monopoly, where Q is the quantity of monopoly output. The cost that the
monopoly incurs for each quantity of output is given by C(Q, QC – Q), where
QC is the competitive output—the quantity produced by the industry without
monopoly restrictions. Based on our discussion in this chapter, we make the
following plausible assumptions about this cost curve. Letting C(Q) be the cost
curve for the industry before formation of the monopoly, C(Q, QC – Q) > C(Q)
for all Q < QC . The total costs, and therefore the average costs, are higher for
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the monopoly than for the competitive industry at all output quantities less
than QC. But at QC = Q, C(Q, QC – Q) = C(Q, 0) = C(Q). Furthermore, as is stan-
dard, we impose the conditions that C1 > 0 and C11 > 0, along with the just dis-
cussed condition that C2 > 0 and the plausible condition C22 > 0.
We can now express the monopoly’s objective as choosing the Q that max-
imizes the pro‹t function
 = P(Q)Q – C(Q, QC – Q). (1)
The maximizing Q, which we denote as Q*, necessarily satis‹es the condition
d/dQ = P + (dP/dQ)Q – (C1 – C2) = 0, (2)
or
P + (dP/dQ)Q = C1 – C2 . (2′)
Condition (2′) yields to the standard interpretation of the requirement for
monopoly pro‹t maximization: that marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
The only difference is that in our case, marginal cost is lower than in the stan-
dard case because of the agency costs of reducing output: C1 – C2 < C1.
Although the agency costs increase the average cost, they reduce the marginal
cost. When output is less than QC , an increase in production reduces the
agency costs and therefore generates a partial offset to the increase in the stan-
dard costs of production. In the absence of agency costs, with C2 = 0 for all Q,
condition (2′) becomes the standard monopoly pro‹t-maximizing condition
and Q* = QM. But, because of agency costs, C2 > 0, and it follows from (2) that
P + (dP/dQ)Q < C1, (3)
or the cartel’s marginal revenue is less than the standard marginal cost of pro-
duction. If, as is almost always the case, the marginal revenue decreases in out-
put, then (3) implies that Q* > QM. The output that maximizes cartel pro‹ts is
greater than the output that maximizes the pro‹ts of the standard monopoly.
On the other hand, if the monopoly is worth forming, its pro‹t-maximiz-
ing output will be less than the competitive output level. At QC, if the monop-
oly marginally reduces output, it loses marginal revenue of P + (dP/dQ)QC, but
it gains the marginal costs of C1 – C2. Since P = C1 at QC, it follows that if
(dP/dQ)QC < –C2 (or –(dP/dQ)QC > C2), then monopoly pro‹ts are increased by
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reducing output below QC. The possibility exists, of course, that C2 (QC, 0) >
–(dP/dQ)QC.
11 If this is the case,
P + (dP/dQ)QC > C1 – C2 (4)
at the competitive output level and the loss in revenue from a marginal reduc-
tion below QC is greater than the reduction in costs. Therefore, no motivation
exists to reduce output, and nothing is to be gained from forming a monopoly.12
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Chapter 4
Welfare-Enhancing Monopolies
The implications of the conventional textbook analysis of
monopoly markets should be well established, given the attention they receive.
As a consequence, consumers everywhere should be expected to oppose (if they
had the requisite incentives to understand monopoly markets, which, of
course, they don’t) any effort on the part of the monopolist to enhance its pro-
tective barriers to entry, whatever their source. After all, such efforts could
only raise the price that a pro‹t-maximizing monopolist would charge and
would lower consumers’ surplus value. As a consequence, consumer support
for the monopolist side of any antitrust case should seem paradoxical, and hard
to explain if conventional monopoly theory is the last word on antitrust. Simi-
larly, competitors’ support of the government’s side in an antitrust case should
seem equally paradoxical, if the ‹rm accused of violations of antitrust law has
been acting like a monopolist. Restricted sales on the part of one (dominant)
producer should open a larger share of the market for the competitors, who
can then charge a higher price.
Our purpose in this chapter is to unravel this apparent paradox. To do that,
we take up the issues of network effects and the peculiar characteristics of the
growing markets for “digital goods,” or those goods (such as software, e-books,
e-music, and e-movies) that can be produced with 1s and 0s and can be distrib-
uted as electrons over wires and through the air. We refer often to the
Microsoft antitrust case that was ‹led by the Justice Department and nineteen
state attorneys general in the spring of 1998 and settled in 2002. We take up
the Microsoft case because it vividly illustrates, to our way of thinking, how
conventional monopoly theory can misguide discussions of a monopoly’s sup-
posed harm to consumers.1 Moreover, as we will see, Microsoft’s market rivals
were the Justice Department’s biggest boosters on the case in the United
States and Europe, while consumers were largely supportive of Microsoft’s
side of the case. In addition, relatively new concepts to antitrust prosecutions
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such as “network effects” and consumer “lock-in” were at the foundation of the
government’s allegations of Microsoft’s misdeeds in the operating system and
browser market. Citing the monopoly issues in that case helps us make our
more general point, that is, how and under what circumstances monopoly can
be welfare enhancing for consumers.
the paradox in the microsoft antitrust case
Following conventional monopoly wisdom, the existence of some identi‹ed
barrier to entry, whether natural or arti‹cial, necessarily translates into
monopoly power. The higher the barrier, or the higher the cost that new
entrants must incur to enter the market, the greater the monopoly power, and
the greater the market inef‹ciency. The protected ‹rm can be expected to
exploit its favored market position just to maximize the wealth of the owners.
An understandable presumption exists among economists and policymakers
that a monopolist will fully exploit its market position. If a ‹rm does not
exploit its protected position, then the ‹rm’s stock price will suffer. Savvy
investors can be expected to buy out the monopoly owners, hike the ‹rm’s
product price to monopoly levels by curbing market supply, and then sell at a
higher price re›ecting the ‹rm’s monopoly rents.
If they could (at little or no cost), consumers would counter the monopo-
list’s market power by colluding with the intent of taking one or some combi-
nation of the following collective actions.
• Buying off the monopolist, which would involve paying the monopolist
more to expand output and sell at the competitive level than the monop-
olist would lose by not restricting production
• Setting a maximum price consumers would pay the monopolist exactly
equal to the competitive level, which, as is easily shown, would induce
the monopolist to expand production to the competitive output level
• Agreeing to suppress resale markets for the monopoly product in order
that the monopolist might (perfectly) price-discriminate, leaving con-
sumers with more output and, perhaps, greater consumer surplus
Barring their ability to collude (for collective decision-making reasons; see
chap. 2, this vol.), we would expect consumers to favor antitrust prosecution
against monopolists, but only if the costs of prosecution are not greater than
the added consumer surplus resulting from greater competition, lower prices,
and higher industry output. Consumers might understandably favor the regu-
lation of monopoly, as long as the regulation were used to further the interests
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of consumers, not those of the regulated monopoly (which might be a political
pipe dream)—all of which are points that should now be familiar to readers
who have made their way through the ‹rst three chapters of this book.
A paradox therefore arises in the way that monopoly theory plays out in
modern markets: Consumers continue to support monopolies that (supposedly
or allegedly) utilize what appear to be the market restrictions of a monopolist
(or any ‹rm with market power). We say that because a federal district court in
2000 declared Microsoft to be an oppressive monopoly, protected by the so-
called applications barrier to entry, which Microsoft had sought to fortify and
to extend its market power by tying—or bolting—its Internet browser to its
operating system. According to the district court, the company also engaged in
predation against Netscape—which, at one time, was the most widely used
Internet browser and which the court saw as a presumed critical component of
a potential alternative computer platform to Windows—by giving away its
Internet Explorer and by negotiating exclusive contracts for the distribution of
Internet Explorer with an array of independent software developers, Internet
access providers, computer manufacturers, and others.2
Although the appeals court reversed the lower court on several of
Microsoft’s alleged misdeeds, the appeals court did concur that Microsoft was
a monopoly that had (in limited ways) abused its market position. Indeed, both
the district court and the appeals court found that Microsoft (with an operat-
ing system market share found to be upward of 95 percent) was protected by
the “applications barrier to entry” (made up, supposedly, of 70,000 Windows-
based applications), which necessarily hikes entry costs for potential rivals.
Accordingly, the appeals court unanimously upheld “the District Court’s [that
is, Judge Thomas Pen‹eld Jackson’s] ‹nding of monopoly power in its
entirety” (U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 2001, 15), draw-
ing that conclusion mainly on this determination.
That barrier—the “applications barrier to entry”—stems from two charac-
teristics of the software market: (1) most consumers prefer operating sys-
tems for which a large number of applications have already been written;
and (2) most developers prefer to write for operating systems that already
have a substantial consumer base. . . . This “chicken-and-egg” situation
ensures that applications will continue to be written for the already domi-
nant Windows, which in turn ensures that consumers will continue to pre-
fer it over other operating systems. (20)3
On the other hand, survey after survey throughout the four-plus years of
court proceedings found that a substantial number of computer users—upward
of three-fourths—continued to favor the Microsoft side in the ongoing legal
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debate and would have liked nothing better than for the Justice Department
and the nineteen state attorneys general pursuing the case to leave Microsoft
alone. For example, Americans for Technology Leadership (van Lohuizen
2001), an advocacy trade association for a number of technology ‹rms (but
mainly ‹nanced by Microsoft), found just after the appeals court handed down
its decision in late June 2001 that
• 84 percent of the 500 registered voters polled believed that Microsoft
had bene‹ted consumers, whereas only 8 percent believed that
Microsoft had harmed consumers. 
• 74 percent disapproved of preventing the shipment of Windows XP,
which would, at the time of the poll, be shipped with additional inte-
grated applications, and 57 percent of the respondents felt “strongly”
about this point.
• 68 percent felt that Microsoft’s competitors, not consumers, were
bene‹ting most from the case. 
• 78 percent said that Microsoft’s competitors should spend more time on
innovating and less time on litigating.
Moreover, 77 percent of those polled had a “very favorable” or “somewhat
favorable” impression of Microsoft, whereas only 12 percent had a “somewhat
unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” impression of Microsoft. Those ratings
compare very favorably with the ratings received by AOL-Time Warner (58
percent to 21 percent), Sun Microsystems (31 percent to 3 percent), and Ora-
cle (25 percent to 4 percent)—all ‹rms that have never been legally tagged as
monopolies. Only IBM—a ‹rm that spent thirteen years defending itself in the
courts against federal claims of antitrust violations—among the four alterna-
tive ‹rms covered in the survey had a better rating (80 percent to 5 percent).
Granted, these survey results might have been shaped by the people behind
them, who surely were interested in making Microsoft look good and in hav-
ing the antitrust case set aside. The Harris Poll found from a survey conducted
in 1999 (a year and a half after the Microsoft antitrust case had been ‹led) that
in spite of all the hostile commentaries on how the company had “bullied”
practically everyone in the computer industry, Microsoft was rated number
one in terms of overall reputation among the forty top technology companies,
many of which—such as Dell, Amazon, and eBay—are in what might be
deemed highly competitive markets (Alsop 1999).
The persistently high level of public support for the Microsoft side in the
case seems to be all the more striking given how many hundreds of thousands
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of times Microsoft was tagged in the media (even before any court handed
down a ruling) by respected policymakers, business people, journalists, and
editorialists as a power-wielding “monopoly” that extracted its considerable
cash reserves (in excess of $50 billion at this writing in mid-2006, after the
company began setting aside long-standing private antitrust suits from a vari-
ety of companies with settlements in hundreds of millions, and billions, of dol-
lars) from the hides of consumers.
Moreover, the survey ‹ndings on consumers’ widely shared favorable view
of Microsoft are all the more surprising when it is recognized that the so-called
network effects that the Justice Department and others claim to be endemic to
software markets can give rise to some unknown amount of consumer resent-
ment toward Microsoft. If Microsoft is able to build its network for Windows
through competitive means—for example, by charging relatively low prices—
more people will buy Windows because more applications will be created
(written by developers because of Microsoft’s actual or expected market dom-
inance). Consumers of Microsoft products will gain in the process. However,
to the extent that Microsoft’s market strategies and network success draw con-
sumers away from alternative operating systems—say, Apple or Linux—
Microsoft causes a collapse of the network effects for users of those alternative
operating systems. Thus, those consumers should see themselves as harmed by
Microsoft and, of course, might be expected to have an unfavorable, if not hos-
tile, view of Microsoft.
There is, we agree, nothing in these (or other poll) ‹ndings that is con-
clusive. Understandably, economists take a dim view of what people report on
surveys, since memories easily fade and the costs of giving distorted responses
can be zero. However, the poll ‹ndings are worthy of serious re›ection
because if Microsoft were an abusive monopoly (at least in the conventional
sense), you might expect consumers to do the opposite, that is, overwhelm-
ingly favor the government’s side, while Microsoft’s competitors favor the
Microsoft side. But again, the exact opposite has been the case, revealing a
paradox important enough to demand an explanation. We are concerned here
not so much with the particulars of the Microsoft case but rather with a more
general question: Is it possible to conceive of a “monopolist” that has all the
markers of a monopoly (that is, has a dominant market position with its mar-
ket ›anks protected by some entry barrier), acts like a monopolist (that is,
seeks to price above marginal cost and to reinforce its entry barriers), and yet
has consumers wanting it to retain its (supposed) market power? We submit




We see three possible ways of unraveling the paradox surrounding a so-called
monopoly such as Microsoft that appears to have all the customer approval of
a market-constrained competitor. First, perhaps computer users do not have
the requisite information to judge Microsoft’s behavior properly. If they did,
so the argument might be developed, they would see Microsoft for what it
really is, a monopolist that is, on balance, harmful to the vast majority of com-
puter users. This explanation is hardly appealing to most economists, whose
natural professional inclination is to go beyond popular commentaries that, in
so many words, reduce to the refrain that “people are stupid.” We economists
tend to dismiss such explanations unless some reason compels the belief that
consumers are uninformed. Maybe consumers are rationally ignorant when it
comes to monopoly, as Gordon Tullock has explained (1967, chap. 7).4
Then again, if consumers are not aware that they have lost consumer sur-
plus because of the monopoly behavior of a ‹rm, can it be said that any harm
has been done? The answer to that question is, at the very least, debatable, with
no clear resolution—not to our minds at least. Continuing this avenue for rec-
onciling the paradox appears to be no more productive than picking up on the
proverbial debate over whether any sound occurs when a tree falls in the forest
and no one is around to hear it.
The public choice and rent-seeking literature suggests another easy expla-
nation for the observed paradox. Microsoft’s competitors’ support for the
antitrust case, which contrasts with consumers’ support for Microsoft’s side, is
prima facie evidence that the Justice Department has the case all wrong:
Microsoft has been acting competitively, and the Justice Department has been
out to protect Microsoft’s competitors, not consumers, as several industrial
organizations and legal scholars have stressed with eloquence.
Perhaps Milton Friedman was correct when he mused, indirectly providing
his assessment of the Microsoft antitrust case,
When I started in this business, as a believer in competition, I was a great
supporter of antitrust laws; I thought enforcing them was one of the few
desirable things the government could do to promote more competition.
But as I watched what actually happened, I saw that, instead of promoting
competition, antitrust laws tended to do exactly the opposite, because they
tended, like so many government activities, to be taken over by the people
they were supposed to regulate and control. And so, over time, I have grad-
ually come to the conclusion that antitrust laws do far more harm than
good, and that we would be better off if we didn’t have them at all, if we
could get rid of them. (1999)
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William Baumol and Janusz Ordover have observed less kindly, “There is a
specter that haunts our antitrust institutions. Its threat is that, far from serving
as the bulwark of competition, these institutions will become the most power-
ful instrument in the hands of those who wish to subvert it. . . . We ignore it at
our peril and would do well to take steps to exorcise it.” They add later, “Para-
doxically, then and only then, when the joint venture [or other market action]
is bene‹cial [to consumers], can those rivals be relied upon to denounce the
undertaking as ‘anticompetitive’” (1985, 247, 257).
Former judge Robert Bork made the Baumol and Ordover point in the late
1970s even more strongly (two decades before he became a legal consultant on
the Microsoft case for Microsoft’s critics): “Modern antitrust has so decayed
that the policy is no longer intellectually respectable. Some of it is not
respectable as law; more of it is not respectable as economics; and now I wish
to suggest that, because it pretends to one objective while frequently accom-
plishing its opposite, and because it too often forwards trends dangerous to our
form of government and society, a great deal of antitrust is not even
respectable as politics” (1978, 63).5
This explanation may be comforting both to antitrust experts with a pub-
lic-choice bent and to Microsoft media supporters, such as the editors at the
Wall Street Journal, but it hardly rings true for many of Microsoft’s critics—
including many lawyers in the Justice Department, as well as the eight judges
(one at the district court level and seven at the appeals court level) who have
heard the case—who seem to truly believe in it and have faith in their position
that Microsoft is a protected dominant producer that has acted like a full-
›edged, welfare-destroying monopoly. They posit that many consumers are,
for all practical purposes, locked into the use of Windows by very high switch-
ing costs, attributable to network effects and the applications barrier to entry
(another form of entry barrier taken up, with different twists in arguments, in
the next chapter). Consumer lock-in supposedly gives Microsoft its predatory
monopoly power against potential rivals and affords Microsoft the opportunity
to exploit its market position in the future, if not before and during the trial.
Even if Microsoft had not immediately exploited its monopoly power, by
the time of the trial, rational consumers should have felt the future harm that
Microsoft was poised to in›ict—the expected lost consumer surplus—as they,
the consumers, developed present discounted estimates of the high price of
using Microsoft products in the future. Nevertheless, many computer users do
not seem to be particularly concerned that Microsoft may have precluded com-
petitors from the market.
How might these reactions be explained without resorting to an explana-
tion that posits consumer ignorance or a sinister political plot by the Justice
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Department and Microsoft’s competitors? More generally, and apart from the
particulars of the Microsoft case, how can it be that a ‹rm showing all the signs
of being a protected monopoly is viewed by most consumers as benign, if not
welfare enhancing? We can posit an even more intriguing question: Might
there not be such a thing as a welfare-enhancing monopoly, contrary to what
is suggested by practically all of the economic literature, with Joseph Schum-
peter’s (1942) and John McGee’s (1971) works being the most prominent
exceptions?
If we start with the standard monopoly model under which market demand
is given and ‹nd that the marginal cost of producing additional units is posi-
tive, and possibly even increasing, then a protected, pro‹t-maximizing monop-
oly cannot be welfare enhancing, at least not in a present-value sense. Con-
sumers would clearly want the monopolist controlled. But perhaps the
conventional hypothesized market conditions would not apply to all markets
subject to monopolization. Perhaps we need a new perspective—or rather, we
need to reconsider an old one.
In developing his view of markets as an evolutionary process of “creative
destruction,” Schumpeter (1942, chap. 8) reasoned that only by having
monopolies, with their attendant negative consequences (as conventionally
modeled by economists), can we count on growth reaching its full potential.
Schumpeter suggests that monopolies established by market means play much
the same role in markets that patents and contracts play, as barriers to entry
with an array of provisions that allow ‹rms to recover their up-front invest-
ments.6
We might quibble with Schumpeter’s position, as have many economists
(evident from the review of the literature in chap. 1). However, he seems to
have a reasonable point: Before making their investments, entrepreneurs need
to be able to at least expect to recover them. Patents, copyrights, regulatory
regimes, and contracts are institutional means that have been developed to
provide entrepreneurs with the requisite assurances and incentives to make
their investments. We can conceive of market circumstances in which these
other means of assurances don’t work very well. For example, we can imagine
circumstances that require more parties to sign contracts than is feasible. Fur-
ther, some goods might be too cheaply copied to make patents and copyrights
effective, and ‹nally, governments might be too constrained constitutionally to
permit regulatory regimes to create the required protection. However, in some
subset of those cases, monopolies—with natural or arti‹cial barriers erected—
might provide the requisite entrepreneurial assurances for up-front invest-
ments to be made.
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digital markets
Schumpeter’s view of what we might call welfare-enhancing monopolies might
be more appropriate for our time than his own, mainly because of the advent
of digital goods, or goods that basically consist of 1s and 0s. Two key attributes
of such goods are their strong network effects and the low—close to zero, if not
zero—marginal production cost.
Network Effects
Consider a market that has the attribute believed by the Justice Department to
characterize the operating system market: network effects.7 This term means
that the value of the product to individual consumers escalates with the growth
in the number of users. In the case of the operating system market, if more
people use Windows, then more program developers will write applications for
Windows. When more applications are written for Windows, then the
demands of individual consumers for Windows will rise, mainly owing to the
growth in the number of Windows users and the value of Windows to each
user. There are, in other words, economies of scale in consumption that
increase short-run market demand while potentially making the long-run
demand for the network product highly elastic. As with scale economies on the
production side, demand-side scale economies should be expected to lead to a
concentration of sales among a few producers, if not a single producer.
To graphically see the impact of network effects, consider ‹gure 4.1. In
that ‹gure, D1 is the current short-run demand for a good that exhibits net-
work effects of the sort just described, with future demand a function of the
quantity currently bought. We can start with a high price of P3, which will lead
to a quantity bought of Q1, which we assume, for simplicity’s sake, is such a
small quantity that no material network effects occur. However, if the price is
lowered to P2, the current consumption goes to Q2, with the result that in the
future, the short-run consumer demand rises to D2—because the inframarginal
values of all units rise with more people buying the good. Future consumption
rises to Q3 at price P2. In the case of an operating system, the greater sales of
the system lead to more programs being developed for the system. In the case
of telephones, it means that all telephone subscribers have more people to call
with more phone and service contract sales. If the current price is further low-
ered to P1, consumption in the short-run expands along the short-run demand
curve D1 to Q4. However, with time the short-run demand rises from D1 to D3.
Consumption in the future at price P1 rises to Q5.
A couple of points emerge from this description of demand for a network
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good. First, the economist’s old axiom that price doesn’t affect demand as a
functional relationship between price and quantity (but rather affects “quantity
demanded”) is no longer exactly right. Demand is affected by price (indirectly
at least) via the quantity consumed by a larger pool of consumers. Price there-
fore affects value, which raises questions about the supposed antisocial nature
of a monopolist’s pricing strategy—because the standard static model is no
longer representative of what a monopoly does and does not do.
Second, in standard demand analysis, the long-run elasticity of demand is
affected by the length of the time period (because the time period affects the
number of substitutes that can be sought out and considered by consumers).
For a network good, the elasticity of demand is also affected by the extent of the
network effects. The greater and more immediate the network effects, the
greater the elasticity of the long-run demand and the greater the incentive the
producer has to lower its initial price. In terms of ‹gure 4.1 and the assump-
tions about the expansion of the short-run demand curves from D1 to D2 to D3
when the price is lowered from P3 to P2 to P1, respectively, the long-run
demand is represented by the line DLR1. However, if the network effects are so
strong that the short-run demand expands with time from D1 to D3 when the
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Figure 4.1. The lagged demand curve
price is lowered currently from P3 to P2, the long-run demand curve will be
more elastic, DLR2 instead of DLR1.
Third, network effects can give rise, beyond some point, to a tipping of the
market toward a producer that appears to be winning any competitive battle.
This means that consumers can be expected to move to the dominant producer
because of that producer’s increasing sales, which, again, must force up the val-
ues of all units bought. The ‹rm that is the subject of the market tipping need
not actually be the dominant producer at the time the market tips. All that is
required is that consumers think or expect that the ‹rm will be the dominant
producer. Hence, all producers in the market should be expected to work to
affect consumer expectations of their individual market dominance. One way
for a producer to make believers of consumers is to price its product low, which
can assure consumers that it will have lots of sales and that the market will tip
its way. The up-front competition among would-be dominant producers can
be expected to be intense, because the producers are competing not just for
current sales but for a future stream of growing sales and market dominance,
and the potential economic pro‹ts that can then come from market domi-
nance.
Fourth, concerned with standard, non-network goods, economists under-
standably draw their blackboard demand curves fully contained within the ‹rst
or positive quadrant. That is, the demand curve is never extended below the
horizontal x-axis into the negative fourth quadrant (as done in ‹g. 4.1). This is
because a (conventional textbook) ‹rm never has a reason to charge a negative
price (that is, the ‹rm pays consumers to buy the good), even if the negative
price would extend sales. Negative prices can never be pro‹t maximizing for
conventional goods because marginal cost is never negative, and no future
bene‹t is to be derived from its negative prices. Network goods are categori-
cally different. Zero and negative current prices are viable pricing options
because of the network effects, or because the short-run demand in the future
can be greater because of the current zero and below-zero prices, which sug-
gest at least the potential for raising the price in the future. Zero or below-zero
prices are not necessarily any more predatory for network goods than are pos-
itive prices for non-network goods.
Fifth, current (low) prices do not necessarily imply that consumers are bet-
ter off than they will be in the future when the price is raised (if it is raised).
The explanation hangs on the potential for an enlarged future network. Con-
sumer surplus from the current low price can be lower than the consumer sur-
plus realized when the then current demand in the future is higher and the
price is higher. In terms of ‹gure 4.1, the consumer surplus from a price of P3,
when the demand is D1, is P3AB. The consumer surplus from a price of P2 in the
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future, when the demand is D3, is off the chart, equal to the area above P2C and
below the demand curve D3 (assuming that it is extended at the top to the ver-
tical axis). Consequently, even if a producer of a network good comes to dom-
inate totally its market (because of, say, the tipping process) and that producer
charges (what are conventionally thought to be) monopoly prices (because at
that point in the development of the market the price is above marginal cost
and a deadweight-loss triangle and a rectangular economic pro‹t box can be
identi‹ed), consumers are not then necessarily worse off. Their net consumer
surplus—the Dupuit triangle—can be greater at that future point in time when
they pay monopoly prices. This is true even if consumers feel trapped by, or
locked in to the purchase of, the network good. Indeed, consumers can ‹nd
positive value in the prospects of being locked in to a network, meaning their
demand for the good can be greater with the lock-in than without. With the
potential for lock-in, consumers can be more willing to make their own up-
front investments in adapting their behavior to the network good, with
reduced fear that fellow consumers can easily move, unraveling the network
and undercutting the value of consumers’ up-front investments.
Sixth, any producer that comes to dominate its market because of network
effects cannot be judged to be a monopolist solely by the economic pro‹ts that
it is then making. Over the course of the relevant market periods, the monop-
olist might really have earnings that are far closer to normal pro‹ts. This is
because it might have charged zero or negative prices (or more likely, below-
cost prices) in early time periods. Its losses must be set against any future eco-
nomic pro‹ts to determine the ‹rm’s true rate of return over time.
Low or Zero Marginal Cost
The marginal cost of reproducing units of the digital good can be close to zero,
if not zero. At such cost, all (or practically all) production costs are up front—
that is, sunk costs. In the case of Windows, Microsoft ships a master copy to
computer manufacturers that they store on their central servers, and they,
competing computer manufacturers, make copies electronically by transfer-
ring the code from their servers to the computers that are shipped, a process
that makes the marginal cost of copies of Windows about as close to zero as can
be imagined for Microsoft; and nothing suggests that marginal cost will ever
rise, given the scant material and labor costs involved in the reproduction of
copies from the master.
Graphically, the digital ‹rm’s cost structure is substantially different from
the cost structure discussed in chapter 3 (‹g. 3.1), in which the marginal cost
and average cost curves are constant and identical. Assuming the limit of zero
marginal cost, the long-run marginal cost curve lies along the horizontal axis in
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any constructed graph. The long-run average cost curve, however, starts out at
one unit for which the average cost is equal to the up-front (‹xed) cost. As
more and more units are produced, the average cost descends, since the up-
front costs are progressively prorated over a larger and larger quantity. The
average cost curve will have a parabolic shape, with the curve becoming asymp-
totic to the horizontal axis. There are, indeed, virtually unlimited scale
economies in supply in the case of the pure digital good.
Perhaps these economies of scale in supply and demand do not map per-
fectly to the Microsoft case. However, any lack of congruency should not dis-
tract us from the conceptual points that ›ow from a market beset by economies
of scale on both sides of the market. If a number of producers were already in
such a market, meaning that they have products and have incurred the up-front
development costs, the up-front development costs would be ignored in their
pricing decisions, as they should be. But this means that the price of the prod-
uct can fall to zero in competitive markets in which the ‹rms do not produce
complements (and can possibly fall to below zero in competitive markets in
which the ‹rms produce complements, with negative prices translating into
the producers paying buyers to take their products).8 Even if the price were
barely above zero, it would be in the interest of producers to lower their prices
more, given the network effects and supply-side economies of scale. Clearly,
the producers in such a market would agree that they made a big mistake in
getting into the market in the ‹rst place. They would feel this way because they
will not be able to cover their up-front costs. Their prior mistakes, however,
will not deter them from pricing with only their marginal costs in mind (as we
economists reverently teach our beginning students).
Dynamic Inef‹ciency
Recognizing the prospects of a zero price in markets with a zero marginal cost,
producers will understandably look carefully at such markets before ever incur-
ring the ‹xed development costs, a point that has been recognized in the eco-
nomic literature for at least 150 years but that has been updated by a sequence
of economists over the years.9 In contemplating the creation of goods, produc-
ers will assess their chances of becoming the standard, or selling to the entire
market, in the initial competitive struggle, but they will also assess the extent
to which competitors can enter and capture their buyers after they have
become the standard and incurred their up-front ‹xed development costs.
The situation faced by an aspiring monopolist of a network good is not
unlike that of a rent-seeking ‹rm attempting to secure a legal monopoly from
Congress in competition with other ‹rms. In the rent-seeking case, only one
‹rm can succeed, and the money spent rent seeking is lost whether a ‹rm wins
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or loses. The possibility exists, as shown by Tullock (1980), that the competi-
tion can result in more being spent on rent seeking than the legal monopoly is
worth. In the case of ‹rms taking losses on current sales of a network good as
each attempts to become the dominant ‹rm, Tullock’s result establishes the
possibility that the total current losses (which are gains to consumers) can be
greater than the monopoly pro‹ts realized by the winning ‹rm.10 This is
clearly a situation in which the consumers do very well even though they end
up dealing with a monopolist (Tullock 1980).
One of the unrecognized problems with prices established in perfectly
competitive markets, as stressed by Paul Romer (1994) in his contributions to
the “neo-Schumpeterian growth theory,” is that such prices re›ect goods’
marginal values only and, in turn, are equated only with producers’ marginal
costs of production. The disincentive that producers have to innovate under
such circumstances is particularly acute in markets with high ‹xed costs (rela-
tive to marginal costs), as noted, but the incentive problems on the innovation
front of perfectly competitive prices do not go away when ‹xed costs are rela-
tively low. This is because the prices do not and cannot re›ect the full infra-
marginal values of the goods that can be created.11 In static analysis, this obser-
vation is of no consequence, because the goods are given, meaning they do not
have to be created, but the observation can be critically important when the
goods must ‹rst be created (or improved). With prices not re›ecting the
goods’ full market value, entrepreneurs have an impaired incentive to innovate,
that is, create the goods that can be then subjected to static analysis. While
monopoly prices might give rise to the static deadweight loss, they also allow
entrepreneurs to capture more of created goods’ full market value, which can
mean more goods than otherwise being created. Put another way, perfectly
competitive prices can imply static Pareto ef‹ciency but can also result in a
form of dynamic inef‹ciency, or an underallocation of resources to the cre-
ation of new products and improvements in old ones. If created, such goods
could enhance consumer welfare over time by far more than welfare is under-
cut by monopoly prices at any point in time, given the array of products that
are then available.
As Romer (1994) suggests, static competitive analysis assumes away one of
the more important problems any economy faces, the appropriate allocation of
resources to the extraordinarily complex problem of selecting those goods that
will in fact be created from a virtual in‹nite array of goods that could be created.
In highly competitive markets, the high-‹xed-cost problem will cause some
goods that should be created (because their total value exceeds all costs) to go
uncreated altogether, with development resources (mis)allocated toward the
(over)creation of goods that do not confront the high-‹xed-cost problem.
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Competitive prices that allow for recovery of ‹xed costs can still lead to an
underallocation of resources in the creation of the most highly valued new
goods. And the problem of ‹xed costs, which are unavoidable when consider-
ing the creation of goods, is obviously of greater importance than economists
have been willing to admit.
Evidence that ‹xed costs are important comes from the observation that
many services and goods are simply not available at any price in many parts
of the world. If there were no ‹xed costs, one should ‹nd that all possible
goods, services, and production processes and types of exchange are avail-
able to ‹rms located everywhere in the world. (Romer 1994, 24–25)12
One of the totally unappreciated bene‹ts of monopoly prices is that they allow
for at least a partial correction of this dynamic resource allocation problem
over time. Monopoly prices can capture more of the consumers’ bene‹ts and
can, therefore, be better signals as to what entrepreneurs should do than com-
petitive prices, which can capture few of those bene‹ts (and the lower the mar-
ginal cost, the lower the bene‹ts competitive prices capture).
the relevance and potential welfare 
value of entry barriers
In the absence of entry barriers, a sole producer would be just that, a sole pro-
ducer—but without market power. That entry barriers protect the sole pro-
ducer’s ability to curb its own production, and therefore market supply, can be
surmised from William Landes and Richard Posner’s (1981) supply-based for-
mula for market power.13 Indeed, it is altogether reasonable to deduce that a
dominant ‹rm’s power to extract monopoly rents and impose deadweight
losses is directly related to the height of the entry barriers. The higher the
entry barriers, the greater the monopoly rents and deadweight losses, as con-
ventionally argued.
Such a line of argument is ‹ne as long as it is pursued for its own theoreti-
cal sake, because the conclusions drawn can be perfectly consistent with the
underlying premises. The standard paradigm, however, can become problem-
atic when it forms the basis of antitrust prosecution, mainly because it suggests
that the primary task of antitrust enforcers is twofold: (1) to establish the ‹rm’s
market dominance, and then (2) to establish the existence of entry barriers.
Accordingly, in the Microsoft case, the appeals court endorsed the district
court’s ‹nding that Microsoft was an overwhelmingly dominant ‹rm in the
operating system market and that, in the absence of conventional entry barri-
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ers, an interesting new entry barrier had arisen in the operating systems mar-
ket. This “applications barrier to entry” was justi‹cation enough for the dis-
trict court to deduce that key Microsoft business strategies—such as giving
away Internet Explorer or bolting Internet Explorer into Windows—were vio-
lations of antitrust laws, because they (and Microsoft’s substantial expenditures
supporting those strategies) could have no other conceivable justi‹cation than
to maintain Microsoft’s market dominance. Of course, the implications are
that the barriers worked to lower consumer welfare, not so much in the usual
way, through production restrictions, but through impairment of innovation
( Jackson 1999, ¶ 412).
But are entry barriers always and everywhere destructive of welfare? Might
they not advance welfare, at least sometimes? The answer to both questions is
obviously confused as far as government policy is concerned. Governments
everywhere have elaborated complex antitrust laws that focus on entry barriers
as close to prima facie evidence of monopoly power. On the other hand, gov-
ernments have equally complex copyright and patent laws that accomplish
nothing if they do not erect entry barriers, all for the express purpose of pro-
viding the copyright and patent holders with an element of monopoly power,
the presumed requisite incentive for holders to produce more new works than
would otherwise be produced. This means that there is a presumption underly-
ing copyright and patent laws that the added value to consumers from the addi-
tional works produced is greater than the lost value from all works having some
monopoly privilege. Is there not some differential market condition that is dri-
ving the schism in the government’s treatment of the different entry barriers?
Again, if the entry costs were zero, the producers would be understandably
reluctant to enter the market. Indeed, they simply would not enter. They could
anticipate being under constant threat of entry and would have to constantly
fear that their prices would be pushed toward zero, if not to zero (and below).
Producers of normal goods—those with positive and eventually rising mar-
ginal costs—do not have to worry nearly as much about market protections in
the form of entry barriers because of the nature of their cost structure—
namely, the positive and rising marginal cost of production. That marginal
cost curve provides them with some protection against the price falling to zero
and against their not being able to recoup their up-front investments. Indeed,
the greater the marginal cost and the more steeply it rises, the greater protec-
tion such producers have and the less they have to be concerned about such
auxiliary protections, most notably entry barriers.
Producers of goods with zero marginal costs, on the other hand, would
naturally look for entry barriers to ensure that they can recover their develop-
ment costs. They would also (more so than producers of goods with positive
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and rising marginal cost curves) critically assess a priori their market power—
or monopoly position—after they become established in the market. The
greater their prospect of recovering their development costs, the greater their
willingness to produce the product, which converts to the proposition that the
greater the entry barriers, the greater the producers’ willingness to incur the
development costs, with the end result being, potentially, greater consumer
welfare.
Of course, products can vary along any number of dimensions, not the least
of which are sophistication, usefulness, and reliability—what might be con-
strued as quality—and the quality of a product can determine the required
development costs. The greater the quality, the greater the required develop-
ment costs, or so we might expect. Hence, we would rightfully anticipate that
entry barriers can determine how much ‹rms would be willing to incur in the
way of development costs, which is to say, what quality they would seek in the
products they develop. The greater the entry barriers, other things being
equal, the greater the quality of the product.
As in the case of copyrights and patents, the added value from additional
goods and higher quality goods being produced with entry barriers can exceed
the monopoly ef‹ciency losses on all monopoly goods.
Chicken-and-Egg Problem
As noted, some markets are said to harbor network effects. No doubt, some
network effects are “natural,” that is, they occur without any work on the part
of the ‹rms producing the products. However, many network effects require
work and encouragement on the part of the ‹rms that might bene‹t from
them, if for no other reason than the widely acknowledged “chicken-and-egg-
problems” that often are embedded in such network good markets. To encour-
age their customers to join their online banking networks, banks understood
that they had to ‹nd ways to overcome many customers’ resistance to incurring
the initial costs of changing well-worn banking habits and learning new com-
puter click sequences on the banks’ Web sites. Hence, when it initiated its
online bill-paying service, Citibank gave customers up to $25 for using its
online system. Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Wachovia, and Washington
Mutual offered the service free for at least two months and then priced the ser-
vice below cost after the introductory free period. J. P. Morgan/Chase outdid
them all by paying their customers $5 per transaction carried out online with
the total payment per month limited to $50, with the offer period also limited
to three months (Bayot 2003).
An operating system ‹rm understands that an operating system is useless to
most computer users without applications, and applications developers can
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reason that their applications are useless without an operating system. Accord-
ingly, the applications developers’ willingness to write for any given operating
system will also be founded on their assessment of the operating system’s
chances of becoming the dominant producer.14
To overcome this classic chicken-and-egg problem and to improve its
chances of being seen as the dominant producer, an operating system ‹rm can
be expected to work hard at improving its system and, just as important, easing
the problems that developers face in writing for its operating system. The
operating system ‹rm also has two incentives to lower its initial price. First, a
lower price will increase the copies sold and cause network effects to kick in.
Second, a lower price can be expected to improve the chances that the applica-
tions developers will see the operating system as becoming the dominant pro-
ducer, which can make for self-ful‹lling expectations of the ‹rm’s market
dominance.
Now, the extent of the entry barriers can affect how diligently—in terms of
how many resources will be devoted and how fast they will be devoted—any
‹rm will attempt to develop its potential network. The entry barriers will also
determine how low a ‹rm will push its initial price. It seems altogether reason-
able to surmise that the greater the entry barriers, the lower the initial price
and the faster the network will develop, because the prospective entry barrier
for other potential entrants implies a greater reward for developing the net-
work. In the case of the operating system ‹rm, the lower the initial price, the
greater the likelihood that it will have applications written for it, and if a bar-
rier to entry exists in the form of an “applications barrier to entry,” as the
courts have af‹rmed is true of the Microsoft market, then the lower the initial
price, the greater the applications barrier to entry.15
What makes the efforts by would-be monopolists to create and nurture
entry barriers problematic is that any barrier, whatever its name, that is created
and nurtured in the process of a ‹rm taking advantage of network effects will
be seen, by those who have adopted conventional monopoly theory, as inspir-
ing monopoly behavior, or rather behavior that is, on balance, destructive of
consumer welfare. If the ‹rm charges anything above marginal cost (meaning
above zero), the price will necessarily be seen as monopolistic, especially if the
‹rm is dominant (because of the network effects). And if there is some entry
barrier, the presumed monopoly (and harmful consequences of the ‹rm’s
“restrictive practices” or its aggressive pricing and product development
strategies to maintain its market dominance) will be forti‹ed even more if the
‹rm also makes a lot of money on current sales, as Microsoft does.
Interestingly, in the rebuttal phase of the Microsoft trial, the Justice
Department’s chief economic consultant, Franklin Fisher, argued that
84 in defense of monopoly
Microsoft’s monopoly position in operating systems is the reason that
Microsoft can charge “superhigh prices” and earn “supernormal pro‹ts.” Sim-
ilarly, when the Computer and Communications Industry Association ‹led its
antitrust complaint against Microsoft in early 2003, it argued that “Microsoft’s
extraordinary ‹nancial performance and pricing behaviour provide powerful
evidence of its dominance. In particular, Microsoft’s exceptional freedom from
competition is apparent in its 80 percent pro‹t margins for both its operating
systems and personal productivity applications.”16 Conventional monopoly
theory makes no allowance for the prospect that current monopoly rents, gen-
erated by above-marginal-cost pricing, may in some cases really be necessary,
a form of payback for initial up-front, sunk expenditures and depressed prices,
strategies the monopolist may have used to build its network, as well as build
its requisite entry barriers. Moreover, the theory fails to consider that the exis-
tence and persistence of Microsoft-type monopolies can inspire a “perennial
gale” of innovation throughout the economy, precisely because of the demon-
strated monopoly rents garnered by the extant monopolies.
Entry barriers can seem on par with mountains: Once they exist, they never
go away and never have to be forti‹ed and maintained. However, that is not
likely to be the case, except in instances in which the entry barriers are physi-
cal (as in exclusive control of a raw material). Even government regulatory
entry barriers have to be maintained with continual lobbying to ensure that the
ever-changing body of legislators sees the need to maintain the regulations as
they are. In the case of an entry barrier such as the applications barrier to entry,
the operating system ‹rm may constantly have to assure the applications writ-
ers, through both the development and pricing of its operating system, that it
will retain its dominant market position. The ‹rm might even have to use
whatever market power it has to keep competitors at bay. For example, it
might integrate a browser into its operating system when faced with the
prospects of a new personal computer platform emerging based in part on a
browser.
Alternatively, the ‹rm might ‹gure that when faced with a market chal-
lenge, it can use the existing barrier to entry as a means of achieving contracts
with computer manufacturers, independent software developers, and Internet
access providers to use its browser over the browser of the rivals. The point is
that the ability to fend off potential challengers will feed back into the ‹rm’s
willingness to incur the up-front costs for developing its product and network
effects, some of which occur by lowering the product’s initial price (perhaps to
zero or even below zero). The greater the ease with which potential rivals can
be fended off, the greater the development costs incurred by the ‹rm—and the
greater the potential network bene‹ts to consumers.
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We can’t stress enough that given the current antitrust thinking, which is
grounded in conventional monopoly models, antitrust enforcers could easily
interpret the efforts of the operating system ‹rm to fend off rivals as anticom-
petitive and a violation of the country’s antitrust laws. Indeed, as already noted,
the district court declared Microsoft to be a monopoly because the company’s
substantial market share was protected by the applications barrier to entry. It
then reasoned that Microsoft’s efforts to zero-price its browser were predatory
and that its restrictive contracts were exclusionary. Moreover, Microsoft had
demonstrated a persistent “course of [monopoly] conduct” that justi‹ed a
breakup of the company, or as Judge Thomas Pen‹eld Jackson wrote in his
Findings of Fact (1999, ¶ 412),
Through its conduct toward Netscape, IBM, Compaq, Intel, and others,
Microsoft has demonstrated that it will use its prodigious market power
and immense pro‹ts to harm any ‹rm that insists on pursuing initiatives
that could intensify competition against one of Microsoft’s core products.
Microsoft’s past success in hurting such companies and sti›ing innovation
deters investment in technologies and businesses that exhibit the potential
to threaten Microsoft. The ultimate result is that some innovations that
would truly bene‹t consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do
not coincide with Microsoft’s self-interest.
With conventional monopoly theory as a reference, the normal assumption
is that consumers would be against the monopolist preying against actual or
potential market rivals—and the maintenance of its entry barriers. From the
less static, evolutionary Schumpeterian perspective, the predation offers two
sources of consumer gains that would cause consumers to support the ‹rm’s
predation and its other efforts to maintain its entry barriers.
• First, consumers will understand that there are cases in which products
might not be created and produced in the ‹rst place if the ‹rm did not
see the potential to maintain its protective entry barriers, by predation or
otherwise.
• Second, if a ‹rm fends off potential entrants, some consumers can gain
from such predatory actions by the fact that the market might otherwise
fragment, meaning that the network will unravel, leaving its consumers
with fewer network effects and, beyond some point, the prospects of hav-
ing to incur the costs of switching to another network.
In short, the Justice Department’s and courts’ view notwithstanding, a
more consumer-friendly and developer-friendly explanation is possible for
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Microsoft’s actions that emerges from our discussion of how network effects
in›uence pricing decisions prior to the evolutionary process by which any net-
work emerges: In a market beset by network effects, consumers and applications
developers have an interest in some form of entry barrier, application or otherwise.
Consumers understand that the prospect of an applications entry barrier could
be all the reason Microsoft needed to aggressively develop the network by low-
ering its up-front price and by encouraging developers to write applications for
the Windows network, all to the bene‹t of the consumers. The network could
have developed more rapidly and to a greater level of coverage, with a more
sophisticated operating system and more sophisticated applications, than
would have existed without the prospects of the applications barrier. Seeing
the prospects of the applications barrier, the developers could have been all the
more eager to join the network early on and to upgrade the quality of their
programs, anticipating that their investment would not be voided by a later
breakup of the network.
Similarly, applications developers and consumers have a good old-fash-
ioned private interest in having the entry barriers maintained (even if the
methods have to be predatory): If competitors move into the market, the net-
work can be threatened. The applications developers’ up-front investments
can be undermined with a breakup of the network. The consumers’ assessed
value of the product can be undercut with the decline in available applications
and reduction in the count of consumers.
the problem of digital piracy
Buyers of industrial-era goods—for example, cars—can replicate the goods
they buy only at considerable cost, usually at a much higher cost than that of
the producers of the bought copies. Consumers certainly cannot use their
bought copies as a master. Hence, consumers are never imagined (in econo-
mists’ models) to be producers. In sharp contrast with industrial-era goods,
digital goods can be easily replicated by, potentially, nearly all buyers (with
the actual cost of replication clearly on a downward trend, barring the cre-
ation of workable and cost-effective locks for electronic and digital goods).
This means that buyers can become producers without having to incur any (or
few) up-front development costs, and buyers certainly represent a credible
threat when they have ready access to free and open distribution systems such
as the Internet.
The fact that buyers can be producers gives rise to two prospects: (1) digi-
tal markets are far more open to entry than are other markets—unless auxil-
iary, arti‹cial entry barriers are imposed; and (2) the marginal cost of produc-
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tion from all available producers of digital goods can remain at or close to zero
for a much larger range of output than is the case for industrial-era goods,
mainly because if marginal cost starts rising (which may not occur) for some
producers (say, the developers), buyers can transform themselves, and have the
incentive to transform themselves, into producers with an attendant marginal
cost of production that is at or close to zero, drastically extending the produc-
tion range before diminishing returns and scale diseconomies can be expected
to set in. That is, the elasticity of supply is greatly increased, and the price is
held close to zero. This set of circumstances can give rise to a virtually expo-
nential explosion in potential producers, who can enter the digital markets at
low purchase prices that have been suppressed by the price competition of the
original producers with existing and potential buyers who become producers.
This issue of the potential for buyers morphing into producers is especially
problematic for digital goods, given that the usual means of erecting entry bar-
riers—policing and prosecuting pirates—might prove to be ineffective.
Granted, Napster (which made a business out of making it easy for people to
swap—that is, pirate—musical ‹les) has been closed down, but as we developed
this book, media reports began emerging on how new Internet sites were pop-
ping up overseas, giving away the music of top acts—for example, Bruce
Springsteen—before they had been released by their labels (e.g., Healy 2002).
At any point in time in the real world, as opposed to the imagined static
models economists employ, an array of goods must exist that can be produced.
Without question, these goods will vary in the extent to which they can be
pro‹tably produced. Naturally, entrepreneurs will favor the more pro‹table
goods as they pick and choose among the array of potential goods they can
produce. Consequently, given the constraints of scarcity, some goods will not
be produced, but it does not follow that the goods that are forgone are the
goods with the least value to consumers. Some of the goods could be—and are
likely to be—ones that have low or zero marginal costs and, because of low or
a total absence of entry barriers, have little or no chance of being pro‹table (for
long), precluding some arti‹cially imposed entry barriers. Arti‹cial barriers to
entry, even when erected by the dominant producers, can in one sense lead to
what might be construed as a “monopoly” (especially if monopolies are de‹ned
by observed entry barriers), with the presumption of a deadweight loss as out-
put is restricted below competitive levels. However, no net inef‹ciency may
occur, in spite of the price being above marginal cost: The entry barriers them-
selves help overcome another possible market inef‹ciency, or a misallocation:
the overallocation of resources toward those goods that are protected by the
usual, natural means, that is, by positive and rising marginal costs and by buy-
ers not being able to easily replicate the goods they purchase.
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The case for ef‹ciency-enhancing entry barriers that we are seeking to
make here is, as might have already been surmised, similar to the case for cre-
ating police- and court-enforced entry barriers that protect legitimate holders
of copyrights and patents. Such barriers are created because the preponderance
of the relevant costs in developing products that are subject to copyrights and
patents are largely, if not totally, up-front, or sunk, costs. The holders are
granted so-called monopoly positions (for what used to be limited, though
increasingly lengthy, periods, but much less so today)17 to enable them to
recover their development costs.
The case for entry barriers that we are making also squares with the case
for preventing piracy on digital and nondigital goods. The pirates do not have
development costs, which means that if they are unconstrained, the producers
of the original products will not be able to recover their development costs, or
will have suppressed incentives to produce their products or to develop their
products to higher-quality levels. And there is every reason to expect that the
level of product development in terms of quality and sophistication will be
related to the extent that all entry barriers protect markets suf‹ciently for orig-
inal innovators to recover their quality-improvement costs.
When the goods at stake are digital, the pirates have a decided competitive
advantage: They can buy a fully formed master for their products off the shelf,
meaning, again, that they face virtually no barrier to entry on the product
development side, and their replication costs can be inconsequential, just as
might be true of the original producers, but they do not have to recover the
type of development costs that the original producers have to recover.18
Understandably, producers of many digital goods look to legal impediments—
arti‹cial entry barriers—to determine what, at what quality level, and how
much they produce.
However, there is one important caveat to keep in mind: Some piracy is not
all bad for the creators of all pirated goods, mainly those goods subject to net-
work effects. This is because the pirated copies can increase the value con-
sumers realize from buying copies. In the case of Microsoft’s Windows oper-
ating system, pirated copies can increase the willingness of applications
developers to write for Windows. The greater number of applications for
Windows can spur the pirating of Windows, but they can also increase the
number of bought copies of Windows (and, hence, bought copies of other
Microsoft productivity applications like Word). In the case of music, pirated
copies of music CDs can increase the number of people who buy the legitimate
CDs because they want to listen to what other people are listening to (Becker
1991). To the extent that their products are copied, original producers may not
have to lower their initial prices as much as otherwise to build their networks.
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Indeed, because of piracy, at least some original producers may be able to
charge higher prices in the future because of the buildup in demand over time
with piracy and added purchases.19
once again, why monopolies?
The lesson to be drawn from taking a Schumpeterian view of monopolies is
that economists should not be surprised that monopolies with varying degrees
of market power do exist and, at times, persist, at least long enough to allow the
monopolies to recover their development costs. In an ideal world, the kind of
monopolies that Schumpeter envisions would be unnecessary. Entrepreneurs
would solve the need for recovering their development costs via contracts (if
not patents and copyrights). However, entrepreneurs must make their way in a
second-best world ‹lled with limitations on institutional solutions such as con-
tracts. As is widely recognized, developing contracts might not work at all
under some conditions, for example, when the recovery of up-front invest-
ments requires a very long time, when enforcement mechanisms are uncertain,
and when the groups of consumers and producers (e.g., developers) are in ›ux.
Monopolies might simply work better than competitive markets under
some conditions, which could include situations that have high transaction
costs. When high transaction costs are involved, we might expect ‹rms to
avoid working out the required contracts and to work within the market con-
straints determined by available protections afforded by extant entry barriers
or by ones that can be erected. Alternatively, we might expect ‹rms with high
up-front investments and zero or close-to-zero marginal costs to gravitate
toward the production of those goods that have natural entry barriers, as
opposed to those goods that can be produced only with contracts that are
costly to negotiate.
We should not be surprised that monopolies of the kind Schumpeter envi-
sioned abound in markets for digital goods such as software. Given the zero, or
just very low, marginal cost of production, the optimum ‹rm size should be
expected to be very large, which, given the number of consumers involved,
could make transaction costs of negotiating the innumerable contracts quite
high. Also, given the enormous potential for piracy in digital markets (which,
again, emerges from the fact that each copy sold is a potential master for mak-
ing other copies), the ability and temptation for customers to become produc-
ers is also high, which is all the more reason that a ‹rm might not enter the
market without some con‹dence that customers face entry barriers that the
original producers don’t face.
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the microsoft problem for microsoft’s competitors
Admittedly, the thrust of our arguments to this point relating to the Justice
Department’s antitrust case against Microsoft favors the Microsoft side. This
bias exists not only because we see Microsoft as an example of our contention
that ‹rms with market power can bene‹t consumers but also because we see
fundamental inconsistencies in the government’s reasoning. Microsoft has
been charged with being a monopoly but does not appear to have acted like
one—at least in terms of its production and pricing decisions. The govern-
ment’s initial charge of “predatory” pricing suggests that Microsoft followed
a market strategy that is opposite of what would be expected of a classic
monopolist.
Granted, a ‹rm might seek to destroy competition with low prices, only to
charge monopoly prices in the future. However, the charge of predatory pric-
ing against Microsoft was, at the time the case was settled in late 2002, at least
a decade old, with no sign of Microsoft ever following through with a monop-
oly pricing strategy. In 1999, a year after the government ‹led its original com-
plaint, the real price of Windows 98 was 58 percent below the real price of a
much inferior version of Windows in the early 1990s. Moreover, Microsoft
had increased its market share over the passing decade, not contracted it, as
might have been expected of a true classic monopolist who reduces output and
raises prices. Besides, the company’s so-called predatory pricing for Internet
Explorer is, as we have argued, perfectly consistent with the pricing strategy a
‹rm would follow in a market beset with the conditions—network effects and
close-to-zero marginal cost—on which the government founded its case.
Fortunately, in 2002, the appeals court set aside most of the government’s
claims of Microsoft’s wrongdoing, with instructions that the case be reconsid-
ered by a new judge at the district court level and that any remedy should focus
on Microsoft’s bullying of computer manufacturers and Internet service
providers.
Nevertheless, Microsoft’s competitors—including Sun Microsystems,
Nokia, AOL/Time Warner, Kodak, Fujitsu, and Oracle—have not given up.
In early 2003, through their trade organization, the Computer and Communi-
cations Industry Association (CCIA), Microsoft’s competitors ‹led an antitrust
complaint with the European Commission, arguing that Microsoft was using
its “superdominant” monopoly position in the operating system, productivity
applications, and browser market to muscle its way into adjacent software mar-
kets that it had not yet managed to but would soon dominate if left unchecked,
according to the CCIA (2003).
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The adjacent markets of concern to Microsoft’s competitors are their mar-
kets for media players, e-mail client, instant messaging, server operating sys-
tems, e-mail and media servers, authentication, multimedia content and man-
agement, Internet advertising, handheld computing operating systems, smart
phone, game consoles and set-top boxes, and Internet portal software.
Microsoft’s competitors argue that “Microsoft’s anti-competitive behaviour
exploits two key characteristics of software markets: (1) strong network effects
and (2) strong interdependencies among software products, given that applica-
tions and the operating system must work together” (CCIA 2003, 2).
The European Commission bought Microsoft’s competitors’ argument,
ruling in 2004 that Microsoft must provide competitors with its source code so
that they could make their applications and server operating systems better
operate with Windows, must provide a version of Windows without media
player, and must pay a ‹ne of $610 million for abusing its monopoly position.
When the EC deemed Microsoft had stalled in opening its source code, it
imposed another ‹ne on Microsoft in mid-2006 of $358 million ( Jacoby 2006).
From the perspective of standard microeconomic theory, it is hard to
understand how Microsoft’s efforts to move into adjacent markets can be seen
as problems of monopoly per se, other than that Microsoft is a dominant pro-
ducer in key markets and threatens to become dominant in adjacent markets.
However, any market dominance achieved by Microsoft in adjacent markets
means that Microsoft must extend its production, not contract it as would be
expected in the case of a classic monopoly. Microsoft is also giving away several
of the products identi‹ed—again, the exact opposite of what is expected of a
classic monopoly. The antitrust complaint is also being ‹led by competitors,
which suggests, from the perspective of standard theory, that they are being
harmed by Microsoft’s market strategies, but antitrust law is not supposed to
be concerned with the prosperity of competitors, at least not directly. The
complaint is not being ‹led by consumers, which suggests that most, if not all,
consumers could be gaining by Microsoft’s market strategies. Indeed, they
could be gaining in three ways.
• First, consumers get the add-on software free (or at prices below the
prices of Microsoft’s competitors).
• Second, they bene‹t from the network that Microsoft proposes (or
threatens, depending on perspective) to develop with its moves into the
adjacent markets.
• Third, consumers get their add-on software from the same source as that
of their operating system, productivity applications, and browser soft-
ware, thereby reducing the risk of incompatibilities among programs. (If
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the risk isn’t reduced, consumers always have the option of going to
alternative vendors.)
What is the competitors’ true beef, then? We suggest that their complaint
is not about monopoly or antitrust concerns, but the exact opposite: a ‹rm—
Microsoft—that is in a “supercompetitive” market position because of its abil-
ity to compete in adjacent markets. What the competitors are seeking in the
way of remedy for the “Microsoft problem” are arti‹cial barriers (in the form of
product development prohibitions) to Microsoft’s entry into their markets.20
The competitors’ beef might be construed as identical with the problem we
have already noted for competitors when marginal cost of production and
entry costs are nil or small: They can’t recoup their development costs (or, at
the very least, have a seriously impaired chance of doing so). An add-on devel-
oper can incur the costs of identifying an unexploited market opportunity,
developing a product for the identi‹ed market, and then incurring the costs of
developing the market for the product. However, given that Windows is all but
ubiquitous, with the cost of appending add-ons to Windows being very low,
Microsoft has the equivalent of a twelve-lane, unobstructed freeway into any
software market it wishes to enter. Microsoft can sit back and wait for others to
incur all the initial development costs and then cherry pick, or as Bill Gates
described his company’s strategy in a 1995 meeting during which he made
conquering the browser market the company’s top priority, to quickly
“embrace and extend” the successful add-ons, but only after the identi‹ed mar-
kets have reached critical mass, which will make Microsoft’s entry into the
market worthwhile.21
Of course, Gates and company might stand ready to buy out ‹rms that
have developed proven products, but the buyout price need not be any higher
than Microsoft’s development costs, because those are the only costs Microsoft
has to incur after an identi‹ed market has reached critical mass. (And, because
of its size, Microsoft’s development costs could easily be much lower than the
development costs of many upstart ‹rms.) The buyout price also need not
cover the costs that the developing ‹rm had to incur in order to identify the
market (which can include the development of many unsuccessful products or
earlier versions of the successful product) and to develop the market for the
identi‹ed product (including the costs associated with overcoming the initial
chicken-and-egg problems mentioned earlier). If developing ‹rms cannot
recoup all their development costs, and have little or no chance of reaping eco-
nomic pro‹ts, incentives to innovate can be impaired, resulting in less software
development than would be the case if the developing ‹rms could recoup their
development costs and make a pro‹t.
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The restrictions that Microsoft’s competitors have sought for Microsoft—
including outright prohibition on what products Microsoft can include in
Windows, not to mention the breakup of the company—can be (conceptually,
at least) socially constructive, by encouraging other ‹rms to be more innova-
tive and welfare enhancing. We emphasize can be simply because the restric-
tions will have to be imposed through legislative, regulatory, or legal means, or
all these ways. Our public choice backgrounds make us worry that although the
restrictions actually imposed might be optimal, given the market circum-
stances, they could just as easily be excessive, resulting in the replacement of
one less-than-optimal market condition by a worse one.
Regardless, we are inclined to believe that even if the theory of competition
Microsoft’s critics have articulated is valid in the Microsoft case (and we have
our reservations), we don’t see the issues raised as coming under the purview of
antitrust law. To repeat, the market problems that are the source of the com-
petitors’ complaint do involve a dominant ‹rm. However, that is as far as the
association of the problem with monopoly goes, and the association is not ten-
able. The identi‹ed problems have nothing to do with the existence of entry
barriers that allow a ‹rm to restrict sales for the purpose of elevating market
price and ‹rm pro‹ts. If the identi‹ed problems have a legal home, that home
would appear to be in the area of patent and copyright law under which the
government-imposed market corrections have historically been in the form of
market entry barriers. The beef that Microsoft’s critics have with Microsoft
could be that because of Microsoft’s market dominance (and twelve-lane free-
way into their market), Microsoft’s competitors don’t have the extent of
monopoly privileges with their patents and copyrights that they might have
thought they held. This is because ideas (as distinguished from the expression of
ideas) cannot be patented or copyrighted. Ideas aren’t provided legally
enforced monopoly protection because such protection could sti›e the devel-
opment of more advanced ideas and innovations. Perhaps we need a whole
new, yet-to-be-named subcategory of law for special cases such as Microsoft.
concluding comments
Monopoly theory has been grounded in the proposition that all entry barriers
give rise to monopoly rents and net welfare losses. However, Schumpeter sug-
gests that such a perspective is far too sweeping, because it is static and myopic,
focusing too exclusively on the consequences of monopoly restrictions on pro-
duction when they are in place. In effect, Schumpeter is suggesting that our stan-
dard monopoly diagrams do not capture all the bene‹ts of monopolies. When
all bene‹ts are considered, including those from having products that would
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not arise at all were it not for so-called monopoly protections, much of what we
describe as monopoly rent and deadweight loss evaporates.
Our intent is not to say that all monopolies are good. It is to say, however,
that some monopolies have, on balance, bene‹cial effects for the particular
markets they are in and for the economy taken as a whole over a long stretch
of time. We might draw the demand and costs curves for such monopolies in
the way economists always have, identifying the deadweight-loss triangle. Such
a myopic perspective fails, however, to balance that deadweight loss with the
even greater potential deadweight loss that could be imagined if the monopo-
lies never existed. Perhaps we need a new name for this subset of monopolies.
We might call them “welfare-enhancing monopolies.” Then again, it might be
better and more accurate to designate them “Schumpeterian monopolies”
(mainly because Schumpeter made “welfare-enhancing monopolies” central to
his view of the way capitalism advances through time).
At the very least, we need to be careful when we go from identifying mar-
ket protections for ‹rms (entry barriers and switching costs, for example) and
observing that a ‹rm’s price is above marginal cost, to concluding that the ‹rm
is a welfare-destroying monopoly, as is so often done in antitrust cases. Break-
ing down all the market protections can be the policy equivalent of throwing
out the baby with the bathwater.
Going against conventional wisdom, as we are doing in this volume, has a
decided advantage. Doing so catches people’s attention. By the same token,
countervailing arguments also have a disadvantage. Listeners and readers may
not understand the acknowledged limits of the argument that is posited. To be
clear, our argument for entry barriers has its limits, just as arguments for copy-
rights and patents have their widely accepted limits. Indeed, the two sets of
arguments for entry barriers and copyrights or patents are congruent, because
the latter are founded on the necessity of limited entry barriers to spur innova-
tion and economic development. Indeed, copyrights and patents are founded
on an explicit trade, which is that the holders will receive highly circumscribed
monopoly privileges for a limited period of time, allowing for the recovery of
up-front development costs in exchange for the copyrighted and patented
materials ultimately being transferred to the public domain.
Our arguments presented here actually add up to a call for a change in the
way we think about entry barriers of all kinds. More speci‹cally, our arguments
call for thinking about the need for entry barriers—whether natural, ‹rm cul-
tivated, or government induced (e.g., through regulation)—in the same way
that we think about the need for copyright and patent protections. In short, we
should consider the need for some ‹rms to create entry barriers as well as the




When incompatibilities exist between different variations of a
product with network effects, it is possible for a producer of one of the variations
to secure a competitive advantage over producers of other variations by being
the ‹rst one to achieve a critical market share. The net result of such a market
strategy can be that the market tips toward the dominant producer, causing its
market share to expand as consumers receive increasing value from the pro-
ducer’s growing market dominance (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986, 1994).1
This chapter is concerned with how the tipping process in a market for net-
work goods can give the producer of the network good monopoly power.
However, the thrust of the analysis is directed toward explaining the limita-
tions of the monopoly argument. We also explain how consumer lock-in and
switching costs can bene‹t consumers. Indeed, consumers might want to be
exploited (at least up to a degree) by a so-called monopoly producer of a net-
work good.
consumer lock-in
With the retreat of other producers from the market as consumers move
relentlessly toward one producer, consumers may ‹nd themselves locked in to
the most widely used variation of the product simply because it is widely used,
or so the argument has been developed (Arthur 1989). This is because, after
the tipping process has run its course, no alternative source of supply may
remain for the network good, at least not one providing the same level of net-
work bene‹ts. Even if an attractive alternative supplier exists, the cost of con-
sumers actually switching to another technology or product can make switch-
ing impractical. Switching costs in the case of a computer operating system can
include the costs of retraining, new equipment, and software, as well as the
establishment of new of‹ce routines and, possibly, cultures.2
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The result of the lock-in or (what amounts to the same thing) switching
costs that can emerge in network markets is that the network producer has
market power.3 The greater the switching costs, the more inelastic the con-
sumer demand for the network good. This implies the greater the market
power for the ‹rm toward which the market has tipped, a line of argument
prominent in the Microsoft antitrust case.4 The greater the market power, the
greater the ‹rm’s monopoly earnings.5
In addition, locked-in consumers imply that new entrants will be locked
out as surely as would be the case with any entry barrier protecting the borders
of the market. This is because consumers’ ability to move will be impaired by
new entrants’ inability to make sales. This also means that “superior” varia-
tions of the product can (supposedly) have a dif‹cult time entering the market
and attracting consumers. For example, Paul David (1985) has argued that the
QWERTY keyboard continues to dominate the arrangement of keys on key-
boards simply because QWERTY was adopted early on in the history of type-
writers in order to minimize the extent to which keys would become entangled
as they struck the paper. Even though the Dvorak keyboard is (supposedly)
superior to the QWERTY keyboard in terms of achieved typing speed, the
cost of retraining typists has locked in everyone—buyers and producers of
typewriters and computer keyboards—and has prevented the adoption of the
superior Dvorak keyboard.
The appeal of this line of argument was transparent in the Microsoft
antitrust case, as we have already noted. However, virtually every element of
the argument has been subject to scrutiny by economists and has been found
wanting. At the forefront of this attack are Liebowitz and Margolis (1990,
1995), who argue on both empirical and theoretical grounds that little risk
exists of inferior technologies and products becoming entrenched by lock-ins
caused by network effects. For example, Liebowitz and Margolis question the
inferiority of the QWERTY keyboard arrangement that supposedly remains
the entrenched, dominant keyboard only because of the lock-in effect. They
point out that the only researcher whose studies show that the Dvorak key-
board is superior was done by Mr. Dvorak, who designed the Dvorak key-
board, and his studies are suspect for other reasons as well.6
Of course, with constant technological improvements there are cases of
existing technologies being widely used and bene‹ting from network effects
and signi‹cant switching costs, despite being inferior to new technologies. But
if the gains from switching are greater than the costs of doing so, incentives
exist for entrepreneurs—so-called network sponsors—to overcome the built-
in resistance to change. Each consumer may face the Prisoner’s Dilemma of
‹nding that it doesn’t pay to give up the existing network bene‹ts by switching
Locked-In Consumers 97
to the new superior technology even though all would be better off if all (or
most) did switch. The entrepreneur-owner of the new technology, however,
can internalize this effect by sharing the gains of the ef‹ciency improvements
with customers through subsidies in the form of low, possibly negative, prices
over some period of time. That said, not all network effects are necessarily net-
work externalities (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995), which would lead to market
inef‹ciencies.
Without such internalization of network effects it is hard to explain the large
number of new products and technologies that overcame the network/switching
cost advantage of previously dominant products and technologies. Examples of
‹rms overcoming the problem of consumers being locked in have become com-
mon, including cellular phone companies (e.g., Cingular and Verizon) that have
offered free or reduced-price phones for new customers; software companies
(Microsoft) that have lowered the prices for users of competing applications;
banks (Citibank) that have offered credits for customers’ initial Internet transac-
tions; and Internet retail sites (MotherNature.com) that have provided adver-
tised discounts on customers’ initial purchases.
The switching subsidies that new entrants have to pay consumers to switch
need not be equal to the switching costs consumers have to incur. This is
because if the established ‹rm does try to exploit its market position, charging
monopoly prices, there are “staying costs” for consumers equal to the present
discounted value of the lost consumer welfare from the monopoly prices. The
higher the prospective staying costs imposed on consumers, the lower the pay-
ments new entrants must make to entice consumers to switch.
Of course, a consumer subsidy to overcome the lock-in effect of an existing
product is an investment on which sellers expect to generate positive returns
with higher prices for their products after consumers get locked in again.7
Obviously such investments are risky because the new products may not be
suf‹ciently superior to replace existing products, or may have a short reign in
the marketplace even if they do. We can think of the high prices temporarily
realized from establishing a large and locked-in market share as an incentive
for technological improvements and as a means by which consumers reimburse
suppliers for helping them overcome their Prisoner’s Dilemmas. Put another
way, without the potential for some degree of lock-in, network ‹rms might not
have suf‹cient incentive to lower their initial prices (or to provide initial-use
subsidies) for the purpose of creating the network and providing users with the
attendant network bene‹ts as the network expands. This situation suggests the
need for caution in attempts to prevent ‹rms from exploiting locked-in con-
sumers with antitrust remedies. Even if a ‹rm can exploit network effects and
switching cost by locking in consumers inde‹nitely, preventing this “exploita-
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tion” by breaking up the ‹rm to increase competition will do less to protect
consumers than indicated by standard models, and may harm consumers.
Even then, if the market is subject to consumer turnover—with new con-
sumers coming into the market all the time—the best pricing strategy for the
entrenched producer can be one that encourages new entrants, a point devel-
oped at length by Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1998). To see their point,
assume that the entrenched producer initially dominates the market with its
consumer base bene‹ting from the network effects of the product they are
consuming and that the network was developed by the entrenched producer by
initially charging low prices. Suppose that the entrenched producer takes
advantage of its consumer base, charging its customers a high monopoly price.
Consumers might have little reason to object to the monopoly prices they are
charged because they bene‹ted from the low up-front prices and the network
effects.
Now, suppose that new consumers start coming into the market. The
entrenched producer can ‹gure that the new consumers can be brought into
the network with low prices (compensating the consumers for the expected
higher monopoly prices in the future). But the entrenched producer can also
‹gure that if it can’t price-discriminate, it will have to charge everyone the low
price, which means that it will have to give up on monopoly pro‹ts. With new
consumers coming in all the time, a strategy of trying to bring all new con-
sumers into the network can be a strategy that requires the entrenched pro-
ducer to forgo monopoly pro‹ts perpetually. Seeing that prospect, the
entrenched producer can reason that the wealth of the ‹rm can be maximized
only by leaving new consumers outside of the network. This means that the
entrenched producer’s strategy leaves a growing portion of the consumer base
available to new entrants, which implies that switching costs faced by the
entrenched producer’s consumers can encourage entry. This also means that
the total quantity sold by all producers and the ef‹ciency of the market will be
greater than is implied by the simple version of the switching-cost argument.8
In the next section we develop a model of a ‹rm selling a product that gen-
erates network effects (not necessarily network externalities). Under the
assumption that the ‹rm is able to expand until it dominates the market and is
able to fully exploit all network effects, we extend the analysis of others (e.g.,
Klemperer 1987, 1989; Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1994) and examine the effect of
threatening to break up the ‹rm into separate competing units (or in other
ways that impair the ability of the ‹rm to exploit locked-in consumers, which
is what Microsoft’s competitors recommended in dealing with the supposed
entrapment of Windows users; see CCIA 2003). If a proposed breakup is ever
made credible, we ‹nd that the effect of the breakup threat can be to increase
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the current price, and is certain to reduce the price by less than what the stan-
dard monopoly model would predict. Any increased ef‹ciency that results is
less than implied by the standard monopoly model, even when ignoring the
very real possibility that the antitrust action reduces network bene‹ts to con-
sumers and retards the introduction of new technologies.
a product with network effects: a model
Consider a ‹rm that is producing a product that generates a network effect. To
capture this effect, we represent the price, P, in each time period as a negative
function of the quantity sold currently and a nonnegative function of the
cumulative quantity of all past sales, adjusted for decreases due to deterioration
and discard. In period t, for example, the price, or inverse demand function, is
given by
t–1
Pt(Qt ,  t–iQi) (1)
i=1
with P1
t < 0 and P2
t  0, where the subscripts represent partial derivatives with
respect to the indicated variable, Qi is the quantity sold in period i, and 
  (0, 1) is the deterioration and discard rate each period. We assume that the
marginal cost of production is zero in each period.
The ‹rm’s objective is to maximize the discounted present value of pro‹ts
over some time horizon T, given by
T                      t–1
 = P1(Q1,0) Q1 +  Pt(Qt ,  t–iQi) QtDt–1, (2)
t=2 i=1
where D = 1/(1 + r), with r being the discount rate. We assume that the time
horizon T is such that at time T the accumulated sales (net of deterioration and
discard) are suf‹ciently large that the network effect is complete, or P2
T = 0,
with P2
t > 0, for all t < T.
The Qi’s that maximize (2) necessarily satisfy
T

= [P1 + Q1P11] +  QtP2tt–1Dt–1 = 0, (3.1) 
Q1 t=2
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T

= [P t + QtP1t] D t–1 +  QiP2i i–tDi–1 = 0, (3.t) 
Qt i=t+1

= [PT + QTP1T] DT–1 = 0. (3.T) 
Q1
These necessary conditions yield to a straightforward interpretation. The ‹rst
term in each equation in (3) is the current period marginal revenue. The sec-
ond term in the ‹rst T – 1 equation in (3) is the present value of future mar-
ginal revenue from current sales and is positive. Therefore, the current period
marginal revenues are negative in the ‹rst T – 1 periods, and the quantities sold
in periods 1 through T – 1 are increased until the marginal losses from current
period sales are equal to the marginal gain from enhanced future demand
through the network effect. In period T the marginal network effect is zero,
and therefore the current period marginal revenue is also zero. There is no fur-
ther advantage in expanding sales beyond the amount that maximizes current
revenue. The negative marginal revenues in the earlier periods represent the
investment mentioned in the introduction that begins yielding a return to the
‹rm in period T when the ‹rm begins behaving like a conventional monopo-
list—equating current period marginal revenue to marginal cost (zero in our
model).
What do conditions (3) tell us about the effect of government action
designed to prevent the ‹rm from exploiting the monopoly position, begin-
ning in period T, assuming that it achieves that position? Consider ‹rst the
effect of a credible threat to prevent the future price from increasing to the
monopoly level. Such a threat clearly reduces the return that the ‹rm can
expect to realize by investing in the network effect. By reducing the positive
value of the second term in the ‹rst T – 1 equations in (3), a cap on future
prices calls for a less negative current marginal value in the early periods. So,
the attempt to protect consumers against high future prices results in higher
current prices as the ‹rm reduces output.9 Not only are current prices
increased, but also the value of the product is decreased as the reduction in out-
put reduces the network advantage realized by consumers.10
Attempts to protect consumers against exploitation by a potentially suc-
cessful network monopolist by breaking it up (or in any other way holding
future prices and pro‹ts down) can also generate counterproductive results. If
the breakup is anticipated, the result will be qualitatively the same as imposing
a price cap on the future price. Not being able to capture the future monopoly
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bene‹ts from subsidizing sales currently, the ‹rm will respond by reducing
sales (and network bene‹ts) and charging higher prices in early periods.
But what if the ‹rm is broken up at some point before the network monop-
oly is complete, say in period j < T ? Such a breakup might cause a current
increase in output and a lower price as several ‹rms are now competing for
market share—but it might not. And even if it does motivate more output and
a lower price, the effect will be smaller than the standard monopoly model pre-
dicts. Being more precise, we rewrite the jth equation from the necessary con-
ditions (3) as
T
[P j + (1 – ) QjP1j] + (1 – )   QtP2t t–1Dt–j = 0 (4)
t=j+1 
with  = 0.
If the ‹rm is broken up in period j, the parameter  increases from zero,
indicating that the ‹rm no longer accounts for the entire market for the prod-
uct. The question is, what is the effect of an increase in  on the left-hand side
of (4), the current and future marginal revenue in period j? Differentiating (4)
with respect to , evaluated at  = 0, yields
T
– (QjP1j +  QtP2tt–1Dt–j). (5)
t=j+1
From (4) it follows that (5) = 0 when Pj = 0, (5) > 0 when Pj > 0, and (5) < 0 when
Pj < 0. In the case in which Pj > 0, then breaking up the ‹rm (assuming that
production costs remain unaffected) results in an expansion of output to main-
tain a marginal revenue of zero. This is the standard result and is what one
would hope for when combating monopoly in›uence. But, as we shall see, even
in this case the effect is not as strong as the standard monopoly model leads us
to expect. If Pj = 0, then breaking up the ‹rm would have no effect on current
output. And if Pj < 0, then breaking up the ‹rm would have the effect of actu-
ally reducing current output and increasing price.
Considering the effect of a zero, or even a negative (or less than marginal
production costs) price is not as far-fetched as it may seem. As argued earlier,
with network effects, giving away a product, or even paying people to use it,
can increase the present value of the product, and the present value of future
revenues, suf‹ciently to make up for nonpositive prices in early periods.
Indeed, the possibility of nonpositive prices is more likely than the present
102 in defense of monopoly
model indicates. In our model, the only positive spillover from current sales of
the product is enhanced future demand. But commonly, the ‹rm has several
complementary products, and there are intratemporal, as well as intertempo-
ral, positive spillovers from expanding the use of one of the products. Breaking
up such a ‹rm would not only reduce the intertemporal advantage of keeping
the price of a product low but also could eliminate entirely the intratemporal
motivations to do so, thereby increasing the likelihood that breaking up the
‹rm will cause a price increase.
For example, Microsoft has an array of products that run from its chief
operating system (Windows) to productivity applications (Word and Excel) to
content sources (Encarta) to advertising on its Internet service site (MSN).
When Microsoft holds down the price of Windows, it encourages the devel-
opment of the Windows network as more computer users buy Windows, more
programmers develop applications, and even more computer users buy Win-
dows because more applications are available and more users are compatible.
Microsoft also encourages the sale of personal computers and more software
packages, more Internet use, and more advertising on the Web—with
Microsoft garnering many of the bene‹ts. By having this array of products,
Microsoft has managed to internalize the bene‹ts of holding the price of Win-
dows in check, which adds to its incentives to do just that.
Breaking up a single ‹rm into several competing ‹rms has the well-known
effect of increasing the marginal revenue of each ‹rm over that of a single ‹rm
in the industry. By itself, the increase in marginal revenue provides a strong
motivation for the ‹rms to increase output and lower price. Because this moti-
vation is unopposed in the standard model, the effect of breaking up a single
‹rm is an unequivocal increase in output and reduction in price. With network
effects the situation is complicated by the fact that breaking up a single ‹rm
reduces the internalization of the network effects. The ability of a single ‹rm
to capture the additional future revenue from increasing its current output is
reduced as more ‹rms are created. With several ‹rms, the additional future
demand that each ‹rm’s current sales create is captured in large measure by
other ‹rms. Therefore, breaking up a single ‹rm reduces the future marginal
revenue from current sales, which at least partially (and possibly more than)
offsets the increase in the current marginal revenue from current sales.11
The analysis suggests an interesting possibility in the case of a cartel of
‹rms producing a product generating a network effect. As opposed to the stan-
dard cartel model, each ‹rm’s marginal revenue (current and future combined)
could be less than its marginal cost (zero in our model). Collectively the ‹rms
are better off if each takes into consideration the future bene‹ts its sales are
generating for the other ‹rms and resists the temptation to adjust sales to bring
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its marginal revenue in line with its marginal cost. But if this temptation is not
resisted, the cartel will, like most cartels, begin to break up. The striking dif-
ference in this case is that, as opposed to the standard cartel, this cartel will
break up as a result of each ‹rm reducing output and increasing price.
efficiency considerations
Of primary interest when discussing the effect of actions to prevent a ‹rm from
exploiting a network effect to secure a monopoly position is how much, if any,
ef‹ciency is increased by the action. The standard of comparison is determined
by maximizing the surplus from the product:
Q1 T      Qt t–1
S =  P1(, 0)d +   P2(,  T–iQi) dDt–1 (6)
0                              t=2     0                  i=1
with respect to each period’s output. The Qi’s that maximize S necessarily sat-
isfy the conditions
Pi + MFSi = 0 i = 1, 2, . . . , T, (7)
where MFSi is the present value of the marginal future surplus from expanding
output in period i. Because MFSi > 0 for all i < T (we continue to let T repre-
sent the period in which the marginal network effect is zero even though the
time this occurs varies with the Qi’s), condition (7) requires that P
i < 0, i = 1, 2,
. . . , T – 1.
The ‹rst thing to recognize is that it is not necessarily the case that, at least
during the early periods, the ‹rm, if left free to maximize pro‹ts through the
creation of a network monopoly (conditions [3]), will underproduce and over-
charge compared to the surplus-maximizing conditions given in (7). For any
given Qi and accumulated stock of the good in period i, Pi is greater than the
single ‹rm’s current marginal revenue in period i, or Pi + QiP1
i. But for any
given sequence of Q’s from period i to period T and any given accumulated
stock in period i, the second term in (7), MFSi , is also greater than the second
term in the ith equation in (3), Tj=i+1QtP2
jj–1D j–1. This follows from the fact
that the second term in (7) captures all the future surplus from selling an addi-
tional unit in period i, whereas the second term in (3) captures only the addi-
tional revenue the ‹rm receives from selling the additional unit in period i. So,
the socially ef‹cient output in period i may also be the one that satis‹es the sin-
gle-‹rm pro‹t-maximizing condition in the same period. We are not suggest-
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ing that this is likely, just that it is possible. We also acknowledge that as time
T is approached, the certainty increases that the single ‹rm output will become
smaller than the socially ef‹cient output. The difference between Pi and cur-
rent period marginal revenue in period i does not diminish in any 
systematic way as T is approached, but the difference between MFSi and  
Tj=i+1QtP2
j j–1D j–1 goes to zero as both vanish in period T. So, even though the
single ‹rm may produce close to, or even more than, the socially ef‹cient
quantity early on as it is attempting to establish a network monopoly, it will
begin behaving more like a traditional monopolist as its monopoly position
becomes established.
Given the eventual inef‹ciency of a potentially successful network monop-
olist, is it likely that public policy aimed at reducing the ‹rm’s exercise of
monopoly power will improve ef‹ciency? As discussed in the previous section,
a credible commitment to preventing the ‹rm from bene‹ting from a future
network monopoly with a price ceiling or a future breakup has the effect of
reducing the incentive to expand current output by reducing future marginal
revenue with respect to that output. There is the interesting possibility that
such a reduction in output can increase in-period ef‹ciency because the ‹rm
may be selling more than the socially ef‹cient amount in an early period. But
the reason for the commitment to regulate is that the ‹rm will eventually be
producing too little, so a policy that reduces output will soon be reducing
rather than increasing ef‹ciency.
A policy of breaking up a ‹rm into several competing ‹rms before it has
established a full network monopoly (or, again, by other means of holding
down its future prices and pro‹ts) can also be counterproductive. If the
breakup occurs when the ‹rm’s price is negative, we have seen that it will cause
a decrease in current output by reducing the incentive effect of that output on
future demand. Unless this occurs when the ‹rm is producing more than called
for by the conditions in (6), the effect will be the opposite of what ef‹ciency
requires, at least initially. Of course, later in time, when the single ‹rm would
have been charging a positive price, the effect of having broken it up will be to
increase output and improve ef‹ciency. Therefore, breaking up a potential
network monopolist might improve overall ef‹ciency. But the presence of net-
work effects will severely limit the ef‹ciency gains that can be generated by
competing ‹rms. Replacing a single ‹rm with several competing ‹rms will
bring each ‹rm’s current marginal revenue more in line with the marginal
social value of the product. But the greater the number of ‹rms, the greater the
discrepancy between each ‹rm’s future marginal revenue from current sales
and the future marginal value of the social surplus generated by current sales.
So although increasing the number of ‹rms is promoting ef‹ciency on one
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margin, it is undermining ef‹ciency on another margin. The standard argu-
ment favoring numerous competing ‹rms over one ‹rm loses much of its force
when network effects are present.
Of course, the ef‹ciency gains from breaking up a ‹rm creating a network
monopoly are sure to turn positive and rise as the network becomes increas-
ingly established, at least as indicated by a comparison of necessary conditions
(3) and (7).12 The smaller the marginal network effect from current sales, the
more our analysis becomes a standard monopoly-versus-competition compar-
ison and the greater the advantage of several competing ‹rms over a monopoly
supplier. Ef‹ciency could no doubt be improved if a ‹rm could be kept
unaware of any antitrust threat until it had established a network monopoly
and then was broken up. At least it could be improved in this one case. The
problem is that any ef‹ciency achieved in this one case will lead to expectations
on the part of other ‹rms whose products create network effects that will moti-
vate inef‹cient responses. Once producers recognize the possibility that suc-
cessful network monopolists will be broken up, new ‹rms with new technolo-
gies will be less aggressive at cutting prices and expanding output to establish
new, or replace existing, networks. The result could be to reduce not only the
social value these ‹rms create directly but also the indirect value they create
through the discipline their existence exerts over the existing market power
possessed by established network monopolists—a discipline more responsive
to consumer preferences and consistent with dynamic ef‹ciency than is realis-
tically possible from antitrust action.
creating networks
Many discussions of networks presume that network effects are a part of
nature, much as gravity or chemical reactions are. When an operating-system
‹rm—the network sponsor—sells more copies of its operating system, applica-
tions ‹rms are likely to write more applications, more or less naturally, with-
out any encouragement from the operating system ‹rm. That may sometimes
be the case, but certainly not always. Developers may be reluctant to join the
network for any number of reasons, not the least of which is that the network
in question might not be the successful network. That is, as developers prepare
to write applications for one network (Apple), the market could tip toward
some other network (Windows). The developers’ investments could then be
worthless. The developers’ investment risk costs are heightened by the fact
that the size and durability of the network is outside their direct control and is
controlled by the network sponsor, but this is a problem in risk allocation that
can possibly be reduced by the sponsor with appropriate side payments.
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As Katz and Shapiro (1985) have argued, given that much of the invest-
ment in networks can be up front, the actual investment made by applications
developers (and the network sponsor) will depend on their expectations about
how the market will evolve over time, which can be in›uenced by how much
the network sponsor is willing to spend up front to ensure that the market tips
toward its network product and not toward some other ‹rm’s product. The
network sponsor, in other words, may want to shoulder some of the applica-
tions developers’ risk costs just to manage expectations, that is, encourage the
expectation among applications developers that the network sponsor’s product
will be the product toward which the market will tip. The greater the potential
pro‹ts from the market tipping and lock-in, the more the network sponsor
would be willing to spend up front to encourage the development of the net-
work and of locked-in customers. This is a slightly different way of restating a
central point of our argument, which is that even the customers need not mind
being locked in securely, given that the network develops more rapidly and
with greater consumer bene‹ts when the network sponsor encourages the
development of applications and lock-ins.
Understandably, if the market is prone to tip and to leave consumers and
applications developers locked in, the applications developers also have to fear
that the operating system ‹rm/network sponsor will, after it has achieved its
monopoly position, begin to extract monopoly rents, curbing its sales in the
process, but also the sales of the developers’ applications. The more they have
to fear the monopoly practices of the network sponsor, the more reluctant they
can be to write applications for the network. To overcome developers’ reluc-
tance, the ‹rm sponsoring the network may either have to lower its up-front
price or aid the developers by covering their development costs or providing
outright payment to developers for writing for the network. Such payments
can be viewed as prepayment of monopoly rents that the developers expect to
be extracted later when the network sponsor achieves its monopoly position.
This scenario leads to the interesting conclusion that the so-called monopoly,
the dominant network sponsor, may have largely dissipated the expected
monopoly rents among the developers and consumers prior to when the
monopoly rents are extracted. Of course, the sponsor can invest in some of
those writing applications, which will be seen as creating a strong motivation
for it not to act like a textbook monopolist when (if ) it achieves a dominant
position. While this would reduce the likelihood of monopoly restrictions, it
will likely be seen as a violation of antitrust laws supposedly designed to curb
monopoly formation and maintenance.
The up-front payment problems of the network sponsor can be, as men-
tioned earlier, a consequence of the fact that the network sponsor may not be
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able to make a credible commitment to avoid taking advantage of any monop-
oly position that is achieved in the future. The developers have to fear that the
network sponsor will renege on its commitment, say, to hold its future prices
to competitive levels. If it does achieve monopoly status but does not renege,
then its stock price can be suppressed because of the absence of the potential
monopoly pro‹ts that could be extracted. This means that savvy investors can
take over the network ‹rm and hike prices and pro‹ts. Seen from this perspec-
tive, the network sponsor/potential monopolist can favor antitrust enforce-
ment. Antitrust enforcement can make the network sponsor’s commitment to
not charge monopoly prices in the future credible (or more credible than oth-
erwise), which means that the network sponsor would not have to lower its
price or increase its side payments to applications developers (by as much as
otherwise).
Barring antitrust enforcement, the network sponsor can ease the fears of
outside developers by licensing its network product to several producers. It can
also develop complementary products, which, for an operating system ‹rm,
would mean creating productivity applications of its own (as Microsoft has
done), which can, of course, be seen as heightening the network sponsor’s mar-
ket dominance and a violation of antitrust laws. The network sponsor would
then have an incentive to hold down the price of its product, thereby easing the
need to make side payments to outside developers. The greater the array of
complements the network sponsor has, the greater the assurance that outside
developers will have that the network sponsor will not in the future hike the
price and curb the sales of the network good. Hence, a breakup of a horizon-
tally integrated operating system/applications ‹rm can, once again, reduce the
incentive of the network ‹rm to hold its prices down. It can thus reduce the
incentive of the applications developers to stay with the network, possibly
resulting in network contraction and lost consumer bene‹ts.
Applications developers can also be concerned that the network sponsor
will be timid about defending the network against takeover by some other net-
work standard. The more durable they perceive the network to be, the more
applications developers are willing to invest up front. Hence, it follows that the
network sponsor can reduce its up-front payments to developers by showing
them that it stands ready to compete ferociously to suppress any new compet-
itive threat to its network standard, which, coincidentally, is precisely what
Microsoft did when it was confronted with the prospects of its Windows stan-
dard being overrun by a new computing platform based in part on Netscape’s
Navigator. The judge in the Microsoft case interpreted Microsoft’s zero and
negative prices for Internet Explorer as “predation” with the obvious conse-
quence of raising the “dangerous probability” that Microsoft would be able to
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act like a monopoly in the future (Jackson 2000a). Alternatively, Microsoft’s
zero and negative price could be interpreted as an effort to maintain the net-
work and ›ow of gains to applications developers and, hence, to consumers.
concluding comments
Lock-in is not all bad. Nor are switching costs all bad. Switching costs might
make it more dif‹cult for new ‹rms to attract customers from established pro-
ducers. However, switching costs can also cause new ‹rms with potentially
superior products to incur substantial up-front development costs associated
with many network goods (e.g., software). And for ‹rms interested in develop-
ing a network, switching costs can make ‹rms willing to underprice their prod-
uct initially, which can have the bene‹t of helping to build the network at
greater speed. In such network environments, threats to break up a successful
network ‹rm (because it is perceived to be the dominant producer and, hence,
a monopolist, or because its pricing may appear predatory) or threats to limit
such a ‹rm’s future price increases can have the effect of raising current prices,
retarding the development of the network, and harming both current and
future consumers. Such an outcome must be construed as perverse, given that
the professed goal of antitrust enforcement is to improve consumer welfare.
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Chapter 6
Monopoly Prices and the 
Client and Bonding Effects
In conventional economic theory, monopoly prices (relative
to lower competitive prices) are almost always viewed as destructive of con-
sumer welfare. Monopoly prices are inef‹cient because they are above the
marginal cost of production and they distort the distribution of income and
consumer welfare. Under the conventional view of monopoly, monopoly
prices have no offsetting bene‹ts. In this chapter, we cover two unheralded
ways by which monopoly prices can boost consumer welfare, which we dub the
client effect and the bonding effect. The former changes the consumer welfare by
changing the composition of consumers. The latter improves consumer wel-
fare by increasing the con‹dence buyers have that producers will do what they
say they will do.
the client effect
In some markets unregulated competition is supposed to drive prices down to
ruinous levels. This is supposed to be the case in high-‹xed-cost/low-mar-
ginal-cost industries (e.g., railroads). Interestingly, such ruinous price compe-
tition is not evident in other high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost industries
(e.g., hotels). Indeed, many ‹rms in such industries can rightfully be accused of
charging monopoly prices, or prices above both marginal and average cost,
enabling them to make nontrivial monopoly pro‹ts, at least for respectable
stretches of time.
Why the disparity in market outcomes? We argue that price competition is
often moderated in high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost industries when the
value one consumer realizes from the service is affected by the characteristics of
other consumers. We develop a simple model of the client effect using the
example of the demand for hotels and then generalize the implications of our
model to other industries. Underlying our argument is a proposition that con-
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ventional analysis ignores: A high price (or a price above marginal cost) can
make a good or service more valuable to consumers.
The most general and important point, which is consistent with the over-
all theme of this book, is one that squares with our analysis of the impact of
network effects: Price can affect not just the amount demanded but also the
market demand and how much value consumers derive from the purchase of a
good. In the case of network goods, consumers’ value is enhanced when the
count of consumers goes up, enhancing further the effect of low prices on con-
sumer surplus.1 In the case of client-effect goods, the opposite can be the case:
The surplus value of consumers who continue to buy the good when the price
of the good price goes up can rise when the price affects the types, not just the
quantity, of consumers who purchase the good. This is because in real-world
markets (as distinct from economists’ imaginary, blackboard worlds), the type
and mix of consumers vary with the price being charged. When the price rises,
the composition of consumers changes, mainly because consumers not willing
to pay higher prices are pushed out of the market. This change in the compo-
sition of consumers can, at times, be expected to change the remaining con-
sumers’ demands. Granted, when consumers’ demands fall with changing con-
sumer composition due to the higher price, monopoly has a more pernicious,
ef‹ciency-destroying impact than conventional static models suggest. How-
ever, when the higher prices increase consumers’ demands, the result can be a
net increase in consumer welfare across consumers.
We focus on the market for hotels for two reasons: First, hotels are a con-
crete example to which readers can easily relate. Second, and more important,
we want to move away from past discussions of network effects evident in mod-
ern technology markets and take up the problems of a market that was estab-
lished long before the advent of personal computers. As we will explain, the
client effect is decidedly different from network effects in terms of underlying
character and in terms of how demand is affected by price.
By making the assumption that price can affect the composition of con-
sumers and hence their consumer surplus, we can explain some observable
characteristics of the hotel industry. For example, we observe patrons of dif-
ferent chains segmented by income and social characteristics. In addition, dif-
ferent hotel chains have established reputations for the level of services and the
characteristics of the hotels’ clientele. We would also expect, and in fact
observe, that the parent companies of hotels—for example, Marriott—are
holding companies for an array of chains that appeal to various clienteles. Mar-
riott offers rooms in hotel chains that range from its low-end Fair‹eld Inns to
its high-end Marriott Marquis Hotels. Even if you care to take issue with our
example, our more important point—that monopoly pricing can be welfare
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enhancing for consumers who continue to consume the monopoly good in
spite of the monopoly price they are required to pay—remains conceptually
valid. It can help explain why many consumers do not lament above-marginal-
cost prices as much as economists do. Our model of the client effect also
explains why some high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal cost industries such as hotels
do not seem to have the problem of “ruinous price competition” that plagues
other high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost industries.
Sources of “Ruinous Price Competition”
We begin our discussion by laying out the widely recognized problems of
potentially ruinous price competition in industries with high ‹xed costs. It has
long been argued that unregulated price competition, though desirable in most
industries, is inappropriate in industries characterized by high ‹xed costs and
low marginal costs. For example, the well-known business historian Alfred
Chandler (1977, 134) writes:
Competition between railroads bore little resemblance to competition
between traditional small, single-unit commercial or industrial enterprises.
. . . Never before . . . had competitors been saddled with such high ‹xed
costs. . . . The relentless pressure of such costs quickly convinced railroad
managers that uncontrolled competition . . . would be “ruinous.” As long as
a road had cars available to carry freight, the temptation to attract traf‹c by
reducing rates was always there. Any rate that covered more than variable
costs of transporting a shipment brought the road extra income. . . . To
both the railroad managers and investors, the logic of such competition
appeared to be bankruptcy for all.
Although most economists believe this argument can be overstated, few
would deny that plausible models suggest that unrestrained competition
between ‹rms in a high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost industry can be inconsis-
tent with maintaining a viable industry. For example, it has been argued in U.S.
v. Addyston Pipe Steel (Bittlingmayer 1982, 203) “that explicit cartelization, tacit
collusion, and horizontal merger can be viewed, in many instances, as the non-
competitive arrangements that the ‹rms in an industry must necessarily
adopt.”2 Most economists also agree that the primary effect of government
price regulation in high-‹xed-cost industries (e.g., railroad shipping rates) has
been to maintain those prices higher than they would have been under unreg-
ulated competition. And certainly ‹rms in high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost
industries, such as railroads and ocean shipping, have attempted, through car-
tel arrangements, to keep rates higher than would otherwise prevail.
However, in some industries characterized by high ‹xed costs and low
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marginal costs, intense competition exists with little if any attempt to cartelize
or obtain government regulation to moderate it. The service provided by
hotels, for example, requires very high ‹xed costs embodied in the physical
facility but very low marginal costs. After a hotel has been built, very little cost
is associated with accommodating an additional guest as long as any vacancy
exists. Yet no one has seriously argued that competition among hotels is
ruinous, with hotel rates likely being driven down to the cost of cleaning a
room. Why not? If unregulated competition can supposedly drive the freight
rates on railroads down to marginal cost (at least during periods of excess
capacity), why shouldn’t it do the same to hotel rates?
We argue here that the existence of a client effect in the demand for a ser-
vice can explain differences in downward price pressures in the presence of
excess capacity between some high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost industries
and others. The client effect is clearly illustrated by comparing railroads and
hotels. A person’s demand for shipping freight on a railroad is not affected by
who else is shipping freight or the type of other freight being shipped in the
same train.3 On the other hand, a person’s demand for staying in a hotel is
affected by the other people staying in the same hotel. There is no client effect
in the demand for freight shipments on railroads, but there is in the demand
for staying in hotels.
The Client Effect and Expensive Chocolate
The client effect exists when the value a consumer receives from consuming a
good or service is in›uenced by the other consumers. Consider an extremely
stylized example. Two hotels in the town you are visiting are identical except
for their clientele. One is patronized by nonaf›uent and poorly behaved row-
dies who create loud disturbances all night, whereas the other is patronized by
af›uent, well-behaved folks who are careful not to disturb their neighbors.
Which hotel would you prefer? Preferences differ, and no doubt some would
prefer the action that is more likely available at the ‹rst hotel. But it is a safe
bet that most af›uent, well-behaved folks would prefer, and be willing to pay
more for, the second hotel.
This client effect seems to suggest a pro‹t opportunity for one of the hotel
owners: Establish a reputation for catering to the af›uent and well-behaved by
refusing to rent to anyone else and then charge premium room rates. However,
it is not easy to tell whether prospective guests are either af›uent or well-
behaved—particularly guests who make reservations by telephone. Also, even
if unacceptable guests could be easily identi‹ed, refusing them a room could
violate public-accommodation laws.
But another way—using price to screen out less desirable guests from
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desirable ones—has the advantage of being legal and of promoting the hotel
owner’s primary objective of high pro‹ts: Just charge higher room rates than
the other hotel. The less desirable guests will tend to take their business to the
low-priced hotel, making the high-priced hotel more valuable to those who
can afford to pay extra to avoid guests who are unruly, less af›uent, or both.
This strategy won’t work perfectly. It does not, for example, screen out rock
bands, whose members may be af›uent but unruly. But high prices can do a
reasonable though imperfect job screening out less desirable guests.
Of course, all hotel owners would like to increase their pro‹ts by simply
increasing their rates without having to spend more improving the quality of
the service. Obviously, not everyone can succeed with this strategy. Because of
competition, those who want to attract the well-to-do to their hotels with
higher prices will ‹nd that they also have to provide nicer facilities and more
services than are available at lower-priced hotels. So the higher ‹xed costs
associated with a nicer facility and amenities will have to be incurred at high-
priced hotels, along with some increase in the marginal cost. In equilibrium,
these costs will be high enough to keep the rate of return on investment in
high-priced hotels about the same as the rate of return on other investments,
including investments in low-priced hotels (which because they are built to
appeal to price-sensitive guests will likely have lower ‹xed costs relative to
marginal costs). But because one bene‹t to guests at expensive hotels comes
from associating with other guests who can afford to pay high rates, the frills at
those hotels, when considered by themselves, won’t necessarily be worth what
they cost.4
Indeed, it is widely believed that people pay more for extras at expensive
hotels than they are objectively worth. Just how much is it worth to have the
bed turned down and a mint left on the pillow? A few years ago, one of the
cut-rate hotel chains took advantage of the belief that some hotel amenities
are overpriced by running a television commercial showing a hotel guest
holding up a quarter-sized piece of chocolate wrapped nicely in gold foil and
asking whether it was worth the extra $30 guests paid for it at a more expen-
sive hotel. Viewers who thought not were urged to stay at the cut-rate hotel.
It was a clever advertisement, but it ignored the fact that people are getting
more for the extra $30 than the chocolate. They are getting a place to stay that
screens out those who aren’t willing or able to pay an extra $30 for a taste of
chocolate.5
Hotel Demand and the Lack of Ruinous Competition
We now develop a simple model of the demand for a hotel that incorporates
the client effect. To keep the presentation as simple as possible given the
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objectives of the chapter, we hold constant the quantity and quality of the
physical facility and amenities that would be endogenously determined in a
more complete analysis.6
Because the demand, as well as the amount demanded, depends on the
room rate, the analysis begins with the consideration of a family of arti‹cial
demand curves, one for each rate. For example, demand curve DR1 in ‹gure 6.1
shows the amount (number of rooms) demanded at each rate given the type of
clientele resulting from room rate R1.
7 If the only way to achieve that particu-
lar clientele is by actually charging R1, demand curve DR1 is arti‹cial in the
sense that it is relevant only at rate R1. With the somewhat improved clientele
resulting from the higher rate R2, the demand curve shifts out to DR2. The
demand curves associated with successively higher rates R3, R4, R5, . . . , R8, R9,
R10, and R11 are also shown in ‹gure 6.1, with a constant difference between
each successive price. The varying distances shown between the successive
demand curves re›ect the assumptions that (1) the ‹rst few rate increases
above the lowest rate, R1, do little to improve the client mix and increase
demand; (2) at some intermediate point, rate increases begin having a pro-
nounced screening effect and signi‹cantly increase demand; and (3) the point
is reached at which the screening effect of further rate increases diminishes and
eventually does nothing to increase demand.8
Only one point is relevant on each of the rate-speci‹c demand curves just
discussed: the point determined by the rate assumed in the construction of the
curve. The locus of these relevant points represents the equilibrium demand
for the hotel.9 As long as any upward demand shift occurs in response to a
higher room rate, the equilibrium demand curve is steeper at each rate than is
the relevant price-speci‹c demand curve. In keeping with assumption (1) in the
previous paragraph, over some initial range of low rates, the equilibrium
demand curve will be only slightly steeper than the relevant rate-speci‹c
demand curves. Over some intermediate range of rates, however, assumption
(2) implies that the steepness of the equilibrium demand curve increases rela-
tive to the relevant rate-speci‹c demand curves, with the equilibrium demand
curve possibly becoming very steep.10 As the rate increases further, assumption
(3) becomes operative and the slope of the equilibrium demand curve con-
verges back toward the relevant rate-speci‹c demand curves. The equilibrium
demand curve is shown in ‹gure 6.1 as DE.
We have shown two equilibrium demand curves for a hotel in ‹gure 6.2:
DP, representing the equilibrium demand during the peak season, and DO ,
representing the equilibrium demand during the off-peak season. The number
of rooms available in this hotel, or the capacity constraint, is given by the ver-
tical line SS. The position of this capacity constraint re›ects the trade-off
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between having a hotel smaller than ideal during the peak-season demand and
of having one larger than ideal during off-peak demand. With this trade-off in
mind, we have positioned the capacity constraint so that it intersects the peak-
season demand curve at the high rate RP and intersects the off-peak demand at
a low rate RO. We assume that the marginal cost of accommodating a guest
(renting another room) in the hotel is zero up to the capacity constraint, which
means that the marginal cost curve is given by 0SS in ‹gure 6.2.11
As the demand and cost conditions are constructed in ‹gure 6.2, the mar-
ginal revenue curve to DP (not shown) is positive at SS, and RP is the pro‹t-
maximizing room rate during the peak period. At rate RP , the market for this
hotel clears; all its rooms are rented. But what if other hotels in the relevant
market area have excess capacity at their rates, which are assumed constant
when constructing the demand curve DP? This could, of course, result in
downward pressure on rates at these other hotels and cause a shift back in DP,
leading to a new equilibrium peak-period rate in ‹gure 6.2 below RP. But such
downward pressure on prevailing hotel rates from excess capacity is not likely
to push prices down very far, as becomes apparent when we consider the effect
of moving to the off-peak demand situation in ‹gure 6.2.
Under standard assumptions, if all hotels in the relevant market area faced
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Figure 6.1. Rate specific and equilibrium demand curves
demand curves that intersected their capacity constraints at positive rates and,
as assumed, marginal costs are zero, competition is highly likely to drive down
rates ruinously until excess capacity is eliminated. As the standard story is told,
the marginal revenue of each individual hotel is greater than the collective
marginal revenue of all hotels in the relevant market, so the temptation is to
lower rates in a largely self-defeating effort to attract customers away from
other hotels. But this competitive pressure for lower rates can be rendered
inoperative, or quickly truncated, because of client effect in›uence on hotel
demand curves.
For example, consider the off-peak demand curve DO, which is now exhib-
ited in ‹gure 6.3, along with the capacity constraint SS. Because of the client
effect, DO is shown as becoming very inelastic over a range at rates lying some-
what below the pro‹t-maximizing peak-season price RP and then becoming
quite elastic again as the rate approaches the off-peak market-clearing rate RO.
The marginal revenue curve associated with demand curve DO is shown in
‹gure 6.3 as MRO and becomes negative under the inelastic region before
becoming positively sloped, and possibly positive again, as the capacity con-
straint is approached. As constructed in ‹gure 6.3, the pro‹t-maximizing level
of occupancy during the off-peak season occurs at QO (where MRO equals zero)
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Figure 6.2. Peak and off-peak demand curves
at a room rate of RO* . As shown, RO* is a little less than RP, the pro‹t-maximiz-
ing peak-season rate, but far higher than RO , the rate that would be predicted
by the standard analysis of high-‹xed-cost and low-marginal-cost situations.
So, as opposed to the standard analysis of ruinous competition, a hotel has
little, if any, motivation to lower its rates to capture business from competitors
or to protect its business against their rate reductions.12 And even if competi-
tors do reduce their rates, the effect will be to shift the hotel’s demand curve
back so that the highly inelastic portion remains operative over about the same
range of rates as before, with little change in the pro‹t-maximizing room
rate.13
The argument here is that price competition can be greatly moderated in
cases in which the client effect is important (such as hotel accommodation),
even when ‹xed costs are high and marginal costs are low. But even with a
strong client effect, there can still be downward pressure on prices in the face
of excess capacity. An implication of the model, however, is that the price
reductions will be limited and selective. Consider the rate-speci‹c demand
curve DRO that intersects the demand curve DO at rate RO* in ‹gure 6.3. Cutting
the rate below RO* would clearly be pro‹table if it could be done by moving out
along DRO, that is, done without altering the clientele mix. This is dif‹cult to
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Figure 6.3. Off-peak profit maximization
do. But hotels employ some pricing policies that can be understood as attempts
to lower effective rates while minimizing adverse demand consequences from
the client effect. Hotels often give room upgrades to selected customers at
rates that typically apply to smaller, or less desirable, rooms. Preferred guest
programs provide frequent customers with lower effective rates by allowing
them to earn credits that can be redeemed for free stays, upgrades, or other
awards. Convention rates can be considered a way of offering lower rates to
people whose membership in a professional organization has prescreened
them to some degree.14 Weekend rates are typically explained as a pro‹t-max-
imizing response to off-peak periods for hotels that cater to business travelers
during the week. Without dismissing this explanation, it is also possible that
the client effect is somewhat less important on the weekend when fewer people
in the hotel are preoccupied with business pressures. Furthermore, as should
be expected given the client effect, the number of rooms eligible for these dis-
counts is typically limited.
A particularly interesting implication of the analysis is that we should pre-
dict more aggressive price competition between hotels located in remote and
posh resort areas than between hotels located in large cities. The more remote
and posh the area, the less the need to use high room rates to screen out unde-
sirable clients. In downtown Chicago, Cleveland, or New York, the location
does less to enhance the client effect, so price screening is relatively more
important.15 Assuming, then, the same shifts between peak and off-peak
demand for both big city and remote resort hotels, we should expect rate
›uctuations to maintain more uniform occupancy rates in the former hotels
than in the latter. This is a highly speculative implication, however. Cheap air-
fares may have largely eliminated any such difference in rate ›uctuations
because remote resort hotels are no longer very remote. Also, if big city hotels
can accommodate lower weekend rates without large client-effect concerns,
then ski resorts may be able to protect against adverse client effects from sum-
mer rate reductions.
More General Observations
The previous discussion of the client effect has been con‹ned to its implica-
tions for hotel pricing. But there are other services in which the client effect is
important and has implications worth considering here, at least in a prelimi-
nary way.
Educational establishments can be characterized as having high ‹xed costs
(especially when the salaries of tenured teachers and professors are appropri-
ately treated as ‹xed costs) and low marginal costs. This suggests, according to
the standard analysis, that competition between private colleges could easily be
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ruinous, thereby reducing their viability for a reason quite apart from the com-
petition of state-supported colleges. Yet as a group, many private colleges are
not ‹nancially threatened (some are struggling, of course, but others are doing
very well), and they are certainly not engaged in ruinous price competition.
Indeed, most of the discussion about private college tuition focuses on how
high that tuition is. There are many explanations for the high tuition at private
colleges, but the client effect has received little, if any attention.16
The client effect is obviously important in the demand for a college. The
student who attends a college with intellectually capable and enthusiastic stu-
dents will typically get a far better education than one who attends a college
with intellectually weak and unmotivated students, even though both colleges
are similar in terms of faculty and facilities.17 Students learn not only from
their professors but also from their interaction (both in and out of class) with
other students. High tuition can give a private college more value by serving as
a screening device, and this can moderate downward pressure on tuition even
in the face of high ‹xed costs and low marginal cost. Private colleges do engage
in some price discrimination by offering scholarships to some students. But
scholarships are typically given to students who are expected (often for a vari-
ety of reasons) to enrich the student body, that is, not reduce demand through
adverse client effects. As a consequence of merit scholarships, colleges can ele-
vate even more their charges on those students who are not deemed meritori-
ous but who draw value from having meritorious students on campus.
The pricing of airline travel (another high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost
service) is consistent with the analysis of the client effect in some ways. The
traditional high ‹rst-class fares are clearly consistent with the proposition that
people will pay more to consume a service with others who have been screened
by higher prices. First-class passengers receive better service, of course, but it
is dif‹cult to believe that the value of the improved service (in isolation of the
client effect) can justify the additional fare. The wider seats, the cloth napkins
(although the knives and forks are now plastic), and the help with coats have
much in common with the turndown service and chocolate mint on the pillow
in nice hotels.
Of course, under deregulation, airline consumers have become more price
sensitive, with ‹rst-class service disappearing on many (relatively short)
domestic ›ights and the fare differential between ‹rst-class and coach service
becoming smaller.18 But the decline in domestic ‹rst-class service is consistent
with the client effect. As airline travel has become more commonplace (and
therefore a less prestigious activity) and faster, the client effect has become less
prevalent and important.19 This situation contrasts with long international
›ights, for which the client effect can be expected to remain strong. And, con-
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sistent with our discussion, three different classes on international travel (econ-
omy class, business class, and ‹rst class) are often available, with steep fare dif-
ferentials between them. Of course, the more comfortable seats and amenities
are not insigni‹cant advantages on long ›ights and clearly explain some of the
fare differential. But just as clearly, businesspeople who want to work and sleep
on a long overnight ›ight are willing to pay extra to increase the chances that
their nearby fellow passengers want to do the same.20
Although the client effect will probably remain strong enough in airline
travel to prevent the ruinous competition often associated with high-‹xed-
cost/low-marginal-cost services, the price competition that hampered airline
pro‹tability in the early 1990s and 2000s may be explained partly by a weaker
client effect in the demand for air travel. But this explanation raises an inter-
esting question. If the client effect in air travel demand was strong in the past,
why did the airline industry feel the need to lobby so hard, and effectively, for
a government cartel in the form of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)? And
why did the political in›uence of the airline industry wane, with the loss of its
cartel, when the case for it became stronger (though not necessarily strong)
with the decline in the client effect? These are largely political questions, and
many factors are at work here besides the client effect. But the history of the
CAB is not quite what the analysis of the client effect would predict.
In all cases in which the client effect is important, reputation plays an
important role. High prices can both create and signal consumers on the pres-
ence of a reputation for quality. This chapter has emphasized the role of high
prices in creating a reputation for quality by actually improving quality
through the customers actually served (the client effect).21 But a supplier who
has a reputation for catering to less-than-desirable clients may ‹nd it dif‹cult
to alter that reputation. Such a supplier can attempt to develop a reputation for
desirable clients by raising its price, but this may be making an investment that
never pays off. The higher price may screen out the less desirable clients, but
it will likely take a long time for others to become aware of that fact. And until
they do, the supplier’s reputation remains the same, and it has lost one set of
clients without appealing to the other set.
An interesting example of the dif‹culty of improving a reputation related
to the client effect by raising prices is Brazilian soccer. Soccer matches in
Brazil, as elsewhere, have attracted large numbers of disruptive fans who often
seem more interested in mob violence off the ‹eld than the game on the ‹eld.
The result is that many real fans are fearful of attending soccer matches in
Brazil. Signi‹cant numbers of these fans, however, ›ew to Dallas, Pasadena,
and San Francisco and paid far higher ticket prices than in Brazil to see their
team in action during the 1994 World Cup matches. The Brazilian authorities
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have responded by increasing ticket prices and stopping the sale of cheap
blocks of tickets to supporter groups to price the hooligans out of the market.
Unfortunately, the reputation that soccer matches in Brazil are dangerous has
lingered, and the real fans have not returned. So the immediate effect has been
large ‹nancial losses as soccer matches are being played before a few thousand
fans in stadiums built for a hundred thousand or more. And those fans who do
attend may ‹nd the experience less enjoyable than they expected because of the
absence of a large number of other fans (Becker 1991). The attempt to improve
the reputation of soccer in Brazil through higher prices and an improved client
effect may prove pro‹table in the long run, but it is costly in the short run. It
may be the case that the best strategy initially would have been, from the very
beginning, high prices for soccer matches and a reputation for attracting
respectable fans. However, once a reputation for spectator hooliganism has
been established, the best policy may be to remain with that reputation, a pol-
icy that the British seem to have followed.22
In short, high up-front prices can hike demand and expand the size of the
Dupuit triangle. The result can be higher pro‹ts and a larger Harberger trian-
gle. At the same time, the increased size of the Dupuit triangle (and the gain it
represents) can be larger than the increased size of the Harberger triangle (and
the loss it represents), resulting in a net increase in consumer welfare.
the bonding effect
Those familiar with principal-agency theory have often emphasized how busi-
nesses need to develop hostages or bonds that they, the businesses, can offer
their customers as assurances that agreed-upon standards of contracted service
will be met. The hostages and bonds are devices used by managers and ‹rms to
overcome any perceived opportunistic behavior and holdups.
Hostages and bonds enable managers and their ‹rms to make so-called
credible commitments.23 To the extent that ‹rms can do all these things, they
can increase their prices and pro‹ts. To the extent that the reputational capital
for credible commitments is attributable to managers, then the compensation
packages of responsible managers can rise, which researchers have found to be
the case ( Jensen and Meckling 1976). Indeed, organizational economic theo-
rists have argued that one very good reason for “overpaying” executives is that
executives are in the best position to misuse and misdirect lots of ‹rm
resources. Hence, to ensure that executives seek to maximize the principals’ (or
stockholders’) wealth, executives must be overpaid so that they suffer a real
economic loss if caught engaging in behavior that maximizes their own wealth
at the expense of the principals. Of course, this means that executives can’t be
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paid merely an amount equal to their opportunity cost (Murphy 1986; Jensen
and Murphy 1990; Lazear 1979, 2000).
The hostages or bonds are said to make the contracts self-enforcing, which
can lower transaction costs, improving the overall ef‹ciency of markets and
increasing the array of goods and services available for consumption, since
fewer resources will be needed to complete transactions and attendant con-
tracts (written and unwritten) and to monitor businesspeople’s commitments.
Economic organizational theorists have pointed to how brand names and
unnecessarily luxurious building façades can provide the needed assurances to
buyers: If a ‹rm that has invested in the brand names or luxurious facades fails
to meet agreed-upon standards for the products that are delivered, the ‹rm’s
reputation can suffer, nullifying in part or in total the ‹rm’s investment in its
brand name and building facade.
Economic pro‹t garnered by monopolies can similarly serve as a ‹rm’s
hostage or bond—that pro‹t can decline with poor performance or abrogation
of contracts. Moreover, the economic pro‹t can represent the deep pockets
that attorneys need in order to pursue suits against a ‹rm that fails to live up to
its contracts. Hence, the economic pro‹t that emerges as a monopoly raises its
price can do more than curb production and give rise to deadweight loss; it can
increase the value of the units that are purchased, in effect shifting up the
demand, as the price is raised.24 Once again, the Dupuit triangle can be
expanded (and costs lowered), perhaps with the total expansion in surplus value
more than offsetting the emergence of any deadweight loss that could be
recovered if the competitive output level were sold at the competitive price.
Note that perfect competitors have zero economic pro‹ts to offer as a
hostage or bond, but then the good in a perfectly competitive market is, by
assumption, the same for all producers, so hostages and bonds are unnecessary
in perfectly competitive markets to ensure quality. When we move away from
such perfect markets, however, economic and monopoly pro‹ts can offer con-
sumers some assurance that producers’ commitments on the particulars of dis-
similar products are credible. Producers then must lose something (over and
above opportunity cost) for acting opportunistically and getting caught, which
makes written and unwritten contracts closer to being self-enforcing. In effect,
monopoly pro‹ts increase the present value of the penalty (discounted by time
and the probability of getting caught) for wayward behavior.
concluding comments
The model developed here explains why product and service prices can be
higher than predicted by standard models of competition in situations with
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high ‹xed cost and low marginal cost. Indeed, we have sought to explain two
sources of advantages of monopoly pricing not touched on in conventional
monopoly models, the client and bonding effects. In our discussion of the
client effect, the high-price result obtained here adds some theoretical symme-
try to models that explain why prices are often lower than standard economic
models predict.
One such model is that a ‹rm will not respond to excess demand by raising
prices to the level needed to clear the market. The argument is that a ‹rm’s
most loyal customers have invested in information on the price-quality charac-
teristics of its product, and a sudden price increase renders that investment less
valuable and can motivate those customers to seek new information, some-
thing the ‹rm would prefer them not to do. Furthermore, a ‹rm may be able
to manage a queue so that its loyal customers have better access to the product
than do transient consumers, something it cannot do if the queue is eliminated
with a price increase. These arguments apply particularly to those cases in
which the excess demand at the initial price is expected to be temporary.25 It
has also been argued that restaurants do not always raise prices to ration cus-
tomers during periods of excess demand because the pleasure an individual
derives from a restaurant meal may be positively related to the number of other
people who want to eat in the same restaurant (Becker 1991). If so, an attempt
to exploit excess demand by raising prices, even a little, can result in a precipi-
tous drop in demand, as well as in amount demanded, and an increase in excess
capacity.26
It could be that effects described by Becker (1991) and Haddock and
McChesney (1994) are examples of the client effect helping to restrain a sup-
plier from increasing prices during periods of excess demand, whereas the
client effect discussed here operates to prevent the same supplier from lower-
ing price by much during periods of excess capacity. An expensive hotel, for
example, can bene‹t from the fact that it is known to be popular, which rec-
ommends against attempting to eliminate all excess demand during the peak
season, while still recognizing that lowering prices by much during the off-
peak season would adversely affect demand because of the client effect dis-
cussed in this chapter. So prices can be less ›exible both upward and downward
than the standard model indicates.
Also, the client effect discussed here can put downward pressure on prices
as well as upward pressure, as is the case with our previous examples. The price
of tickets to the concerts of popular rock groups is commonly less than the
market-clearing price. Why would rock musicians sell tickets at a lower price
when they could still ‹ll the stadium at a higher price? A plausible explanation
is the client effect. A higher price would do more to ‹lter out young people
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than older folks because the latter typically have higher wage rates. On the
other hand, with a less-than-market-clearing price the tickets will be rationed
by waiting, and young people with relative lower wage rates are more likely to
queue up by spending the night in a sleeping bag than an older person. And the
more people in the audience who will yell, scream, and take off some of their
clothes, the more exciting the concert. Furthermore, young fans are probably
more likely to buy auxiliary products like CDs, DVDs, T-shirts, posters, and
programs on offer. In this case, a better client mix results from a lower price
rather than a higher price.27
We have taken up the bonding effect in this chapter because it along with
the client effect reveal a glaring de‹ciency in standard monopoly theory, that
price hikes can only be used by ‹rms to curb sales. As we have argued, price
hikes and the economic pro‹ts that arise from them can serve as a bond. Both
the client and bonding effects can serve the function of increasing the value of
the units bought, thus increasing the size of Dupuit triangles at the same time
they give rise to Harberger triangles. When this central point is understood, it
follows that some monopoly prices (or all prices that exceed marginal cost) do
not reduce economic welfare. Indeed, such prices can at times be completely
consistent with rigorous competition and increased consumer welfare.
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Chapter 7
The Monopsony Problem
Monopsony is the buyer-side counterpart to monopoly. That
is to say, a monopsony, in its pure form, is a single buyer of a resource, such as
labor, that is protected from competition by barriers to entry facing potential
buyers outside the monopsonist’s market and also barriers making it very
dif‹cult for the resource (e.g., workers) from exiting the local market. In less
pure or extreme form, a monopsony is any ‹rm that has market power as a
buyer of a resource. In this case, market power means that the ‹rm can affect
the resource price—or wage rate for labor—by adjusting its employment of the
resource up or down. By altering its employment, the monopsony, by
de‹nition, affects the overall demand for the resource.
In this chapter, we will present the standard monopsony model, showing,
as economists do in their classrooms and textbooks, how a monopsony under-
pays and underemploys the resources it buys. We focus on the market for labor
because that is the resource market that seems to be the major concern to
economists when they are discussing monopsony. That labor market is also
likely to be of most concern to readers. Having developed the wage and
employment effects of monopsony, the model is also used to show the extent
to which a monopsony, like its seller-side counterpart, gives rise to market
inef‹ciency and thus can be cited for being another source of market failure.
By now, readers might surmise, correctly, that our purpose in developing
the conventional monopsony model is not to agree with the conventional view
economists take on monopsony. Rather, it is to challenge that view. Like other
economists, we can imagine the existence of a monopsonist, but, as we will
argue, we are hard-pressed to believe any ‹rm in the real workaday world
would ever deliberately seek to rise suf‹ciently in prominence in its local labor
markets to be able to signi‹cantly affect the wage it must pay its workers. We
say this because, as we will argue, for a buyer to develop into a monopsonist in
a resource market, it must pay above-competitive level prices for its resources.
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This necessarily means that the monopsony can only underpay the resource
(labor) in a peculiar sense: The monopsony pays less than economists can imag-
ine it should pay, given the standard of perfectly competitive market conditions.
However, such a pay level is very likely to impair, if not doom, the so-called
monopsony in the product market, given its then way-above-market wages.
In chapter 8, we extend our discussion of monopsony by taking up a promi-
nent widely presumed case of monopsony, the National Collegiate Athletics
Association, that, supposedly, has cartelized college and university sports mar-
kets with the intent of exploiting budding athletes. We show there how the
NCAA could not survive for long if it exploited athletes to the degree that the
economist-critics of the NCAA have argued. Taking both this and the follow-
ing chapters together, we conclude that monopsony, when it exists, can be wel-
fare enhancing, as we believe is likely the case in the market for college athletes.
the conventional monopsony model
Figure 7.1 captures the essence of the economist’s textbook model of monop-
sony, which we can assume is for a pure monopsony, just for the sake of sim-
plifying our demonstration. The downward-sloping demand curve D1 is the
monopsonist’s demand for labor, which captures the underlying market value
of what each additional worker (or each additional hour of labor) can produce
and, therefore, what the monopsonist is willing to pay for each unit of labor
laid out on the horizontal axis. Hence, D1 illustrates the usual labor market
relationship between the wage rate and the quantity of labor hired: the lower
the wage rate, the greater the quantity of labor demanded. (Again, D1 can be
the demand for any resource, since all resource inputs can be expected to have
declining marginal values within the range of production that is relevant to the
buyer of the resource.)
The upward sloping supply curve S1 captures the opportunity cost of each
worker (or each hour of labor) and, therefore, the wage each worker must have
before going to work for the monopsonist. The higher the worker’s opportu-
nity cost, the higher the wage rate required before the worker will go to work
in the market. The higher the wage rate, the greater the number of workers
who would be willing to work for the monopsonist.
The analysis of monopsony is developed by economists in much the same
way that the monopoly is developed, by starting with the ef‹ciency of a per-
fectly competitive market—in this case, the labor market. A perfectly compet-
itive labor market has assumed conditions that mirror the conditions to a per-
fectly competitive product market: (1) all workers (and/or their units of labor)
are identical, (2) numerous workers want to work, (3) numerous employers
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want to hire workers (with no one employer large enough to affect the going
market wage rate), (4) entry into or exit from the market is costless for workers
and employers, (5) information on wages and employment opportunities
across markets is zero, and (6) transaction costs are zero. Assuming perfect
competition, the equilibrium wage would be the intersection of D1 and S1. The
wage rate would be Wc, and the quantity of labor employed would be Qc.
1
In addition to these wage and employment outcomes, we can observe that
at equilibrium, all mutually bene‹cial trades between employers and workers
would be exploited, given that the marginal value of the last worker hired, the
Qcth worker, would be exactly equal to that worker’s opportunity cost and
reservation wage. All workers before the Qcth would contribute more in value
than they would incur in cost, with the summation of their surplus value equal
to the triangular area under the demand curve and above the supply curve, or
W1W2Y. Any portion of this triangle not captured by the interaction of the two
sides of the market is declared to be an inef‹ciency, or loss in surplus value—
and an indication of a market failure.
How can an inef‹ciency arise in a monopsony market? A pure monopsony,
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Figure 7.1. The standard monopsony model
by virtue of being the only employer in the market, can vary how much labor
it demands in a search for the most pro‹table wage rate and employment level
combination. Its task can be visualized in the graph by ‹rst noting that the
monopsony (which, for simpli‹cation purposes, is assumed not to be able to
discriminate among workers on the wages paid) must ‹gure that as it increases
the number of workers hired, it forces the wage rate that it must pay all work-
ers up to the wage rate paid to the marginal worker. Therefore, if the monop-
sony hires one worker, it might have to pay that worker, say, $10 per hour. If
it wishes to hire two workers, it might have to raise its wage for both workers
from $10 to, say, $12 per hour. That means that the marginal cost of the sec-
ond worker is not just $12 per hour, what the second worker is paid, but $14
per hour since the ‹rst worker has to be paid an additional $2. Put another way,
the total wage bill for the monopsony goes from $10 an hour for one worker to
$24 an hour for two workers, with the added cost of the second worker equal
to the difference, $14 an hour.
From this example, we can deduce that the monopsony faces a marginal
cost of labor curve, such as MCL1, that starts at the wage rate for one worker
and then is more steeply upward sloping than the monopsony’s labor supply
curve. The marginal cost of labor curve diverges further from the supply curve
as more workers are hired because any increase in the wage rate needed to hire
an additional worker has to be given to progressively more workers as the
monopsony moves up its labor supply curve.2
In determining how many workers will be hired, and at what wage, the
monopsony will weigh off the marginal value of each worker with each
worker’s marginal cost. This means it will compare the values on the demand
curve, D1, with the values on the MCL1 curve. It will extend its hiring of work-
ers so long as the additional value of each worker exceeds the additional cost
and will stop extending its hiring when the marginal value and marginal cost
are equal, or up to Qm. Beyond Qm, ‹rm pro‹ts are reduced with additional hir-
ing because each additional worker then costs more than he or she is worth to
the monopsony.
In settling on the wage rate it will pay, the monopsony looks to the labor
supply curve, S1, because that curve indicates what wage rate any quantity of
labor would be willing to accept. The supply curve indicates that quantity of
labor of Qm would be willing to work for Wm.
This conventional analysis of monopsony leads to ‹ve key deductions.
• First, the monopsony effectively (and arti‹cially) suppresses labor mar-
ket demand (by suppressing its own demand), from the solid D1 curve to
dashed D2 curve in ‹gure 7.1.
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• Second, the monopsony pays less than the competitive wage rate. As can
be seen in ‹gure 7.1, Wm is below Wc .
• Third, the monopsony employs fewer workers than would a competitive
market. The quantity Qm is below Qc.
• Fourth, a monopsonized market leads to market inef‹ciency (in much
the same manner as a monopolized market does, and for much the same
reason, control over price). The monopolist hires too few workers when
the marginal (opportunity) cost of hiring the last unit of labor is less than
its marginal value. The monopsony also produces too little output with
the marginal cost of the last unit of output less than its marginal value. In
the illustration of ‹gure 7.1, the inef‹ciency in the labor market is the
triangular area XYZ. This also means that the ‹nal product would
expected to be underproduced in most product markets dominated by
monopsony employers.
• Fifth, some of the surplus value that would go to workers under a com-
petitive labor market goes to the monopsony by virtue of the monop-
sony’s management of its labor demand.
As can be seen, there is a presumption that workers are worse off because
both their employment and income opportunities are constrained by the
monopsony’s management of labor market demand. Society at large also loses,
from the perspective of this standard model, given that workers who could
more valuably be employed in the monopsonized market are forced into
unemployment or are forced to go elsewhere, to other competitive markets,
where they are worth less.3
the mysterious existence of monopsony
Our critique of monopsony theory begins with a reminder that the case against
monopsony is made in terms of the ef‹ciency standard associated with perfect
competition, which is not likely to be relevant to any real-world market. The
‹rst and most important constraint on the achievement of any “perfect market
outcome” is the fact of pervasive scarcity. Scarcity ensures that movement
toward a more perfect market is, beyond some point, likely to become progres-
sively more costly in an array of terms, not the least of which are the availability
of information to buyers and sellers and the count of market participants.
We also point out that the monopsony outcome is often presumed to be
the monopsony’s fault alone, that is, a consequence directly and solely attrib-
uted to the monopsony’s control of resource demand. The market outcome
can also be said to be a consequence of the inability of the consumers of the
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‹nal product to organize for the purpose of buying off the monopsony, that is,
by paying the monopsony to hire more workers up to the idealized competi-
tive level. When the consumers can’t get together to do just that, we must
assume that their organizational costs are greater than their gains to be had by
buying off the monopsony. If that were the case, there would be no net
ef‹ciency improvement by achieving the competitive outcome. The costs of
getting to that point could then be greater than the ef‹ciency gain (or the tri-
angle XYZ), making the competitive outcome less preferred than the monop-
sony outcome.4
Otherwise, we have no real complaint with the analysis of monopsony, as
far as it goes. If a monopsony is brought magically into existence (by assump-
tion) and then is superimposed on a labor market under the conditions
speci‹ed, then the conventional monopsony model does tell us that welfare is
destroyed as the monopsony transfers some of the undestroyed surplus value
that would have gone to workers in competitive labor markets to itself. How-
ever, we have to wonder how a monopsony could ever emerge so magically in
the real world. If it cannot magically appear on a labor market scene, we are left
to wonder if a ‹rm would ever want to do what it takes to become a monop-
sony, with the powers of demand management attributed to it in the standard
monopsony model.
Our most important point is really very simple, which means our criticism
of the monopsony model can be handled in far fewer words and pages than are
typically devoted in textbooks to the development of the standard monopsony
model. In elaborating our point we can’t help but remember that at the start of
the movie [Little Orphan] Annie, Ms. Hannigan—the decadent, boozing, sex-
obsessed house mother of thirty or so little girls—wonders in obvious exasper-
ation, “Why anyone would ever want to be an orphan beats me.” She is right—
no one in his right mind would ever choose to become an orphan (especially if
they have the fabulously wealthy Daddy Warbucks as an alternative care
option). The relevant issue is how Annie got to be in the orphanage and what
her options were along the way. By the standard of where she came from (not
where she went to live after her stint in the orphanage), the orphanage might
be an improved form of child care. Indeed, it could have been her best care
option, in spite of its obvious imperfections, made all the starker by the
strained decadence of her Ms. Hannigan and the glitter of her adoptive home.
Similarly, monopsony might be seen as an improved state of markets if we
‹rst understand where the monopsony came from. In real-world markets, a
monopsony doesn’t just spring into existence fully capable of managing labor
market demand. Large or dominant employers (not to mention single employ-
ers of any resource in a local market) almost always start out small. When suc-
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cessful at what they do, they grow. The more successful a ‹rm is in satisfying
consumers and in controlling principal-agency problems (and, therefore, con-
trolling its production costs), and the more successful the ‹rm is in developing
its product and the product’s market, the bigger the ‹rm can become both in
terms of market sales and workers employed. Seen from this perspective, the
extant inef‹ciency attributed to the monopsony in ‹gure 7.1 must be weighed
against the unseen welfare gains in both the product and resource markets that
were realized as the ‹rm grew to become the sole or just dominant employer.
There is no reason why a ‹rm that can control the wage rate it pays is, on bal-
ance, any more of a net welfare loss to an economy than are other ‹rms in
other markets that do not grow to where they can affect the terms of worker
employment.
It is important to note, again, that the only way a ‹rm can grow is to hire
more workers. Granted, it might initially grow without affecting the wage rate
in its market. This is expected to be the usual case because its labor demand is
initially (almost by de‹nition of a new start-up ‹rm) such a small part of the
total labor demand in its relevant market(s). If the ‹rm’s demand for labor con-
tinues to grow because of its successes, it can, at some point, become so large
that its demand begins to affect the wage rate. At such a point, it might be
tagged as a monopsony by economists. However, at this point in its upward
growth path, it can’t just lower its wage rate below the prevailing wage rate, as
might be expected of a monopsony (and as is certainly intimated in the presen-
tation of the standard monopsony model). If the monopsony does lower its
wage, it will contract, not grow, because workers will then go elsewhere to
higher-paying opportunities.
The point is that a would-be monopsony’s growth must add to the total
demand for labor, which must put upward pressure on the wage rate, at least
beyond some point. This means that a successful ‹rm that grows to the posi-
tion of market dominance of a monopsony must hike, not depress, workers’
wage rate and employment level over and above what the wage rate and
employment level would otherwise have been. In short, workers must be bet-
ter off, not worse off, as is suggested by conventional monopsony analysis.
Almost surely, as the ‹rm grew to dominate its labor market, it would have
attracted at least some new workers into its labor market. If it was possible for
labor to move in, then surely labor would then have suf‹cient mobility to move
out were the monopoly to start suppressing wages below competitive levels
that enable the dominant ‹rm to expand in the ‹rst place. Economists can’t
have it both ways: assume that labor can enter a labor market in response to
attractive pay bundles, but not move out in response to below-competitive pay
bundles. But then, conventional monopsony theory implicitly assumes
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(wrongly, we argue) a Roach Motel view of labor markets: Labor can move in
but is then forever trapped, subject to exploitation by a monopsony.
Granted, the monopsony might constrict employment below the point at
which the marginal value of labor could be equal to the marginal cost, but such
a matter is of no consequence. That idealized employment and wage rate level
is not attainable, at least not by the usual welfare-enhancing negotiations
between buyers and sellers.
Perhaps it could be attained if some federally mandated minimum wage
(or, as some advocates of social justice propose, an even higher living wage)
were imposed at Wc, a line of argument well worn in microeconomic theory,
once the monopsony was in existence.5 However, we have to ask whether such
a minimum wage would actually be welfare enhancing, on balance? If the mini-
mum wage were applied across all labor markets, both competitive and
monopsonistic, then the welfare or ef‹ciency gains in monopsony markets
must be weighed against the welfare or ef‹ciency losses in the competitive
markets.
If the monopsony could expect the imposition of the minimum wage—
before it started growing—then it is not at all clear that a minimum wage
would be welfare enhancing even if the wage control were applicable only to
monopsony markets. Surely, if the growth of the ‹rm is predicated on paying
less than the to-be-imposed minimum wage, then the anticipation of the min-
imum wage would affect the monopsony’s future growth plans for product
sales and employment, because the minimum wage would make it less
pro‹table (in present discounted value terms).
Granted, in a riskless world in which producers didn’t have to confront the
prospects of product and ‹rm failures, the anticipated minimum wage might
have minimum impact, or have the effect economists argue it can have in
monopsony markets. However, as noted in our discussion of problems with
monopoly theory, scarcity practically mandates product and ‹rm failures, and
‹rms use the pro‹tability (whether achieved from monopoly or monopsony
pricing) of a few products to offset losses of failed products. Entrepreneurs
often buy portfolios of ‹rms, either directly through acquisitions of the ‹rms
or through the acquisition of their stock. Again, they do so assuming that the
economic pro‹t on the few pro‹table ‹rms or stocks will offset or more than
compensate them for the economic losses on the many. From the perspective
being advanced here, minimum wages directed only at monopsonies, and the
appropriation of monopsony rents, can be a sure‹re method of dampening
investments across a range of labor markets, competitive and monopsonistic,
the net effect of which can be a welfare loss from the development of new
products, production processes, and product markets that can more than offset
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the welfare gain from the expansion of employment that is expected in any
given monopsonized labor market.
But after dealing with this minimum-wage digression, we must come back
to questioning why a monopsony would ever expand in any given or local labor
market to where it began to materially hike the market wage that it would then
have to pay—if it had other potential employment venues (which most ‹rms
have). If labor markets were ›uid (or no less ›uid as is normally assumed in
conventional monopsony analysis), the wage rate in the yet-to-be-monop-
sony’s local market should initially be more or less equal to the wage rate paid
in other local labor markets.6 If there is any difference in the wage rates among
local labor markets, the difference should re›ect the cost of ‹rms and/or work-
ers moving across the local labor market boundaries. This means that a grow-
ing ‹rm, when it begins to push the wage in its local labor market upward,
should begin to think about expanding elsewhere, where its expansion plans
are suf‹ciently small that they no longer will result in the wage rate of that new
local market being pushed up.
Granted, the conventional view of monopsony assumes that other viable
labor markets don’t exist (or that they are prohibitively costly to get to), both
for the monopsony and the workers. However, here the source of the
inef‹ciency is the (assumed) highly constrained options of the model, not the
monopsony per se. People are basically trapped by the model’s assumption of
limited options—the presumed “state of nature”—not by the abuse of workers
by an expanding ‹rm. If the state of nature is so constrained, then we are hard-
pressed to conclude that the monopsony is doing no more than what the work-
ers are doing, which is the best that can be done under the circumstances. The
presumption of inef‹ciency is illusory since competition is ruled out. More-
over, exploitation loses its pejorative connotation if workers have the option of
morphing into producers. Of course, in the standard model, such morphing is
precluded, but only by assumption (perhaps because the monopsony model
was developed when such morphing was, understandably, considered infeasi-
ble, or less feasible than it is today in digital goods markets).
Our view of monopsony is founded on the more realistic view that both
workers and ‹rms have an array of employment options, which, naturally,
means that the negative effects of monopsony, if they exist at all, are nowhere
nearly as likely.
All of this leads us to draw a transparent conclusion. We should expect a
would-be monopsony to do what many successful ‹rms actually do: they
expand by setting up production units in a growing array of labor market
venues. They shift to new venues, both domestic and foreign, when conditions
in any existing labor markets become so tight that their having the de‹ning
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characteristic of being a monopsony is a real threat to their further expansion
and pro‹tability. Certainly those who are critical of ‹rms that outsource jobs
should at least acknowledge that those ‹rms are reducing their real or poten-
tial monopsony power.
If a ‹rm were to persist, blindly expanding in a given local labor market to
where the ‹rm acquired monopsony powers, you might think from standard
analysis that the ‹rm would be showered with the capital it needed for expan-
sion. However, the exact opposite would likely be the case, which means com-
petitive capital markets are effective means of disciplining would-be monop-
sonies that insisted on driving up labor costs, giving other producers in the
‹nal product market a decided market advantage. This suggests that in order
for monopsonies to emerge with any frequency at all, there would have to be
failures beyond those that are conceptualized for labor markets. The failures
would have to extend to bizarre behavior on the part of investors in capital
markets, which implies a form and level of systematic market inef‹ciencies (if
not stupidity) not normally considered in monopsony analysis.
Seen from the perspective of this new view of monopsony, the only local
labor market condition a ‹rm would want to confront less than a market in
which the market wage rate was rising because of the rise in the aggregate labor
demand is a labor market in which it, individually, was the sole source of the
rising wages. Hence, just like Annie might not want to become an orphan, so
would a ‹rm not want to become a monopsony, if it could help it.
Granted, the suggested desirability of being a monopsony comes from the
implied assumption that a ‹rm with a given demand curve for labor suddenly,
and magically, ‹nds itself with the same labor supply as before it became a
monopsony, but with no competition for the labor supply and no way for the
labor to move away from the monopsony. This would be nice from the ‹rm’s
perspective, but so would a lot of other equally unrealistic market conditions
we could assume.
the monopsonistic “company town”
We understand that historians have pointed to company towns as evidence of
how a dominant employer—a monopsony—can exploit its workers. As the
story could be, and is often, related, a mining company (as one of many poten-
tial examples) might set up a mine is some remote part of the Rockies. By virtue
of its location, the ‹rm is the only employer in the town (town used loosely)
that it creates. It sets itself up, in other words, as a monopsony (a single buyer
of labor and, for that matter, every other resource in the area), fully capable
(supposedly) of exploiting its workers with below-competitive market wages.
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Because the company owns all of the houses in town, it can further exploit
its workers by its rental demands. Because it owns the only general store and
bar (or whatever else) in the town, it can hike the prices for things its workers
buy at the company’s stores to the point that the workers’ real incomes can be
reduced (potentially) to a subsistence-level existence, which can be, in itself, a
form of entrapment, because the worker must stay on, living from one pay-
check to the next (as the story is developed). The implied economic logic of the
story is captured by the lyrics to a song, “Sixteen Tons,” that the late Ten-
nessee Ernie Ford made widely popular in the 1960s.
Sixteen tons and what do you get?
Another day older and deeper in debt.
Saint Peter don’t you call me ’cause I can’t go.
I owe my soul to the company store. 
The basic problem with this story is that it assumes an immense level of
intelligence and clairvoyance on the part of the monopsonist and an immense
level of irrationality or nonrationality, if not stupidity, and myopia on the part
of the workers. In such a circumstance, we have to wonder if there is any mar-
ket inef‹ciency in the company town scenario, because the workers’ lack of
awareness as to what they are getting themselves into should surely temper
their own assessment of their own welfare loss from their own employment
decisions that are made without much thought of the consequences. A question
many economists seem to fail to entertain is whether there can be a material
market inef‹ciency in a world in which choices are not made rationally. This
question is particularly relevant when the adverse net consequences of worker
exploitation in company towns are so blatantly obvious that even remote
observers (economists and historians) can see them with clarity. Why can’t the
workers also see their own prospective exploitation, from afar, before they
move to the company town?
In the case of the mining company, the workers would have to be willing to
incur the substantial relocation costs of going to a remote location and to over-
look obvious features of their new employment venues, not the least of which
is that they would be facing a monopsony employer and a monopoly seller of
housing and all other goods they would be buying. The workers who move to
the remote location would also have to fail to recognize that the relocation
costs of moving back would lock them into monopsony/monopoly exploita-
tion. Often, they would also have to fall down in these regards and incur the
relocation costs with an array of inattentive family members in tow, who are
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equally oblivious to what they are getting themselves into (and won’t be able to
get out of except at considerable cost).
Maybe some workers would be so de‹cient that they strike out for “them
thar hills” without ‹rst investigating the consequences and taking account of
the risks involved of being exploited beforehand that are supposed by the para-
meters of the company-town story. However, the mining company will have to
‹gure that its expansion plans will be guided by those marginal workers who
can appropriately assess the risks involved and will make wage demands based
on their (more real worldly) assessments. And the greater the risks of being
exploited either on the wage or product price ends can be expected to affect the
workers’ up-front willingness to move to the new location and, hence, the con-
ditions of their employment. Of course, because worker willingness to move
can affect employment costs for the monopsony, the monopsony has an inter-
est in managing those risks, if it wants to grow and remain the type of employer
that can continue to attract good workers—workers who, among other attri-
butes, aren’t completely stupid.
As economist Price Fishback (1992, chaps. 8, 9) has stressed, these market
threats that workers face in going to remote company towns are precisely the
reasons there are company towns in the ‹rst place. By virtue of its remote loca-
tion, the company must pay a wage rate that is above what the workers would
get where they are, say, back East. Otherwise, why else would they move to
that remote spot, incurring the relocation and risk costs? The prospects of pay-
ing higher wages is all the more reason the mining company would want to
minimize the risk workers perceive in relocating.
One strategy the company can use to minimize its workers’ employment
risk is for the company to pay the workers’ moving expenses and to provide an
up-front signing bonus that essentially compensates the workers for the risk
costs of being exploited, contrary to the employment agreement that is written
or even unwritten. The bonus can be seen as a bond that the workers can cash
in the event the employer reneges on its agreement and “exploits” the workers
by more than indicated or expected. Of course, the workers can use the signing
bonus to move back where they came from, which is a means by which the
monopsony tells workers in so many dollars, “I am increasing the elasticity of
my labor supply, which is to say, I am limiting my own ability to exploit work-
ers by suppressing their wages below competitive levels.”
The company can also follow a strategy of building company houses it
rents to its workers (as a means of lowering its signing bonuses or its wage bill).
If it didn’t provide the houses for workers and the workers had to sink their
funds in their own houses, the workers would have to fear that they would
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indeed be locked in to (or would face high switching costs from) employment
with the company—and would be far more open to exploitation. By providing
the company housing, the company is basically saying to workers, “I am reduc-
ing your risk of coming to this remote spot. If I ever act like a monopsony, you
can move on without putting up your housing investment at risk. I am, again,
increasing the elasticity of worker supply. Moreover, if I ever act like a monop-
sony [to any substantial degree], I am putting the company’s housing stock at
risk. Moreover, I will be putting the company’s investment in the general
store, brothel, and bar at risk. I am not asking that you accept my word as my
bond. You don’t know me. As a consequence, I am asking you to accept my
housing investment as my bond.” The company’s reason is, again, obvious: It
can hire more workers at a lower wage (and a lower overall value of its payment
bundles to its workers) than otherwise and can expand by more than it could if
it didn’t create the town, as they say, lock, stock, and barrel.
This all means, understandably, that the company has an incentive to
develop a reputation for playing fair with its workers, for holding to its bar-
gains, and for resisting the temptation to actually act like an exploitative
monopsony—or opportunist or holdup artist. The monopsony also has an
incentive to resist acting like a monopoly in its housing and general store mar-
kets. Otherwise, the higher the prices on the goods side of the company, the
higher wage rate on the employment side. Indeed, by owning the entire town,
the company internalizes the monopoly and monopsony consequences of its
own actions, a factor that is bound to lead to an improvement in the overall
ef‹ciency of the market that it operates than would otherwise be possible.
Ownership of the company town, in other words, is a substitute for a yet-to-
be-earned reputation for fair dealing, or not acting like a monopsony. It is a
source of welfare improvement.
Of course, the company’s efforts to create its own town are costly. They
can give rise to some later “exploitation,” in the sense that the workers would
be willing to endure what are then lower wage rates (that economists claim are
below competitive). However, the point that can too easily get lost in monop-
sony wage payments is that workers could have earlier been compensated for
any supposed exploitation by the initial, up-front signing bonus or by the off-
setting subsidies embedded in the housing rentals.
In the name of ef‹ciency, we might want to wish away the various bonding
costs a company might have to incur on the grounds that the world would be a
more ef‹cient place without them. However, that is simply imagining
ef‹ciency by wishful thinking.
It’s possible that the mining company could be paying less than economists
imagine to be the wage rate of perfect competition. Again, if a criticism of
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markets is implied, we must wonder how a perfectly competitive market would
ever be created in what are imagined to be remote places in the Rockies (or on
South Seas desert islands). By the de‹nition of the setting, such perfect mar-
kets are beyond realism, or amount to an imaginary world that only economists
could construct. Ironically, in constructing their imaginary (labor market)
worlds of monopsonies, economists might be the most consequential source of
market distortions, or inef‹ciency, since their imaginary worlds form the intel-
lectual foundations of policy recommendations that can be misguided.
firm and worker mobility and 
monopsony market power
A monopsony’s market power, and its effect on the market wage rate, must be
functionally related to the mobility of resources, both its own ability to move
about local labor markets and its workers’ ability to do the same. The bene‹ts
of a ‹rm’s or would-be monopsony’s own mobility is transparent. The greater
its ability to move to other markets, the greater its potential pro‹tability,
because the would-be monopsony would then have a greater ability to avoid
paying supra-local-market competitive wage rates (or wages paid elsewhere).
The bene‹ts to the monopsony of worker mobility may be harder to see,
given the economists’ standard take on monopsony. Greater worker mobility
under that model means that the monopsony would not be able to suppress
worker wages below competitive levels. However, from our perspective,
greater worker mobility, because it implies a greater elasticity of worker sup-
ply, lowers the increase in the wage rate that the monopsony would have to
offer in order to expand production in any given local labor market. Whether
or not greater worker mobility implies higher pro‹ts is uncertain. This is
because other ‹rms can bene‹t from worker mobility, with the market bene‹ts
of worker mobility being competed away through price competition on the
product side of the market.
The fact of the matter is that resource mobility, especially labor mobility,
has grown substantially over the last century as the cost of virtually all forms of
transportation (and communication, which can enhance worker mobility) has
steadily declined. Resource mobility has also grown with the development of
computer and telecommunication technology. Where information once had to
be transported in physical paper form via truck, plane, train, and/or boat for
days or hours and at a cost that could easily run into the hundreds of dollars, it
can now be sent around the world with a few keystrokes on a computer at vir-
tually the speed of light and at the cost of cents (or fractions thereof ). These
improvements have surely reduced any inef‹ciency of whatever monopsony
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presence there is in any local, therefore isolated to one degree or another,
economy. Workers can move to alternative local labor markets at far less cost
than they once could, lowering the upper limit on the degree of labor exploita-
tion. Firms’ mobility has also improved dramatically, a fact that shows up in
the willingness of ‹rms to hopscotch among local labor markets on a world
scale, thus reducing their need to pay above-market (albeit monopsony)
wages.7
This increase in mobility of resources has directly increased the ability of
‹rms to grow through a reduction in their out-of-pocket expenditures. It has
also reduced the risk costs workers have had to incur. Accordingly, it has
reduced ‹rm costs by reducing their need for ‹rms to provide such offsetting
employment bene‹ts as signing bonuses and houses. In short, because of the
escalation in capital and worker mobility, company towns have become less
prevalent in part because they have become a less necessary component of
employment contracts as a means of attracting workers.
concluding comments
We must admit that with regard to the monopsony model, we are of two
minds. In one sense we accept the standard monopsony analysis for what it is.
If markets meet the speci‹ed conditions for monopsony that are set in the
model, then the standard monopsony results follow. The model makes for at
least one good lecture that may appeal to many students’ predisposition to
believe that market power on both the buyer’s and seller’s sides is everywhere
evident in a market economy and, in all too many cases, in need of government
remedy.
Our objection is with the speci‹ed resource market conditions, especially
when the monopsony refers to a single seller and not to a cartel of employers.
The most objectionable condition is that the monopsonist exist with no history
of how the identi‹ed ‹rm actually came to be a monopsony—that is, with no
concern with the question of why a ‹rm would, when it was small, ever want to
grow so large in one particular location that its hiring drives up the prevailing
wage, which is the key requirement in the monopsony model. The central
point of this chapter is that if the analysis is changed to allow for the emergence
of the monopsony through normal market success and growth processes, then
it doesn’t follow that the monopsony has all of the pernicious consequences
that are attributed to it. Indeed, a growth-based, so-called monopsony can be,
on balance, welfare enhancing. This means it can elevate the income and
employment opportunities of workers, as well as all other stakeholders.
We can easily see how a governmental entity might emerge and continue
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to expand until it takes on the market prominence of a monopsony. This can
be the case because it does not have to maximize stockholder equity. Govern-
ment employment is all too often a political football and often, as such, a goal
unto itself. In addition, governments are, by their very creation, landlocked.
They are politically constrained from doing what a private ‹rm can do, hop-
scotching among labor markets to take advantage of expansion opportunities
without causing a hike in the wage rates it pays. Governments, understandably,
often appear more than willing to expand in a given local labor market to the
point that they begin to drive up resource prices above surrounding competi-
tive levels.
We note that the wages of federal government workers in the District of
Columbia are notoriously above the wages paid for comparable workers in the
private sector. A part of the in›ated wages can be attributed to the fact that
members of Congress, whose political home bases are far removed from DC,
do not have to worry about their constituencies objecting to the above-market
wages paid in DC. Voters (especially those far beyond the Beltway) can be
expected to be often rationally ignorant of such governmental details as worker
pay. Also, members of Congress can shift the blame for overpayments to other
members of Congress or on to Congress as a whole—or they can simply point
out the obvious, that the preponderance of the federal government’s work
must be done in the district.
However, a part of the blame for the government’s supracompetitive wage
level is that the federal government has become, in staying within its political
constraints, the closest thing to a monopsony in the DC area that we are likely
to see. This observation, we suggest, corroborates our central thesis in this
chapter, which is that a ‹rm that develops to the stage of a monopsony must
hike, not suppress, worker wage rates. If there is any inef‹ciency to be consid-
ered in the process, it is that the governmental services possibly could have
been provided at lower cost had the federal government had the freedom to
expand across local labor markets the way footloose private ‹rms are able to
do. But then, such a point can only be made by erring the same way a standard
monopsony errs, by assuming, or wishing away, real-world economic con-
straints, which, in this case, have a political origin.
We concede that if a group of formerly competitive resource buyers con-
spire to manage their resource demand, then we have, potentially, another
story, one of suppressed wages and employment opportunities and a market
inef‹ciency, at least for a time. All that we would add is that the restrictions on
employment, wage rates, and ef‹ciency are not likely to be as great as the
monopsony model suggests. This is because, as in the case of seller cartels,
there are costs to coordinating and managing the buyer cartel. Those costs are
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likely to escalate with every decrease in labor market demand orchestrated by
the cartel, and the escalation in the coordination cost will choke off further
restrictions on the cartel’s labor demand. Also, such a cartel would face out-
migration from workers as the cartel attempted to use its monopsony power to
reduce the wages that cartel members pay.
Having said that, not all ‹rm organizations that have the look and feel of a
monopsony cartel can be expected to have the supposed universally applicable
oppressive market impact of a monopsony. We seek to drive that point home
in the next chapter. There we critically examine the economic and legal roots
of the NCAA, which is often held up as a grand, if not the grandest, example of
an oppressive employment cartel designed to exploit college and university
(mainly minority) athletes and to pad the pockets of NCAA members’ coffers
and their coaching staffs. With both this and the following chapters, we con-
tend that economists have the monopsony problem wrong, both as a means of
assessing labor market ef‹ciency and, in general, as a foundation for critiquing
the restrictive employment rules in college athletics.
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Chapter 8
The NCAA: A Case Study of 
the Misuse of the Monopsony 
and Monopoly Models
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is
under perennial attack from academic, sports, and media critics for its rules
governing the recruitment and retention of athletes. Few people inside or out-
side colleges and universities are satis‹ed with the NCAA’s rules, criticizing
the NCAA for being both too strict and too lenient in the rules it makes and
enforces. Cheating on NCAA rules appears to be widespread, if not rampant,
as evidenced by the number and prestige of colleges and universities that have
been penalized for rule infractions (Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992, chap. 5).
Few expect that rule infractions will ever be a thing of the past.
Many academic administrators and much of the general public appear to be
worried that the NCAA has failed to adequately maintain the academic stan-
dards college athletes must meet to attend college. Concern also has been
expressed about the payments, overt and covert, that member colleges and
their supporters can make to athletes (Farrell 1985; Klein 1985).1
On the other hand, many members of the media and the economics pro-
fession appear convinced that existing NCAA rules represent an egregious, as
well as inef‹cient, attempt by colleges and universities to cartelize the athletic
labor markets for the purpose of facilitating a monopsony. As do all monop-
sonies (following conventional monopsony theory covered in chap. 7), the
NCAA has, according to critics, suppressed the labor-market demand, in this
case for student-athletes, thereby limiting their employment opportunities,
wages, and fringe bene‹ts. By restricting athletes’ employment opportunities
as well as restricting the number of games colleges and universities can play,
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and controlling collegiate games on television, the NCAA has imposed its col-
lective will on the public with conventional monopoly consequences of a dom-
inant “‹rm” with extensive monopoly power.
Economists Armen Alchian and William Allen popularized the cartel argu-
ment as applied to the NCAA within the economics profession in their intro-
ductory economics text ‹rst published more than four decades ago.2 That
argument has been adopted by others and continues to lie at the heart of pro-
fessional critiques of the NCAA (Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992; Koch
1973, 1983; McCormick 1985, 27). In their book-length investigation of the
NCAA as a cartel, Arthur Fleisher, Brian Goff, and Robert Tollison insist,
Economists generally view the NCAA as a cartel. They hold this view
because the NCAA historically devised rules to restrict output (the number
of games played and televised) and to restrict competition for inputs (stu-
dent-athletes) . . . These points [all relating to the NCAA’s cartel position]
are well established in the literature, and, indeed, it could be observed that
the NCAA has obtained much more durable returns on its cartel behavior
than other, more notable cartels such as OPEC. (Fleisher, Goff, and Tolli-
son 1992, 5)
Having assumed the NCAA’s unquestionable cartel role, these authors go on
to consider the only remaining issue that they consider worthy of investigation:
“How is the cartel enforced? Who are the key regulators? Which schools are
put on probation and why? How do member schools vote on rule changes?
What is the nature of monopoly/monopsony rent distribution within the
NCAA?” (5). After noting that in 1984 the U.S. Supreme Court had found the
NCAA in violation of the nation’s antitrust laws with its rules governing the
televising of football games, Gary Becker stressed that “the NCAA’s real
monopoly power is over athletes” (1985, 18).3
Almost all critics detect signi‹cant hypocrisy in the NCAA’s enforcement
activity. Several have called for reform, including outright payments to student-
athletes on the grounds that “maintenance of the present system can only con-
tinue to produce victims, not bene‹ciaries” (Howell 1985, 31).4 The hypocrisy
in the NCAA system is, according to proponents of the cartel thesis, patently
evident in the differential treatment of a music student and a student-athlete.
Both may have narrow academic goals, but only one—the student-athlete—is
not permitted to sell his or her talents at market value (McCormick 1985, 27).5
With criticisms of the NCAA so widespread (and unrelenting), our pur-
pose in this chapter is hardly to add to the array of critics. On the contrary, our
central purpose is to reassess the conventional claims of economists that the
NCAA is a welfare-destroying monopsonist and monopolist and, as a conse-
quence, that wages of student-athletes are suppressed by the NCAA as evi-
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denced by the existence of NCAA rules, the persistence of ›agrant cheating,
and the fact that ticket prices of collegiate athletic events have been moving
toward monopoly limits. In so doing, we expect our assessment of the NCAA
will fortify our critique of monopsony theory and show how following conven-
tional monopsony/monopoly modeling can mislead policy discussions.
Our reassessment leads to strikingly unconventional conclusions. Most
important, economists’ cartel theory is hardly the only explanation for the
NCAA behavior, contrary to what the critics have suggested with some zeal.
The most notable explanation is that the NCAA devises rules for the types of
games its members want to play and does so in a mutually bene‹cial way, a fact
that appears to us to be self-evident in the growth of college athletics and
NCAA membership over the past half century (and more), as well as the ‹nan-
cial gains (economic pro‹ts) many member schools have realized. Moreover,
we argue that athletes’ wages are not generally and materially suppressed by
the NCAA. Indeed, NCAA rules likely enhance the demand for student-ath-
letes in general and increase their wages and employment opportunities in col-
lege athletics (a theme that emerged in our general treatment of monopsony in
chap. 7). We conclude that overlooked but important market-based forces can
be expected to contain any potentially ill-conceived and misused powers of the
NCAA to exploit athletes that exist. This suggests that reoccurring moves to
force the NCAA to permit its member colleges to pay athletes competitive
wages are misguided. Athletes’ wages can be expected to adjust over time in
response to market forces without regulatory intervention.6
We begin by reviewing the conventional economic argument on how an
employer, a monopsony cartel, which the NCAA is alleged to be, can suppress
worker wages. This cartel theory relies on the uncritical acceptance of an
unfounded presumption that more than a thousand colleges and universities
can form through the NCAA an effective, workable cartel that can be main-
tained even without legal restrictions barring entry into the athletic labor mar-
kets by other sports associations that permit competitive wage payments to
athletes.7 We (with the considerable help of law professor Thomas Sullivan)
‹nd no legal and regulatory barriers to the emergence and entry of alternative
sports associations into athletic labor markets.
In the absence of such barriers to entry, we argue further, the NCAA rules
are, contrary to conventional wisdom, prudent measures by colleges to play the
types of games they want to play and to increase the demand for intercollegiate
athletics and college education. In short, the NCAA rules are a reasonably
ef‹cient contract among participants in a joint venture. They are similar in
character and purpose to the rules that franchisors impose on their franchisees.
In fact, the observed cheating on NCAA rules is to be expected, as it is in
franchise markets, because of the common bene‹ts that the colleges’ joint
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sports venture entails. Cheating by colleges can be construed (as we will show)
as evidence of the public-goods character of the objectives of the NCAA rather
than prima facie evidence of a cartelized labor market. Penalties on violators of
NCAA rules are no less necessary, and no less expected, than penalties imposed
by franchisors on wayward franchisees. Our review of antitrust law court deci-
sions involving the NCAA directly, as well as decisions affecting a variety of
other nonsports ‹rms, suggests to us that economists, especially those who
openly criticize the NCAA for being a monopsony, have much to learn from
judges who have been willing to assess antitrust charges by not only consider-
ing the direct effects of market restrictions, given demand, on cooperative
organizations such as the NCAA, but also by accounting for the impact of the
restrictions on increasing market demand and, therefore, consumer surplus.
the conventional cartel argument against the ncaa
Economists have leveled two sets of major charges against the NCAA. First, the
NCAA operates as a seller cartel of athletic events, restricting the number of
events its members can put on and have televised. In doing so, it transfers
incomes from event attendees and television viewers to member colleges and
universities (and their conferences and associations). While this is an important
charge, we are not principally concerned with this set of charges in this chapter
because we dealt with the monopoly issue in earlier chapters; we dedicate this
chapter mainly to extending our understanding of monopsony (although we
can’t sidestep monopoly issues that have been intertwined with claims that the
NCAA is a destructive monopsony). Here we mean only to remind readers that
the cartel charges presume that market restrictions can affect the nature and
character of the sports events offered and can, as a consequence, positively affect
the long-run demand for college and university sporting events. Hence, buyers
can be better off in spite of the higher prices that may (or may not) be charged
and the monopoly, economic pro‹ts that are secured.
The second set of charges involves the claim that the NCAA acts as an
employer cartel that suppresses athletes’ wages: “A convincing prima facie case
that the NCAA is a cartel can be derived from the explicit behavior of the
NCAA” (Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992, 7). This explicit behavior includes
the NCAA’s contract with a single television network, as well as other facts.
While revenues to schools, coaches’ salaries, and expenditures on athletic
programs have exploded over the years since 1950, allowable compensation
to athletes has remained essentially the same: a full grant-in-aid equal to
tuition and fees, room and board, and books. Any athlete receiving more
than a full grant-in-aid is automatically ineligible for NCAA participation.
(Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992, 7–8)
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Through such restrictions (and many more), the NCAA creates market
inef‹ciencies that ultimately have the effect of transferring income from ath-
letes (a substantial percentage of whom in football and basketball are African
American) to coaches (almost all of whom are Caucasian) and their colleges
and universities (in much the same way that the pure monopsony did in chap.
7, through management of the aggregate labor market demand).8 Also as a
consequence, the NCAA breeds hypocrisy, given that the rules governing ath-
lete recruitment and retention are founded on noble claims of encouraging fair
play but also result in widespread cheating on rules. Implicit in these criticisms
is the charge that temporary problems of underpayment to athletes are not
subject to market self-correction. The presumed monopsony (and monopoly)
power of the NCAA, therefore, must be corrected from outside the collegiate
athletic market through, for example, antitrust enforcement or the passing of
new laws that weaken, if not abolish, the NCAA’s employment rules.
The NCAA as an Employer Cartel
The argument that the NCAA is a working cartel that suppresses athletes’
wages (including fringe bene‹ts) is grounded in the conventional microeco-
nomic theory that labor-market competition among independent employers
dissipates (quasi) rents that would otherwise go to employers. The wages paid
to athletes by all colleges are raised by their bidding against one another in an
effort to employ additional athletes when the wage is below the athletes’ mar-
ginal value. Competition may help employ more athletes than otherwise would
be employed, and the “ef‹cient” employment level may be achieved. In the
competitive process, however, revenue from sporting events is transferred
from colleges (or, more precisely, their athletic departments) to athletes.9
For colleges contemplating the formation of a labor-market cartel, the
competitive results are an unnecessary increase in the wage bill and an unnec-
essary reduction in the pro‹ts from college athletics. If they were not dissi-
pated, the sports pro‹ts could be used to increase the salaries of coaches and
athletic directors or could be transferred to nonathletic programs.
To keep the potential sports pro‹ts out of the hands of athletes, according
to the NCAA’s critics, colleges have an understandable desire to cartelize, or
monopsonize, their labor market and suppress their intercollegiate athletic
competition for labor. The NCAA’s rules on the employment and payment of
athletes are seen by some as workable devices for suppressing colleges’ demand
for college athletes and, thereby, labor-market competition and wages.10
Market Inef‹ciency and Income Transfers
The expected market consequences of the NCAA rules include reduced wages
and employment opportunities for student-athletes, greater pro‹ts for col-
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leges, market inef‹ciency, and a transfer of income from many low-income
athletes to higher-income coaches and other members of athletic staffs.11
Because of the suppressed labor-market demand, wages and employment
opportunities for athletes will fall, and fewer athletes will be hired because
fewer will be available for employment at the lower wages.
Because student-athletes are paid less than their market marginal value,
monopsony rents will be collected by their colleges and universities. The inter-
collegiate athletic labor market exhibits inef‹ciency because the number of
athletes actually hired is less than the competitive level, and the marginal value
of additional athletes will exceed their opportunity costs. The gap between the
marginal value and opportunity cost of athletes necessarily means that some
athletes are forced to employ their talents where they are less valuable than in
college athletics (Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992, 8–9).
Cheating on NCAA Rules
If the NCAA is perceived as a cartel, cheating (or attempted cheating) on
NCAA rules is fully anticipated. Each school can reason that because athletes’
wages are below their market value, additional pro‹ts can be made by skirting
the NCAA rules and paying more than the NCAA allows—attracting better
athletes, higher rankings in national sports polls, larger attendance at events,
more lucrative television contracts, and greater national publicity. Under-
standing its own incentives to cheat on the cartel rules allows each college to
further conclude that other colleges will be induced to cheat and that it must
cheat to remain competitive.
Indeed, the coaches who may bene‹t through higher-than-competitive-
market salaries from the cartel rules will have a real, personal incentive to cheat
or to allow cheating to persist by those around them. Premium players can
contribute to winning records, with the result being increases in their coaches’
salaries (Humphreys 2000). It follows that coaches who do not cheat or do not
allow cheating may lose their salaries laden with economic rents to others who
are willing to cheat and are, therefore, better able to attract larger crowds, tele-
vision coverage, and national prominence.12
However, cheating is suppressed in two primary, cost-effective ways.
• First, when coaches, alumni, and other college and university con-
stituents bid improperly for athletes and lose those bids, the NCAA can
count on the losers to report the schools that must have been bidding
improperly for those athletes. 
• Second, as opposed to monitoring all athletic programs in any detail, the
NCAA can spot-monitor by looking for and investigating in detail only
schools that have sudden improvements in their win-loss records. 
148 in defense of monopoly
Both Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison (1992, chap. 5) and Humphreys and Ruseski
(2001) have found that an improvement in a school’s athletic performance can
increase its likelihood of being investigated and put on probation.
Added Complexities
The foregoing standard but limited monopsony cartel argument has been
re‹ned and extended by Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison (1992). These economists
argue that the NCAA’s origins can be traced to 1873, when several universi-
ties—Columbia, Princeton, Rutgers, and Yale—met to standardize the rules
for football (which amounted to varying combinations of the rules for soccer
and rugby, plus a few rules not associated with either of those games). These
universities formed what was called the Intercollegiate Football Association,
which, in its short history, had an uneven record of retaining members and set-
tling on uniform rules among member colleges.
Spurred by the growth in sports-related violence (which was re›ected in 18
deaths and 159 serious injuries in 1905),13 President Theodore Roosevelt
brought together representatives from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to discuss
solutions to the violence problem. That initial meeting was followed later that
year by a conference of 62 colleges and universities that gathered to deal more
completely with football violence, forming the Intercollegiate Athletic Associ-
ation, which in 1910 was renamed the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992, 38–40).
Hence, Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison argued that the NCAA began and ini-
tially expanded with noble purposes in mind, to produce public goods in the
form of rules standardization and the prevention of game-related violence.
However, “while listing lofty goals and motivations,” the constitution adopted
by the members in 1906 “left ample room for the NCAA to expand from pub-
lic-goods provider into cartel rules enforcer.” In addition, given that the initial
organizational costs of the NCAA had already been covered under the banner
of producing public goods, it could readily expand into market restrictions at
very little cost.14 Accordingly, in the pursuit of cartel rents during the early
part of the twentieth century, the members began to set player eligibility
requirements, including the stipulation that student-athletes had to be (gasp!)
full-time students. Moreover, “enticing students to stay in school through
direct or indirect ‹nancial aid for the sole purpose of pursuing athletics was
condemned” collectively by the members—more prima facie evidence of the
suppression of labor-market competition, according to Fleisher, Goff, and
Tollison (1992, 41).
Such restrictions are given a cartel intent by Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison
because they obviously limit the resource input, both in terms of the number
of people who could play and in terms of the quality of the players in games. By
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restricting inputs, the NCAA members could suppress their labor costs and
enhance their monopsony rents. Their input restrictions also limited the mem-
bers’ collective output. With additional output restrictions in terms of the
number of games that could be played and (after 1950) televised, the NCAA
enabled its members to reap greater monopoly rents—which could be easily
hidden by the members in “university general operating expenses, coaches’
salaries, of‹ce facilities, and so on” in order to keep their real intent obscured
from public scrutiny (1992, 21).
Given all the NCAA rules cited repeatedly by Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison
as examples of labor-market restrictions—covering such details as how many
times recruits can visit prospective campuses, what they can be provided while
on their campus visit, the level of academic preparation of recruits, how many
courses they must take, the minimum grade-point average players must main-
tain, how many years they can play—there appears to be nothing that the
NCAA could have required of players and their member institutions during its
formative years, and especially after it had become a well-oiled organization in
the late 1940, that did not have a cartel-creation and maintenance interpreta-
tion. Of course, the growing array of input restrictions was part and parcel of
an ongoing educational sham: “Member schools have successfully hidden car-
tel behavior behind the rhetoric of academic achievement and the nonpropri-
etary setting of universities” (1992, 7).
A “cartel [labor-market monopsony] scheme” is also suggested by the fact
that only student labor is singled out for competitive restrictions. The mem-
bers’ “brand names” and other capital assets (including, but hardly limited to,
stadiums and training facilities) are not similarly restricted.
If a quest for education, amateurism, and standardized rules were truly at
the heart of NCAA behavior, these inputs would be regulated along with
labor inputs. Indeed, if such purpose were a goal of the NCAA, then some
schools would not be allowed to offer recruits a more attractive package
than other schools, and student-athletes would not be allowed to choose
schools freely. (1992, 8–9)
The resulting suppression of athletes’ wages can be easily inferred from the
fact that players such as Bo Jackson, Patrick Ewing, and Doug Flutie (their col-
leges’ superstars of the 1980s, familiar to sports fans when Fleisher, Goff, and
Tollison were writing their sweeping critique of the NCAA) could have earned
millions if they had not taken their respective universities’ athletic offers and
instead had played for professional teams (1992, 8).
According to Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison, the ongoing increase in demand
for NCAA member sporting events throughout the past hundred years is evi-
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dent in the growth in game attendance and counts of radio and television view-
ers, along with the forty-six-fold growth in the (nominal dollar) value of
NCAA’s television contracts (1992, chap. 4).15 Total attendance at football
games across the country expanded from 19 million in 1948 to 36 million in
1989, the last year of available data to Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison before their
book went to press (1992, 54). With the growth in demand came a concomi-
tant increase in NCAA rents, which gave rise to an increase in NCAA mem-
bership from 38 in 1906 to 1,017 in 1988 (the last year in the Fleisher, Goff,
and Tollison 1992 table, 67) to more than 1,250 in 2007—with 1,024 of the
members in 2007 being colleges and universities and with most of the remain-
ing members being athletic associations (e.g., the American Football Coaches
Association) and athletic conferences (e.g., the Atlantic Coast Conference)
(NCAA Web home page 2007). With the growth in demand for the ‹nal prod-
uct and rents, the demand for enforcement of cartel rules rose, according to
Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison.16
This growth in membership occurred throughout the century in spite of
the tightening restrictions on players and institutions and in spite of the fact
that the NCAA history consisted of an ongoing power struggle among the
established and nonestablished members over how the NCAA’s monopoly/
monopsony rents would be divided. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison see many
of the restrictions that have been adopted as devices by which the estab-
lished members have been able to retain relatively dominant athletic posi-
tions and, hence, their relatively greater share of the rents. Indeed, the
established members have basically captured the NCAA’s regulatory bodies,
using them for private rent-seeking purposes, the objects of which are
money, perquisites for everyone other than the athletes, and winning
records (which have feedback effects on the ‹rst two). The authors argue
that members with “substantial reputational and physical assets” have
advantages in recruiting athletes and in capturing the NCAA’s enforcement
mechanisms. The existence of these advantages explains the oppressive rules
against the student-athletes: If nonestablished ‹rms could compete by pay-
ing athletes in wages or bene‹ts (and not forcing them to adhere to aca-
demic standards of any consequence), the established schools would lose
athletes and games—and rents.17
Why then don’t the nonestablished powers break with the NCAA, set up
their own “NCAA-2,” and agree to a whole new set of rules (including
allowance for paying athletes market wages) that will allow them to attract the
best athletes and secure a level of rents higher than the oppressed level they
receive as members of the NCAA? Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison have a ready-
made, two-part explanation.
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One factor is the discontinuous, or “lumpy,” entry condition in college ath-
letics. One or even a few schools cannot produce a viable ten- or eleven-
game football season or a thirty-game basketball season. Coordination
among several schools would be necessary for a successful breakaway from
the NCAA. . . . In other words, there is a ‹rst-mover advantage. (1992,
10–11)18
The other factor is “the threat of sanctions against a school’s academic pro-
grams” (1992, 11; emphasis in the original ). Even though Fleisher, Goff, and
Tollison admit that the NCAA has no direct control over academic accredita-
tion, they still claim (backed up by a single anecdote) that the NCAA “sanc-
tions and pressures have in›uenced the process.” Hence, the NCAA can
threaten the “brand-name capital” of institutions that do succeed, thus increas-
ing the cost and likelihood of the succession and the establishment of viable
sports alternatives (1992, 11).
If the NCAA is the 800-pound sports gorilla that Fleisher, Goff, and Tol-
lison make it out to be, then the inevitable perplexing puzzle surfaces (in the
words of the authors): “Why there is so little interest, in general, in market-
oriented reform of the NCAA, and, in particular, reform in the spirit of eco-
nomic analysts, which would suggest paying players the value of their marginal
products” (1992, 3). But Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison have ready answers here
as well.
• In spite of fans’ (supposedly) having to pay higher prices for sporting
events (because of the NCAA’s input and output restrictions), Fleisher,
Goff, and Tollison posit that fans’ interest in reform is “minimal”
because they individually gain so little from organizing a reform move-
ment (1992, 147, 148). 
• Schools’ faculties fail to support reform because they suffer under a
“misconception” as to the substantial gains they receive from their
schools’ athletic programs. 
• The media have shown little interest because they are on the take, given
that their livelihoods are dependent on access to players and coaches and
that they will suffer costs in terms of access if they wave reform banners
(1992, 149–152). (Even so, aside from their self-acknowledged “specula-
tive explanations,” the media’s lack of interest in reform remains some-
thing of a mystery to Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison).19
• Finally, the players don’t press for reforms because they would have to
endure the costs (in out-of-pocket expenditures and time) of organizing
a uni‹ed reform movement, and they have very few resources and little
time to mount the campaign.
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The whole of the Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison argument ultimately rests on
an interesting position: that their assessment of the NCAA is correct because
absolutely no alternative, sensible explanation exists for what the NCAA has
done. They make this point in their explanation of the media’s lack of interest
in the issue of the NCAA as an oppressive cartel.
Given the evidence reviewed and presented in this book, if the NCAA is
not a collusive organization of schools for economic bene‹t, then an inde-
fensible alternative is left: the NCAA is ‹lled with a majority of public-
interested people who rarely recognize or understand the consequences of
their own decisions. Given that people are generally self-interested and
that NCAA policymakers are not dull-minded, this explanation seems
inconceivable. (1992, 150)
Restrictions are restrictions, necessarily ef‹ciency destroying, as well as
oppressive to student-athletes, fans, reporters, and faculty, all of whom must
have been co-opted in one way or another, to one extent or another. Other-
wise, they suffer from delusions, or so it must seem. There is, supposedly, no
way to imagine that restrictions for games or markets can be, on balance, wel-
fare enhancing, or even Pareto ef‹cient (or bene‹cial to everyone involved in
college athletics—that is, to the NCAA’s critics).
science as ideology
Joseph Schumpeter titled his 1948 presidential address to the American Eco-
nomic Association “Science and Ideology” (1949). By “ideology” he did not
mean un›inching political or religious convictions. Rather, he meant the pre-
scienti‹c, original “Vision” (or “Intuition”) that economists, as a matter of
doing science, must take along with them into their analytical inquiries.20 It is
through this initial vision that we economists see and assess the world,21 but
the vision itself is hard to subject directly to scienti‹c tests. This is because sci-
ence, as a process for discovery and inventions, usually focuses exclusively on
the test of the vision’s implications (or hypotheses), with the whole testing
process guided by professional biases in ‹nding support of (or, rather, not
‹nding fault with) the implications and therefore the underlying vision.22 The
problem with these initial visions or ideologies is that they, because of their
success in an array of inquiries, can “become creeds which for the time being
are impervious to argument” (1949, 358). In the end, however, science is an
evolutionary process involving an “endless chain of give and take,” with the
original vision giving way to adjustments in ‹ndings and perceptions and then
theories. Eventually, inferior original visions (which is obviously how Schum-
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peter viewed John Maynard Keynes’s take on the macroeconomy) can lose
their initial attraction and can be marginalized by the profession once their
weaknesses are exposed (1949, 356).
Schumpeter was especially concerned with how economists’ ideology with
respect to monopoly enterprise has captured so much of economic discourse.
Throughout this volume, we have stressed that he posited that it is very
dif‹cult for economists, captured by the monopoly model, to conceive of
monopolies (or cartels) as having bene‹cial consequences.23 Why? Because the
models in the back of their minds exclusively focus on stationary cost and
demand structures, which necessarily means that the only option available to
the monopoly—restrictions on output to raise price—is necessarily detrimen-
tal, in the context of that model.
We submit here, as evident from the foregoing discussion, that the monop-
sony model has, in a similar way, captured the analytical skills of economists.
When something can be labeled “restrictions” or “rules” for market players,
and when an organization is formed to establish and openly promulgate and
enforce “restrictions” and “rules” for its market, there can be, as Fleisher, Goff,
and Tollison have concluded, only one analytical deduction, that the intent of
the restrictions and rules is as oppressive, redistributive, or both as it is welfare
destroying. Ergo, the promulgating organization, the NCAA in this instance,
must collectively have an oppressive intent. Moreover, any explanation other
than that of Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison for what the NCAA has done through
its history is “inconceivable” (1992, 150).
The point of the following sections of this chapter is straightforward:
Although a monopsony (or a dominant buyer cartel) clearly can, in the imme-
diate period, restrict employment opportunities below what might be imag-
ined for a perfectly competitive market and can suppress worker wages below
some imagined (perfectly) competitive level, it is not self-evident that the
NCAA is the kind of welfare-destroying monopsony, or employer cartel, that
economists have in mind when parroting standard criticisms of any and all
observed restrictions and rules. Under some market circumstances, restrictions
and rules may do nothing other than curb immediate production, but they also
can, at least in some other circumstances, de‹ne the nature of the product. In
doing so, they can change an industry’s dynamics over time, with the long-term
consequences of the restrictions and rules being far more bene‹cial to
expanded opportunities than any detriment from short-run, passing curbs on
output and hikes in prices.
To repeat a Schumpeterian theme of this volume, a system of monopsony
restrictions and rules that foster the appearance, if not the reality, of short-run
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inef‹ciencies may at times be necessary for maximum long-run growth of wel-
fare. We treat the NCAA as a case study because the particulars of that orga-
nization’s restrictions and rules can help us make a few evolutionary adjust-
ments in the “vision” that undergirds the monopsony model.
If our perspective is right, then no mystery surrounds what Fleisher, Goff,
and Tollison and other economists and NCAA critics see as a paradox, the
widespread disinterest (or lack of interest) among various constituent groups in
major reform of the NCAA-controlled athletic markets.24 Using a different
starting analytical vision, which allows them to distinguish among market cir-
cumstances, the courts have recognized as much in an array of decisions
regarding the NCAA’s monopsony powers, which Schumpeter would surely
applaud. We suggest that economists can learn much about how to evaluate
restrictions from the legal history we cover in a later section.
As we will demonstrate, the revisions in argumentation do not require
(contrary to what Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison and others suggest) that we
assume that NCAA policymakers are “dull-minded” or that they are “public
spirited” (or are not motivated by self-interest).
the mistaken presumption of “underpaid” athletes
Proponents of the cartel theory of the NCAA implicitly, if not explicitly, con-
clude that resources are misallocated because athletes are “underpaid” for their
services. As noted in the foregoing section, one representative and presumed
piece of prima facie evidence is the NCAA rule that restricts colleges and uni-
versities from paying student-athletes more than the equivalent of room,
board, tuition, and books. Using the pay of professional athletes as “shadow
prices,” the (approximate) extent of the underpayment becomes transparent, or
so it is argued.
However, the critical pay variable determining the allocation of resources
is the expected, not actual, pay of athletes. The expected pay of college athletes
is typically greater than their actual pay by an amount equal to the present dis-
counted value of the anticipated future income from future (especially profes-
sional sports) employment. Without doubt, the prospective pay in professional
sports, if obtained, is a critical component of many (but not all) athletes’ antic-
ipated future income stream and their current calculation of the gains from
playing college sports, but it is hardly the only variable, given that many ath-
letes capable of playing at the college level couldn’t even dream of professional
play. For many athletes, their expected pay is rightly founded on combined
estimates of their future employment in sports and nonsports areas. (Of course,
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the fact that many athletes are willing to play their sports even without schol-
arships suggests that “joy of the game” cannot be totally dismissed as a non-
money form of payment for services rendered.)
This fact alone means that the value of the athletes’ education, and the
effect that their degrees’ reputation (and the contacts they make) has on their
future income streams (which can be bolstered by established industry-wide
rules), cannot be summarily dismissed. As most economists would attest, pay
restrictions can affect student-athletes’ time allocations while in their universi-
ties. Because those restrictions apply to all players and schools, they can affect
what Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison call colleges’ and universities’ “reputational
capital”—which implies that pay restrictions can help athletes overcome a free-
rider problem. This also means that NCAA’s rules can have the effect of plac-
ing on athletes’ education the sports equivalent of a Good Housekeeping Seal
of Approval, especially if it is widely known that college and university presi-
dents and faculty (with academic interests outside those in athletic depart-
ments) control the rules-making process, which is the case for the NCAA.25
Granted, few college athletes make professional teams. Many football and
basketball players, however, could turn professional before their college eligi-
bility is ‹nished.26 The fact that many athletes—including most of the better
athletes (even those whom Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison consider to be exam-
ples of underpaid athletes [1992, 9])—voluntarily use years of their college eli-
gibility before turning pro suggests that their extra year or years spent in col-
lege sports provide valuable on-the-job training and media exposure. The
result is an increase in their expected lifetime income (broadly de‹ned) that
more than compensates for the loss of income during their college years.27
Clearly, because of the pay restrictions, some college and university ath-
letes turn professional before they ‹nish their years of eligibility. A handful of
high school graduates each year skip college altogether, choosing their
expected lifetime professional income streams over what they could have antic-
ipated by ‹rst going to college and then into the pros. However, it must be
noted that the number of student-athletes who turn pro before the end of their
college eligibility is a very small part of the total count of athletes, even when
we restrict the count of total viable athletes (candidates for going pro) to those
in football and basketball at the 107 schools in the NCAA’s Division I.28 Even
if the percentage of athletes who don’t avail themselves of their full college
sports experience were much larger than it is, it does not follow that the NCAA
pay restrictions can be judged to be oppressive in a monopsonistic sense. This
is because rules are rules, broadly applicable to people in widely varying cir-
cumstances. Few rules with any coverage at all are likely to ‹t all circumstances
equally, nor did anyone expect them to be designed to do so, mainly because of
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the underlying economics of rule making. Making any given set of rules fully
Pareto ef‹cient can be as futile as trying to create a perfectly clean environ-
ment (or to develop a perfectly competitive market). The costs of trying to
craft rules that are bene‹cial to everyone are likely to escalate with the rules’
coverage. These economic considerations may be used to restrict the coverage
of the rules.
However, why have such restrictions if the rules are generally bene‹cial
and harmful to so few? The few student-athletes who turn professional obvi-
ously gain individually by their decisions, while the rules themselves can
remain generally bene‹cial, on balance, to those athletes who remain in
school. The fact that so many athletes stay in school suggests that the employ-
ment rules are hardly oppressive to them. Indeed, the fact that few athletes can
and do make the shift to professional sports can be construed as good evidence
that the exit costs of student-athletes going professional are hardly prohibitive,
if athletes have the talent to make professional teams. That fact is also good
evidence that the professional “shadow prices” grossly exaggerate the student-
athletes’ so-called underpayment. Indeed, the absence of an unchecked move-
ment from college to professional sports could be construed as evidence that
the student-athletes are as likely to be overpaid (given their opportunity cost)
as underpaid. Then again, as will be argued later, the rules themselves could be
de‹ning college and university athletics in such ways that the student-athletes’
expected incomes are higher than they would have been had the restrictions
not been in place for so long and had the rules not allowed college and univer-
sity athletes to call themselves student-athletes.
the mistaken interpretation of cheating
Proponents of the cartel theory of college sports mistakenly conclude that the
existence of cheating is prima facie evidence of an employer cartel that exploits
athletes by materially depressing labor-market demand and athletes’ wages.
The existence of rules and the persistence of cheating, however, could be inter-
preted to be the products of voluntary collective efforts of member colleges to
engage in a demand-enhancing joint venture. The joint venture may be char-
acterized as the enhancement of the colleges’ and universities’ competitive ath-
letics and internal and external support for nonathletic, as well as athletic, pro-
grams, which can be most effectively accomplished by ensuring that college
athletics remains amateur. The members may believe quite correctly that the
public’s demand for college and university education may be signi‹cantly
reduced by the creation of professional or semiprofessional college sporting
events.29
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The joint venture problem and the rules that emerge may be comparable
to the quality-control problem faced by most sellers of brand names and fran-
chises. The vertical restrictions are illustrative. For example, McDonald’s
restaurants collectively produce a joint product, that is, a reputation for fast-
food service at a certain price and quality in reasonably clean facilities. Like the
NCAA, the McDonald’s Corporation also has detailed rules and restrictions
for its franchisees to follow (and its rule book is at least as thick as the
NCAA’s). These restrictions cover such operational details as cleanliness of the
kitchens and dining areas, the very exacting recipes for the products served,
standards on employment, the parking facilities, and the amount of time cus-
tomers should have to stand in line. Take note of an important attribute of the
“restrictions”: They de‹ne McDonald’s products and, according to McDon-
ald’s, elevate the value that consumers ascribe to the company’s products. The
restrictions also establish uniformity in product and service with the intent of
enhancing the reputation of McDonald’s restaurants, increasing the pre-
dictability of McDonald’s offerings and increasing the demand (and consumer
value) for McDonald’s products at all outlets—all with the intent of increasing
the corporation’s pro‹ts by way of enhancement of its customers’ net value.30
The individual franchisees are willing to consent to the prospects of paying
the penalties for violations because they understand that McDonald’s overall
institutional reputation across all franchises is important to their own individ-
ual franchise pro‹ts. The franchisees willingly accept the restrictions on their
own behavior to ensure that limits are placed on the behavior of others, all to
reduce free-rider problems.
At the same time, in the absence of monitoring and penalties, each fran-
chisee at all times has an incentive to cheat on the restrictions. By cheating—
for example, by not cleaning their bathrooms regularly or by adding soybean
meal to hamburgers—individual franchisees can lower their own production
costs and raise their own pro‹ts. Franchisees (especially those who have little
repeat business from customers) also can rightfully reason that their individual
reputation in general may be only marginally, if not inconsequentially, dam-
aged by its own violations of McDonald’s rules. Each franchisee understands,
however, that all other franchisees have a similar incentive to cheat. If the
bene‹ts of improved market demand did not more than compensate for the
added costs that franchisees incur to avoid penalties, the restrictions would
presumably never be accepted. Moreover, franchises would not command such
high prices.
Similarly, NCAA rules and regulations can be viewed as means to enhance
the reputation of all those associated with college athletics—including athletes
and nonathletes—by keeping college sports nonprofessional.31 NCAA mem-
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bers will accept restrictions on payments to athletes to enhance the demand for
college athletics, college enrollment, and contributions to athletic and non-
athletic programs. Each NCAA member understands, however, that every
other member has an incentive to cheat on the rules of the joint venture. From
this perspective, penalties are required because, as in the case of McDonald’s
restaurants, cheating can be expected when the bene‹ts from the joint venture
are common to all participating members.32
To the extent that the demand for college athletics is enhanced by the
NCAA’s system of rules and penalties, the demand for athletes will increase,
which means that the athletes will have more sports opportunities than
would be the case without the restrictions. More college teams can survive
and prosper.
In addition, more athletic talent at lower wages will be available for the
professional ranks, which may explain professional teams’ support of the
NCAA system of rules and regulations. Proponents of the cartel theory of col-
lege sports have a dif‹cult time explaining professional teams’ support of the
NCAA rules. If the NCAA were a cartel that suppressed wages and employ-
ment opportunities for athletes, the supply of athletes available for the profes-
sional ranks would be reduced, increasing the wages professional teams must
pay. Also, when wages are suppressed by a cartel, we do not anticipate a surplus
of labor that would spur nonprice competition in the form of talent improve-
ment. If anything, a cartel that seriously suppressed wages would induce a
reduction in athletic talent available to the college and professional ranks.
the mistaken presumption of monopsony power
Proponents of the cartel theory mistakenly assume that because the NCAA
includes more than a thousand members, it has substantial monopsony power
that enables member colleges to suppress athletes’ wages (e.g., below imagined
perfectly competitive market conditions). The proponents acknowledge that
colleges have substantial private incentives to cartelize their markets. They
overlook, however, the critically important and patently obvious fact that the
NCAA members are not a single uni‹ed ‹rm but are a collection of many inde-
pendent ‹rms with different cost structures and different market demands.
They have the same incentive to improve their pro‹ts by cheating on the car-
tel—even forming alternative collegiate or semiprofessional sports associations
that permit explicit wage payments to athletes—as they do to form the cartel in
the ‹rst place.33 In other words, the proponents of the cartel theory fail to
explain how any effective, exploitative sports cartel can be maintained in the
long run, in the absence of forced membership or barriers to exit from the
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NCAA by member colleges and barriers to entry into the sports market by
alternative sports associations. Many economists who argue that the NCAA is
an effective employer cartel would be the ‹rst to contend that it would be
extremely dif‹cult, if not impossible, for a collection of twenty-‹ve or ‹fty
‹rms in any other industry to maintain an effective cartel for long (without
government backing, a point Schumpeter made, as readers may recall).
If the NCAA seriously depressed athletes’ wages, the temptation of mem-
ber colleges to drop their membership and form another association that per-
mitted competitive wage payments would appear to be overwhelming. This is
especially true because economists who have criticized the NCAA have also
documented a symbiotic relationship between big-time athletic programs and
the student demand for enrollment at those colleges and universities, which
they found leads to higher SAT scores of entering students, other things being
equal.34 Schools that break with the NCAA could form their own sports net-
work that allows for payments to athletes, as well as relaxed academic standards
for athletes. As a consequence, the new sports network should be able to draw
in the best athletes, which would allow breakaway members to develop much
improved athletic programs and, at the same time, allow them to improve their
academic standings (given that the demand for admission from higher-quality,
nonathlete students should rise with the schools’ athletic standing)—but only
if the critics’ case against the NCAA rules were solid. The incentive for schools
to break away would be reinforced if, as calculated, the value (or marginal rev-
enue product) of a “premium” college football player were a half million dol-
lars annually to the school that gets him (Brown 1993) and if the breakaway
teams could actually attract the premium payers through payments (that more
than compensate them for any lost value from not being associated with non-
paying, NCAA-endorsed athletic programs), which the NCAA’s critics pre-
sume would happen without fail but which is not assured by any means.
Proponents of the cartel theory cannot escape with the argument that the
initial organizational costs have “lumpiness,” founded on the proposition that
in order to ‹ll out their schedules, several teams must agree to form an alter-
native association, an argument made repeatedly by Fleisher, Goff, and Tolli-
son (1992, 10–11 et passim). Their argument that the NCAA actually is now an
effective cartel suggests that the creation of an alternative sports association is
a viable possibility, or else an NCAA would not exist. Clearly, the NCAA over-
came the lumpiness problem. In addition, regional and national conferences
(e.g., the SEC and ACC) and the College Football Association (CFA), which
are a part of the NCAA, are already well organized to secede from the NCAA
as a unit and to establish alternative sports associations that would allow pay-
ments to athletes if the NCAA were not appropriately responsive to market
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forces and member schools. The existing associations—the National Associa-
tion of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) and the National Little College Ath-
letic Association (NLCAA)—could take advantage of the NCAA’s alleged
exploitation of athletes and allow payment.
If athletes were seriously exploited under the NCAA, the seceding teams or
conferences might reasonably expect that their exit would induce other teams
and conferences to follow suit.35 Because the seceding teams would be offering
a better alternative, those that did secede would be the ones attracting the
more sought-after athletes and presumably would bene‹t from larger atten-
dances and television contracts to the detriment of the remaining NCAA col-
leges. In fact, entrepreneurs outside college athletic departments searching for
sports pro‹ts should be willing to organize the necessary critical number of
schools.36 The openness of the association market is important because the
emergence (or the threat of emergence) of alternative sports employment
opportunities would cause wages of student-athletes to rise to something
approximating competitive levels.
The logical extension of the proponents’ own cartel premises leads to the
inescapable conclusion that if colleges didn’t see something intrinsically
important in their efforts to maintain the pretense, if not the substance, of
amateur athletics at the college level, the NCAA rules would not last long in
the absence of signi‹cant barriers to exit from the NCAA or in the absence of
signi‹cant barriers to entry into the sports association industry.37 These barri-
ers would have to be legal, and our review of the legal literature suggests a
powerful point: No legal impediments exist to the formation of alternative college
and university sports associations, governed by a different set of employment rules. And
surely the NCAA’s critics—most notably Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison—would
never claim (or so we would think) that any legal or economic barriers (aside
from cost and demand considerations) stand in the way of savvy entrepreneurs
wishing to form an array of municipal, neighborhood, and company-based
sports associations that could compete on more favorable terms (if they could
be devised) for would-be student-athletes.
Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison point out that schools might suffer accredita-
tion risks by seceding from the NCAA. In the absence of any more than the
one anecdote the authors provide, we have to consider the claim baseless, more
on the order of the pretense of documentation.38
We concede, but only for purposes of argument, that schools might ini-
tially lose some academic credibility, given the brand-name value of being
associated with the NCAA relative to any new and necessarily untried associa-
tion. However, if athletes are as seriously oppressed as the critics suggest (and
the restrictions have no value apart from the direct labor-market rents they can
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generate), then any short-term credibility problems could be surely overcome
in the long run. This is because the elimination of the labor-market restric-
tions can lead to an untold increase in market surplus value being garnered and
shared by the seceding schools and their athletes. The schools’ quality of play
would (supposedly) improve dramatically as they secured the “best” athletes,
which should give them more access to improved television contracts and lead
to a greater demand from better students willing to pay higher prices, and
more athletic and academic donations from private benefactors. The critics’
suggestion that the oppression is so great, yet widespread secession does not
appear to be in the of‹ng, is more good evidence that the critics’ case is made
of straw.
sports demand and ncaa membership
We noted how the NCAA’s critics have made much of the growth in the
demand for college and university athletic events, as revealed by attendance
‹gures and the dollar value of television contracts (Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison
1992, 51–56). According to the critics, such statistics indicate growth in NCAA
rents, which, of course, is a cause for increased membership. The theory is rel-
atively simple, as brie›y noted earlier: The NCAA starts small, with the pro-
duction of public goods as its original intention. After it has covered its orga-
nizational costs, it discovers that it can, at little added cost, increase its rents by
imposing labor-market restrictions (as well as by imposing output restrictions).
When the rents begin to pour in, other schools want their share, spurring an
expansion in the NCAA’s membership. The membership expansion becomes
(at some unde‹ned point) self-perpetuating, given that with the growth in
NCAA membership, nonmember colleges and universities face growing prob-
lems in ‹lling out their game schedules.
To review, the validity of this simple theory—or “vision,” to use Schum-
peter’s word—is revealed, supposedly, by the growth in NCAA members
(Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison 1992, table 4, 67).39 The theory is further cor-
roborated by a series of empirical studies that show the extent to which mem-
bers have tried to in›uence NCAA control mechanisms to in›uence the distri-
bution of the NCAA’s total revenues among the members (chaps. 5–7). Any
internal squabbling over rents implies the existence of rents, which implies the
existence of monopsony (and monopoly), which must mean that the NCAA’s
restrictions are oppressive.
The unstated assumption in this scenario is that the growth in demand for
athletics was unaffected in any positive way by the NCAA’s restrictions and
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rules as well as its accompanying enforcement efforts. Con‹dence in a pure
cartel theory of the NCAA’s history must surely crack on the prospect that the
reported demand dynamics over the past century could have been fueled, if
only partially, by the expansion of NCAA restrictions and rules and the
bene‹cial effects they have on the market value of the sporting events, as seen
from the perspective of the relevant fan base. That is to say, the cited atten-
dance ‹gures through time could easily be interpreted as strong evidence
against the applicability of the cartel theory. Surely, the raw ‹gures do nothing
to support the cartel theory and (in the absence of additional econometric
work that is not provided) could undermine that theory. Cartels designed only
to constrict both the input and output sides of the market are not market struc-
tures in which substantial ongoing growth should be a hallmark. Rather, an
appropriate measure of the NCAA’s impact should be how much growth has
been impaired by the double-sided market restrictions and rules.
We also are very reluctant for two reasons to accept the claim that the
growth in NCAA members indicates the success of the NCAA cartel. First, if
rents were available to be gained by so many colleges and universities joining
the NCAA cartel, then chances are that even more rents would be available for
the would-be new members to form their own alternative NCAA cartel with
different, and less oppressive, monopsony rules for their athletes, as argued.
The would-be new members could also lower the price of tickets for fans,
could attract more donors for their athletic and academic programs, and should
be able to get more favorable publicity from the media (who could be given
greater access to the country’s best athletes whose performance in non-NCAA
schools could be greater than in NCAA schools, because those athletes would
have to spend little or no time in class or studying).
Our second reason for being reluctant to accept the critics’ theory is that
part and parcel of the theory is the presumed rampant discrimination in
enforcement of cartel rules and in the allocation of cartel rents by the “estab-
lished” schools against the nonestablished schools. In promulgating their
argument, the critics must be assuming that institutional members in the
NCAA are like lemmings, unable to see where their frantic march is taking
them. Put another way, in joining the NCAA, the ever-growing count of non-
establishment school members must have no capacity for self-directed, self-
interested courses of action. If we accept the critics’ argument in its entirety,
we must wonder why similar cartels are not everywhere evident in markets,
not just those in which the restrictions de‹ne the product and its value. After
all, the NCAA is a cartel of over a thousand members with differing cost
structures.
The NCAA 163
college and university sports as games
As economists have long argued, market-based exchanges are better viewed
not so much as trades in things as trades in rights. More to the point of this
chapter, trades almost always carry with them restrictions that can be publicly or
privately enforced. The publicly enforced restrictions are often noted. People
who buy pens or cars can’t use them as weapons. In the case of pens, legal lim-
its exist concerning what one can write with them. For example, pen owners
cannot use them to make slanderous public comments. In the case of cars, the
owners can’t drive them (as a matter of course) on city sidewalks and, in many
states, must get them inspected once a year. Clubs usually have physical facili-
ties, the use of which by members is bounded in myriad ways by an extended
set of restrictions, including restrictions on the development of inside markets
(e.g., prohibitions on using the facilities to sell nonclub goods).
Indeed, it might be useful to think of goods that are bought and sold
arrayed on an extended spectrum in terms of how much the goods are de‹ned
by or draw their essential character—and, hence, their market value—from the
restrictions on how the goods can be used. On one end of the spectrum might
be marshmallows, which are a good that is largely de‹ned by and largely draws
its market value from its physical attributes, including marshmallows’ touch
and taste (and calories). Marshmallows are, apparently, little affected by
restrictions on use or any other matter, because relatively few such restrictions
exist (that we can think of ).
On the other hand, many board games are good examples of traded and
experienced goods that are (typically) on the other end of the spectrum because
their physical attributes are relatively inconsequential to their value. The
board game Monopoly has only a few ounces of physical content, including a
brightly marked piece of cardboard and bundles of play cash, all of which have
in themselves little to no intrinsic value. The physical components are given
value largely by the rules of play, or by the multitude of restrictions on what
players can do during the course of play. Under Monopoly’s restrictions, play-
ers can move only along prescribed paths, in accordance with counts of spaces
from throws of the dice. Players must also buy (imagined) locations and houses
at set prices and must use only their initial cash allotments and winnings to
make purchases and pay ‹nes. Players are expressly prohibited from using their
own real money to make property and house purchases, and they can’t use
their own real money to enlist the cooperation of other players or to bribe the
designated “banker” in an effort to win. We can only surmise that the makers
of Monopoly ruled out the use of side payments in real money because that
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restriction enhanced the then perceived value of the game to potential players,
with some (but clearly not all) of the added utility from the restrictions
imposed on the play of the game being transferred to Parker Brothers, the
game’s producer, via a higher price for the game than otherwise. Everyone—
players and owners alike—can be happier because of the highly detailed
restrictions than they would otherwise be.
By their nature, ‹eld games (football and basketball, to name two) are
much like board games, given that to be operational and to give value to the
physical components of the game, they require rules that amount to restric-
tions on players’ competitive impulses. Rules that require athletes to be stu-
dents, and to maintain at least limited academic standards, share a common
purpose with restrictions on the size of the playing ‹eld: Both sets of restric-
tions de‹ne the nature of the game that is to be played. Similarly, rules pro-
hibiting college and university payments to athletes may be seen as materially
the same as rules against changing the goal line or allowing for payments (or
bribes) to referees intended to affect their calls during the game. Again, restric-
tions on payments of many kinds may be useful devices for increasing the per-
ceived value of play, as well as increasing the extent to which competitive ener-
gies are directed toward improving player skills and the quality of competitive
play.
In our view, the cartel case against the NCAA employment restrictions fal-
ters for a simple reason: The critics do not understand that the advocates and
supporters of NCAA employment rules want to de‹ne the way they want the
game played. The critics seem to want to play another game, which some
might see as totally different from the one that the NCAA members (and a sub-
stantial majority of their various constituencies) want to play.
If the critics want to see their proposed games played—de‹ned, in part, by
allowing free-market payments to athletes and few or no academic restrictions
on athletes—then by all means they should take the risks of developing such
games. They really should not fall back on supposed problems of the lumpiness
of organizational costs or on what amount to network effects, which are no less
than natural costs many budding industries have to overcome. The critics
should identify legal, externally imposed restrictions that would prevent the
critics and others from developing alternative forms of play that they obviously
dream of experiencing ‹rsthand. If they are unwilling to incur the organization
and lobbying costs of changing the constricting legal structure, then at least
they could apprise us of exactly what legal or policy changes need to be made.
Pointing to the absence of antitrust enforcement in college and university ath-
letic markets is not suf‹cient for two reasons.
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• First, critics of the NCAA are often critics of antitrust laws and have, at
times, recommended their abandonment because their enforcement his-
tory is replete with instances of gross misuse.
• Second, as we will show, the courts have repeatedly refused to apply
antitrust laws to college and university sports for very good reasons.
college athletics as an open market: 
a review of the legal literature
Critics of the NCAA ‹nd it mysterious that the “NCAA can so successfully
thumb its nose at the Sherman and Clayton acts . . . especially when one con-
siders that the victims of this exploitation are predominately black”
(McCormick and Meiners 1987, 235). The answer to their perplexity is not
mysterious at all. Indeed, the answer is very clear. A review of antitrust law and
attendant court decisions supports our central thesis that the NCAA acts not as
a restrictive, welfare-destroying cartel but as a demand-enhancing joint ven-
ture that dominates college sports because of the mutual bene‹ts it provides its
members. Court rulings on collegiate athletic restrictions not only are com-
patible with our view of the function and purposes of the restrictions but also
indicate that no legal barriers exist in antitrust or other areas of law to prevent
entry of rival leagues, conferences, or associations of leagues and conferences.
That colleges voluntarily enter conferences and join the NCAA as member
colleges for the purpose of producing an entertainment product of a given kind
and quality through joint control and regulation is evidenced by experience
and legal approval (one of several points that judges have seen but that have
been lost on the NCAA’s critics who, held captive by their static models, fail to
see that restrictions in themselves can be demand enhancing and that the
demand increase can lead to welfare gains that overwhelm any deadweight loss
embodied in a failure to achieve the competitive ideal).
The fact that colleges join the NCAA or combine in conferences to imple-
ment rules and regulations governing the production and marketing of college
sports does not make the colleges per se “competitors in any economic sense,”
even though they “compete on the playing ‹eld.”40 Without cooperation and
regulation, college sports might not exist at all or would not be as healthy an
enterprise as it is. The courts have recognized that joint action is a precondi-
tion to the existence and success of the product, if for no other reason than that
athletic games (e.g., football and basketball) require rules that de‹ne the
boundaries within which competition will be allowed to prevail and that make
the game interesting and mutually bene‹cial to the participants and fans.41
The fact that restrictions on players are needed may only prove the existence
166 in defense of monopoly
of ancillary or incidental restraints necessary for the success of the joint ven-
ture.42 Antitrust law has long sanctioned restraints that are ancillary or inci-
dental to otherwise lawful combinations.
The ancillary restraint doctrine was established as early as 1898 as an
accepted American rule of interpretation of the Sherman Act.43 In U.S. v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,44 Judge Taft held that a contract or combination that
produces an ancillary restraint is nevertheless reasonable and lawful as long as
the main purpose of the contract, transaction, or combination is lawful and the
restraint is limited in time, place, and manner of enforcement. The underlying
rationale of the ancillary restraint doctrine is based on the premise that the
incidental restraint enhances the ef‹ciency of the main agreement (Bork 1978,
26–30). Throughout the history of the Sherman Act, the doctrine has enjoyed
wide application and acceptance, including the sports market.
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,45 the District of Columbia Circuit applied the
doctrine to its initial analysis of the National Football League (NFL) regula-
tion of the player “draft.” The court recognized that the NFL was a legal com-
bination in the traditional antitrust sense. Joint cooperation was essential for
the production of professional football. Normal market forces did not operate
in the sports market because teams and leagues were not “interested in driving
[other teams] out of business, whether in the counting-house or on the football
‹eld, for if the league fails, no one team can survive.”46 The joint venture pro-
duced a new product; it also produced restrictions on the actions of members
of the league and players. A rule of reason was used to judge the legality of the
regulations necessitated by joint venture.47 Critical to the court’s analysis was
the characterization that sports leagues operate as joint ventures with the pur-
pose of producing new products and increasing demand, not as a cartel that
restricts output or supply.48 The joint venture analysis of Smith was followed in
the mid-1980s when the Supreme Court considered the restrictions of the
NCAA on college sports.
In NCAA v. Board of Regents,49 the Supreme Court, in a broad and sweep-
ing decision, recognized the important role the NCAA plays in regulating col-
legiate sports.50 Speci‹cally noting the NCAA’s regulation of “standards of
amateurism, standards of academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruit-
ment of athletes, and rules governing the size of the athletic squads and coach-
ing staffs,”51 the Court ruled that the NCAA is an association of colleges that
compete against each other for athletes, fans, and television revenues.52 But the
Court was candid in recognizing that college sports is an “industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be avail-
able at all.”53 Quoting former appeals court judge Robert Bork, the Court said,
“Some activities can only be carried out jointly.”54 The product marketed is
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“competition itself—contests between competing institutions.”55 Finding that
incidental restraints are essential for the production and success of the product,
the Court reasoned (showing a level of analytics about markets that is, in our
view, more sophisticated than that of the NCAA’s critics),
Of course, this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on
which the competitors agreed to create and de‹ne the competition to be
marketed. A myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the ‹eld,
the number of players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence
is to be encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain
the manner in which institutions compete.56
On college football, the Court was speci‹c in approving the nontelevision
regulations of the sport. The regulations enhance consumer demand and
choice, including the choices available to athletes.57 Because college football is
a part of the academic tradition, the Court found that ancillary restraints pro-
duced by the NCAA joint venture are essential “in order to preserve the char-
acter and quality of the product.”58 Absent mutual agreement by colleges on
the regulation, the “integrity” of the product would be compromised and
“might otherwise be unavailable.”59
The Court concluded that the integration produced by the NCAA joint
venture, while placing some limited restraints on colleges and athletes, actu-
ally promotes increased competition and output by producing a product dis-
tinguished from other sports (professional) entertainment. The result
enhances consumer and athlete choices. On balance, the joint venture’s non-
television regulation increases competitiveness. The restraints, which main-
tain the “competitive balance among amateur athletic teams,”60 are a
“justi‹able means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and
are therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercol-
legiate athletics.”61
At bottom, the Supreme Court sanctioned many nontelevision regulations
issued by the NCAA. Because the Court found that the “preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercolle-
giate athletics,”62 it was willing to give the NCAA “ample latitude to play that
role,” a role “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.”63 This
conclusion was premised on the Court’s implicit ‹nding that amateurism and
education are components of a market product, the promotion of which is pro-
competitive.64 As long as the NCAA regulations have the design and the effect
of enhancing the market product and preserving sports amateurism and educa-
tion, they will receive favorable reviews from the Supreme Court.65 Since
NCAA, the antitrust outcome centers on the restraints’ effect on output and
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consumer demand and preference (which, in our view, is how economists
ought to always consider matters of monopoly).66
The review of legal cases presented here is not intended to suggest that the
NCAA does not have some modicum of market power or that market power is
a precondition to liability under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court in
NCAA answered each of these concerns. First, the Court found that the NCAA
does have market power in the regulation of television contracts.67 Second, the
Court explicitly said that market power is not a prerequisite for liability under
a section 1 charge,68 as is required under a section 2 claim. Although the Court
did not decide whether the NCAA has market power over nontelevision
aspects of the sports regulation, for our purposes the issue need not be debated.
Even if the NCAA has monopsony power, which is debatable in markets for
athletes, monopsony power alone is not illegal. The question is whether that
power is exercised and, if so, whether the result is a predatory or exclusionary
practice—one that deters entry of a potential competitor by raising the costs of
entry, or one that discourages existing rivals from increasing output.69 The
focus is on whether the monopsony conduct is designed to destroy or smother
competition. The exercise of monopsony power does not refer to monopson-
istic pricing in the absence of entry barriers, but to the creation or preservation
of market power by means that are anticompetitive (Sullivan and Hovenkamp
1984, 455).70 On this point, the Supreme Court decision in NCAA is clear.
Again, the Court in NCAA recognized that certain market products cannot
be produced without cooperation between competitors (Sullivan 1984; Easter-
brook 1984). Speci‹cally, the NCAA’s nontelevision regulations over college
sports were held to be lawful because they enhance output by increasing con-
sumer and athlete demand.71 Contrary to a ‹nding of monopolization (e.g., mar-
ket power plus exclusionary practices), the Court concluded that the NCAA’s
nontelevision regulations are ancillary but essential restraints that actually pro-
mote and more evenly distribute the market product of sports competition.
Implicit in this analysis is the ‹nding that the NCAA did not act to reduce
output or earn monopoly pro‹ts as is the case with a traditional cartel or sin-
gle-‹rm monopolist. Indeed, the creation and success of the rival CFA, which
has the purpose of promoting the interest of major football colleges,72 belies
the notion that the NCAA’s conduct increased the cost or deferred the entry of
a rival competitor. The nontelevision means used to achieve the integration of
the NCAA’s joint venture produced ef‹ciencies, not anticompetitive conse-
quences, through reduction of transaction costs. The result was an increased
demand for amateur sports. As with other joint venture agreements, member
colleges in the NCAA or CFA are able to obtain certain economies through
lower costs that bene‹t not only the participating colleges but also consumers
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and athletes (Hovenkamp 1985, 111–13).73 The result is the creation of a new
product market.74
This same economic approach used in NCAA is evident as well in following
Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence. The one recurring theme is that eco-
nomic ef‹ciency is a valid business justi‹cation for conduct engaged in by a
monopolist or joint venturers (Sullivan and Hovenkamp 1984).75 During the
same Court term in which NCAA was decided, the Court recognized in Copper-
weld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.76 that integration and collective coopera-
tion among related ‹rms can produce ef‹ciencies. Addressing the issue of
whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary would “conspire”
within the meaning of the Sherman Act, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that
Coordination within a ‹rm is as likely to result from an effort to compete
as from an effort to sti›e competition. In the marketplace, such coordina-
tion may be necessary if a business enterprise is to compete effectively. . . .
[To deny this reality] would serve no useful antitrust purpose but could
well deprive consumers of the ef‹ciencies.77
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Paci‹c Stationery and Printing Co.,78
the Court unanimously ruled that per se illegality does not result from a hori-
zontal concerted refusal to deal unless the defendant “possesses market power
or exclusive access to an element essential to effective competition.”79 This
relaxed standard of analysis was accepted in spite of a longstanding per se rule
of illegality for horizontal concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts.80 The
justi‹cation for the changed legal standard was again an ef‹ciency rationale—
that the challenged practice might “enhance overall ef‹ciency and make mar-
kets more competitive.”81 Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan observed,
Not every cooperative activity involving a restraint or exclusion will share 
. . . the likelihood of predominantly anticompetitive consequences. . . .
Cooperative arrangements [may] seem to be “designed to increase eco-
nomic ef‹ciency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.”
The [purchasing cooperative] arrangement permits the participating retail-
ers to achieve economies of scale in both the purchase and warehousing of
wholesale supplies, and also ensures ready access to a stock of goods that
might otherwise be unavailable on short notice. The cost savings and order-
‹lling guarantees enable smaller retailers to reduce prices and maintain
their retail stock so as to compete more effectively with larger retailers.82
Finally, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,83 which was at
the time (1985) the ‹rst monopolization case decided by the Court in nearly
twenty years, the Court said a monopolist has “no general duty” to deal with a
competitor. The right is not unquali‹ed, however. As long as the conduct is
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not predatory or exclusionary, the monopolist can compete vigorously on the
merits.84 But the monopolist cannot deliberately refuse to deal with a competi-
tor, whom it has dealt with before, when that refusal would change the “char-
acter of the market” and hurt the competitor and consumer, in the absence of
an ef‹ciency justi‹cation.85
In Aspen Skiing, the Court ruled against the monopolist because it failed to
offer any business justi‹cation for the refusal to deal. From the lack of an
ef‹ciency defense, the Court concluded that the defendant had decided to
forgo short-run pro‹t for the long-run effect of weakening competition.86 In
characterizing the conduct, the Court decided, “If a ‹rm has been ‘attempting
to exclude rivals on some basis other than ef‹ciency,’ it is fair to characterize
its behavior as predatory.”87 Thus, it is clear from Aspen Skiing that had the
monopolist engaged in the restraint for the purpose of promoting ef‹ciency
(reducing long-run costs, thereby increasing demand for the product), the
Court might well have deemed the refusal to deal lawful.
Read together, Copperweld, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, and Aspen Skiing
serve as authority for recognizing cooperation and integration as means of
achieving cost-reducing ef‹ciency objectives. Unlike raw cartels or single-‹rm
monopolists, partially integrated associations, such as the NCAA joint venture,
can increase output and consumer demand. The Court in NCAA found no less.
Economic ef‹ciency is sanctioned under the current antitrust laws, even when
advanced by a horizontal agreement or a monopolist. Consequently, the
NCAA’s nontelevision regulations are inapposite to the traditional cartel goal
of reducing output and increasing price. Allocative ef‹ciency is promoted and,
as the Supreme Court has held, the predisposing characteristics of cartelization
are not present in the NCAA nontelevision regulations.
In short, legal barriers do not prevent the continuation of the present
NCAA regulations or alternative competing leagues or associations from con-
tinuing or entering the market to compete against the NCAA for production
and marketing of college sports. The emergence and presence of the CFA (or,
for that matter, the National Association of Independent Colleges or the
NLCAA) are substantial evidence of a lack of barriers to entry.88 The current
state of antitrust law encourages robust competition on the merits through
ef‹ciency-enhancing conduct. The present NCAA and CFA regulations are
paradigms of this type of competition.
concluding comments
Our analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion that the conventional eco-
nomic wisdom regarding the intent and consequences of NCAA restrictions
on the recruitment and retention of athletes is hardly as solid, on conceptual
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grounds, as the NCAA critics assert, often without citing relevant court cases.
We have argued that the conventional wisdom is wrong in suggesting that, as
a general proposition,
• college athletes are materially “underpaid” and are “exploited”; 
• cheating on NCAA rules is prima facie evidence of a cartel intending to
restrict employment and suppress athletes’ wages;
• NCAA rules violate conventional antitrust doctrine;
• barriers to entry ensure the continuance of the NCAA’s monopsony
powers over athletes.
No such entry barriers (other than normal organizational costs, which need to
be covered to meet any known ef‹ciency test for new entrants) exist. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court’s decision in NCAA indicates that the NCAA would
be unable to prevent through the courts the emergence of competing athletic
associations. The actual existence of other athletic associations indicates that
entry would be not only possible but also practical if athletes’ wages were
materially suppressed.
Conventional economic analysis of NCAA rules that we have challenged
also is misleading in suggesting that collegiate sports would necessarily be
improved if the NCAA were denied the authority to regulate the payment of
athletes. Given the absence of legal barriers to entry into the athletic associa-
tion market, it appears that if athletes’ wages were materially suppressed (or as
grossly suppressed as the critics claim), alternative sports associations would
form or expand, and the NCAA would be unable to maintain its presumed
monopsony market position. The incentive for colleges and universities to
break with the NCAA would be overwhelming.
From our interpretation of NCAA rules, it does not follow necessarily that
athletes should not receive any more compensation than they do currently.
Clearly, market conditions change, and NCAA rules often must be adjusted to
accommodate those changes.89 In the absence of entry barriers, we can expect
the NCAA to adjust, as it has adjusted, in a competitive manner its rules of
play, recruitment, and retention of athletes (Farrell 1985, 29–32). Our central
point is that contrary to the proponents of the monopsony thesis, the collegiate
athletic market is subject to the self-correcting mechanism of market pres-
sures. We have reason to believe that the proposed extension of the antitrust
enforcement to the NCAA rules or proposed changes in sports law explicitly or
implicitly recommended by the proponents of the cartel thesis would be not
only unnecessary but also counterproductive.
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Chapter 9
Monopoly as Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship plays an honorable, indispensable role in
the evolution of market economies. It is the creative force that leads to the
identi‹cation and development—through inventions and discoveries—of new
products, improvements in old products, and the creation of new production
technologies and re‹nements of old ones. The entrepreneur energizes the cre-
ative—and destructive—forces of markets by discovering pro‹table opportu-
nities and then by taking advantage of those opportunities and/or by ‹nding
ways of motivating others to do so.
In this chapter, we suggest that one unrecognized reason monopolies are
looked upon with disrepute among economists is that their economic models
are empty of any role for entrepreneurship. In economists’ models, monopo-
lies are seen solely as static constrictors of production of already identi‹ed
goods that, when the analysis is undertaken, have a fully developed market and
cost structure (as represented by the demand and cost curves in graphical pre-
sentations). With such a single-purpose role, monopolies have no prior claim
to any of the surplus value consumers receive from the goods and services that
the monopolies produce. Hence, any consumer surplus the monopolist takes in
the form of economic pro‹ts can, understandably, be disparaged as a form of
unearned rent or, worse yet, as a form of theft. Any welfare loss that is
destroyed in the process is viewed as worse than theft, on par with a burglar
burning down the burglarized residence and running from the crime scene
with the stolen loot.
We strive in this chapter to drive home three central points.
• First, monopolists as entrepreneurs have a claim on a portion of con-
sumers’ surplus value, given that they as entrepreneurs were responsible
for the realization, if not the creation, of much of that surplus value.
• Second, entrepreneurs can be expected to seek out markets where
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monopoly rents are a real possibility. This means that they will seek to
develop goods and services in markets in which they have some realistic
chance of earning supranormal pro‹ts, which in turn entails the prospect
of being protected for a time by entry barriers that either exist in the
nature of the markets or that the entrepreneurs can create. 
• Third, instead of destroying value, given our take on monopolies, entry
barriers are a source of added value, mainly because of their impact on
monopoly rents and, concomitantly, entrepreneurial alertness. Hence,
the creation of entry barriers can, once again, best be seen as part and
parcel of the entrepreneurial process, as well as integral components
(such as the color or accompanying features) of the goods and services
that are produced.
We do not mean to suggest that all entry barriers and the monopolies they
protect can be construed as welfare enhancing and hence can be judged as
“good.” We mean only to fortify with new twists a recurring theme of the
book, which is that monopolies and their entry barriers are not all “bad” and
that maximum economic advancement can be achieved only with some level of
monopoly power evident in some markets within an economy.
the entrepreneurial role in firms and markets
Economists Israel Kirzner (1973) and William Baumol (1968, 2002) see entre-
preneurship as a category of human endeavor that stands apart from the
important task of economizing—using given, known means of productions to
maximize given, known ends. Entrepreneurship also stands apart from the
actual exploitation of identi‹ed pro‹table opportunities. In its pure form,
entrepreneurship is human action de‹ned, according to Kirzner, by alertness to
the existence of pro‹table opportunities: “Entrepreneurship does not consist
of grasping a free ten-dollar bill which one has already discovered to be resting
in one’s hand; it consists in realizing that it [the ten-dollar bill] is in one’s hand
and that it is available for the grasping” (1973, 47).
This entrepreneurial process, in other words, has nothing to do with actu-
ally making a pro‹t, which implies (given the use of “making”) that costs must
be incurred at some level. Rather, “the pure entrepreneur . . . proceeds by his
alertness to discover and exploit situations in which he is able to sell for high
prices that which he can buy for low prices. . . . The discovery of a pro‹t oppor-
tunity means the discovery of something obtainable for nothing at all. No investment
at all is required; the free ten-dollar bill is discovered to be already within one’s
grasp” (Kirzner 1973, 48; emphasis in the original).1
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Similarly, Baumol argues that the entrepreneur’s “job is to locate new ideas
and to put them into effect. He must lead, perhaps even inspire; he cannot
allow things to get into a rut and for him today’s practice is never good enough
for tomorrow. He is the individual who exercises what in the business litera-
ture is called ‘leadership.’ And it is he who is virtually absent from the received
theory of the ‹rm” (1968, 65).2
We like Kirzner’s and Baumol’s characterizations of the “pure entrepre-
neur,” given that “alertness” (which is explicit in the Kirzner quote and implied
in the Baumol quote) is an unheralded component of successful market
processes. Without doubt, a whole subdiscipline could be developed around
the factors that give rise to “alertness,” and we don’t propose to develop that
subdiscipline here. However, it needs to be noted that real-world entrepre-
neurs, as distinct from pure ones, invariably do more than simply stand alert to
pro‹table opportunities. They typically act on their discoveries, becoming
investors and organizers of much new and improved economic activity. If real-
world entrepreneurs didn’t do more than remain alert to pro‹table opportuni-
ties, little new would get done. Their alertness would go nowhere but would
remain a strictly mental phenomenon. Also, we clearly see that much real-
world entrepreneurship is not as free as Kirzner’s pure form (if not Baumol’s
also). Real-world entrepreneurship involves costs, mainly because alertness
requires some devotion to task. It requires readiness to ‹nd and to act upon
‹ndings. And given the sophistication of modern goods and services, alertness
must go hand in hand with investigations that can involve varying amounts of
resources, including hard work on the part of entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur
can’t expect to stand idly by waiting for the concept of, for example, the inte-
grated circuit or the plot for a best-selling novel to appear as if by magic. Some
good ideas might come as ›ashes of insight, but that is hardly the case for most.
That is to say, most entrepreneurs must work at being prepared to see or real-
ize the opportunities that present themselves.
Alexander Fleming discovered, somewhat serendipitously, how a green
mold, Penicillium notatum, could kill many bacteria that infect humans, but in
making his discovery, he was clearly hard at work on another goal. Even then,
it was left to others—Howard Florey and Ernst Chain, who were searching for
ways to reduce battle‹eld infections in wounded soldiers—to recognize more
than a decade later the medical value (and pro‹t potential) of Fleming’s dis-
covery. Similarly, Xerox pioneered the development of the graphical user
interface (GUI) for computer screens and the computer mouse. Xerox was
alert to the GUI and mouse, or else these concepts would never have been
made operational in the Xerox lab, but the “entrepreneurs” (if they can be
called that) at Xerox did nothing with the company’s inventions. It was left to
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Steve Jobs and Stephen Wozniak to see how these technologies could be incor-
porated in personal computers and then make use of them. Without any doubt
penicillin, the look and feel of our computer screens, and the way we navigate
the Web owe their existence to entrepreneurial alertness, but Fleming, Florey,
Chain, Jobs, and Wozniak were all working at being alert, or so it seems to us.
Their alertness went beyond awareness. They stood ready to move resources
(or move others to move resources for them).
Nevertheless, no matter exactly how entrepreneurship and entrepreneurs
are perceived in their details, Baumol is right: Those constructs play little or no
role in conventional microeconomic models. This is true largely because the
products and production processes in those models are assumed to exist and
because any improvements in products and technologies that are conceivable
are assumed to already be conceived and adopted by producers in the identi‹ed
markets. Microeconomic theory starts, in other words, with tenets that effec-
tively assume away a great deal about what happens in market processes (which
is why “price theory” is a more appropriate characterization of the models’
intended use, to explain in large measure how prices are determined within dif-
ferent market structures). Those tenets unavoidably assume away any identi-
‹able role for “entrepreneurs” that is functionally independent of resource
owners, leaving the models’ embedded actors (to the extent that there are any)
solely concerned with a more mundane or uninspired single function, to max-
imize the production of given goods with given resources (Baumol 1968;
Kirzner 1973, chap. 2). The analysis is thereby restricted to the problem of
resource allocation to a narrow range of all that real-world ‹rms do with the
resources they marshal.3
Under perfect competition, individual competitors have no real choice
about anything, not even about the prices they charge. We say that because
perfect competitors must adopt the market price and respond to it in their pro-
duction decisions, as if by rote, or be driven out of the market (Buchanan
1964). Absolutely no room exists in this model for error on any matter. But
then, ‹rm failures in such models are of no consequence to anything, because
of the presumed costless ›uidity of resources. In such a world, ‹rms can’t really
fail, given that they can move their resources instantaneously, once the
prospects of losses are detected, and can do so at zero cost. They always earn
their opportunity costs, including normal pro‹ts by virtue of the ease of
resource movement.
Under pure monopoly, the entrepreneurial function is limited (if it has any
function at all) solely to that of “choosing” the price and output combination
along its given market demand curve and is constrained by its given marginal
cost function, with the curve being set by known production technologies (and
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with the monopolist’s marginal cost curve assumed to be identical with the
market supply curve of perfect competition).4 We put “choosing” in quotation
marks because price and output choices are actually dictated by the assumption
of pro‹t maximization, which eliminates all degrees of freedom, a point
stressed by Buchanan (1964). The redeeming, albeit limited, value of the stan-
dard analytics is that the structure of the logic followed by the monopolist (or
perfect competitor) in achieving pro‹t maximization—weighing revenues and
cost at the margin—can be inferred. This inferred logic of pro‹t maximization
can (possibly) inform real-world entrepreneurs who have a far more complex
role than simply setting their production and price levels and who are not so
constricted by the dictates of competition and pro‹t maximization that the
prospect of meaningful freedom is nonexistent—meaning that the pro‹t-max-
imizing rule is not imposed on them.
When economists step outside of their formal modeling, they undoubtedly
appreciate the role of the entrepreneur and entrepreneurship. After all, goods
and services, which are sources of consumer value, don’t descend as if from
heaven for consumers to gather at will. Without entrepreneurs, goods and ser-
vices would never be produced and distributed widely. Markets might operate
ef‹ciently, given the presence of people who could make optimal use of
resources within the constraints of the available goods and services, resources,
and technologies. But no room would exist for improvement beyond the status
quo. We can’t help but think that such a world would be dreadful because it
would be hopelessly stuck in time.
monopoly rents as entrepreneurial entitlement
Entrepreneurs hold an honored role in economies because they do what con-
sumers want and, presumably, can’t do for themselves as cost effectively. The
entrepreneurs identify, develop, produce, and distribute new goods and ser-
vices that have value. At the same time, because new goods and services do not,
by de‹nition, initially have competitors, entrepreneurs who do create new
goods are quickly chastised by economists for not doing all that consumers
would like—expanding output to the competitive ideal level—a perspective
that seems to be lacking completely in appreciation and gratitude for what has
been done.
However, we don’t treat all entrepreneurs the same. Consider, for exam-
ple, artists (or composers and musicians) and manufacturers. Surely no one
would fault Rembrandt and Picasso for what they accomplished as artists,
mainly because these two artists imagined new and very great paintings and
then brought them into existence. And their paintings have given people
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immense value for many years. Just as surely no one—not even their critics or
economists—would now think to fault Rembrandt and Picasso for not having
produced more paintings than they did during their lifetimes. This is the case
in spite of the fact that Rembrandt and Picasso could have given more people
more pleasure (surplus value) had they not restricted their painting (had they
worked more of their waking hours than they did and sold the paintings that
they completed at lower prices). We submit that few would ‹nd fault with
Rembrandt and Picasso even if it were shown conclusively that they actively
operated as the monopolists that they were, restricting their work (or just sales)
to maximize (albeit imperfectly, but as best they could) their monopoly rents
during the course of their lifetimes.
Indeed, to one extent or another, all highly creative people are monopolists.
And we might stress that Rembrandt and Picasso didn’t just happen to be
monopolists (on par with monopolists who happen to exist within economists’
models). They no doubt committed themselves early in their lives to becoming
that which they became, exceptionally good artists who, because of the high
quality of their works, achieved monopoly status, that is, control over market
supply and, therefore, price. In short, they entrepreneured their respective
monopoly market positions for their times. Should they not have had some
legitimate claim on the consumer gains that could have been expected to ›ow
from their monopoly-given work during their lifetimes? Of course they should.
But then, Rembrandt and Picasso are hardly in a league without equals
through the ages. Art history books are replete with artists in a variety of ‹elds
who were monopolists for their times because they worked for what they
became. Is the world a worse place today because so many artists intentionally
worked to achieve a position of monopoly power? Could the world have been
a better place had these artists been prevented from seeking and then garner-
ing the rewards from their monopoly positions? Hardly not. 
In more contemporary times, of the top-selling ‹fteen books published in
the 1980s, twelve of them—representing an 80 percent market share—were
written by just three authors, Stephen King, Tom Clancy, and Danielle Steel
(Cowen 1998, 53). Now, with the publication of her Harry Potter fantasy
adventure series, J. K. Rowling has pushed King’s, Clancy’s, and Steel’s com-
bined sales into the dustbins of publishing records, given that Rowling’s ‹rst six
Harry Potter books sold an astounding 300 million worldwide (in 62 languages)
by the end of 2006 (and the seventh and ‹nal volume in the series was released
shortly before this book went to press, with sales expectations on the seventh
book exceeding the sales of all previous volumes.5 These authors were hardly
immune to the constraints of competition imposed by the tens of thousands of
other books (and videos and other forms of entertainment) released each year,
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but just as surely, some portion of their current substantial fortunes was built
from the monopoly rents they collected over the years as a consequence of their
privileged market positions, achieved through hard work, as well as through the
development of market protections, their pen names (which marketing scholars
might deem “brands” when talking about soap or what Fleisher, Goff, and Tol-
lison [1992] have called “reputational capital” when describing the market
advantage of NCAA member schools). What is truly amazing is how Rowling,
the monopoly holder of the Harry Potter storytelling brand, is revered by hun-
dreds of millions of devoted readers who are not only willing to pay prices that
must include substantial monopoly pro‹ts for both her and her publisher but
are willing to wait hours, sometimes in inclement weather, to buy her books
when they are released at midnight. You’ve got to believe that most Harry Pot-
ter readers think only of their Dupuit triangles and probably have never had
even a passing thought about the welfare loss that might never have been gen-
erated (even if the concept has any relevance at all to assessing human welfare
from what Rowling was able, in the span of ten years, to do).
Why then don’t economists view, say, manufacturing monopolies in the
same positive way creative people should be and are viewed, endowed with the
acknowledged right to collect whatever monopoly rents they can create? We
suggest that the explanation has (at least) two dimensions: First, manufacturing
‹rms are all too often used as examples in economists’ monopoly models, with
the result being that economists’ assessments of manufacturing monopolies are
warped by what Joseph Schumpeter characterized as their “original Vision,”
grounded in static analysis. Under economists’ model of monopoly, no place
exists for the kind of creativity expressed by Rembrandt, Picasso, King, Clancy,
Steel, and Rowling. We submit that this vacuum derives from the goods and ser-
vices in the economists’ model being the given as a starting point for analysis.
No one talks about how or why the goods and services were created, or what
the world (or consumer surplus value) would have been like had the goods and
services never been given. Such talk is not needed, because the goods and ser-
vices don’t need to be created. They exist by assumption. Hence, the only issue
of consequence in the analytics, subject to the control of the presumed monop-
olist, is what is not done, rather than what is created and then produced. Had
the analysis started before the goods are given, the judgment imposed on manu-
facturing monopolists might be similar to the more positive valuation of
monopoly artists and writers. The value generated from the goods that are cre-
ated would then have to be weighed against any lost ef‹ciency from the monop-
olists not producing as much as outside observers/economists might believe
they should produce to achieve some idealized construction of ef‹ciency
(which, we remind you, can never be fully achieved in real-world markets).
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A second reason that monopolists among artists and writers are treated
more positively by economists is that all people’s assessments of what others do
or don’t do must, we submit, be guided by larger and more compelling values
than strict static market ef‹ciency, as conceived by economists. One such value
could be the justice of people’s claims to streams of income or consumer sur-
plus. And the justice of any person’s claim to an income stream must be
informed by the person’s contribution to the generation of the income stream,
a perspective adopted by no less than Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Senti-
ments (1759). Where there is no effect on the generation of the income stream,
there is no claim to it—or so one labor-based theory of the justice of owner-
ship (or entitlement), founded on the work of John Locke, seems to suggest.
Indeed, Locke started with the proposition that “natural law” dictated that
each person owns himself, including his labor. This natural law necessarily
implies that anything a person creates with labor alone becomes that person’s
private property (because the property does nothing more, according to
Locke, than capture the value of what that person already owns, his labor).6
Indeed, Locke went on to posit that a person is entitled to the ownership of the
full product of whatever a person commingles with his labor with other previ-
ously unowned resources that are also used in the production of the product.
Clearly, such a labor theory of just entitlement has problems, not the least of
which is, according to the late philosopher Robert Nozick, that of setting the
boundary for the property one owns when one mixes his labor with a previ-
ously unowned object in the natural world: “If a private astronaut clears a place
on Mars, has he mixed his labor with (so he comes to own) the whole planet?
Which plot does an act bring ownership?” (1974, 174).
Nozick goes on to suggest two principles of entitlement: (1) a person is
entitled to a holding as long as the person has acquired the holding in a just
manner, meaning that he has not stolen it, for example; and (2) he has acquired
the holding from someone else who had acquired the holding in a just manner
(1974, 150–53). That is to say, a person who acquires stolen property from
someone else who stole the property would not be justly entitled to the own-
ership of the property.
We need not digress here into a full-›edged philosophical discussion of the
justice of property rights. We simply point out that people’s common assess-
ments of what artists and writers do and how they take advantage of their mar-
ket positions could be, and probably is, shaped by some crude variant of
Locke’s labor theory of entitlement. The artists and writers we identi‹ed
clearly created (to the best of our knowledge) what they produced, both in con-
cept and physical output. Had they not created what they did—had they not
actually done the work on the paintings and books but instead had stolen them
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or had them fall like manna from heaven into their workplaces—the justice of
their ownership claims to their holdings, including their works’ future income
streams, could and would surely be disputed on justice grounds, no matter
what the assessed ef‹ciency of the resulting market outcomes. But in some
meaningful sense, from what we know, the artists and writers did create their
works. From all accounts, they did not steal the materials they used, did not
enslave anyone to get the paintings and books they produced, and did not buy
the works they claimed as their own from known thieves. Their realized
rewards for any given pieces were simply the incentive they imagined before
they started work and provided incentive for their continued work.
The artists and writers acquired their works in accordance with what Noz-
ick calls the “principle of justice in acquisition” and the “principle of justice in
transfer.” Accordingly, they possessed a just claim to exploit, if not all their
future income stream—monopoly rents included—then surely a portion of it
that goes beyond “normal pro‹ts.” Indeed, most people would have no prob-
lem with the concept of the artists and writers receiving as much as possible of
the resulting surplus value. The same can be said for the consumers. Indeed,
the surplus value can be expected to be divided in whatever way the buyers and
sellers can negotiate, as long as the negotiations themselves are done fairly,
that is, in accordance with preconceived rules of exchange.
By way of contrast, monopolies of the abstract, textbook variety—not the
usual kind in the real workaday world—have no such prior justi‹cation for a
claim to the surplus value because they did not, within the restricted con‹nes
of formal models, create the goods and services subject to analysis. Those
goods, to repeat for emphasis, are given, which means they are born devoid of
any hint of prior claims of creation. The goods’ producers simply make the
decisions on how much of the given good should be produced and what price
should be charged to maximize economic or monopoly rents. Under such ana-
lytics, the monopolist has no prior claim to the surplus value, but neither do
consumers. Indeed, the legitimacy of any claim to the surplus value is left up in
the air, unsettled in such models, which is why any economic rent garnered by
the monopolist is treated by economists in their lectures as nothing more, nor
less, than a redistribution of income with no negative welfare connotation
(supposedly) imputed to the process.
However, matters are radically different, or should be, when the monopo-
list actually creates the good (or service) over which it has production control.
This is true because a prior claim then exists to the surplus value, just as Picasso
and Rowling have had claims to the surplus values of what they created. The
argument can surely be made in this case that the product might not have been
produced had the monopolist not been able to claim at least a portion, if not
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all, of the potential surplus value, which means some of the net gains from
trade. In a world replete with failures, we remind you that it is hard to say
whether “large monopoly pro‹ts” extracted on identi‹ed goods occur because
of a ‹rm’s mere size or because of how much consumer surplus is left for con-
sumers. This is the case because the critical concern to the monopolist-qua-
entrepreneur is how much pro‹t is made across an array of goods, some of
which will likely be total market ›ops. When the good or service is given, any
prior claim to the surplus value across an array of given goods is, we repeat,
devoid of such justi‹cation.
The great redeeming value of markets, heralded since the days of Adam
Smith, has been that welfare improvement emerges from mutually bene‹cial
exchanges. What is peculiar about the way microeconomics is traditionally
taught is how professors so often start their courses with David Ricardo’s great
demonstration, that there are mutual advantages from trades, resulting neces-
sarily in an increase in aggregate income for the traders, even when one trader
is absolutely more productive in all goods than all other traders. Gains can
always emerge, students are shown, when trade occurs in line with the “law of
comparative advantage.” Indeed, in such demonstrations the increase in aggre-
gate income cannot occur without trade being mutually bene‹cial, meaning the
gains are truly greater than mere costs. However, as the course proceeds, pro-
fessors eventually explain how the most ef‹cient market structure conceiv-
able—perfect competition, made up of numerous identical ‹rms as well as
numerous consumers—is one in which the gains are not mutual at all. Con-
sumers get all the true net gains from the trades—that is, all the consumer sur-
plus. Producers receive nothing other than coverage of their opportunity costs,
which is no real gain in terms of what else could have been done.7 This is truly
an odd, and we believe ethically dubious, outcome when in fact the producers
create the goods and then develop their markets from scratch while consumers
have absolutely nothing to do with the creation and production of the goods
they buy. The consumers’ only contribution to the exchange process is the
expression of their preferences for the goods they buy (and in real-world mar-
kets, even then the producers may have been responsible for stimulating, if not
creating, consumer demand).
When microeconomics courses take up the issue of monopoly, they
acknowledge what are clearly the mutual gains—consumers get some portion
of the surplus value in the form of consumer surplus, the Dupuit triangle, while
the monopolist receives some of the surplus value in the form of economic
rents. But then while the gains of consumers are rarely noted, much less her-
alded, the gains going to the monopolist are everywhere condemned for the
deadweight loss that results, as well as for their distorting in›uence on the
income distribution. (And as we noted in an earlier chapter, consumers are
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never condemned for not paying the monopolist to extend its production.)
Surely one can argue that the dictates of mutual gains from trades mitigate
against the producers getting all the consumer surplus value from exchanges,
but just as surely, those same dictates suggest to us (and to Schumpeter) that
the producers have a claim to at least a portion of that which they created,
especially if trades are expected to occur systematically. The producers’ claim
mandates, in our view, both the realization of monopoly rents for a time, as
well as some (unspeci‹ed) degree of entry barriers for some (unspeci‹ed) time
in order for the economic rents to emerge.
the justice of entry barriers reconsidered
In standard textbook treatments of monopoly, entry barriers are, like the goods
and services they protect, often assumed into existence, which means that they
are not the consequence of anything producers do. Entry barriers are also
independent of the goods and services they protect, are not in any way a source
of independent value, and do not add value to the goods and services they pro-
tect. Entry barriers (other than copyrights and patents) have no socially
redeeming purpose, according to the economists’ model.
In addition, the privileged market position of standard textbook monopo-
lies is often tainted by how the protective entry barriers arise. All too often, the
entry barriers are assumed into existence, said to be “natural,” or are a conse-
quence of happenstance or of exclusive ownership of some strategically impor-
tant resource. Worse yet, the entry barriers are assumed to be ordained,
enforced, and maintained by the government. In such cases, the acquired eco-
nomic rents in themselves may not be viewed as a market curse, but they surely
cannot be seen as anything approaching just entitlement, given any reasonable
and defensible philosophical foundation, such as the ones articulated by Locke
or Nozick. As with income from land, the monopoly rents that “just happen”
because of the fortuitous circumstances of nature can justi‹ably be viewed as
the equivalent of pure rent on land, that is, as being unearned and with no trace
of a claim of entitlement that is clearly above anyone else’s claim. They can
also be taxed away without damage to the allocation of resources or to anyone’s
sense of entitlement. When the monopoly rents are the consequence of entry
barriers that the government (meaning politicians) erects in response to inter-
est groups’ rent-seeking payoffs, the monopoly rents can be construed as a
form of theft, potentially no less destructive to social welfare than common
burglaries and muggings, and violating Nozick’s principles of justice in acqui-
sition and transfer as well as an array of less sophisticated, commonsense
understandings of entitlement.
However, there is no reason that such assumptions regarding the origins of
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entry barriers need be descriptive of all real-world markets. Indeed, we note
that property rights in general often carry with them embedded entry barriers,
and we hasten to add that economists sing the praises of how property rights
contribute to economic ef‹ciency by staving off “tragedies of the commons.”
Patents and copyrights, which are nothing other than (limited) entry barri-
ers, also represent a politically endorsed, contrary view of entry barriers. These
legally established entry barriers provide their holders with some limited
degree of monopoly power because they can add to the array of protected
goods as well as add value to the individual goods produced. They do so
because patents and copyrights provide people (producers) with an incentive to
produce additional goods and services that might not otherwise be produced at
all or, if produced, would be produced in lower quantities. These entry barri-
ers also add value directly to the goods themselves because they give entrepre-
neurs an enhanced incentive to develop the qualities of their products by more
than would otherwise be the case.8
When patent and copyright protections are achievable, we should expect,
and do ‹nd, entrepreneurs seeking to obtain them, often at a modest cost in
the case of copyrights but, at times, at considerable cost in the case of patents.
This observation leads to a more general conclusion, which is that entrepre-
neurs should see other forms of entry barriers as part and parcel of the devel-
opmental process of the goods and services. Entrepreneurs can be expected to
devote resources to the development of entry barriers at the same time that
they develop the other various attributes of their products. How many
resources they invest directly in the development of their products will, of
course, depend upon the expected payoff. However, it needs to be stressed that
the products’ expected payoff is functionally related to how protective the
entry barriers that are also under development can be expected to be, as well as
to the value of the goods to consumers. It stands to reason that if entry barri-
ers of any consequence are prohibitively expensive to develop, as is the case
under perfect competition, then entrepreneurs have absolutely no reason to
develop their product in the ‹rst place, because they could then expect no gain
from product development. The reason for this is the unrecoverable develop-
ment costs incurred on the product (and its market), as we noted earlier in the
book. After the product (as well as the market for the product) is developed,
other ‹rms could enter the market and copy whatever product has been devel-
oped, thus causing the price to fall past the point at which the original devel-
oper or producer could recover its development costs.
Hence, we are led to a more benign, if not positive, view of many (but not
all) entry barriers. Just how many products are developed will be functionally
related to the cost of developing entry barriers: the lower the cost of entry-bar-
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rier development, the more the product will be developed and the greater the
number of products on the market. This is because the cost of setting up (and
maintaining) entry barriers can affect the con‹dence that ‹rms have with
respect to recovering their product and market development costs (especially
in industries in which the marginal cost of reproduction is very low or minimal,
e.g., digital goods). Some of the growth in consumer value from enhanced
goods and more goods can, as a consequence, be seen as the productive contri-
butions of entry barriers. Hence, both consumers and producer or monopolists
can gain from entry barriers (as discussed earlier).
In traditional economics, any resources that a ‹rm devotes to the erection
of barriers to entry are necessarily destructive to social welfare because they
allow the protected ‹rms to restrict production and raise the price. Dead-
weight loss is created in two stages: Resources are allocated away from doing
productive things to producing entry barriers. Then, behind the entry barriers,
the protected ‹rms can add to the deadweight loss by curbing production.
Simultaneously, a portion of the consumer surplus derived from the good is
transferred from consumers to producers (which can bother those economists
who believe that consumers are more deserving of the consumer surplus than
are the producers).
But is it always true that resources devoted to the production of entry bar-
riers are destructive of welfare? Consider again the case of the good with high
up-front costs in the form of expenditures on product and market development
and low to zero marginal cost. Legally enforced copyright protection may pro-
vide little protection from pirates who understand that they have a slim chance
of being caught, prosecuted, and convicted, with the expected penalties lower
than the expected rewards from piracy. Presumably, the creation, develop-
ment, and production of such goods would be curbed. Suppose that the pro-
ducer were to develop a computer chip (or program) that, when embedded in
the product, greatly increased the cost of the good being pirated. Might not
the resources devoted to the creation of the chip—an entry barrier—enhance
social welfare? In such cases, the entry barriers that are created serve the same
function that deadbolt locks serve on apartments and stores (which are literal
entry barriers). They redirect the use of misused resources of thieves. They
also encourage production of more goods in greater quantities.
Brand names—Intel, Good Housekeeping, BMW—have frequently been
cited as sources of monopoly power, given that once established, they can
reduce the options that consumers will consider when purchasing, increase
consumer switching costs, increase the inelasticity of consumer demand, and
increase the entry costs for producers. The result is that the owners of the
branded products can curb production and extract monopoly rents. The same
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line of argument can be applied to trade secrets that can provide ‹rms with
more durable entry barriers than copyrights and patents.
We have two reasons for not accepting this line of argument. First, with
the establishment of identi‹able brand names that carry marketing weight, we
have to think that the demands for the branded products rise, which means that
consumers’ surplus value can rise along with any monopoly rents and any
deadweight loss, as conceived by economists. If consumers become less
responsive to price increases of the branded products, we believe it commonly
happens for a reason: that the brand itself, apart from the product, carries some
added value in itself. Of course, the consumers might be duped by producers,
a prospect that seems to be the implied claim of the critics of branding. But if
they are duped, who can say de‹nitively that consumers are worse off from
buying the branded products at monopoly prices? (If the consumers can be so
duped, why can’t people who see brands as having little value be duped as well,
not just with respect to the branded products but also to the fact that other
consumers have been duped?) Whether consumers are duped or not, if pro-
ducers can acquire monopoly positions by branding their products, should we
not expect more producers to create more products that are branded?
monopolies, public goods, and the 
gains from price discrimination
The monopolist in the standard monopoly model does produce less than is
desirable, but we have to inject a point rarely mentioned. The monopolist does
so because it is creating value over and above what it can capture. In the termi-
nology of economics, the monopolist is creating a positive externality: The
price of any addition unit of output (which re›ects its value) is greater than the
monopolist realizes from producing it.
For all practical purposes, the monopolist is in the same position as the
person who creates a beautiful ›ower garden in a portion of his (or her) front
yard, visible to those who drive by. This gardener is creating a positive exter-
nality that is analytically equivalent to the one created by the monopolist—
because the motorists who enjoy the garden don’t pay anything to the gardener
for their enjoyment, the gardener is creating a value that is greater than he
receives. It would be desirable if the gardener expanded the garden and made
it even more beautiful and visible to passing motorists, but because the
motorists won’t pay for the additional value they would receive, the gardener
has no motivation to do so.9 No fair-minded person would criticize the gar-
dener for not expanding his output as much as is socially desirable. Rather,
most people would praise the gardener for providing more value to others than
the gardener is receiving in return.
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But the same argument can be made for a monopolist. The monopolist is
providing more value to others than it is receiving in return (if not on the mar-
gin, then surely inframarginally and in total), even though it is not producing
as much as consumers might ideally like. Criticizing someone who is produc-
ing something consumers value because the output is not as much as people
want is tantamount to the preacher criticizing his congregation for being too
small.
Again, the monopolist isn’t necessarily as bad as typically depicted when
the textbook model of monopoly is discussed. Whether a monopolist should be
praised for making consumers better off than they would otherwise be, or pil-
loried for not making them as well off as it could, depends on why the ‹rm has
monopoly power in the ‹rst place.
The underproduction associated with positive externalities is possible only
because of transaction costs. Whether we are talking about a gardener, a
painter, or a monopoly ‹rm, no problem would exist if it were costless for
people to engage in transactions (as in perfect competition). A gardener could
costlessly deny the visible bene‹t of the garden to passing motorists unless they
paid him an amount equal to the marginal bene‹t they derived from it. In this
case, the gardener would receive the information and motivation needed to
increase the size of the garden until the marginal cost of doing so equaled the
marginal value created. Similarly, without transaction costs, a monopolist and
its customers would costlessly exchange additional output for a payment at
least equal to its marginal cost until the price (value of the marginal unit) and
marginal cost were equal.
One might wonder why we are even considering such an impossible situa-
tion as zero transaction costs. Of all people, economists—folks who try to
make friends at parties by pointing out that there is a cost to everything—
should know that there is no such thing as a free transaction. True enough. But
even though transaction costs can never be eliminated, they can be reduced,
and a consideration of zero transaction costs adds to our understanding of the
ef‹ciency implications of reducing them.10
Clearly, the monopolist and its customers (and potential customers) would
like to reduce the transaction costs of doing business with each other. The
deadweight loss in the standard monopoly model is wealth being left on the
table, and some of that wealth could be appropriated and distributed in a way
that made some better off and no one worse off, if only the costs of negotiating
agreements and enforcing those agreements could be reduced. It would be
dif‹cult, if not impossible, for consumers to reduce those costs. They are too
numerous to join forces and deal with a ‹rm with monopoly power in a uni‹ed
way. Consumers could individually approach the monopolist, of course, but
two problems arise with that.
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• First, the product is unlikely to be one that is important enough in a con-
sumer’s budget to justify trying to deal directly with the producer rather
than just accept the quoted price. Your favorite band has monopoly
power, but it certainly wouldn’t pay you to try negotiating directly with
the band’s recording company. You just pay the listed price for the CD
at the local store.11
• Second, even if the price being charged is high enough to make it worth-
while for some customers to try negotiating directly with the producer,
the producer is unlikely to be interested in dealing with you. The only
reason it would pay you to deal directly with the monopolist is to nego-
tiate a lower price. But the monopolist is selling all it wants at the pre-
vailing price. As widely acknowledged (see chap. 6), the monopolist
might be willing to sell another unit to you at a lower price, but only if it
can be sure that doing so won’t result in lots of other consumers
demanding a lower price also. Coordinating the cooperation of all the
other consumers to provide that assurance would be impossible. Even if
it weren’t, what motivation would they have to allow you and a few oth-
ers to get a lower price while they had to continue paying the high
monopoly price? 
The monopolist is in the best position to take the action necessary to
retrieve some of the wealth that would otherwise be lost. In other words, the
monopolist is in the best position to reduce the transaction costs that explain
the standard monopoly result, and it has a strong motivation to do so. A
monopoly increases its pro‹ts and the welfare of consumers by lowering trans-
action costs and converting the deadweight loss in the standard monopoly
model into wealth that is shared with consumers. The way a monopolist can
lower transaction costs is through price discrimination—or charging a differ-
ent price for different units of the same good.
In most standard discussions of price discrimination, economists typically
assume that no transaction costs are associated with price discrimination with
two (or more) different prices. But although the monopolist can effectively
reduce the transaction costs associated with capturing some of the wealth lost
in the standard monopoly model, it obviously cannot eliminate the wealth loss.
Implementing even the simple two-price price discrimination encounters non-
trivial transaction cost–type problems. The ‹rst problem is determining whom
to charge the high price and whom to charge the low price. If the higher price
is imposed on consumers who don’t value the product very much and the lower
price is charged those who would buy just about as much at a much higher
price, then the price discrimination could reduce rather than increase the
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amount sold. But even if the monopolist targets the different prices to the right
consumers, a second problem arises: preventing those paying the lower price
from reselling to those being charged the higher price. If that can be achieved,
then the customers paying the lower price will out-compete the monopolist for
the high-price customers, and the prices in the two markets will converge,
eliminating the ef‹ciency gains from price discrimination. Therefore, the two
markets have to be separated by somehow increasing the costs of transacting
with each other for the customers in the low-price and high-price markets.
Somewhat paradoxically, to reduce the transaction costs between the monop-
olist and its customers enough to make price discrimination possible, the trans-
action costs among the customers have to be increased.
Many good examples exist of how ‹rms with market power engage in
imperfect price discrimination, the most important feature of which is that the
‹rm is able to segment its markets so that different prices can be charged and,
at the same time, those who buy the good at a low price can’t resell what they
buy to those customers who pay the higher prices.12 What is not often noted in
discussions of examples of price discrimination is how the monopolist, being
the only producer (or one of a few producers), solves the transaction-cost
problems that consumers face. Put differently, the monopolist effectively does
for the consumers what they would do themselves, if their costs were not so
high. In so doing, the monopolist produces a public good by internalizing the
(consumer-side) externalities.
It might be comforting to think that the perfectly competitive output level
could be achieved absent any ‹rm with market power because of entry barriers.
If such an output level were achievable, then the monopolist would indeed,
through price discrimination, be doing nothing more for greater society than
recovering the wealth lost from what the monopolist fails to do. However, read-
ers should by now see the perfectly competitive standard as a conceptual pipe
dream, founded on an assumption of an idealized world in which (among other
things) transaction costs are nonexistent. From the perspective of a more real-
istic world, one in which transaction costs abound everywhere in the market,
the monopolist doesn’t just recover otherwise lost wealth, it creates wealth with
the various methods it devises to segment markets, to erect barriers to entry
and resales, and to engage in price discrimination. It creates the added wealth
by ‹nding ways to lower transaction costs (for itself but not for consumers)
below not only what they would be for consumers but also below the net
potential welfare gains from expanded production.
Moreover, price-discriminating monopolists can create wealth in a largely
unheralded way, through improving on any dynamic ef‹ciency achieved from
nondiscriminatory monopoly pricing. We have noted that Romer (1994) has
Monopoly as Entrepreneurship 189
stressed how competitive prices can be a poor indicator of the total value con-
sumers place on various actual or potential products. This is because competi-
tive prices tend to re›ect only the marginal cost of production, and the prob-
lem of prices being poor signals of consumer value is especially acute under
perfect competition beset with high up-front development costs and very low
(to zero) marginal production costs. Actual or prospective price discrimina-
tion, which enables producers to capture more of the consumer surplus, can be
seen as giving improved signals on where and how entrepreneurs should focus
the resources at their command, thus improving dynamic, or long-run,
ef‹ciency.
Economists have long understood that in order for a ‹rm to engage in
price discrimination, the ‹rm must have some degree of market power. Other-
wise, the ‹rm could not charge some consumers higher prices. Without mar-
ket protection, those consumers paying the higher prices would soon be
offered lower prices by new market entrants. We have no problem with the
direction of this line of argument. However, we do suggest that economists all
too quickly reverse the direction of the argument: Price discrimination is
prima facie evidence of monopoly power. Hence, through price discrimina-
tion, the ‹rm is, as noted previously, doing nothing more than recovering the
otherwise lost wealth that would have resulted from constricted production.
Any cost incurred to enable price discrimination is then seen to fall into a dif-
ferent (and destructive) category from costs that are incurred in the develop-
ment of new goods and services. However, we suggest a different perspective:
Coming up with wealth-creating devices to cost-effectively segment the mar-
ket can require the same kind of alertness to pro‹table opportunities that
entrepreneurs have been heralded for having in the development of new prod-
ucts and services. Indeed, the development of new goods and services by ‹rms
can be pro‹table to ‹rms because they lower the costs consumers would have
to incur in order to obtain the same goods and services. We are arguing that
methods of price discrimination (such as those economists frequently cite)
require no fewer entrepreneurial skills and do the same thing—create wealth
by lowering costs.
However, we should never forget that although methods of price discrim-
ination can cause a monopolist’s rents to rise, they can also enable the monop-
olist to go into business in the ‹rst place and to prevent its books from being
perennially covered in red ink. Firms with high ‹xed costs and low marginal
costs—for example, the nation’s airlines—can see price discrimination as a sur-
vival tool. Because of the threats of war and terrorism after the collapse of the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, combined with a weak economy
(attributable in part to the negative wealth effect associated with the collapse of
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the high-tech boom), demand for air travel dropped off, causing airlines to do
what comes naturally: lowering their fares to ‹re-sale levels and, in the process,
sending several airlines either into bankruptcy or to its brink. We can only
imagine that more airlines would have continued to see their capital base erode
by greater amounts had they not been able to price-discriminate, that is, ‹nd
creative ways of charging practically every passenger (on some ›ights) a differ-
ent fare.
the efficiency of monopoly failures
Joseph Schumpeter made “creative destruction” a centerpiece of his theory of
how markets are constantly re-creating themselves, in spite of ever-present
monopoly in›uences.
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organiza-
tional development from the craft shop to such concerns as U.S. Steel illus-
trate the same process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological
term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within,
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This
process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is
what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live
in. (1942, 83; emphasis in the original)
In a footnote, Schumpeter stresses that incessant is not exactly the right word
for describing industrial revolutions from within, because the kind of revolu-
tions he had in mind “occur in discrete rushes which are separated from each
other by spans of comparative quiet,” but he also adds that there is a meaning-
ful sense in which the revolutions are “incessant,” namely, “that there always is
either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution, both together
forming what are known as business cycles” (1942, 83, fn. 2).13
We have explained why Schumpeter was for several reasons not very con-
cerned with monopoly elements in the economy. Monopolies were a destruc-
tive force in markets because they were also creative, contributing to the ongo-
ing revolutions through the development of new products and services and
new, more cost-effective methods of production.
Economists have spilled a great deal of ink on an implication of Schum-
peter’s third empirically testable point, that ‹rm size and innovation go hand
in hand (chap. 1, this vol.). They have paid far less attention to his more over-
arching point, albeit covered in a footnote, that industrial revolutions “occur in
discrete rushes which are separated from each other by spans of comparative
quiet.” (The development process that occurs in spurts is now cited by aca-
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demics in various disciplines from science to business as “punctuated equilib-
ria.”)14 Many economists have not noticed an inherent paradox within Schum-
peter’s theory of creative destruction: Large ‹rms with the kind of market
power that comes with their domination of their markets lose their market
dominance or fail altogether because of new market entrants with new and
improved products and production methods. This is the case in spite of the fact
that new entrants are often small (by virtue of their newness and limited access
to capital because they lack proven records) and in spite of the fact that the old,
established ‹rms are supposed to be leaders in innovation, or so Schumpeter
presumed.
Consider a short list of the dramatic cases of large-‹rm failures that have
either failed, had to make market retreats, or had to reinvent themselves—
Woolworth, Sears, LTV, U.S. Steel, K-Mart, General Motors, Wang Com-
puters, Montgomery Ward, Eastern Airlines—all of which once dominated
their market categories and have since either gone out of business or seen their
market prominence collapse.
How can one reconcile what might be dubbed the “Schumpeter paradox”?
The paradox has become more perplexing with recent scholarly revelations
about the fate of so-called ‹rst movers in markets and their followers. In the
1990s, many business scholars and businesspeople resurrected the often-
repeated but untested article of business faith that ‹rst movers (the ‹rst per-
sons or companies to develop product lines) in any market had strong, strate-
gic market advantages over following rivals.15 First movers could establish
brand names and could achieve economies of scale and lower their costs from
“learning by doing,” thus erecting formidable demand and costs entry barriers
for followers. First movers could also create network effects, which could lead
to the market’s tipping toward the ‹rst mover, resulting in the ‹rst mover’s
market dominance building on itself.16
However, business professors Gerald Tellis and Peter Golder (2002) found
that in sixty of the sixty-six manufacturing industries they studied, the ‹rst
movers had, at the time of their study in the mid-1990s, long been eclipsed by
second, third, and following movers. Moreover, the ‹rst movers, if they were
still in business, generally did not then hold anything more than minor shares
of their markets.17
Wal-Mart emerged in the 1960s, when Sears was being praised for creat-
ing an “extraordinary powerhouse of a company” (McDonald 1964) founded
to a large extent on its development of “supply-chain managements”—an
inventory maintenance strategy that Wal-Mart now seems to have radically
advanced as a means of cutting costs and retail prices. Procter & Gamble and
Gillette are current market leaders in key product lines—disposable diapers
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and safety razors, respectively—but they were hardly the pioneers in their mar-
ket categories. P&G’s Pampers were introduced in the 1960s, three decades
after the ‹rst disposable diaper (Chux) was developed and sold. Similarly,
Gillette introduced its ‹rst safety razor two decades after other ‹rms had intro-
duced theirs and more than a century after the ‹rst (Tellis and Golder 2002).
How could it be that ‹rst movers so often lose their market leadership? A
complete list of the answers to that question is probably quite long. Schum-
peter and many other economists could have been wrong on their initial,
untested assessments of the relative innovativeness of established and large
‹rms (which appears to be the case; see chap. 1, this vol.). Economists might
point to the fact that markets are constantly being revolutionized and that
dominant market positions cannot be held for long, given the rapidity of the
ongoing technological advances in products and production processes—and
especially if the ‹rst movers behave like monopolies, hiking their prices and
pro‹ts and encouraging new entrants, or not concerning themselves with their
costs because of their economic pro‹t cushions. Schumpeter appears to have
been right concerning another claim embedded in his theory, that “creative
destruction” would tend to lead to what has in recent years been dubbed “ser-
ial monopolies,” perhaps because monopolies couldn’t resist behaving like
monopolies.
It could well be that although ‹rst movers have certain advantages, second
movers (or followers) have perhaps greater ones, not the least of which is not
having to identify and prove the economic viability of the market for a product
category. Second movers can re‹ne what the ‹rst movers do, both in terms of
product design and the cost of production (which appears to be how Wal-
Mart, Procter & Gamble, Dell Computers, and Microsoft, among many com-
panies, have been so successful).
We have no quibble with all these explanations, but we hasten to add
another, often overlooked line of argument, namely, that the retrenchment or
demise of ‹rms, especially ones making monopoly pro‹ts, is often (but not
always) built into their success (Christensen 1997; McKenzie and Galar 2003).
This explanation has to do with what business professor Clayton Christensen
calls the “innovator’s dilemma.” To see the market predicament of innovators,
suppose that decades ago you owned the ‹rst ‹rm to market a revolutionary
new product—say, a mainframe computer—that quickly became very
pro‹table because the product had considerable (cost-saving) value to buyers
and because you could charge (within the constraints of limit pricing) monop-
oly prices. To maximize pro‹ts from the new technology, you would then need
to develop a corporate culture and incentive system that direct the energies of
line workers and managers toward gradually re‹ning, upgrading, and exploit-
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ing the known technology. In de‹ning your ‹rm’s internal control and devel-
opment system, you determine not only what will be done in the ‹rm but also
what will not be done. In the case of your R&D work, you will likely limit the
range of researchers’ investigations, which can preclude research on other evo-
lutionary new product categories, ones that do not rely directly on your ‹rm’s
known technologies.
Of course, you could leave your business and R&D systems unconstrained,
which means that employee energies can and will be directed in any number of
directions. Your problem is that you have a known product and production
technology that are producing pro‹ts. If you left your ‹rm’s R&D unfocused
on your known product line, your employees could discover or invent the next
big product breakthrough—what would be seen in retrospect as a “disruptive
technology.” However, you may have no more idea where the disruptive tech-
nology is coming from than anyone else does, and you can waste a lot of ‹rm
resources trying to ‹nd it. Furthermore, you can, in the process, divert
resources from the exploitation of your known technology. The point of this
discussion is that for many ‹rms, the best option will be keeping the ‹rm’s
focus on the known technology and having its workers re‹ne and upgrade the
known product with the intent of mining a fairly predictable pro‹t stream. In
the process of making that strategic decision, the ‹rm can intentionally leave the
discovery and development of new, disruptive technologies to other ‹rms.
Now, it might be thought that the ‹rm in an initial dominant market posi-
tion can sit back and wait for the new technology to come on to the market and
then either buy the ‹rm that develops the product or simply copy the product.
However, when disruptive technologies ‹rst appear, it is not always clear that
they are indeed disruptive, or that they will cause the market retreat or demise
of the established dominant ‹rm and its products. After all, new products and
technologies are new. This necessarily means they are untested in terms of ini-
tial pro‹tability and long-run survivability. That is to say, no one can initially
be sure that the new products and technologies will ever be able to achieve any
pro‹ts, much less monopoly pro‹ts for as long as the dominant ‹rm has
achieved them with its existing products and technologies.
The established ‹rm is also constrained in moving off into new markets
and adopting new production technologies by its own internal culture and
incentive systems. Although the corporate culture and incentive systems may
be ef‹ciently exploiting the known product and technology, those same sys-
tems might not work so effectively in the development and exploitation of the
new products and technology. Of course, the established ‹rm might frequently
test its corporate ›exibility, but such tests can be costly and, in themselves, dis-
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ruptive in the sense that pro‹ts from known products and technologies can be
lost in the process.
We suggested earlier that a good example of the type of innovator’s
dilemma we have in mind is mainframe computers. This example is appropri-
ate because IBM was by far the most established, most prominent mainframe
computer producer in the 1970s and before. When the personal computer
emerged in the 1970s, no one—not Steve Jobs or the people at Big Blue—
knew for sure whether the personal computer would actually challenge to any
signi‹cant degree the market hegemony of the mainframe computer and
IBM’s total dominance of the mainframe market. IBM also had a tightly con-
trolled corporate culture and incentive system, all directed toward further
enhancing and selling mainframe computers and related services. IBM could
have chosen early on to explore the personal computer market, but it also may
have ‹gured that the diversion of corporate talent was a waste, given that the
personal computer might remain merely a sophisticated toy (as it was initially
seen by many industry analysts) and never a signi‹cant challenge to main-
frames in the market for business computing. IBM could also have reasoned,
rightly (given the best but limited available information at the time) that it
could sit back and wait for others to prove (or disprove) the viability of the per-
sonal computer market. Then, using its established position and brand name,
it could quickly take over the then budding personal computer market. Need-
less to say, because of its wait-and-see strategy and because it made several cru-
cial, mistaken market assessments, IBM was a fairly late mover in personal
computers and has never achieved the prominence and pro‹tability in that
computer market that it had in 1970s and before in the mainframe market.
With Dell and other personal computer companies selling circles around once
indomitable IBM, IBM sold off its personal computer units to Lenovo, a Chi-
nese personal computer manufacturer, in early 2005.
This is not to say that IBM made the wrong decision in the 1970s to hold
its corporate focus on mainframe computers. In hindsight, one can say that if
IBM had become a player in the personal computer market early on and if it
could have avoided, concomitantly, taking up any number of other lines of new
product development that could have proven to be ‹nancial dry holes (which a
less focused corporate culture could have allowed), then it could have been a
much stronger personal computer company in the 1980s and 1990s than it
became (and at one time in the early 1990s, IBM looked as though it might not
last the decade, partly because of the ›ow of red ink on its books from its per-
sonal computer business). However, those are really big ifs. Who’s to say that
IBM didn’t, from the perspective of the 1970s, make decisions that maximized
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the then present value of the company’s wealth, even if, by remaining in›exi-
ble, its decisions wound up causing the company’s retreat in the personal com-
puter market in the 1990s and early 2000s?
In other words, a company’s ultimate market retreat, if not demise, can be
part and parcel of a company’s strategy for maximizing the company’s wealth.
And this point is especially applicable to ‹rms that act like monopolies. A
monopoly that restricts production to maximize pro‹ts can reason that it can
maintain its market dominance only by trying to attract any new buyers that
move into the market and fending off new rivals with a competitive pricing
strategy. To do so, however, it might have to give up some of its economic
pro‹ts in the market for its established products and technologies. The result
could be that by always trying to survive, the company’s stockholders suffer
wealth losses.
concluding comments
Our central point in this chapter is that the creation and maintenance of
monopoly market positions, along with the attendant entry barriers however
privately devised, is as much an entrepreneurial endeavor as is the development
of new products and technologies themselves. Furthermore, monopolists have
a far greater claim of entitlement to monopoly rents (and hence consumer sur-
plus) than is suggested by static model analysis, which assumes the goods under
study into existence. This claim exists partially because, as Schumpeter recog-
nized, monopolies “largely create what they exploit,” referring to their market
positions as well as the products they produce (1942, 101).
Our point goes beyond the observation that many business scholars and
practitioners have failed to understand: ‹rm retrenchment and even demise
can be a wealth-maximizing strategy for stockholders. It is a broader point: that
the persistence of constricted production and elevated prices by monopolies on
known products and technologies, even in the face of their looming deaths, can
contribute to overall economic and market ef‹ciency. For monopolies to do
otherwise—to remain ›exible, without constraining business systems, and to
be able to move rapidly into any and all potentially new and pro‹table product
lines—carries with it notable costs and a threat to survival not recognized by
popular business gurus who pound their lecterns for corporate ›exibility,
wanting corporations to always stand ready to reengineer themselves.
By restricting production and raising prices, monopolies “misallocate”
resources, using the conventional standard of perfect competition. However, if
they constantly try to survive and play the fully competitive game by always
meeting new rivals on their terms—that is, by aping potential competitors on
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product development and prices—monopolies can also misallocate resources,
perhaps to a greater extent, by sinking ‹rm resources into a host of what we
have called ‹nancial dry holes that more than offset any gains from new prod-
ucts that prove to be disruptive to their existing markets.
Market ef‹ciency, in other words, can be enhanced in the way that Schum-
peter suggested, by the “perennial gale of creative destruction.” His key,
unheralded message encapsulated in that compact phrase was, effectively, let
monopolies be monopolies. Let the economic rents that monopolies garner be
the requisite incentives they and their potential replacements need to create
the goods and services that consumers want and that they, monopolies, exploit.
In the process, monopolies not only add to the market ef‹ciency of the
moment but also give rise to their own retrenchment and demise. These
results occur because monopoly rent, so long disparaged by economists, is
simultaneously a creative and destructive force. Economists have long mar-
veled at the market magic of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” But many don’t
seem to understand that the visible grip of monopolies on markets in the short
run is an important source of the market’s long-run magic.
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Chapter 10
Property and Monopoly
For legal scholars, property rights is a muddled and, hence,
highly contentious legal construct. For economists, private property is a far
more straightforward concept: It is any bundle of limited (and incomplete)
rights that de‹ne what a person can do with a physical thing (e.g., a car or an
acre of land) or a nonphysical thing (e.g., a piece of copyrighted music,
patented formula, or trademarked insignia).1 Market exchanges are founded
on trades that modern economists now readily see not so much as exchanges
of things but as exchanges of the various bundles of rights that the trading
parties have.
The exchange value of property, accordingly, will vary with the array of
rights in the property bundle. If the use rights of land are obstructed by gov-
ernment regulation, the market value of the property can fall. If the copyright
term for books is increased, the market value of many (but hardly all) books can
be expected to rise.2
At the same time, one of the longer standing, more persistent claims and
criticisms of markets, repeated frequently by economists and political theo-
rists, is that property—especially landed and copyrighted property—amounts
to a monopoly grant (albeit circumscribed to one degree or another) that is
protected by state enforcement. This line of argument implies that, to one
degree or another, property ownership gives rise to a market inef‹ciency as
property owners exploit their monopoly rights to hike their prices and garner
monopoly pro‹ts, indeed, for some, the equivalent of theft.
We argue that the presumption that a system of private property rights,
including copyrights and patents, is tantamount to theft is founded on a con-
fused understanding of monopoly. Indeed, as is well known among econo-
mists, private property rights have the effect, on balance, of expanding pro-
duction and human welfare, which is hardly the expected outcome from a
system of monopolies that emerges from a property rights regime. Clearly,
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property owners can often (but certainly not always) garner economic pro‹ts
(or pro‹ts above competitive levels), but such above-competitive pro‹ts should
be expected, as well as applauded, when markets are extended. We submit that
a worthy distinction should and can be made between economic pro‹ts and
monopoly rents. That is, not all economic pro‹ts should be construed as monop-
oly rents. The former emerges from an improvement in the allocation of
resources that, in turn, emerges from expanded trade. The latter results from
restricted trade. However, before these points can be developed, we need to
revisit economists’ and political philosophers’ views on private property.
property rent as monopoly theft
The early founders of the discipline of economics—namely, Adam Smith,
David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus—viewed private property in land as a
form of monopoly that invariably (in the words of Malthus) “bears a monopoly
price” (1798, chap. 17, ¶ 10), which, in the thinking of Ricardo, “is at the very
highest price at which the consumers are willing to purchase it” and “is
nowhere regulated by the cost of production” (1817, chap. 17, ¶ 8; see also
chap. 1, this vol.). The implication is clear: The return on land is a form of
rent—more accurately, monopoly rent—that is unearned and derived from
whatever god-given qualities the soil has and whatever market price landown-
ers can extract for the natural qualities of the soil. That is to say, monopoly
rent does not affect price but rather is a residual payment, meaning that which
is left over from revenues after all market-determined payments to all inputs
(other than the landed property) are deducted from ‹rm revenues. Hence, tax-
ing away the monopoly rents would leave the monopoly price unchanged, or in
the words of Ricardo, “If all rent were relinquished by landlords, I am of the
opinion, that the commodities produced on the land would be no cheaper,
because there is always a portion of the same commodities produced on land,
for which no rent is or can be paid, as the surplus produce is only suf‹cient to
pay the pro‹ts of stock” (1821, chap. 20, ¶ 12). 
During the ‹rst half of the nineteenth century, the tie between property
and monopoly seemed to come often from reverse reasoning: Monopoly rent
is any return to an input such as land that is unearned (not a consequence of a
person’s labor) and, therefore, is not morally or economically justi‹ed. Land
earns rent. Accordingly, landed property amounts to a form of legalized
“theft,” according to socialist-anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–65).3
Any input that earns a return above opportunity cost—that is, earns a monop-
oly rent or economic pro‹t—must be a monopoly (of some degree). Hence,
monopoly is no less than a form of legalized theft, which justi‹ed various pro-
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posed plans to redistribute income from the “rich” (property owners) to the
“poor” (workers).
John Ramsey McCulloch (1789–1864), British economist and author of
Principles of Political Economy, wrote, “What is properly termed Rent is the sum
paid for the use of the natural and inherent powers of the soil. It is entirely distinct
from the sum paid for the use of buildings, enclosures, roads, or other
improvements. Rent is, then, always a monopoly.”4 Clement Joseph Garnier
(1813–81), a French economist and commentator on Adam Smith, clari‹ed the
distinction between monopoly rent and other forms of compensation.
Rent paid to the landowner is fundamentally different from the payments
made to the workman for his labor or to the entrepreneur as pro‹t on the
outlays made by him, in that these two types of payment represent com-
pensation, to the one for pains taken, to the other for sacri‹ces or risks he
has borne, whereas the landowner receives rent more gratuitously and
merely by virtue of a legal convention that guarantees to certain individuals the
right to landed property.5
The conceptual linkage between landed property and monopoly was
widely believed to be so tight—a virtual truism—during the ‹rst half of the
nineteenth century that French economic journalist Frédéric Bastiat (1801–50)
devoted much ink to uncovering (if not ridiculing) what he thought were gross
errors in the logic underlying the claims: “The theorists ‹rst characterized
property so understood as a necessary monopoly, then merely as a monopoly, then
as injustice, and ‹nally as theft” (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 10; emphasis in the original).
At the same time, Bastiat acknowledged that the “theorists” he quotes often
and at length (1850, chap. 9) saw property-based monopolies as “necessary
evils.” Bastiat quoted Garnier (as well as others): “In short, it is apparently
admitted by political economists [alas! yes, and herein lies the evil!] that prop-
erty does not stem from divine rights, or rights of demesne, or from any other
theoretical rights, but simply from its practical advantages. It is merely a monop-
oly that is tolerated in the interest of all, etc.” (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 72;emphasis in the
original, with interjection by Bastiat). Bastiat adds, “I believe that I have
suf‹ciently proved that the economists, having started from the false assump-
tion that the forces of Nature possess or create value, went on to the conclusion that
private property (in so far as it appropriates and charges for this value that is
independent of all human services) is a privilege, a monopoly, a usurpation, but
a necessary privilege that must be maintained” (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 74).
Bastiat struggled to identify the inconsistency in claims surrounding pri-
vate property. On the one hand, according to “socialists,” landed property
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amounts to a “monopoly,” which is socially “bad” because it allows the owners
to usurp a part of a good’s value without any justi‹ed claim of having created
the value usurped. Private ownership of property is the moral equivalent of
“cannibalism,” “war,” “slavery,” “privilege,” “fraud,” and “plunder” (1850,
chap. 8, ¶ 8). Nevertheless, the institution of landed property is maintained
because property has a distinct economic advantage: It gives rise to an expan-
sion of output beyond what could be had in the absence of assigned property
rights. This gain outweighs any harm done by the monopoly’s usurpation of a
return above that which is required to keep the property employed where it is.
Bastiat attacked the inconsistency in two ways. First, he denied that nature
is the source of value. Rather, he asserted:
You [landed property owners] have not misappropriated the gifts of God.
You have received them gratis from the hand of Nature, it is true; but you
have also passed them on gratis to your fellow men and have withheld
nothing. They have acted similarly toward you, and all that has passed
between you has been compensation for mental or physical effort, for sweat
and toil expended, for dangers faced, for skills contributed, for sacri‹ces
made, for pains taken, for services rendered and received. You thought only of
yourselves, perhaps, but even your own self-interest has become in the
hands of an in‹nitely wise and all-seeing Providence an instrument for
making greater abundance available to all men; for, had it not been for your
efforts, all the useful effects that Nature at your command has transmitted
without payment among men would have remained eternally dormant. I
say, without payment; for the payment you received was only the simple
return to you of the efforts you had expended, and not at all a price levied
on the gifts of God. Live, then, in peace, without fear and without qualms.
You have no other property in the world save your claim to services due
you for services that you have fairly rendered, and that your fellow men
have voluntarily accepted. This property of yours is legitimate, unassail-
able; no utopia can prevail against it, for it is part and parcel of our very
nature. No new ideology will ever shake its foundations or wither its roots.
(1850, chap. 8, ¶ 5)
A chapter later, Bastiat took on the particular claims that property and monop-
oly are much the same construct.
Economists, you declare: “Rent is what is paid to the landowner for the use
of the productive and indestructible powers of the soil.”
I answer: No. Rent is what is paid the water carrier for the pains he took
to make his cart and his wheels, and the water would cost more if he carried
it on his back. In the same manner, wheat, ›ax, wool, wood, meat, fruit
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would cost us more if the landowner had not improved the instrument that
produces them.
Socialists, you say: “Originally the masses enjoyed their right to the land
subject to their labor. Now they are excluded and robbed of their natural
heritage.”
I reply: No, they are not excluded or robbed; they do enjoy gratis the
utility that the land has produced, subject to their labor, that is, on condi-
tion that they pay by their own labor those who spare them labor.
Egalitarians, you say: “The monopoly of the landowner consists in the fact
that, while he did not make the means of production, he charges for its ser-
vice.”
I answer: No, the land as a means of production, in so far as it is the work
of God, produces utility, and this utility is gratuitous; it is not within the
owner’s power to charge for it. The land, as a means of production, in so far
as the landowner has prepared it, worked on it, enclosed it, drained it,
improved it, added other necessary implements to it, produces value, which
represents human services made available, and this is the only thing he
charges for. Either you must recognize the justice of this demand, or you
must reject your own principle of reciprocal services. (1850, chap. 9, ¶¶
106–11)
Second, Bastiat pointed out that competition among producers would
eliminate any unearned return that is a “gratuitous gift” of Nature. He sug-
gested that a part of the problem in understanding the social role of private
property is that the gains to all, not just the property owners, are obscured by
their ubiquity.
How many times, when considering the phenomena of the social order,
have I not had cause to appreciate how profoundly right Rousseau was
when he said, “It takes a great deal of scienti‹c insight to observe what we
see every day”! Thus it is that habit, that veil which is spread before the eyes
of the ordinary man, which even the attentive observer does not always suc-
ceed in casting aside, prevents us from seeing the most marvelous of all
social phenomena: real wealth constantly passing from the domain of pri-
vate property into the communal domain. (1850, chap. 8, ¶ 40)
Later, Bastiat elaborates, “Fortunately, I maintain, the landowner can no
more charge for the services of the land than for the wind’s or the sun’s,” to
which he adds in a paragraph that is inset in his text to add emphasis,
The earth is a wondrous chemical workshop wherein many materials and
elements are mixed together and worked on, and ‹nally come forth as
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grain, fruit, ›ax, etc. Nature has presented this vast workshop to man as a
gratuitous gift, and has divided it into many compartments suitable for
many different kinds of production. But certain men have come forth, have
laid hands on these things, and have declared: This compartment belongs
to me; that one also; all that comes from it will be my exclusive property.
And, amazingly enough, this usurpation of privilege, far from being disas-
trous to society, has turned out to be advantageous. (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 57)
Third, Bastiat mocks those whose argument reduces to a syllogism built
around the following embedded premises and conclusions.
• Major Premise: Landed property (and the contribution of land to output)
is not created by people’s labor. The value of property comes from God,
not anything people do.
Minor Premise: Monopoly, which is characterized by unearned
income for owners, reduces to a form of theft.
Minor Premise: The return on land, rent, is unearned, a “usurpa-
tion” of value that should go to all, not just the property owners.
• Major Conclusion: Landed property amounts to a monopoly.
Minor Conclusion: Private property is a form of theft.
Minor Conclusion: Private property is still good for all because
there is no better way to ensure the ef‹cient use of resources,
which makes property a “necessary evil.”
• Major Conclusion: The redistribution of monopoly rents is justi‹ed (with
the implication that taxation of monopoly rents is not theft).
To this line of argument, Bastiat sarcastically quipped,
Taken literally, the famous formula, property is theft, is therefore absurdity
raised to the nth degree. It would be no less outlandish to say that theft is
property; that what is legal is illegal; that what is, is not, etc. It is probable
that the author of this bizarre aphorism merely desired to catch people’s
attention with a striking paradox, and that what he really meant to state was
this: Certain men succeed in getting paid not only for the work that they do
but also for the work that they do not do, appropriating to themselves alone
God’s gifts, gratuitous utility, the common possession of all. But in that
case it would ‹rst be necessary to prove the statement, and then to say:
Theft is theft. (1850, chap. 8, ¶ 29)
the property-monopoly equivalence
We wish at this point that we could say that Bastiat got the best of the propo-
nents of what we choose to dub the Proudhon view of property as a form of
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monopoly and theft. Unfortunately, that is hardly the case. Karl Marx
(1818–83) founded the communist movement on the Proudhon view of prop-
erty, which alone, apart from Marx’s theory of the surplus value of production,
served as a “just” foundation for the state’s appropriation of all private prop-
erty.
Moreover, the Proudhon view is seductive, even for more modern and con-
temporary economists who can, and have, extended its application beyond
landed property to all capital, physical and nonphysical. Private property is a
set of rights, including the right to vary the use of whatever is owned and to
exclude others from its use. This means that private property owners can
potentially vary market supply of whatever can be produced by the owned
property. Because entry costs, to one extent or another, abound everywhere in
real-world markets, property rights bestow on owners a measure of monopoly
power that, in turn, can enable owners to extract some amount of monopoly
rents from the products that are bought and sold.
Indeed, the economic and political case for copyrights and patents has his-
torically been founded on the presumption that such property (nonphysical or
intellectual) rights would provide people with suf‹cient monopoly powers that
the creation of new things (books, pieces of music, movies, brands, and soft-
ware) would be encouraged. Without monopoly protection, the development
of new things (as well as the improvement of old things) could easily be subop-
timal, given the ease with which innovations could be replicated by new ‹rms
that would not have to cover the cost of development. Hence, the price that
could be charged by the innovator might, in the absence of copyrights and
patents, not be suf‹cient to cover all costs, including the innovator’s develop-
ment costs.
The late economist Frank Knight (1885–1972) clearly understood that the
classical economists (including Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo) had confused
land rent, founded on the natural scarcity of a resource, with monopoly rent,
founded on a ‹rm’s control of supply.
Monopoly is usually de‹ned as the control of the supply of a commodity. A
common but disastrous error is the confusion of control with natural limi-
tation of supply. We need not pause longer than to characterize as a serious
misuse of words the denomination of land rent, for example, as a monopoly
income. Even J. S. Mill fell into the error of de‹ning monopoly as limita-
tion, and it is exempli‹ed in its extreme form by Mr. F. B. Hawley, who vir-
tually calls all income due to the “scarcity” of any productive resource a
monopoly return. Now, as all income, from the distributive standpoint, is
dependent on the scarcity of the agents which produce it, and all in exactly
the same way, the meaninglessness of such a description is apparent. And of
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course the same applies to “scarcity income” in general, whether called
monopoly gain or not. There is under free competition no other sort of
income, qualitatively or quantitatively, and the designation neither distin-
guishes or in any signi‹cant way describes anything. (1921, pt. 2, chap. 6, 
¶ 14)
At the same time, Knight accepted somewhat uneasily the monopoly case for
copyrights and patents.
The case of investment in invention is different again. Here, owing to the
low cost of inde‹nitely multiplying an idea, it is usually dif‹cult to capital-
ize an increase in productive power. Society generally permits an inventor
or his assigns to keep his idea secret as long as possible or to safeguard it in
any manner. But this is so commonly impracticable and the social value of
new inventions so manifest that the patent system has come into general
use establishing and protecting by law a temporary, and rather short-lived,
property right in the improvement. (1921, pt. 3, chap. 12, ¶ 43)
Knight recognized that the copyright/patent systems were an “exceedingly
crude” way of rewarding creators of new goods and services, partly because of
the effects of the monopoly price, but also partly because the true innovators
are not always the bene‹ciaries of the monopoly grants implied in copyrights
and patents—points that the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises also
understood.6
copyrights as monopoly abuse
A host of contemporary economic and legal scholars have adopted the monop-
oly case for copyrights and patents, all with a measure of reservation about pro-
viding such legal protection, which reveals an underlying philosophical con›ict
on the monopoly grants. On the one hand, copyrights (and patents) are viewed
as being needed to spur innovations. Indeed, to spur innovations and new
works, the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”
(article 1, section 8; emphasis added).
On the other hand, through the grant of “the exclusive Right,” copyrights
grant (so the argument is extended) a form of monopoly power, meaning the
power to limit output and hike prices and economic pro‹ts. The presumption
is that the grant curbs ef‹ciency in the allocation of resources and goods.
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer starts his essay on the “uneasy case” for
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copyright (written before he was appointed to the Supreme Court) by quoting
approvingly Thomas Babington Macaulay’s often-quoted quip made in debate
over a proposed increase in British copyright term before the House of Com-
mons in 1841: Copyright is equivalent to “a tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers” (Breyer 1970, 281).7 Breyer then suggests that there
are two possible foundations for copyright, moral and economic. The moral
arguments, Breyer maintains, revolve around the claim that authors are due
what they produce. As Breyer suggests, perhaps the moral foundation of a per-
son’s right to the income of that which the person creates is (and need be) no
more sophisticated than the theory of property captured in the sixth century by
King Diarmed of Ireland, who quipped, “To every cow its calf.” Alternatively,
a French lawyer reasoned in the sixteenth century, “The heavens and the earth
belong to [God], because they are the work of his word. . . . So the author of a
book is its complete master, and as such can dispose of it as he chooses” (Breyer
1970, 284–85). Breyer dismisses the moral case for copyright on (at least) ‹ve
identi‹ed grounds.
• First, taking something of a Marxian position on the distribution of
income, Breyer writes, “few workers receive salaries that approach the
total value of what they produce,” but no one is arguing that workers’
labor should be restricted just so that workers can receive more of the
surplus value they generate (285).
• Second, “it is not apparent that the producer has any stronger claim to
the surplus than the consumer or that the author’s claim is any stronger
than that of other workers.” He questions why the author’s claim to
above-competitive prices is stronger than a bookseller’s (286).
• Third, copyright “rewards the wrong works,” because it favors those that
sell well, not those works that are “serious and important” (for example,
scholarly books), that are “notoriously in need of funds” (287).
• Fourth, “intellectual creation” is a radically different thing than “land
and chattels.” The latter are subject to “congestion” (or are, in econo-
mists’ jargon, rivalrous in consumption). Ideas, on the other hand, are
in‹nitely divisible, which means they are nonrivalrous in consumption
and are not subject to congestion (288–89).
• Fifth, as Immanuel Kant suggested, created works need protection
because otherwise the works might be misinterpreted or garbled by
“copiers.” Breyer’s response is, “One might quarrel with Kant’s argu-
ments, for the fact that unauthorized copying may sometimes interfere
with an author’s personal interests does not show that it always (or even
often) will do so” (290; emphasis in the original).
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Breyer concludes that because “none of the noneconomic goals served by
copyright law seems an adequate justi‹cation for a copyright system,” any
justi‹cation for a copyright system must rest on economic arguments. An eco-
nomic case for copyright protection must start with the cost advantage that
copiers have over original publishers.8 The case to be made for copyright must
therefore rest on the claim that original publishers—and authors—need the
legal entry barriers embedded in copyrights so that they can restrict sale and
charge monopoly prices in order that they can cover their development costs.
Still, Breyer maintains that the case for copyright remains “uneasy,” because
original publishers have the advantage of being ‹rst to market and can cover
potential market sales before copiers have a chance to get their lower-priced
copies to market (1970, 299–302). (Perhaps Breyer would revise his assessment
somewhat today, given the advent of digital goods with pirated copies of music
CDs and movie DVDs.)
Furthermore, Breyer notes, publishers have market solutions that don’t
involve copyrights available to them. In the absence of copyright, original pub-
lishers can negotiate with buyer groups (e.g., book clubs or major booksellers),
with the buyer groups agreeing before a book is published to buy speci‹ed
quantities of initial print runs. Through such prepublication orders, original
publishers can cover their development costs without copyright protection.
Granted, as Breyer acknowledges, these negotiations can be costly. How-
ever, forcing publishers to incur such transaction costs can be an improvement
over forcing consumers to pay monopoly prices. In addition, in the absence of
copyrights, people who would like to use published works would not have to
incur the transaction costs involved in obtaining permission to use copyrighted
work (1970, 302–8).
We cover the particulars of Breyer’s argument partly because they are
interesting (and they represented, at the time his article was ‹rst published,
new thinking on copyright laws). However, our main purpose in covering the
particulars is to bring to light the economic foundation of his “uneasy case” for
(but, really, mainly against) an extension of the copyright term: Copyrights, as
a form of property right, endow holders with monopoly grants, meaning the
market power to restrict sales and to charge higher-than-competitive prices to
build authors’ and publishers’ monopoly rents. If the social consequences are,
inevitably, an inef‹ciency in the allocation of scarce resources, any extension of
the term will almost surely magnify the market inef‹ciency. This underlying
theory of monopoly is self-evident in Breyer’s central conclusion: “Removing
copyright protection should induce competition in the production and sale of
relatively high-volume titles” (1970, 313). The result would be, according to
Breyer, lower prices and greater sales, maybe not in academic books, but cer-
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tainly in trade books and textbooks that Breyer asserts (without reporting evi-
dence or citing sources) garner monopoly returns. Hence, Breyer concludes
that “the period of copyright protection is at present [1970] too long and
should not be extended beyond ‹fty-six years” (although the copyright period
was extended in 1976 to the author’s life plus seventy years).
This common view of the monopoly consequences of copyright (and
patents) captured with some scholarly force by Breyer has been picked up and
extended more recently by Lawrence Lessig, who starts his analysis by making
the tie between copyright and monopoly explicit: “The [copyright] law creates
this ‘exclusive right’—a.k.a. monopoly right—to help solve a problem that
exists with creative information” (Lessig 2001, 58). He acknowledges (as did
Breyer) that while copyright protection may be required to get works created,
the protection should be limited because copyright represents a monopoly
grant that can be counted to exact monopoly consequences drawn from static
modeling. However, since the country was founded, the copyright term has
been extended ‹fteen times, with eleven of the extensions being passed during
the last four decades of the twentieth century (Lessig 2001).9 The maximum
copyright term in the United States was set at twenty-eight years (fourteen
years for the original copyright with a fourteen-year renewal, provided that the
author survived the ‹rst term) when the original copyright act was passed in
1790. The maximum term went to forty-two years in 1831, to ‹fty-six years in
1909, to seventy years in 1974, to life plus seventy years in 1976, to life plus
ninety years in 1998 (Ochoa 2002, 26–51).
In addition, the coverage of copyright protection has been expanded in a
variety of ways, most notably the following.
• Early in the history of the country (1790–99), only 4 percent of all book
titles published were copyrighted. Now, all titles are copyrighted with-
out the authors even having to go to the trouble of registering their
works (Lessig 2001, 106–7).
• Before the turn of the twentieth century, all foreign books released in
U.S. markets were not copyrighted. Now, they are (106).
• In the not-too-distant past, original artists could not control the use of
components (for example, musical phrases) of their works. Now, because
of a series of court cases favorable to the original artists and their heirs,
use of components can require permission (109).
• When cable television began, cable companies could use the signals of
the television network without charge. Now, the networks have rights of
denial of use (109–10).
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• Napster, the Internet company that facilitated peer-to-peer swapping of
music ‹les that emerged and rapidly expanded in the late 1990s, has been
effectively shut down by the courts, which has reduced the ability of con-
sumers to share their digital ‹les with others without payment and has
restricted the ability of many artists who don’t care about royalty pay-
ments to have their works broadly disseminated (131). 
• The “fair-use doctrine,” which allows for personal (not commercial)
reproductions of copyrighted works, has been constricted in several
ways. For instance, copyrighted posters (and other reproduced art
works) that buyers can display in their homes for others to see under the
fair-use doctrine cannot be displayed on Web sites (181).
• The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 makes it illegal for pro-
grammers to crack the code included in digital recordings of books,
music, movies, and software to prevent copying. This means that con-
sumers are prevented from making copies for personal use, a further
tightening of the domain of fair use (190).
The problem Lessig seeks to highlight is not only that copyright invariably
translates into a monopoly right, giving rise to market inef‹ciencies due to
constricted sales of the copyrighted works, but also to a more important con-
striction in the evolution of ideas, which, Lessig maintains, ultimately drives
upward a country’s economic, social, and political development through time.
The evolution of ideas is dependent upon the growth in the “idea commons,”
or all of those ideas contained in works that fall into the public domain and that
can be drawn on and employed productively, without permission or charge, by
authors and artists who follow. However, with the greater coverage of copy-
right, the idea commons (whether communicated through books, scholarly
research and articles, performances, or the Internet) can no longer grow freely
and in unanticipated but innovative ways as it once could. Supposedly, the
greater coverage of copyright hasn’t totally prohibited the use of many created
works, but, according to Lessig, the greater coverage certainly has increased
the transaction costs involved in the use of many works, given the variety of
permissions that must be sought and the copyright fees that must be paid. The
trend in growth in control of intellectual property rights is clearly in the wrong
direction, according to Lessig. Hence, he argues that many ideas that would
have been advanced will likely not be advanced, mainly because of the greater
transaction costs of making use of ideas that remain private property under an
endlessly increasing copyright period.
In summary, Lessig begins his argument for curbs on the growth of control
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by acknowledging the potential validity of the “tragedy of the commons” as the
foundation for the establishment of private property rights. When property is
held in common, no one is able to prevent anyone else from using a given
property—for example, a pasture—and the property will tend to be overused
because the people who use it do not bear the full cost of use. In the case of the
pasture, ranchers will continue to put cattle on the pasture until the grass is
grazed to the nub and all cattle end up thinner than they could be. In the words
of biologist Garrett Hardin, who paints the tragedy in bleak terms, populariz-
ing the construct in the process.
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him
to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest
in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in the
commons brings ruin to all. (1968, 1243)
Lessig goes on to argue that academics and policymakers have become too
enraptured by the eloquence of the logic underlying the tragedy of the com-
mons and have, accordingly, sought the contraction, if not elimination, of all
commons by expanding the range of private property rights, including copy-
rights—all without due recognition for having some property, those resources
and products, such as ideas, that are nonrivalrous in consumption, held in com-
mon. He suggests that copyright (and patents) can be useful to bring creative
works into existence, but that means that the rights under copyright need to be
strictly limited both in length of term and of coverage so that copyrights do not
allow for long-term monopoly rights. After all, anyone’s use of an idea that has
been created does not diminish the availability of that idea to anyone else.
Ideas are categorically different from the grass on Hardin’s pasture.
Drawing on the work of others (Heller 1998; Buchanan and Yoon 2000),
Lessig then adds to the discussion of intellectual property rights an additional
(potential) form of market inef‹ciency due to the extension of copyrights: the
“tragedy of the innovation commons.” More generally, this “tragedy” (which,
strictly speaking, implies only a misallocation of resources) has been dubbed by
Heller (1998) the “tragedy of the anticommons”—signaling a sharp contrast
with the “tragedy of the commons”—because resources go underutilized
attributable to the elevated transaction costs associated with privatization.10
Lessig draws a variety of policy conclusions that condense to proposed curbs
on copyrights to avert any emerging tragedy of the anticommons and to
expand the competition of ideas, which can enhance market ef‹ciency, both in
the short and the long run.
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property in proper context
The discussion to this point reduces to the claim that private property in many,
if not all, its various forms amounts to a monopoly grant, a claim that has
signi‹cant consequences: Because of the monopoly grants, output is less than
it could be. Prices are higher than they would otherwise be. And property own-
ers are able to extract monopoly rents that are unearned and amount to a form
of theft. The extensive literature on copyrights (and patents)—including the
works that Breyer and Lessig covered—is replete with such empirical predic-
tions regarding the consequences of copyright term extensions. Interestingly,
this literature is equally devoid of empirical tests.11 The empirical void in the
copyright term literature should be of some concern to economic and legal
scholars, if for no other reason than that casual empiricism raises doubts about
the credibility of contentions that extending the copyright term necessarily has
counterproductive effects.12
Filling the void of empirical work on the exact effects of changing the
copyright law is not our purpose. Our purpose is limited to challenging the
underlying conceptual framework for the monopoly predictions. In passing,
however, we might note that our (casual) empirical evidence may be at odds
with the predictions of the critics of copyright for several reasons, not the least
of which could be that the growing copyright term and coverage over the last
two hundred-plus years may not necessarily translate into an equivalent
growth in the effective market protection of authors and publishers. Authors
and publishers in 1790 were protected to a degree by the maximum twenty-
eight-year copyright term, but they were also protected, perhaps to a much
greater degree, from competition by the sheer cost that copiers had to incur to
bring their copies to market. The costs of printing and distribution of books
(especially in electronic form) in contemporary times is far lower than in colo-
nial times. Hence, a copyright term of a hundred or more years today may (or
may not) have any more of an incentive and wealth effect than did a copyright
term of twenty-eight years at the turn of the nineteenth century. Understand-
ably, critics of extending the copyright term rarely, if ever, acknowledge this
point, and for good reason: It undermines their case for turning down any
extension.
We fully understand that the length of the copyright term is only one of a
number of key variables affecting the annual counts of book titles and copies
sold, as well as the ‹nancial conditions of publishers. Our point is that the
credibility of the claims of critics of copyright term extensions, founded as they
are in static monopoly theory, is suspect. Perhaps copyrights in particular, and
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property rights in general, set up economic dynamics through time that result
in net economic gains that are not captured by static models that are at the
foundation of claims that property represents monopoly grants.
We suggest that claims about the monopoly consequences of property
rights, including copyrights, re›ect a fundamental confusion over the nature of
a monopoly and the role of property in a market economy. At one level, the
confusion has a political source: Opponents of markets, such as Proudhon,
have had an interest in denigrating market institutions, one of the more promi-
nent being private property. Monopoly is obviously “bad” because of its perni-
cious impact on prices, unearned rents, and allocative ef‹ciency. By juxtapos-
ing forms of property with discussions of monopoly as seen from static models,
the supposed badness of monopoly is transferred to property, with the sugges-
tion that private property and monopoly should be curbed for much the same
reasons.
The confusion can also be traced to the inevitable choice of words in
describing private property, which endows owners with varying degrees of
exclusivity in control over the use of whatever physical or nonphysical thing is
owned. The words “exclusivity” and “control” suggest that owners have an
ability to restrict the use of the property, which in turn can affect the price and
return that can be garnered from the property. Hence, “property” might
understandably be equated with “monopoly,” because “monopoly” also
implies sole ownership of a market with the powers of manipulating the mar-
ket price and return to the detriment of consumers. We noted how Lessig
assumes that “exclusive control” necessarily implies “monopoly right.”
We suggest, however, that the confusion has a more fundamental source in
theorists’ analytical tunnel vision. Analysts both past and present look at par-
ticular properties in the context of a functioning market economy, often with-
out reference to the circumstances that gave rise to the system of property
rights in the ‹rst place. In such a narrow context, ownership of land can under-
standably be seen as giving rise to restricted crops and higher prices and pro‹ts
for landowners. A copyright means that no one other than the original pub-
lisher can print copies of copyrighted works. In the narrow context of a given
published work for a given market, copyright can also lead to a constricted
market with higher prices and pro‹ts for the given titles being treated as hav-
ing separate markets. Both sets of property rights, land and copyrighted titles,
can be destructive of welfare because they induce an inef‹cient allocation of
resources—or so goes the thinking in such narrow analytical settings.
However, such deductions do not emerge from a less constricted percep-
tion of property rights. Consider again a state of common ownership. As
Hardin (1968) correctly stressed, communal ownership can lead to its own
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tragedy, an overuse, misuse, and abuse of resources because of the absence of
exclusivity, or, more to the point, the absence of owners’ or users’ ability to
exclude all others. The case for private property is built on the presumption
that when rights to exclude are assigned to individuals (or ‹rms), there will be
an improvement in the use of the resources. This follows because the owners
will then bear a cost (in terms of the depreciation of the market value of the
property) if the property is overused, misused, or abused. Because the property
is treated with greater care, more resources will, in effect, be available to the
extent that resources are not destroyed. This means there can be more, not
fewer, goods on the market (and greater quantities of the greater count of
goods).
With private control rights, owners have an enhanced incentive to utilize
the local information at their disposal on how best to use and/or redeploy their
assigned property. The value of the property can rise with the more effective
employment of the property along with the value of the goods that are pro-
duced. This implies a greater real income for consumers in the form of greater
goods production. Although the nominal prices of goods might or might not
rise, their real prices are bound to fall with the more ef‹cient employment of
resources held as private property. This is especially true if property rights
(particularly patents and copyrights) give rise to the creation, invention, or dis-
covery of new things—new property—due to the incentives built in to the
property regime. This is the case because people can capture the value of their
efforts in the market value of the property that they create, invent, and dis-
cover. Today critically important new property can literally be created from a
resource that amounts to thin air, 1s and 0s or electrons, and good ideas that,
of course, often require alertness and due diligence.
Moreover, the assignment of property rights can give rise to trades, with
the property assignments being recon‹gured through trades so that the own-
ers who can get the most value from the property will, after the trades have
been consummated, have control of the relevant property rights. To the extent
that markets expand, property can give rise to the bene‹ts of greater special-
ization, much heralded by Adam Smith, which implies increasing returns to
the scale (size and scope) of markets. If we give people property rights to that
which they create, say, through copyrights, an expansion of property can occur
beyond what would otherwise exist, and the greater property can expand the
markets, and the bene‹ts of markets, even further. Again, people’s real
incomes should be expected to expand.13
In summary, seen from this perspective, instead of constricting markets,
property rights can expand them, with ef‹ciency in the allocation of resources
enhanced in the process. We ‹nd it dif‹cult to appreciate how anyone can,
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under such outcomes, associate the “good” of property with the “bad” of
monopoly, even if the association is purely semantic with due recognition to
the prospects of “good monopolies,” a mistake that can only extend the confu-
sion of both the roles of property and monopolies in market economies.14
“good” and “bad” monopolies
We would readily concede that property in general and copyright in particular
may in given instances of the rights assignment lead to all the negative conse-
quences of monopoly that critics stress. For example, for the sake of argument
only, we might agree with critics of property rights and copyrights that the
novelist John Grisham, the heirs of the late composer George Gershwin, and
the software developer and chairman of Microsoft, Bill Gates, may be such
dominant forces in their respective markets that they are capable of
signi‹cantly curbing their sales and charging prices that are far removed from
competitive levels and, hence, can impose a nontrivial degree of inef‹ciency on
the economy. However, such isolated examples of true monopolies’ conse-
quences (if they are that) hardly make a case against property right and copy-
right institutions as critical components of a market system. The analytical
mistake made is transparent: No system (designed to reduce the constraints of
scarcity) will ever be perfect. There are often unavoidable problems or costs
(or instances of inef‹ciency) with all institutions that are adopted because of
their impact over a broad range of consequences. The critical question in judg-
ing property rights or copyright rights as institutions of markets is how those
institutions perform on balance, given a full assessment of both the gains and the
costs.
Even (supposedly) “bad” monopolies can be more than offset by a greater
number and presence of “good” monopolies, as discussed earlier. Further-
more, we hasten to remind readers of a simple but crucial point: “Bad” monop-
olies can inspire the creation, invention, and discovery, as well as the develop-
ment, of a plethora of other products in other markets that add more to
consumer welfare than the “bad” monopolies deduct. This is because any
monopoly rents garnered by the “bad” monopolies can be the requisite incen-
tive that others need to take the risks of failure and to innovate in markets that
are far-removed, as well as adjacent, to the markets that are monopolized.
Indeed, in the absence of some property holders garnering monopoly rents,
property rights and copyrights would lose their incentive advantage, which is
their raison d’être.
Admittedly, the assignment of property rights and copyrights is a practical
matter with practical (consumer and producer welfare) ends in mind. This
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means they can be taken too far. As Lessig explicitly argues, an unthinking
effort to privatize all “commons,” because of potential tragedies of the com-
mons, can (conceptually, if not actually) give rise to tragedies of anticommons.
The prospect of anticommons tragedies might suggest that the presence of
commons tragedies could be optimal (given that worse problems from ubiqui-
tous property can be imagined). As Breyer and Lessig implicitly suggest, there
is some optimum copyright term. We readily make such concessions because
we have a larger point in mind, one that is consistent with the Schumpeterian
theme of this volume: Market institutions, whether property rights or copy-
rights (or patents), must be judged not by the prevalence of supposed “monop-
olies” (narrowly de‹ned by their assigned exclusive rights to use physical and
nonphysical things) but by what happens more broadly in the economy over
time. These market institutions should be extended as long as they increase
human welfare. Granted, Breyer and Lessig have tried to make the case that
the copyright term and coverage should be curbed because the association of
copyright with monopoly necessarily implies a loss of human welfare. Our
point is that the association has been wrongly drawn. Even if the association is
proper, the consequence could just as easily be an expansion of human wel-
fare—because of the enacted potential for economic pro‹ts.
monopoly profits versus economic profits
As a matter of analytical habit, economists associate any pro‹ts a ‹rm makes
over and above normal pro‹ts with monopoly rents or, which is assumed to be
the same thing, economic pro‹ts. Reversing the analytics, evidence of eco-
nomic pro‹ts or monopoly rents suggests the presence of ‹rms with market
power, or the ability of ‹rms to restrict output to raise their prices above com-
petitive levels. Economic pro‹ts are, accordingly, prima facie evidence of
accompanying market failures.
From our perspective, a useful distinction needs to be drawn between eco-
nomic pro‹t and monopoly rent. The latter emerges when ‹rms constrict their
production due to a reduction in the competitiveness of their markets. The
former emerges when ‹rms ‹nd ways, through the deployment or redeploy-
ment of their property rights, to expand their production levels. The former—
economic pro‹ts—are the carrots that cause ‹rms to do more than they other-
wise would. Economic pro‹ts are ‹rms’ part of the gains from mutually
bene‹cial gains from greater trades that are associated with expanded markets
(and that emerge because of the increasing returns to scale of markets). They
give rise to more ‹rms doing more, not less. The mere prospect, if not realiza-
tion, of economic pro‹ts leads to more, not less, competition than would oth-
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erwise exist. Economic pro‹ts, because they emerge from expanded, mutually
bene‹cial trades, also lead to mutual gains being received by consumers.
Unfortunately, economists continue to condemn the prevalence of eco-
nomic pro‹ts as though their consequences were necessarily the same both in
source and in effect as monopoly rents. Hence, they can’t help but see (mistak-
enly) the visible hand of monopoly inef‹ciency in the most fundamental of
market institutions, private property rights, as well as in copyrights (and
patents). They fail to appreciate, paradoxically, the extent to which economic
pro‹ts drive the much heralded invisible hand of markets.
Economists’ traditional perspective is that economic pro‹t, which equals
monopoly rents, is always bad. We suggest a new perspective: Economic
pro‹ts are always good. Our point, however, is that it is important to note a
useful distinction because monopoly rents are markedly different in source and
effect, but they are not always and everywhere bad. Monopoly rents received
by some firms can lead to the realization of economic profits by other firms.
concluding comments
The debate over the monopoly consequences of private property rights in gen-
eral and copyrights (and patents) in particular is loaded with hypotheses that
are in desperate need of empirical testing by law and economics scholars. We
have sidestepped such fact-based investigations partly because of the dif‹culty
of undertaking the required tests under the auspices of this book but also partly
because our purpose has been more narrowly focused on the conceptual foun-
dation of widely accepted but misguided claims, most notably that property
rights and copyrights amount to monopoly grants, with all the derisive effects
monopoly connotes. We have argued that the easy association of a system of
property rights and monopoly fails to recognize another important lesson that
economists teach with conviction: A system of property rights is instituted for
the purpose of expanding trade by increasing the productive value of the avail-
able property and by giving rise to new property. Monopoly, as represented in
economists’ static model, which is at the foundation of the association of prop-
erty with monopoly, has the effect of constricting trade. Granted, private prop-
erty rights make monopoly possible, but the view that property rights in gen-
eral, and copyrights in particular, necessarily imply monopoly rights is as
confused as the more general proposition that Joseph Schumpeter sought to
correct, that monopoly is everywhere a drag on markets.
If economists could somehow differentiate between “monopoly rents” and
“economic pro‹ts,” we suspect that much confusion and awkward discussions
could be eliminated from economic discussions. As it is, economists and legal
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scholars have to qualify their discussion of monopoly by conceding that
“monopolies are not all bad” (Lessig 2001, 29) or “a monopoly, of the category
described, is evidently ‘productive’” (Knight 1921, pt. 2, chap. 6, ¶ 17). How-
ever, the phrase “good monopoly” (which seems to be the essence of what is
meant in these quotations) appears to us to be the rhetorical equivalent of a
“good bad” or “good inef‹ciency” or a “good market failure.” All three phrases
are not only internally contradictory, they just don’t sound right.
We submit that the economics profession is in need of a new market cate-
gory. Perhaps economists would be well served by talking about Schumpeter-
ian ‹rms, which seems to be far more descriptive of the intended kind of mar-
ket model they have in mind. A Schumpeterian ‹rm is a ‹rm that has many of
the major markings of a classic monopoly: It is dominant (or a single producer)
in its market and makes above-normal pro‹ts by not producing the idealized
competitive output level (or where price equals marginal cost). The main dif-
ference between a classic monopoly and a Schumpeterian ‹rm is that the latter
expands human welfare, its own and the welfare of consumers.
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Chapter 11
Summing Up
We have pressed two themes throughout this book. First,
conventional, static, microeconomic theory, as represented in contemporary
textbooks, exaggerates the economic inef‹ciency of monopoly in market
economies. The extent of the exaggeration is attributable in large measure to
the use of perfect competition, an unachievable market state, as a standard of
judgment.1 Using a supposed state of market perfection, grounded in zero
entry and exit costs, to assess the allocative ef‹ciency of any real-world market
is analytical folly. Assume any degree of entry and exit costs, and at least a por-
tion of the supposed deadweight loss of the then imperfect market—as judged
by the standard of the imagined idealized market—is no longer relevant,
because no way then exists of improving on the ef‹ciency with which resources
are allocated. Hence, the true deadweight loss of monopoly is necessarily less
than the Harberger triangle. On this score, our critique of monopoly theory
af‹rms others’ critiques of perfect competition as a standard for assessing real-
world markets.
Second, in a world in which goods are not given—that is, they must be
imagined, developed, produced, marketed, and distributed, with a signi‹cant
probability of failure at each step—monopoly, and the prospects of it, can be
expected in various ways to actually increase human welfare on both sides of
the markets over time. This is the case not in spite of, but because of a monop-
oly’s ability, for some period of time, to control market supply and to hike
prices and economic pro‹ts above the level achievable in a perfectly competi-
tive market. We repeated Paul Romer’s (1994) crucially important but easily
overlooked observation that perfectly competitive prices necessarily provide
impaired signals and incentives in guiding entrepreneurs concerning which
goods should be created, mainly because they do not and cannot capture the
goods’ full market values. Often, when the competitive price is very low, as it
must be for low-marginal-cost goods—for example, digital goods—the price
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can capture little of the total consumer value. Monopoly prices can more fully
capture the value of goods and can correct, albeit partially, what would be, with
perfectly competitive prices, underutilization of resources toward the creation
and development of some goods. That is, competitive prices can distort the
allocation of resources across the goods that are developed, a distortion that
can be corrected, at least partly, by so-called monopoly distortions.
Even if monopoly prices lead to static deadweight losses in the monopo-
lized markets, the resulting monopoly pro‹ts can be a powerful incentive for
entrepreneurs in both close-at-hand and far-removed markets to create and
develop new products that have a chance of yielding above-competitive rates of
return. Hence, the monopoly that impairs static ef‹ciency can improve
dynamic ef‹ciency. A price-discriminating monopolist can improve dynamic
ef‹ciency even more (because more consumer surplus is extracted) at the same
time, as conventionally argued, it improves static ef‹ciency.
For sake of argument, we might concede that perfectly competitive prices
can ef‹ciently guide entrepreneurs when they don’t have to create anything,
and when all the other conditions of perfect competition are met. However,
perfect competition, as we have argued, is a market recipe for economic stag-
nation simply because, as we noted, no incentive would exist in such markets
for entrepreneurs to get off their proverbial dimes. They could never antici-
pate making anything more than normal pro‹ts, which implies no gains at all
from improving what they produce, a reckless disregard for the ‹rst principle
of market trades, which is that they must be mutually bene‹cial.
We understand that readers may be concerned that our line of argument
leads to what, on ‹rst thought, is a paradoxical conclusion, that a form of
meaningful, welfare-enhancing competition can be expected to emerge from
‹rms that exercise market power. How can that be? We think the more prob-
lematic question is, How can meaningful competition, conceived of as a process,
be conceptualized under the banner of “perfect competition”? First, static
models are static, with all results determined instantaneously, or rather by
speci‹cation of the model. No prospect exists of the kind of “process” that is
required to allocate real resources over time in real-world markets. Second,
with the conditions speci‹ed as “perfect,” we can hardly imagine improve-
ment, which is what real markets in a world of scarcity are supposed to foster,
even if we could think in terms of the so-called price competition as a process.
Last, under such a market setting, prices can alter the allocation of resources
only in fairly minor ways, not in the fairly large ways that are likely to be
involved when goods, and the markets for them, are not given but have to be
imagined, created, and developed through time. At the very least, our perspec-
tive allows for the use of resources in ways that are truly crucial for human
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progress, the conception and development of new goods and of the markets for
the goods (with the conception and development of markets for goods as
important and perhaps no less challenging and resource demanding than the
conception and development of the goods themselves).
We have indicated repeatedly how Joseph Schumpeter was far more on
target in his treatment of monopoly, albeit limited and cursory, than are many
contemporary economists, especially those who can’t conceive of a “good
monopoly” other than one that is held in check by way of antitrust prosecu-
tions or, in other ways, is regulated into competitive submission. We have tried
to explore and validate the subtle wisdom of the Schumpeter quote that we
used as an epigraph.
A system—any system, economic or other—that at every given point of
time fully utilizes its possibilities to the best advantage may yet in the long
run be inferior to a system that does so at no given point of time, because
the latter’s failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of long-
run performance. (1942, 83; emphasis in the original)
Because our themes are stark and strike at the heart of what economists
have taught for so long, we have to fear in closing that we will be misinter-
preted, especially if we don’t set out the required quali‹cations. To clarify our
position, we have never claimed or meant to intimate in this book that all
monopolies are good. Without question, beyond some point, there is some
degree and persistence of monopoly power in given markets that would lead
any economist or analyst to conclude that human welfare is, on balance, being
reduced. We suggest that before the advent of private overnight delivery ser-
vices and e-mail, the U.S. Postal Service, protected from the threat of compe-
tition by the legislated ban on private ‹rst-class mail delivery by private ‹rms,
was one such monopoly. Fortunately, communication technology has made
‹rst-class mail delivery an increasingly marginal service.
Our arguments lead us to the concept of optimum monopoly—a level of per-
vasiveness of monopoly and degree of market power of all monopolies that is
“just right.” Put in economic terms, optimum monopoly is that extent of
monopoly presence in an economy that fully maximizes human welfare over
time. The optimum level of monopoly may give rise to allocative inef‹ciencies
in some markets at any (and perhaps every) point in time. However, those
short-run inef‹ciencies are more than offset by the gains over time from the
creativity inspired, or caused by the extent of, monopoly presence.
We don’t pretend to know what that level of monopoly is, just as Schum-
peter didn’t know what the optimum was when he suggested the concept,
albeit implicitly (and without using the phrase), in the preceding passage and
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throughout his classic work, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1942). More-
over, we don’t need to know exactly what the optimum is any more than other
economists need to know, exactly, what the ef‹cient allocation of resources is
(and, we insist, they have no idea what it is exactly). A concept such as optimum
monopoly is useful only as an analytical construct that can inform positive and
normative discussions of how a market economy operates and how it should be
structured for the betterment of people.
But we are convinced, given all the arguments we have put forward, that an
economy inundated with perfectly competitive markets is likely to be subopti-
mum, and an economy with nothing but oppressive pure monopolies is likely
to be equally suboptimum. The optimum prevalence of monopoly is necessar-
ily in between those two extremes. We also know that while optimum monop-
oly is dif‹cult to de‹ne precisely as a standard for judging an economy, and far
less subject to mathematical speci‹cation than is perfect competition, it is
surely a better standard for judging the ef‹ciency of an economy taken as a
whole and over time than is perfect competition. Optimum monopoly is
achievable. Perfect competition is not even conceivably achievable because of
its presumption of perfect market conditions, including zero transaction and
entry/exit costs and complete information, a blatant analytical sleight of hand
that assumes away the bedrock cornerstone of economics, scarcity.
By the standard of optimum monopoly, a state of perfect competition
throughout an economy and over time is necessarily less than perfect in terms
of the standard we have in mind, maximization of human welfare over time
(not just the more narrow concept of ef‹ciency in the allocation of known and
given resources in the production of known and given goods and services at a
given point in time). That is to say, the level of human welfare achieved in a
fully, perfectly competitive economy is subject to improvement by the intro-
duction of some level of monopoly presence, or so we have argued at length.
We see a movement away from a fully, perfectly competitive economy as lead-
ing to enhancement of human welfare in several key ways (all of which have
been at the heart of discussions in foregoing chapters).
• “Normal pro‹ts,” the minimum return required to keep capital in place
in a static model, allow for no return for the discovery and creation of
goods and services that are not given. This is because, in static analysis,
no need exists for any reward for entrepreneurial alertness. The analysis
is restricted to the goods and services that are given. The economic
actors within ‹rms in such analysis are limited in their role to that of
managers or allocators or maximizers. They do not need to be alert to
pro‹table opportunities that have theretofore gone unrecognized.
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Hence, in a more dynamic, real-world economy in which development or
progress is to be anticipated in some systematic way, some supranormal
pro‹ts must occur, and this level of pro‹tability must be above the level
achievable in a perfectly competitive environment. This means, to our
way of thinking, that there must be the reality or prospects of economic
pro‹ts. If entrepreneurial alertness can be viewed as any other normal
resource, we would expect that the extent and intensity of the alertness
would be a function of the extent of economic pro‹ts. Therefore, entre-
preneurial alertness, and the development it can spawn, can be function-
ally related to the extent of entry barriers, for without some barriers to
entry at some level, there can be no economic pro‹ts. 
• Economic pro‹ts may not be needed in a world in which the only vari-
ables subject to ‹rm decisions are output and price for known goods and
services for which the minimum production costs and demands are also
known. However, in a world full of risk, economic pro‹ts are necessarily
crucial. When products and services are created before markets for them
are developed, product and ‹rm failures are bound to occur, which
means that economic losses are likely to abound. To achieve even nor-
mal pro‹ts across a portfolio of products and services and ‹rms, the
prospect of economic pro‹ts must exist that offset in present value terms
the expected economic losses. The prospects of entry barriers (to some
degree) in some entrepreneurial endeavors that allow for the required
economic pro‹ts must therefore exist as well.
• As is usually done in narrow static analytics, economic pro‹ts drive ‹rms
to enter markets only where the economic pro‹ts were made. Hence,
barriers to entry can undercut realizable economic gains because, in such
narrow contexts, there is underproduction in the monopoly markets—
and no thought is given to offsetting gains elsewhere in the economy.
However, the reality or just the prospects of economic pro‹ts in some
protected market can energize entrepreneurs to create goods and ser-
vices—and the markets for those goods and services—that are far
removed in product category from the monopolized market. The eco-
nomic gains from product and service discovery and creation in these
far-removed markets can easily swamp in value any short-run ef‹ciency
losses in the monopolized markets. We can only surmise that at least up
to some point, the greater the reality of economic pro‹ts in monopolized
markets, the more entrepreneurs will be energized to discover and create
products and services in far-removed markets.
• Zero economic pro‹ts that characterize perfectly competitive markets,
because of no entry barriers and zero transactions costs, create a situa-
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tion that does not allow for ‹rms to engage in strategic pricing behavior
across time that can ultimately work to the betterment of consumers as
well as the monopolies. We noted how network effects can encourage
‹rms to charge low, zero, or negative prices initially in order to build
their networks, which can lead to an enhancement in consumer demand
as the networks grow through time. If economic pro‹ts were precluded
from building such network markets, producers would have an impaired
incentive to lower their prices initially. The networks, if they are built,
might then grow more slowly, be less pervasive, and be less bene‹cial
than they would be if network ‹rms were able to achieve monopoly
pro‹ts (because of, say, the presence of switching costs) when the net-
work is developed.
• We noted in our discussion of the client effect and bonding effect that
monopoly price increases can actually increase inframarginal consumer
welfare when the value that consumers place on goods is a function of
who consumes the good or service. And price increases are bound to
affect exactly who will do the consuming and, hence, can create con-
sumer mixes that increase consumer welfare.
• We also noted in our discussion of the bonding effect that monopoly
prices and pro‹ts ensure that monopolies can suffer a true economic loss
for misbehavior and, hence, can add to the value consumers get from buy-
ing the good, because contracts then have a self-enforcing dimension.
• Clearly, not all monopoly prices are antisocial. We posit that few people,
including economists, would argue that a monopolized hit-man market
would be socially inferior to a competitive one, mainly because there
would then be fewer hits under the monopolized market condition
(which the people subject to the hits would likely appreciate, even if
economists don’t).2 This leads us to the more general point that the
monopolization of markets for “bads” (as distinguished from “goods”)
could yield social value apart from any welfare gains the consumers
might expect.3
• Finally, if all economic gains (above costs, including normal pro‹ts) were
realized solely by consumers, as is the case in perfectly competitive mar-
kets, we have argued that the justice of such outcomes would be deemed
dubious even by consumers. This, of course, would clearly be the case if
such a distribution of gains adversely affected the ›ow of new and
improved products that are available for consumption. Consumers
would want to share the gains—some of their consumer surplus—with
producers just to heighten the ›ow of new and improved products.
However, we suggest that even independent of any enhanced ›ow of
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new and improved products, many consumers would ‹nd some sense of
improved justice in the distribution of gains if at least some portion of
the gains ›owed to the ‹rms that created them. Even economists should
want gains from trade to be mutually bene‹cial, which to us means that
‹rms creating added consumer surplus should be able to share, at least to
some extent, in the added value the ‹rms create.
These points lead us to the view that, at least for purposes of argumenta-
tion, we can think of starting with an economy in which perfectly competitive
markets are fully pervasive. At this end of the competitive spectrum for the
economy, the introduction of some minimum degree of monopolization could
immediately improve people’s assessments of their present discounted evalua-
tion of their welfare. Over time, the monopoly pro‹ts—those generated cur-
rently and those expected in the future—could inspire the development of
more new and improved goods and services through time. We can imagine
that as the monopolization of markets is extended, additional gains could
occur.
Having said that, however, we can also imagine that beyond some point as the
monopolization of markets is extended, human welfare could begin to decline.
This is because the inef‹ciencies generated from the allocative inef‹ciencies in
a sequence of short runs begin to more than offset any potential gains to be had
from additional incentives for entrepreneurs to discover, innovate, and
heighten the “perennial gale of creative destruction” through time. At that
extent of competitiveness (or monopolization), the economy would have
reached the level of optimum monopoly.
How much is too much monopolization? Frankly, we confess again that we
don’t know, and the matter is of little concern to us, mainly because the opti-
mum (as is true of all optimums) is bound to differ from economy to economy
and across time. Also, the optimum we have in mind could not be represented
with a scalar measure, but would be represented by a mix of monopoly powers
that varied from industry to industry. Our main focus in this book has been on
positing the existence of such an optimum that could be far removed from
economists’ idealized competitive economy. Beyond making that conceptual
point, we suggest that the conventional view of monopoly has warped policy
discussions and practices, perhaps leading to too much emphasis on identifying
the “evils of monopoly” at every bend in the economy and not recognizing
monopolies’ offsetting merits. Our concern here is evident in public policy dis-
cussions of how brand names, switching costs, network effects, market domi-
nance, and tacit (as well as explicit) collusions have practically everywhere con-
tributed to the creation and maintenance of market power that, in itself, is
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prima facie evidence of consumer welfare losses and by the virtual absence of
public recognition (aside from the arguments pressed by neo-Schumpeterian
economists) that some level of monopoly presence in the economy could fos-
ter economic development over time. And we hasten to add that although we
may not know the point of optimum monopoly, the economists at the Federal
Trade Commission and in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
have no ‹rmer idea of what the optimum is than do we. Indeed, we suspect our
position on the issue is superior to that of legions of policymakers and compe-
tition enforcers because we have at least considered carefully that the optimum
can be something signi‹cantly less perfect than perfect competition.
We acknowledge that our perspective on monopoly could lead to the view
that because some monopoly presence is “good,” it should be promoted with
(renewed) government-dictated regulations intended to restrict market entry
and price competition. For example, our line of argument could be used to jus-
tify the resurrection of now defunct government agencies, for example, the
Civil Aeronautics Board (which regulated plane fares and routes) and the
Interstate Commerce Commission (which regulated the entry, rates, and
routes for the trucking industry). The problem with such an extension of our
argument is not that it would be incorrect in a few identi‹ed cases if properly
done—a very big if.4 The problem is, as Schumpeter recognized explicitly,
“There is no general case for indiscriminate ‘trust-busting’ or for the prosecu-
tion of everything that quali‹es as a restraint of trade. Rational as distinguished
from vindictive regulation by public authority turns out to be an extremely del-
icate problem which not every government agency, particularly when in full
cry against big business, can be trusted to solve” (1942, 95). Moreover, the pol-
itics of the moment can lead to the misuse and abuse of any argument that
“monopoly is good” by industry interest groups that would like nothing better
than to increase their stockholders’ wealth (above that implied by our argu-
ments for optimum monopoly) through the legislation of their own protection
from competition. The argument could also be easily misused and abused by
politicians who would like nothing better than to pad the pockets of the indus-
try interest groups that, in turn, pad the politicians’ campaign coffers, if not
pockets. We would be the ‹rst among economists to fear that our argument’s
wide acceptance could weaken the case against destructive rent seeking in
Washington and state capitals and thereby could lead to too much monopoly.
What can and should be done? Our purpose in this volume has not been to
improve policy by listing concrete reform proposals. Our purpose has been
mainly to change the orientation of professional discussions of monopoly in
the economy; therefore, any answer to the question we pose must be limited.
Nevertheless, because so much of antitrust policy has been founded on the
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standard perfect competition/pure monopoly dichotomy in economics, we
think that a total review of antitrust law and practice is in order. Perhaps that
body of law and practice should be reconstituted with more liberties given to
at least privately engineered monopolies, to allow them to be monopolies with-
out so much fear of being prosecuted for antitrust violations. We emphasize
privately engineered because we share Schumpeter’s predisposition that monop-
olies that are not supported by public authorities are likely to be temporary,
that is, have a tendency to eventually sow the seeds of their own market
retrenchment and demise. Even enduring monopolies should not, from our
perspective, necessarily be candidates for antitrust busting. The problem is
that such an assault on successful and enduring monopolies can undermine the
creative energies of a host of entrepreneurs, ones that also seek to become suc-
cessful and enduring monopolies. As we have said, monopolies, and their
pro‹ts, are an unheralded source of energy for Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”
that works its wonder through markets.
It probably comes as no surprise that we have a healthy skepticism about
the long-run ef‹cacy of antitrust policy, given that the record of antitrust pros-
ecution has been full of episodes of its misuse and abuse, with the government’s
enforcement resources too easily captured by ‹rms seeking to use antitrust law
to protect themselves against market competition from more ef‹cient ‹rms.5
This skepticism has been built on the observed practice of antitrust enforce-
ment, not on perceived problems with the underlying monopoly theory. The
arguments put forth in this volume should heighten skepticism over whether
antitrust enforcement will in practice lead to social improvement since the
underlying theory is in key ways defective and can misguide enforcement even
when the enforcers believe they have the best of intentions.
The truly worrisome monopolies are those that are government engi-
neered and maintained. We are too steeped in the rent-seeking literature to
not worry about opening wider the gates to government-established and gov-
ernment-maintained monopolies. We can only hope that our arguments are
not misused.
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Notes 
Preface 
1. Developed in the mid-1930s, more than two hundred million copies of
Monopoly have been sold in twenty-six languages and in eighty countries (as
reported on the Parker Brothers Web site for its Monopoly board game,
http://monopoly.com).
2. Strictly speaking, economists recognize three market structures in which
‹rms have monopoly or market power: pure monopoly (a market with a single pro-
ducer that has no close substitutes and that is protected by prohibitive barrier to
entry), oligopoly (a market in which a handful of producers’ production and pric-
ing decisions are interdependent), and monopolistic competition (a market in
which a number of producers’ production and pricing decisions are not inter-
dependent). The key unifying features of all three market structures is that the
demand curves of individual ‹rms are downward sloping, which makes the ‹rms
price searchers (as opposed to price takers under perfect competition). The fact
that all ‹rms in these three market structures can search for the pro‹t-maximizing
price by restricting their production below competitive levels necessarily implies
that the markets will not be optimally ef‹cient.
3. In chapters 4 and 5, we cover the various court rulings that Microsoft is a
monopoly. Here we can point out that when the Wall Street Journal reported
Microsoft’s growth in sales and pro‹ts during the ‹rst quarter of 2003, the reporter
couldn’t resist adding, “Still, the overall results showed Microsoft—at least for
now—continues to weather the technology downturn better than its competitors,
owing to its monopoly position in personal-computer software. The company is
milking the bene‹ts of a new licensing program introduced in July that created an
unprecedented surge in deferred revenue” (Guth 2003, n.p., emphasis added).
4. This is a theme that William Baumol develops at length in The Free-Market
Innovation Machine (2002), with citations to a number of theoretical and empirical
studies, most notably Lucas 1988, Romer 1994, and Solow 1957.
5. Standard Oil in 1910 and Microsoft in 1998 were accused of establishing
their monopolies through predatory practices that, once successful, enabled them
to capture substantial monopoly pro‹ts. The arguments of the antitrust authorities
have been critiqued in the two cases by McGee (1958) and McKenzie (2000).
6. Schumpeter wrote, “The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capi-
talist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of
production or transportation, and the new markets, the new forms of industrial
organization that capitalist enterprises create” (1942, 83). Schumpeter’s point, and
our central theme, has been echoed more recently, and supported with an array of
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empirical studies, by William Baumol: “The static ef‹ciency properties that are
stressed by standard welfare economics are emphatically not the most important
qualities of capitalist economies” (2002, viii; emphasis in the original).
7. Romer’s exact words are, referring to an example Dupuit used to illustrate
the problem of how market prices would not lead to some public goods being pro-
duced, “The bridge that is not built is as easy to overlook as the dog that did not
bark” (1994, 26).
Chapter 1
1. Kenneth Boulding (1945), in a defense of monopoly that focused on monop-
oly as a societal means of alleviating more serious societal problems associated with
“de›ationary spirals,” noted the failures of economists in attracting the attention of
policymakers: “Ever since Adam Smith let off the ‹rst thunderous broadside, the
attack on Monopoly has been a favorite occupation of economists,” only to quickly
add that “it cannot be claimed, however, that the attack has been particularly suc-
cessful; indeed, it seems to have produced more smoke than shot,” given the extent
to which governments everywhere have been in the business of granting monopoly
favors across the business landscape (1945, 524). 
2. The resource “misallocation” occurs because of the presumption that the
units of the goods not produced in the monopolized industries, because of the
monopolies’ restrictions on market supply, are more valuable to consumers than
the units of the goods actually produced with the freed resources in the competitive
markets. The misallocation problem will be discussed in some detail in chapter 2.
3. Of course, economists, scholars, and judges would agree that the govern-
ment’s cost of imposing a solution for monopoly must not be greater than the gains
from dissolving the monopoly.
4. Smith writes, “All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the
rent of land, and the pro‹ts of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant
than they otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one little order of
men in one country, it hurts the interest of all other orders of men in that country,
and of all men in all other countries” (1776, bk. 4, chap. 7, ¶ 146).
5. From Smith’s perspective,
Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expence of car-
riage, put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with those
in the neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest
of all improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote, which
must always be the most extensive circle of the country. They are advanta-
geous to the town, by breaking down the monopoly of the country in its
neighbourhood. They are advantageous even to that part of the country.
Though they introduce some rival commodities into the old market, they
open many new markets to its produce. (1776, bk. 1, chap. 11, ¶ 14) 
6. Smith writes, “That this monopoly of the home-market frequently gives
great encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and fre-
quently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour and stock
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of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be doubted. But
whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the society, or to give it
the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps, altogether so evident” (1776, bk.
4, chap. 2, ¶ 2). 
7. Smith noted that “the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to af‹rm,
are mild and gentle in comparison of some of those which the clamour of our mer-
chants and manufacturers has extorted from the legislature for the support of their
own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be
said to be all written in blood” (1776, bk. 4, chap. 8, ¶ 17). 
8. Smith explained,
The high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many dif-
ferent sorts of foreign goods, in order to discourage their consumption in
Great Britain, have in many cases served only to encourage smuggling, and in
all cases have reduced the revenue of the customs below what more moderate
duties would have afforded. The saying of Dr. Swift, that in the arithmetic of
the customs two and two, instead of making four, make sometimes only one,
holds perfectly true with regard to such heavy duties which never could have
been imposed had not the mercantile system taught us, in many cases, to
employ taxation as an instrument, not of revenue, but of monopoly. (1776, bk.
5, chap. 2, ¶ 172)
9. In Smith’s words, “Merchants and manufacturers are not contented with the
monopoly of the home market, but desire likewise the most extensive foreign sale
for their goods. Their country has no jurisdiction in foreign nations, and therefore
can seldom procure them any monopoly there. They are generally obliged, there-
fore, to content themselves with petitioning for certain encouragements to expor-
tation” (1776, bk. 4, chap. 4, ¶ 1).
10. Malthus maintained that by more equally distributing land, there would be a
more equal distribution of monopoly rent. However, such an outcome from a more
equal distribution of land would do little to deny his pessimistic view of the impact
on human suffering from the press of population growth.
While from the law of primogeniture, and other European customs, land
bears a monopoly price, a capital can never be employed in it with much
advantage to the individual; and, therefore, it is not probable that the soil
should be properly cultivated. And, though in every civilized state, a class of
proprietors and a class of labourers must exist; yet one permanent advantage
would always result from a nearer equalization of property. The greater the
number of proprietors, the smaller must be the number of labourers: a greater
part of society would be in the happy state of possessing property; and a
smaller part in the unhappy state of possessing no other property than their
labour. But the best directed exertions, though they may alleviate, can never
remove the pressure of want; and it will be dif‹cult for any person who con-
templates the genuine situation of man on earth, and the general laws of
nature, to suppose it possible that any, but the most enlightened efforts, could
place mankind in a state where “few would die without measuring out the
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whole period of present existence allotted to them; where pain and distemper
would be unknown among them; and death would come upon them like a
sleep, in consequence of no other cause than gradual and unavoidable decay.”
(1798, chap. 17, ¶ 10)
11. In Ricardo’s words, “But how can they permanently support the market
price of their goods above the natural price, when every one of their fellow citizens
is free to enter into the trade? They are guaranteed against foreign, but not against
home competition. The real evil arising to the country from such monopolies, if
they can be called by that name, lies, not in raising the market price of such goods,
but in raising their real and natural price. By increasing the cost of production, a
portion of the labour of the country is less productively employed” (1817, n. 54). 
12. In Economic Sophisms, Bastiat wrote in his petition,
We are suffering from the ruinous competition of a foreign rival who appar-
ently works under conditions so far superior to our own for the production of
light that he is ›ooding the domestic market with it at an incredibly low price; for
the moment he appears, our sales cease, all the consumers turn to him, and a
branch of French industry whose rami‹cations are innumerable is all at once
reduced to complete stagnation. This rival, which is none other than the sun,
is waging war on us so mercilessly that we suspect he is being stirred up against
us by per‹dious Albion (excellent diplomacy nowadays!), particularly because
he has for that haughty island a respect that he does not show for us.
We ask you to be so good as to pass a law requiring the closing of all win-
dows, dormers, skylights, inside and outside shutters, curtains, casements,
bull’s-eyes, deadlights, and blinds—in short, all openings, holes, chinks, and
‹ssures through which the light of the sun is wont to enter houses, to the
detriment of the fair industries with which, we are proud to say, we have
endowed the country, a country that cannot, without betraying ingratitude,
abandon us today to so unequal a combat. (1845, ser. 1, chap. 7, ¶¶ 6, 7) 
13. Bastiat wrote in Economic Harmonies,
But, make no mistake about it, to af‹rm this is to af‹rm that man’s tendencies
are inherently evil, evil in their nature, evil in their essence; it is to af‹rm that
his natural bent is toward his deterioration and that his mind is attracted irre-
sistibly toward error. What good, then, are our schools, our study, our
research, our discussions, except to add momentum to our descent down the
fatal slope; since, for man, to learn to choose is to learn to commit suicide?
And if man’s tendencies are perverse, where will the social planners seek to
place their fulcrum? According to their premises, it will have to be outside of
humanity. Will they seek it within themselves, in their own intelligence, in
their own hearts? But they are not yet gods: they too are men and hence, along
with all humanity, careening down toward the fatal abyss. Will they call upon
the state to intervene? But the state is composed of men; and we should have
to prove that the men who form the state constitute a class apart, to whom the
general laws of society are not applicable, since they are called upon to make
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the laws. Unless this be proved, the facing of the dilemma is not even post-
poned. (1850, chap. 1, ¶ 87) 
In Selected Essays on Political Economy, Bastiat lampooned the argument that “com-
petition leads to monopoly” by suggesting if that were, “For the same reason, low costs
lead to high prices? That competition tends to exhaust the sources of consumption and pushes
production into a destructive activity? That competition forces production to increase and
consumption to decrease? Whence it follows that free peoples produce in order not to
consume—that liberty means both oppression and madness, and that M. Louis Blanc
simply must step in and set matters straight?” (1848, chap. 2, ¶ 200).
14. Bastiat wrote, “I do not mean here a tendency to desire equality, but a ten-
dency to achieve it. Nevertheless, equality has not been achieved or else is being
achieved so slowly that when we compare two widely separated ages we can hardly
discern that any forward steps have been taken at all” (1850, chap. 16, ¶ 110).
15. For example, Bastiat writes,
The earth is a wondrous chemical workshop wherein many materials and ele-
ments are mixed together and worked on, and ‹nally come forth as grain, fruit,
›ax, etc. Nature has presented this vast workshop to man as a gratuitous gift,
and has divided it into many compartments suitable for many different kinds
of production. But certain men have come forth, have laid hands on these
things, and have declared: This compartment belongs to me; that one also; all
that comes from it will be my exclusive property. And, amazingly enough, this
usurpation of privilege, far from being disastrous to society, has turned out to be
advantageous. (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 57) 
16. Bastiat obviously enjoyed his retort to people who equated property rights
with monopoly power.
After he had invested the rest of his dollars in buildings, fences, clearings,
trenchings, drainage, preparations, etc., after he had dug, plowed, harrowed,
sowed, and harvested, came the moment for selling the crop. “Now at last I’ll
know,” cried Jonathan, still obsessed with the problem of value, “whether in
becoming a landowner I have turned into a monopolist, a privileged aristocrat,
a despoiler of my fellow men, or a usurper of the divine bounty.” (1850, chap.
9, ¶ 122)
17. Bastiat wrote, “There is, then, between the favors bestowed by Nature and
arti‹cial monopoly this profound difference: the former are the result of pre-exis-
tent and inevitable scarcity; the latter is the cause of arti‹cial and unnatural
scarcity” (1850, n. 13).
18. A Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game-theoretic predicament in which all par-
ties, acting individually and rationally, can end up worse off by their actions.
Each person driving to work can reason that exhaust from his car does little to
nothing, by itself, to degrade air quality, but the exhaust of all drivers can cause
an environmental mess and health problems for all drivers and everyone else in
the area.
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19. The word monopoly or monopolist is nowhere found in Marx’s principal work,
Capital.
20. Alfred Marshall wrote,
Again, markets vary with regard to the period of time which is allowed to the
forces of demand and supply to bring themselves into equilibrium with one
another, as well as with regard to the area over which they extend. And this
element of Time requires more careful attention just now than does that of
Space. For the nature of the equilibrium itself, and that of the causes by which
it is determined, depend on the length of the period over which the market is
taken to extend. We shall ‹nd that if the period is short, the supply is limited
to the stores which happen to be at hand: if the period is longer, the supply will
be in›uenced, more or less, by the cost of producing the commodity in ques-
tion; and if the period is very long, this cost will in its turn be in›uenced, more
or less, by the cost of producing the labour and the material things required for
producing the commodity. These three classes of course merge into one
another by imperceptible degrees. We will begin with the ‹rst class; and con-
sider in the next chapter those temporary equilibria of demand and supply, in
which “supply” means in effect merely the stock available at the time for sale
in the market; so that it cannot be directly in›uenced by the cost of produc-
tion. (1890, bk. 5, chap. 1, ¶ 20)
21. With regard to a change in the monopolist’s ‹xed cost, Marshall wrote,
First let this increase or diminution of the expenses be a ‹xed sum, bearing on
the undertaking as one undivided whole and not varying with the amount of
the commodity produced. Then, whatever be the price charged and the
amount of the commodity sold, the monopoly revenue will be increased or
diminished, as the case may be, by this sum; and therefore that selling price
which afforded the maximum monopoly revenue before the change will afford
it afterwards; the change therefore will not offer to the monopolist any induce-
ment to alter his course of action. (1890, bk. 5, chap. 14, ¶ 11)
To this Marshall adds, “The same is true of a tax or a bounty proportioned not to
the gross receipts of the undertaking, but to its monopoly revenue” (1890, bk. 5,
chap. 14, ¶ 12).
22. Marshall wrote,
On the other hand a tax proportional to the amount produced gives an induce-
ment to the monopolist to lessen his output and raise his price. For by so doing
he diminishes his expenses. And the excess of total receipts over total outlay
may therefore be now increased by a diminution of output; though before the
imposition of the tax it would have been lessened. Further, if before the impo-
sition of the tax the net revenue was only a little greater than that which would
have been afforded by much smaller sales, then the monopolist would gain by
reducing his production very greatly; and hence in such cases as this, the
change is likely to cause a very great diminution of production and rise of
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price. The opposite effects will be caused by a change which diminishes the
expense of working the monopoly by a sum that varies directly with the
amount produced under it. (1890, bk. 5, chap. 14, ¶ 13)
23. In Marshall’s words,
The following general results are capable of exact proof; but on a little consid-
eration they will appear so manifestly true as hardly to require proof. Firstly,
the amount which the monopolist will offer for sale will be greater (and the
price at which he will sell it will be less) if he is to any extent desirous to pro-
mote the interests of consumers than if his sole aim is to obtain the greatest
possible monopoly revenue; and secondly, the amount produced will be
greater (and the selling price will be less) the greater be the desire of the
monopolist to promote the interests of consumers; i.e. the larger be the per-
centage of its actual value at which he counts in consumers’ surplus with his
own revenue. (1890, bk. 5, chap. 14, ¶ 5)
24. Bain wrote,
The value of the condition of entry may be positive and there may be “effec-
tively impeded” entry in the following sense: The most favored established ‹rms
could raise their prices . . . enough above their competitive level without
attracting entry to make their long-run pro‹ts at the best entry-forestalling
price greater than if they charged higher prices and induced entry (thus shar-
ing the market with further sellers. At the same time, the best entry-fore-
stalling price is below that which would maximize their pro‹ts were there no threat
of entry. This implies that the entry-forestalling price is moderately above
costs, but not as high as a “monopolistic” price would be in the absence of any
threat of entry. (1956, 22; emphasis in the original)
The theory of entry-forestalling or limit pricing has been severely criticized by
Osborne (1964), Stigler (1968, 67–70), Pashigian (1968), and McGee (1971,
72–75).
25. According to Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, monopoloid means
“of, relating to, or resembling a monopoly, implying ‘gigantism.’”
26. Schumpeter’s predilection to assess economists’ professional “vision” of per-
fect competition as an “ideology” resulting everywhere in the denunciation of
monopoly was evident in Schumpeter’s American Economic Association presiden-
tial address. In that address, he takes on what he saw as the absence of an “ideology”
underlying the work of Adam Smith, but a pervasive ideology underlying the work
of Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes. He concludes by pointing to how econo-
mists’ vision of “pure competition” warps inappropriately economists’ thinking on
monopoly at the same time that such a vision was necessary for the advance of eco-
nomics as a “science.” 
A majority of economists would subscribe to Molina’s dictum: monopolium est
injustum et rei publicae injuriosum [a monopoly is an injustice and a real public
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injury]. But it is not this value judgment which is relevant to my argument—
one may dislike modern largest-scale business exactly as one may dislike many
other features of modern civilization—but the analysis that leads up to it, and
the ideological in›uence this analysis displays. Anyone who has read Mar-
shall’s Principles . . . should know that among the innumerable patterns that are
covered by those terms are many of which bene‹t and not injury to economic
ef‹ciency and the consumer’s interest ought to be predicated. More modern
analysis permits to show still more clearly that no sweeping or unquali‹ed
statement can be true for all of them; and that the mere fact of size, single-sell-
ership, discrimination, and cooperative price setting are in themselves inade-
quate for asserting that the resulting performance is, in any relevant sense of
the word, inferior to the one which could be expected under pure competition
in conditions attainable under pure competition—in other words, that the
analysis offers no material in support of indiscriminate “trust busting” and that
such material must be looked for in the particular circumstances of each indi-
vidual case. Nevertheless, many economists support indiscriminate “trust bust-
ing” and the interesting point is that enthusiastic sponsors of the private-
enterprise system are particularly prominent among them. Theirs is the
ideology of a capitalist economy that would ‹ll its social functions admirably
by virtue of the magic of pure competition were it not for the monster of
monopoly or oligopoly that casts a shadow on an otherwise bright scene. No
argument avails about the performance of largest-scale business, about the
inevitability of its emergence, about the social costs involved in destroying
existing structures, about the futility of the hallowed ideal of pure competi-
tion—or in fact ever elicits any response other than most obviously sincere
indignation. (1949, 357–58; emphasis in the original) 
Schumpeter concludes his address by noting an inherent irony in science, that of
how the “prescienti‹c cognitive act” of devising a “vision” of markets captured in
pure competition that is a source of economists’ ideology with regard to monopoly
is also “a prerequisite of our scienti‹c work”: “No new departure in any science is
possible without it. Our stock of facts and tools grows and rejuvenates itself in the
process. And so—though we proceed slowly because of our ideologies, we might
not proceed at all without them” (1949, 359). In a real sense, Schumpeter saw the
“perennial gale of creative destruction” to be as critical to the advancement of sci-
ence as it was for the advancement of whole economies, and for much the same rea-
sons: “There is more comfort in the observation that no economic ideology lasts
forever and that, with a likelihood that approximates certainty, we eventually grow
out of each” (1949, 359).
27. Schumpeter gave greater importance in terms of motivating ‹rms to the
threat of nonprice competition over actual nonprice competition.
It is hardly necessary to point out that competition of this kind we now have in
mind [from new products, technologies, and organizational forms] acts not
only when in being but also when it is merely an ever-present threat. It disci-
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plines before it attacks. The businessman feels himself to be in a competitive
situation even if he is alone in his ‹eld or if, though not alone, he holds a posi-
tion such that investigating government experts fail to see any effective com-
petition between him and any other ‹rms in the same or a neighboring ‹eld
and in consequence conclude that his talk, under examination, about his com-
petitive sorrows is all make-believe. In many cases, though not in all, this will
in the long-run enforce behavior very similar to the perfectly competitive pat-
tern. (1942, 85)
28. Innovations are the ultimate source of economic pro‹ts in the Schumpeter-
ian system, mainly because at the instant they occur, there can be no direct com-
petitors: “Since the entrepreneur has no competitors when the new product ‹rst
appears, the determination of price proceeds wholly, or within certain limits,
according to the principles of monopoly price. Thus there is a monopoly element
in pro‹t in a capitalist economy” (1934, 152). However, the pro‹t is not likely to be
long-lived, since there is a “tendency” built in to capitalism for industry to be
“reorganized” that “will ‹nally restore the rule of the law of cost” (1934, 135).
Schumpeter points to how a trading company might make a pro‹t by setting up
trade in “glass beads to a negro tribe” for the ‹rst time, but that “an appropriate
organization would soon come into existence and trade in glass beads would very
soon no longer yield a pro‹t” (1934, 135).
29. In his Theory of Economic Development (1934), Schumpeter gave “pro‹t” a
more critical role in capitalism than a mere “incentive”: “Without development
there is no pro‹t, without pro‹t no development. For the capitalist system it must
be added further that without pro‹t there would be no accumulation of wealth. At
least there would not be the great social phenomenon which we have viewed—this
is certainly a consequence of development and indeed of pro‹t” (154). To Schum-
peter, “pro‹t” was not the equivalent of “saving,” meaning nonconsumption, “in
the proper sense.” This is because pro‹t, which springs from the work of entrepre-
neurs and feeds the buildup of “most fortunes,” “is not an encroachment upon the
customary standard of life” (154).
30. As Oakley (1990, 140) has pointed out, pro‹t was not simply the residual,
what is left over from revenues after all claimants other than the entrepreneur are
paid. Schumpeter wrote, “We want ‹nally to emphasize that pro‹t is also not
wages, although the analogy is tempting. It is certainly not a residuum; it is the
expression of the value of what the entrepreneur contributes to production in
exactly the same sense that wages are the value expression of what the worker ‘pro-
duces’” (1934, 153). Schumpeter seems to suggest here that pro‹t is the entrepre-
neur’s incentive to innovate, an especially appealing interpretation given the extent
to which Schumpeter viewed innovation as endogenous to the economic system.
However, he confused the interpretation when he wrote that “it cannot be said of 
. . . [pro‹t] that it just suf‹ces to call forth precisely the ‘quantity of entrepreneur-
ial services required.’ Such a quantity, theoretically determined, does not exist. And
the total amount of pro‹t actually obtained in a given time, as well as the pro‹t
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realised by an individual entrepreneur, may be much greater than that necessary to
call forth the entrepreneurial services which were actually operative” (1934,
154–55). 
31. Schumpeter wrote,
Practically any investment entails, as a necessary complement of entrepre-
neurial action, certain safeguarding activities such as insuring or hedging.
Long-range investing under rapidly changing conditions, especially under
conditions that change or may change at any moment under the impact of new
commodities and technologies, is like shooting at a target that is not only
indistinct but moving—and moving jerkily at that. Hence it becomes neces-
sary to resort to such protective devices as patents and temporary secrecy of
processes or, in some cases, long-period contracts secured in advance. But
these protective devices which most economists accept as normal elements of
rational management are only special cases of a larger class comprising many
others which most economists condemn although they do not differ funda-
mentally from the recognized ones. (1942, 88)
32. Schumpeter adds,
What we have got to accept is that it [“large scale establishment or unit of con-
trol”] has come to be the most powerful engine of that progress and in partic-
ular long-term expansion of total output not only in spite of, but to a consid-
erable extent through, this strategy which looks so restrictive when viewed in
the individual case and from the individual point in time. In this respect, per-
fect competition is not only impossible, but inferior, and has no title to being
set up as a model of ideal ef‹ciency. (1942, 106)
33. Schumpeter adds later, “Especially in manufacturing, a monopoly position is
in general no cushion to sleep on. As it [a monopoly position] can be gained, so it
can be retained only by alertness and energy” (1942, 102). 
34. At the same time that Schumpeter defended “bigness” in business, as well as
marveled at capitalism’s accomplishments, he saw a potential dark side to the
growth and ef‹ciency of business: The growth would be a source of capitalism’s
undoing, leading to a replacement by a socialist state. He reasoned that technolog-
ical progress was “increasingly becoming the business of teams of trained special-
ists who turn out what is required and make it work in predictable ways” (1942,
132), a process that eliminates the “romantic” role of the entrepreneurial ventures
and “expropriates the bourgeoisie as a class” (1942, 134). He concludes that with
the entrepreneur displaced, “dematerialized, defunctionalized, and absentee own-
ership” cannot possibly “call forth moral allegiance,” the net result of which is that
there will be no one left to defend capitalism (1942, 142). The state can then do
what large private ‹rms once did, clearly a deduction that represents an echo of
Marx (Gintis 1991).
35. Early in his Recent Economic Changes, Wells makes the same point, that
“nothing marks more clearly the rate of material progress than the rapidity with
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which that which is old and has been considered wealth is destroyed by new inven-
tions and discoveries” (1889, 30–31).
36. Wells pointed out that Standard Oil had used its “millions of capital . . . most
skillfully in promoting consumption, and in devising and adopting a great number
of ingenious methods whereby the cost of production has been reduced to an extent
that, at the outset, would not have seemed possible” (1889, 132). 
37. For example, Nelson and Winter (1982, 114) have restated it this way: “A
market structure involving large ‹rms with considerable degree of market power is
the price that society must pay for rapid technological advance.” Adams and Dirlam
(1966, 167) in their examination of the steel industry interpreted the hypothesis to
mean “that large ‹rms with substantial market power have both greater incentive
and more resources for research and development.” Mans‹eld argues that Schum-
peter meant “that in recent times innovations have been carried out primarily by
very large ‹rms” (1968, 84) and that “such ‹rms are needed to produce the techni-
cal achievements on which economic progress depends” (6).
38. For example, Worley (1961) found that for ‹rms in six out of eight two-digit
industries studied, R&D personnel as a percentage of total employment fell with
‹rm size. Rosenberg drew much the same conclusion (1976). Hamberg (1964)
found that within the twelve industries he studied, R&D expenditures increased
with ‹rm sales and with industry concentration ratios. However, only 30 percent of
the variance in R&D could be explained by industry concentration. Horowitz
(1962) found a similar but weak relationship between R&D expenditures and
industry concentration.
39. For example, Scherer (1965) found that “inventive output” (measured by
patents issued in 1959 to 448 of the 500 ‹rms on Fortune’s list of the 500 largest
industrial ‹rms) increased with ‹rm sales, but at a less than proportional rate. He
also found that inventive output was not found to be related to ‹rms’ market
power, pro‹tability, liquidity, or product diversi‹cation. Markham (1965) found
that the R&D expenditures-to-sales ration rose “markedly” until the ‹rm reached
an annual sales level of $100 million, only to decline slightly thereafter. Markham
also found that the differences in the ratios of R&D to sales between different size
‹rms declined “substantially” as smaller ‹rms increased their research activities,
mainly as “imitators.”
40. For example, Mans‹eld (1964) found that the relative R&D expenditures as
a percentage of sales for the “largest” and “somewhat smaller ‹rms” varied by
industry. In the petroleum, drugs, and glass industries, the largest ‹rms’ expendi-
tures on R&D were a smaller percentage of sales than their “somewhat smaller”
industry counterparts. However, the largest ‹rms spent more in the chemical
industry and less in the steel industry.
41. For a more recent review of the literature, see Sanjay 1988.
42. Then there are other researchers who concede that ‹rm size could very well
lead to constricted innovativeness and inventiveness. After all, large ‹rms have long
chains of command and impaired incentives for managers and workers to be inno-
vative. Nevertheless, the revolution in information technology can be expected to
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correct these organizational and incentive problems, thus giving new life to
Schumpeter’s hypothesis (Nolan and Croson 1995), a subject to which we will
return in later chapters. 
43. Successful companies can be thought of as often being on the horns of a
nontrivial R&D dilemma, whether further to re‹ne and exploit known and suc-
cessful technologies that they have or break with their current product line (or way
of doing business) and assume the added risks of developing breakthrough tech-
nologies. Their dilemma is made more troublesome and problematic for them
because the bene‹ts of developing their known products are better known than are
the bene‹ts of developing new products and production processes, which suggests
that following the second course can lead to more failed products, as well as added
costs of redirecting the ‹rms’ organizational structure and culture. By choosing
(rationally) to leave the development of breakthrough products to other ‹rms, suc-
cessful ‹rms can give rise to their own demise because of outside ‹rms that develop
the breakthrough products. Established ‹rms can offset some of these risks by hav-
ing outside ‹rms develop the breakthrough products and then by buying the out-
side ‹rms, or the products they develop, that prove successful. For more on this
line of argument on the “innovator’s dilemma,” see Christensen 1997 and McKen-
zie and Galar 2003.
44. The full text of the passage in which he spells out his hypothesis is, “As soon
as we go into the details and inquire into the individual items in which progress has
been most conspicuous, the trail leads not to the doors of those ‹rms that work
under conditions of comparatively free competition but precisely to the doors of
the large concerns—which, as in the case of agricultural machinery, also account
for much of the progress in the competitive sector—and a shocking suspicion dawns on
us that big business may have had more to do with creating that standard of life than with
keeping it down” (1942, 82; emphasis added).
45. McNulty (1974, 629) points out that in Business Cycles, Schumpeter wrote,
“Even in the world of giant ‹rms, new ones arise and others fall into the back-
ground. Innovations still emerge primarily with the ‘young’ ones, and the ‘old’ ones
display as a rule symptoms of what is euphemistically called conservatism” (1939,
vol. 1, 96). In addition, Schumpeter wrote in a footnote, “There would then be
some justi‹cation for treating innovations—excepting, perhaps, ‘revolutionary’
ones—as a function of the size of ‹rms (possibly, as measured by output) and for
arriving at a descending cost curve after all which would include such changes of
the production function as presuppose a certain size and are easier to carry to effect
for big ‹rms. But we see now that this means stressing the secondary element and
obscuring the essential one” (1939, vol. 1, 97, n. 1).
46. Schumpeter wrote, “Disregarding the effects of lumpiness or smoothing
them [the short-run cost curves from expanded scale] out by drawing a monotonic
curve through the alternating stretches of rising and falling average costs, we
should, strictly speaking, get a curve which would for a small individual ‹rm, be
parallel to the quantity axis” (1939, 90), only to add that “our impression of a preva-
lence of decreasing cost . . . is innovation, the intrusion into the system of new pro-
duction functions which incessantly shift existing cost curves” (1939, 91).
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47. Speci‹cally, Schumpeter writes, “Pure cases of long-run monopoly must be
of the rarest occurrence—and that even tolerable approximations to the require-
ments of the concept must be still rarer than are the cases of perfect competition.
The power to exploit at pleasure a given pattern of demand . . . can under the con-
ditions of intact capitalism hardly persist for a period long enough to matter for the
analysis of total output, unless buttressed by public authority, in the case of ‹scal
monopolies” (99).
48. Schumpeter wrote, “It is the cheap cloth, the cheap cotton and rayon fabric,
boots, motorcars and so on that are the typical achievements of capitalist produc-
tion, and not as a rule improvements that would mean much to the rich man.
Queen Elizabeth owned silk stockings. The capitalist achievement does not typi-
cally consist in providing more silk stockings for queens but in bringing them
within the reach of factory girls in return for steadily decreasing amounts of effort”
(1942, 67).
49. According to Allen Oakley (1990, chaps. 1, 2), Schumpeter recognized two
stages of economic development. The ‹rst stage involved the playing out of mar-
kets that approximated the requirements of highly (if not perfectly) competitive
markets in which price competition dominated competition. The second stage was
something of a take-off stage. In this stage ‹rms began to grow with the success of
their products, and their growth afforded them control over price.
50. Perhaps surprisingly, Schumpeter was of two minds on “perfect competi-
tion.” On the one hand he denounced the market model as irrelevant. On the other
hand, in his review of Joan Robinson’s (1933) book on imperfect competition, he
recognized the importance of the perfectly competitive model to the progress of
economic science.
It cannot be repeated too often that the case of perfect competition owes the
fundamental importance which it always had and still has in economic theory
to certain properties characteristic of it and neither to any tendency in the
facts to conform to it nor any “desirability” of the state of the things it depicts.
. . . For by virtue of those properties the theory of perfect competition still
remains useful and almost indispensable background with which to compare,
and therefore by which to understand, any other situation, however far
removed it may be from it. (1951, 125)
51. Of course, economists often note that policies that engender monopolies
should not be abolished when the costs of changing the policies are greater than the
deadweight loss that can be recouped from the elimination of monopoly pricing. 
52. Although Schumpeter never used the term optimum monopoly, the need for a
balance among ‹rms of varying size and differing market power comes through in
this statement: “Economic evolution or ‘progress’ would differ substantially from
the picture we are about to draw, if that form of organization prevailed throughout
the economic organism. Giant concerns still have to react to each other’s innova-
tions, of course, but they do so in other and less predictable ways than ‹rms which
are drops in a competitive sea, and many details—in some points, more than
details—would then have to be altered in our model” (1939, 96).
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53. Schumpeter writes, “It [his construction of monopoly] does show that there
is no general case against indiscriminate ‘trust-busting’ or for the prosecution of
everything that quali‹es as a restraint of trade. Rational as distinguished from vin-
dictive regulation by public authority turns out to be an extremely delicate problem
which not every government agency, particularly when in full cry against big busi-
ness, can be trusted to solve” (1942, 91).
54. Many economists fortify the claim we intend to challenge by asking their
students to repeat the refrain, “Price affects the quantity demanded, not the
demand. Because of the way the demand curve is constructed as a functional rela-
tionship between price and quantity, price cannot affect demand. Something other
than price must affect the demand.” Our point is not that the rule economists press
with their students is wrong everywhere, but rather there are important cases that
violate economists’ conventional position that price changes do not affect the posi-
tion of the demand curve. We identify these cases as we move through the book.
Chapter 2
1. For a complete theoretical discussion of the conditions of perfect competi-
tion, see Graaff 1971.
2. Alternatively, although the market demand for a product might have its stan-
dard downward slope (meaning that the quantity consumers are willing and able to
buy varies inversely with market price), the ‹rms will each face a demand that is
in‹nitely (or perfectly) elastic.
3. If the price is above the intersection, a market surplus (equal to the amount
by which the amount offered on the market exceeds the amount demanded) will
appear, the result of which is price competition among the sellers. The price will
fall all the way to the intersection, and not just move toward the intersection. That
is, the price will not hold steady at some point above the intersection, or equilib-
rium, price, because each producer is so small relative to the market that no one
producer can withhold a part or even all of its output and keep the price from
falling all the way to the intersection. If any ‹rm were able to withhold its output,
and hold the price above the equilibrium price, the price would be above marginal
cost, and some ‹rm or ‹rms would move into the market, all without entry costs,
to grab the unexploited pro‹t on those last sales. The new entrants would ensure
that the quantity provided in the market would match the equilibrium quantity,
which means the market would not clear until the price falls to the equilibrium or
intersection level.
4. We rush to note in passing that if there truly were zero transaction costs
everywhere, then bargaining between buyers and sellers would also be pervasive,
which means that buyers could pay sellers not to collude and sellers could pay buy-
ers not to collude, if not colluding were wealth maximizing.
5. It’s worth noting here that economists often parrot the refrain, “There is no
such thing as a free lunch.” That adage has merit when it is intended to convey the
prevalence of cost in all matters. The Qe units produced in ‹gure 2.1 do have costs,
as indicated by the supply curve. At the same time, in a meaningful sense there is a
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gain to the market process, equal to the triangular area ABC, that is, in a sense, free
for the taking.
6. The inef‹ciency is limited to the triangular area EDC, and not the entire
area underneath the demand curve, because a presumption exists that when pro-
duction is restricted in this market, the resources are released to be used elsewhere.
The value of the goods in this market not produced is lost, but that loss is partially
offset by the value of goods produced in other markets by the released resources.
7. We go through the development of the monopoly model here only for the
bene‹t of those readers who might not remember their introduction to monopoly
theory.
8. The pure monopolist need not make a pro‹t in the short run. Consumers
might value the monopolist’s product so little that the ‹rm can’t ‹nd a price at
which it can cover its costs. However, if it doesn’t make a pro‹t, or doesn’t expect
to make one in the long run, then it will not stay in the market, a fact that encour-
ages the frequently heard comment, “All monopolies are (very) pro‹table.”
9. Normal pro‹t is that minimum level of payment that capital owners would
require in order not to shift their investment elsewhere. Firms receiving a book
pro‹t equal to normal pro‹t would be receiving an economic pro‹t of zero.
10. The monopolist’s marginal revenue curve (MR) is below and pivots away
from its demand because it must lower its price to sell more units. If it charges $10
and sells only one unit, and if it has to lower its price to $9 to sell two units, the
monopolist’s marginal revenue on the second unit is $8. This is because while it
sells the second unit for $9, it has to lower the price of the ‹rst unit to $9, or by a
dollar, in order to sell the second. Hence, the monopolist adds only $8 ($9 – $1) to
its total revenues. If the monopolist sells seven units at $7, and has to lower the
price to $6 to sell eight, its marginal revenue on the eighth unit is –$1 [$6 (the sell-
ing price) – $7, the reduction in revenue from the ‹rst seven units].
11. We add “beyond some point” in parentheses to acknowledge that the level
of inef‹ciency varies up and down as the demand curve moves from being perfectly
inelastic, where there is no market inef‹ciency, to perfectly elastic, where there is
(again) no market inef‹ciency. As the demand elasticity rises from zero to anything
above zero, initially the inef‹ciency of monopoly rises. Beyond some point, how-
ever, the inef‹ciency must fall off, just to get back down to zero.
12. See any standard textbook in microeconomic theory, for example, Pindyck
and Rubinfeld 2005, chap. 12.
13. For details of this point, see Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005, chap. 12.
14. Of course, this argument has to be carefully circumscribed, as Buchanan rec-
ognized (1973). This is because when the monopoly restricts output of “bads,”
street drugs, for example, it can drive up total expenditures that consumers’ drugs
must make for whatever quantity of the bads is made available. Hence, while the
Ma‹a can reduce the sale of criminalized goods, the Ma‹a can induce consumers to
commit more crimes (muggings and bank robberies) in order to fund their pur-
chases of criminalized goods.
15. However, it needs to be noted that estimates of the harm done by monopoly
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from production restricted below competitive levels and from prices above com-
petitive levels in the U.S. economy have been minor. Harberger (1954) estimated
the summation of Harberger triangles across all industries in the United States at
.1 percent of GDP. By including advertising expenditures as a part of monopoly
waste generated from efforts of producers to differentiate their products, Cowling
and Mueller (1978) came up with a larger estimate of the deadweight loss from
monopoly power in the U.S. economy. Ferguson (1988) put the estimated dead-
weight loss at 1 percent of GDP by including price distortions from regulations and
trade protection that give rise to market power and transfers of market surplus
value from consumers to producers.
16. At the same time, ‹rms such as Costco and Sam’s Club can have a pro‹t
incentive to organize and effectively operate on behalf of consumers interested in a
larger quantity through a cartel-like collective agreement. Such stores can build
memberships and negotiate with wholesalers that have market pricing power on
extended sales that are restricted to their members, who must pay an annual mem-
bership fee to remain among the eligible “cartel” of buyers.
17. The best, most ef‹cient outcome is for the rent seeking to take the form of
political campaign contributions that end up as cash transfers to those people who
are in a position to grant the monopoly privileges. The cash transfers mean that
real resources aren’t wasted. However, the cash transfers can give those in power all
the more incentive to grant additional monopoly privileges.
18. In his own words, Robbins de‹ned economics this way: “Economics, as we
have seen, is concerned with that aspect of behaviour which arises because of
scarcity of means to achieve given means” (1946, 24).
19. In trying to explain his point about the absence of choice in much economic
analysis, and to suggest how much “economics” is really applied mathematics,
Buchanan asks how a beginning economics student might be expected to respond
to the question, “What is the difference between an economic and a technological
problem?” Buchanan suggests the student would likely be given a good grade from
most principles teachers with this answer: “An economic problem arises when
mutually con›icting ends are present, and when choices must be made among
them. A technological problem, by comparison, is characterized by the fact that
there is only one end to be maximized. There is a single best or optimal solution.”
He would improve his grade with this example: “When the consumer ‹nds that she
has only $10 to spend in the supermarket, she confronts an economic problem in
choosing among the many competing products that are available for meeting
diverse ends and objectives. By contrast, the construction engineer has $1,000,000
allotted to build the dam to certain speci‹cations. There is only one best way to do
this; locating this way constitutes the technological problem.” Buchanan suggests
rightly that there is no difference in the two settings or, if there is a difference, it is
a difference of degree, not kind (1964, 24–25).
20. It should be noted that Robbins himself was quite emphatic about restricting
his conception of the discipline to the ways in which people use exchanges to solve
their scarcity problems (1946, chap. 1).
21. Our analysis extends McGee’s critique of monopoly theory. McGee
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explained how the rate of output and total size of a market over time can affect
industry concentration and monopoly prices and pro‹ts. He then explained how
the conventional presumption that industry concentration achieved because of
scale economies or mergers is inef‹cient because the dominant (monopoly) ‹rm
faces a downward-sloping demand curve can be found wanting because of its pos-
sibly wrongheaded policy solution.
The dissolution of such ‹rms would be a disservice to consumers and to
national strength. When ‹rms grow to sizes that create concentration or when
such structure is created by mergers and persists for many years, there is a very
strong prima facie case that the ‹rms’ sizes are related to ef‹ciency. By
ef‹ciency I mean “competitive effectiveness” within the bounds of the law, and
competitive effectiveness means service to consumers. If the leading ‹rms in a
concentrated industry are restricting their output in order to obtain prices
above the competitive level, their ef‹ciency must be suf‹ciently superior to
that of all actual and potential rivals to offset that behavior. Were this not the
case, rivals would be enabled to expand their market shares because of the
abnormally high prices and would thus deconcentrate the industry. (1971,
130)
While McGee is willing to admit that markets are not always perfect and that
monopolies might cause some market damage, he raises “grave doubt that econo-
mists, lawyers, courts, and regulators” can actually improve, on balance, on the
ef‹ciency level achieved by markets “freed of legal barriers” (1971, 130).
22. As pointed out in chapter 1, Schumpeter recognized the point we are stress-
ing here (1942, 104–5).
23. McGee makes much the same point this way.
If discovery is not costless, literally no one in the industry would bother him-
self with it. Its private cost is positive; but its private yield is zero. It yields
nothing, because emulation is costless and instantaneous. No discovery, how-
ever valuable to consumers, would get made except by pure accident—which
does not happen with perfect knowledge—since no one could pro‹t by mak-
ing it. A single-‹rm monopolist, on the other hand, faces better pay-off
prospects for research and invention, as would atomistic competitors under
conditions of frictions and long lags, and inventors facing a patent system that
gives monopoly rights to discovery. (1971, 101)
24. We assume that the demand rises by more than the cost curve because the
product improvement would not be instituted were that not the case.
25. The argument made here is similar to one made in organization economics,
which posits that the pay and bene‹ts of higher top executives of corporations must
be far higher than the pay of lower managers in order to properly incentivize the
lower managers to work hard in hopes of reaching the top management level (Mil-
grom and Roberts 1992; Murphy 1986; Jensen and Murphy 1990).
26. Put another way, entrepreneurs will look at the rate of return across their
portfolio of investments to determine whether to keep their resources where they
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are. The pro‹ts for their entire portfolios may be at a minimum level, given the
prospects of monopoly pro‹ts of some investments. If the prospect of monopoly
pro‹ts is wiped out at the same time that nothing is done to relieve the prospects of
failures, the entrepreneurs would have to generate higher returns from their non-
monopoly positions just to make up for the ventures that no longer can generate
lost monopoly pro‹ts. The normal pro‹ts on their nonmonopoly ventures can be
expected to rise because in the absence of higher normal pro‹ts, investment will be
constricted, which can be expected to lead to higher prices and higher normal
pro‹ts.
27. As Chamberlin made the point, “If sellers have regard to their total in›uence
upon price, the price will be the monopoly one. Independence of the producers and
the pursuit of their self-interest are not suf‹cient to lower it. Only if the number is
large enough to render negligible the effect of an adjustment by any one upon each
of the others is the equilibrium price the purely competitive one. If the market is
imperfect, however, true self-interest requires the neglect of the indirect in›uence
to a degree depending upon the degree of imperfection” (1933, 54).
28. Holt (2003) reviews key articles in experimental economics that evaluate how
competitive markets in laboratory and classroom settings move toward equilibrium
with only several rounds of bidding. When the subjects are few in number (say, ‹ve
or six), and individuals within the markets have the capacity to withhold their
assigned product from the market with the result that they can drive up prices, the
market prices may also start high, but will also quickly move toward the competitive
price, staying just slightly above the competitive price. See also Smith 1982.
29. McGee also shows that a market can be highly concentrated—even under a
single “natural monopoly”—even with upward sloping marginal and average cost
curves for production during a speci‹ed time, which is usually assumed for stan-
dard modeling. This can be the case when total sales over time can be limited, so
much so that no other, or few, producers are induced to enter the market, in spite
of the pro‹ts made by ‹rms in the market during the limited periods (1971, esp.
chap. 3). Similarly, Phillip Nelson (1970) argues that an industry can be monopo-
lized, or highly concentrated, because of the costs of searching for and assessing the
value of goods he identi‹es as “experience goods.” If the cost of searching for goods
and then experiencing them is relatively high, then consumers can be expected to
restrict their searches and test consumptions among the variety of available goods.
McGee explicitly asks, while Nelson implicitly questions, whether the monopoly
power exerted by ‹rms who operate under conditions of a limited total market over
time or who have downward sloping demand curves because of the limited searches
of consumers are truly “inef‹cient” in the sense described by the standard monop-
oly model. To make such ‹rms more ef‹cient in the limited sense of the monopoly
model would require a greater inef‹ciency that would come by expanding the array
of producers at greater costs than the bene‹ts that can be reaped.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 is a signi‹cantly revised version of the authors’ chapter in a book in
honor of Gordon Tullock (McKenzie and Lee 2000).
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1. See Browning and Zupan (1996, chap. 12).
2. Our analysis is grounded in Coase’s classic work on the theory of the ‹rm
(1937) and in the considerable literature on institutional-organization economics
spawned by Coase’s work, a literature that, despite the date of Coase’s original con-
tribution, didn’t truly begin ›ourishing until the late 1970s.
3. The authors have covered principal-agent theory, along with various solu-
tions, in some detail in their 1998 book. See also Roberts 2004.
4. For discussions of the impact of group size on incentives, see Tullock 1965,
Olson 1965, and Radner 1987. For example, Tullock (1965, 132) states, “Yet most
of the members of the hierarchy may be doing things that are either opposed to
[the principal’s] desires or, at best, neutral. The dif‹culty here arises because in a
large hierarchy, the persons within it will be doing far more things than can be
ordered by any one man, regardless of his rank, diligence, and ability. Those orders
that he directly issues will represent only a very small part of the total ‘output’ of
the organization, which must, by necessity, operate on the basis of established deci-
sion rules.” 
5. See Tullock 1965, Alchian and Demsetz 1972, and Fama 1980 for a discus-
sion of the role of shirking and other forms of agency costs in organizational the-
ory.
6. Granted, in imperfectly competitive markets, agency costs might exist. Still,
we would expect agency costs to rise with the monopolization of the market, given
that the agency problems become more severe with more people in the ‹rm and
with a shift in the roles that are played by ‹rm members.
7. Johnson and Libecap (1989) evaluate the issue of salary growth in protected
markets in the context of highly protected government monopolies.
8. Jensen (1986) recognizes the ef‹ciency problems that are bound to arise as
monopoly pro‹ts (which will be realized in the form of free cash ›ow) emerge with
curbs in production. We also noted in chapter 1 how Adam Smith seems to have
recognized our point that we make in the language of modern principal-agent the-
ory. Smith saw monopoly as “a great enemy to good management” (1776, bk. 1,
chap. 11, ¶ 14), noting elsewhere, “The high rate of pro‹t seems every where to
destroy that parsimony which in other circumstances is natural to the character of
the merchant. When pro‹ts are high that sober virtue seems to be super›uous and
expensive luxury to suit better the af›uence of his situation” (1776, bk. 4, chap. 7,
¶ 147).
9. Pay rules that tie pay in law ‹rms to years of seniority, not to the market or
productivity (Gilson and Mnookin 1985), or that reduce the dispersion of pay
among academic workers have been explained as a means of reducing internal orga-
nizational rent seeking (Pfeffer and Langton 1988).
10. Gurbaxani and Whang (1991) discuss the various ways in which computers
and communication systems have improved monitoring and reduced agency and
monitoring costs.
11. This possibility is remote when the competitive output occurs in the inelas-
tic portion of the market demand curve. In such cases, since the marginal revenue
curve is negative at QC, the marginal agency cost would have to be large enough to
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cause the cartel’s marginal cost also to be negative (less than the negative marginal
revenue) at QC. Marginal agency cost is unlikely to be this large for the ‹rst little
bit of output reduction below QC.
12. The condition in (4) appears to suggest that pro‹ts could be increased by
expanding output above the competitive level. But this is not the case. The inequal-
ity in (4) holds in only one direction: for reductions in output. In the other direc-
tion (an increase in output), there is no marginal agency cost (C2 = 0), and the
inequality in (4) is reversed.
Chapter 4
1. Also, one of the authors (McKenzie) has written a book on the Microsoft
case (2000).
2. For a detailed discussion of the Microsoft antitrust case, see McKenzie 2000.
3. One of the authors, McKenzie (2000), has challenged the presumed avail-
ability of 70,000 Windows applications, mainly on the grounds that the applica-
tions count was noted in passing at a trial by a former head of Compaq as the count
of applications developed since the ‹rst days MS-DOS became available. In addition,
the count includes large numbers of applications that are better characterized as
“applets” rather than full-›edged “applications,” such as Word, that the term appli-
cations commonly connotes. McKenzie has also noted that most computer users use
only a handful of applications, which suggests that the operating system market is
far more open to challenge than supposed by the judge and the Justice Department,
if Microsoft acted like a monopolist. The key point addressed here is that the pre-
sumed existence of a substantial applications entry barrier led many on the prose-
cution’s side in the case to deduce that Microsoft’s business practices could have
only had an anticompetitive intent and effect, which means they were necessarily
detrimental to consumers.
4. Tullock (1972) was mainly concerned with “rationally ignorant voters” who
remained largely uninformed about political candidates’ positions on relevant pol-
icy issues in elections. He attributed voters’ ignorance to the fact that voters might
anticipate few bene‹ts to seeing one political candidate win the election over any
other and to the fact that any individual’s vote was unlikely to in›uence the out-
come of any election. Hence, the costs to voters of becoming informed typically far
exceeded their expected personal payoff. Similarly, consumers might reason that
there is no expected payoff to their becoming informed about Microsoft’s monop-
oly position, since individual consumers cannot in›uence Microsoft’s pricing and
output policies.
5. It needs to be noted that at the time Bork published his book, the available
evidence on the relative size of the deadweight loss from monopolies in the United
States was minor, no more than 1 percent, and possibly as low as .1 percent (see
Harberger 1954; Cowling and Mueller 1981). Moreover, the measured social
bene‹ts of antitrust enforcement were hard to identify. See Winston 2006 for a
review of this literature.
6. Schumpeter might agree that such “market means” could include (but are
not limited to) ownership of key resources (including both material resources and
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human capital), branding, superior products and organizations that cannot be eas-
ily duplicated, network effects, lock-ins, economies of scale and scope, and trade
secrets.
7. For theoretical discussions of network effects, see Arthur 1989, 1990, 1996.
Also, our discussion of how network goods force a rethinking of monopoly theory
applies, in varying degrees, to discussions of experience goods (Nelson 1970), addi-
tive goods (Becker and Murphy 1988), and lagged-demand goods (Lee and
Kreutzer 1982), all of which presume a tie between current and future consumption
levels, or the consumption of the good today and the demand in later periods.
8. In addition, if ‹rms produce complementary goods, then they might under-
standably think of the marginal cost of the good in question as negative, following
the analysis of Benjamin Klein (1999). This is because the additional revenue on
the additional copies of complementary goods sold, when more copies of the good
in question are sold, can be construed as a reduction in the marginal cost of the
good in question. When Microsoft lowers the price of Windows to sell more
copies, then it can expect to sell more copies of Of‹ce (and a host of other back-
of‹ce software programs). In pricing Windows, Microsoft could understandably
see the revenue received from additional copies of Of‹ce as a reduction in the mar-
ginal cost of Windows. There are, in other words, (extreme) economies of scale on
the supply side.
9. See Dupuit 1844, Hotelling 1938, and Romer 1994.
10. Indeed, Tullock (1980) writes that it is even possible for the winning rent
seeker (or aspiring network sponsor) to spend (lose) more acquiring the monopoly
position than it is worth in higher pro‹ts.
11. In Romer’s words, “In competitive markets, prices work at the margin. If
good Z already existed, then prices that are equal to marginal cost give the right
signals about how much of Z to use in this production process. But these prices do
not attach the correct overall value to the associated bundle of goods, and cannot
be used as a guide in the decision about whether or not to incur a cost and invent
good Z” (1994, 16).
12. Romer (1994, 25) then points out that direct evidence of the importance of
‹xed cost is available from Teece 1977.
13. The Landes and Posner formula for monopoly power is




j (1 – Sj )).
Where:
Pm = monopoly price, Pc = competitive price (marginal cost), Sj = ‹rm’s 
market share, edm = market elasticity of demand, and e
s
j = elasticity of 
supply of competing or fringe ‹rms
14. As the district court found, after noting that new operating systems might
survive in narrow market segments, “Still, while a niche operating system might
turn a pro‹t, the chicken-and-egg problem (hereinafter referred to as the ‘applica-
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tions barrier to entry’) would make it prohibitively expensive for a new Intel-com-
patible operating system to attract enough developers and consumers to become a
viable alternative to a dominant incumbent in less than a few years” ( Jackson 1999,
¶ 31). This is because the available Windows applications would discourage
investors from trying to secure the necessary funding to develop the requisite
(large) number of applications and because consumers would encounter switching
costs, to which we will return later.
15. We need to make note here of another paradox. A ‹rm in a market with a zero
marginal cost structure would seek out markets with entry costs. But if there are entry
costs that bar other ‹rms from entry, how is the ‹rst ‹rm going to get in the market
in the ‹rst place? The answer to the riddle is that the ‹rst entrant must be able to cre-
ate and nurture barriers to entry after entry. This is basically what is done in the case
of patents or copyrights. The patent or copyright holder obtains what is nothing
more than arti‹cial, government-enforced market protection that is, we might add,
not challengeable by antitrust enforcers. Those ‹rms that have to create and nurture
their own barriers to entry are, of course, open to antitrust prosecution.
16. At the time of this writing, the actual complaint document was sealed for
legal reasons. The quotation was taken from the “summary of the complaint”
(CCIA 2003, n.p.). 
17. Several scholars have expressed concern that over the last ‹fty or more years,
the limited monopoly rights of copyrights especially have been made unlimited, for
all practical purposes, or have at least extended the implied monopoly privileges
beyond what is required to provide adequate incentives for product development.
See Lessig 2001 and Vaidhyanathan 2001.
18. Granted, pirates cannot escape some development costs, given that they do
have to establish Web sites and other distributional systems, as well as make the
pirated copies look, sound, and feel like the originals.
19. Piracy can cause the original producers’ demand and, hence, prices to rise or
fall over time, depending on the relative magnitude of obvious offsetting effects.
One study of the word processing market in England found that between 1987 and
1992, researchers for a software developer found that 85 percent of the growth in
one ‹rm’s copies in use were pirated, but they also found that 80 percent of the
copies sold were attributable to the network effects of the pirated copies (Givon,
Mahajan, and Muller 1999). In another study of piracy of music, researchers found
from regression analysis that while the music industry lamented billions of dollars
in lost revenues from nearly two billion pirated copies of music, the actual losses
were much less due primarily to the fact that, as they found, one pirated copy
reduced world sales of CDs in 1998 by .42 units. The worldwide falloff in industry
revenues attributable to piracy (after adjusting for other factors) was no more than
6.6 percent (Hui and Png 2002). 
20. Among the proposed remedies, the CCIA seeks “a requirement to unbundle
illegally bundled products and to refrain from future bundling,” plus a breakup of
Microsoft (CCIA 2003, 19).
21. Bill Gates started his keynote address in on December 7, 1995, with these
words.
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Well, good morning. I was realizing this morning that December 7th is kind
of a famous day. [Laughter.] Fifty-four years ago or something. And I was try-
ing to think if there were any parallels to what was going on here. And I really
couldn’t come up with any. The only connection I could think of at all was that
probably the most intelligent comment that was made on that day wasn’t made
on Wall Street, or even by any type of that analyst; it was actually Admiral
Yamomoto, who observed that he feared they had awakened a sleeping giant.
[Laughter.]
Well, the Internet is a very exciting development. It’s sort of the beginning
of a world of electronic communications. In any phenomenon like this you get
long periods of time where people anticipate it, and yet there isn’t critical
mass. There’s not enough users, so there isn’t enough content; there’s not
enough content, so there isn’t enough users. (1)
He continued later in his talk,
So the Internet, the competition will be kind of, once again, embrace and
extend, and we will embrace all the popular Internet protocols. Anything that
a signi‹cant number of publishers are using and taking advantage of we will
support. We will do some extensions to those things. (5)
Chapter 5
A version of this paper was published by the authors in the Hastings Law Journal
(Lee and McKenzie 2001).
1. Fax machines and computer operating systems are two of the more obvious
examples of goods with network effects, which we have cited in prior chapters.
However, it has been pointed out that many other products—for example, some
books—also exhibit network effects, given that readers gain the added bene‹ts of
being able to discuss the book when many others read the same one (Frank and
Cook 1995).
2. District Court Judge Thomas Pen‹eld Jackson described the switching costs
involved in the operating system market this way (1999, ¶ 20). 
Since only Intel-compatible PC operating systems will work with Intel-com-
patible PCs, a consumer cannot opt for a non-Intel-compatible PC operating
system without obtaining a non-Intel-compatible PC. Thus, for consumers
who already own an Intel-compatible PC system, the cost of switching to a
non-Intel compatible PC operating system includes the price of not only a
new operating system, but also a new PC and new peripheral devices. It also
includes the effort of learning to use the new system, the cost of acquiring a
new set of compatible applications, and the work of replacing ‹les and docu-
ments that were associated with the old applications. Very few consumers
would incur these costs in response to the trivial increase in the price of an
Intel-compatible PC system that would result from even a substantial increase
in the price of an Intel-compatible PC operating system. For example, users of
Intel-compatible PC operating systems would not switch in large numbers to
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the Mac OS in response to even a substantial, sustained increase in the price of
an Intel-compatible PC operating system.
3. Michael Porter (1980, 10) simply asserts that a “barrier to entry is created by
switching costs,” while Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro add details on how switch-
ing costs translate into an entry barrier: “The relationship-speci‹c assets [associ-
ated with ‹nding and establishing a working tie with a new supplier] create switch-
ing costs for a buyer changing from one supplier to another. Evidently, such brand
loyalty gives the seller some monopoly power: in the absence of effective long-term
contracts a buyer is open to exploitation by an opportunistic seller who could raise
the price above competitors’ by an amount almost equal to the buyer’s switching
costs” (1998, 123; emphasis in the original).
4. MIT economist Frederick Warren-Bolton, one of the Justice Department’s
chief economists on the Microsoft antitrust case, described the switching costs
involved in the operating system market this way.
A second barrier both to entry [in addition to the barrier created by the devel-
opment costs of a new operating system] and to expansion by an existing com-
petitor is that users tend to become “locked in” to a particular operating sys-
tem. As discussed above, users are reluctant to switch from Windows to
another operating system, even another PC operating system, because to do so
requires them to replace application software, to convert ‹les, and to learn
how to operate the new software. Often, switching operating systems also
means replacing or modifying hardware. Businesses can face even greater
switching costs, as they must integrate PCs using the new operating systems
and application software within their PC networks and train their employees
to use the new software. Accordingly, both personal and corporate consumers
are extremely reluctant to change PC operating systems. The software “lock-
in” phenomenon creates a barrier to entry for new PC operating systems to
the extent that consumers’ estimate of the switching costs is large relative to
the perceived incremental value of the new operating system.
Additional switching costs arise from the fact that, for most users, operating
systems are only a means to an end—it is the application software that was
designed to work with the operating system that users want. Once they have
purchased an operating system, users are naturally reluctant to consider a dif-
ferent operating system. Unless their current operating system product pre-
vents them from using new applications or hardware, they are likely to con-
tinue to use that operating system; for operating systems, unlike other goods,
do not wear out. (2000, ¶¶ 49, 50)
5. One study found that a quarter of the additional pro‹t Norwegian banks
made from additional borrowers could be attributed to their customers’ switching
costs.
6. Liebowitz and Margolis (1990, 1995) also argue that contrary to widely
repeated conventional wisdom, VHS tape-recording format did not win out over
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the Beta format in spite of its (VHS’s) inferiority, but did so because the VHS for-
mat was able to capture entire movies on a single tape. See also Liebowitz and Mar-
golis 1994; Rohlfs 2001, chap. 6.
7. Klemperer (1989) has argued that with switching costs, price wars are likely.
Indeed, the intensity of the price wars can be a function of the switching costs.
8. Of course, as has been noted by Farrell and Shapiro (1998) and Klemperer
(1988), the entrenched producer’s pricing strategy can result in the entry of new
producers that have higher production costs than the entrenched producer, which
can give rise to another form of inef‹ciency, offsetting partially the ef‹ciency gains
from the expanded number of producers and expanded sales.
9. The analysis here, which suggests that network effects lead to suppressed
initial prices, is similar to the work of Lee and Kreutzer (1982), who developed a
theory of lagged demand, and Becker and Murphy (1988), who were concerned
with the development of a theory of rational addiction.
10. The effect of the threat is particularly detrimental to consumer welfare when
all or most costs of production are up-front costs, that is, the marginal cost of pro-
duction is zero, or close to zero (which is presumed to be the case in many lines of
software, especially operating systems, given that copies of an operating system can
be loaded on new computers by original equipment manufacturers by simply copy-
ing ‹les from one computer to the next with few material resources and little time
involved). In the absence of lock-ins, or switching costs, potential network sponsors
would be reluctant to make the up-front investment in the development of their
products for fear that their investments would rightfully be treated as sunk costs in
ongoing competitive struggles with other ‹rms in which the price would be pushed
toward marginal cost, which is close or equal to zero (Klemperer 1989; Katz and
Shapiro 1985).
11. Benjamin Klein (1999) has developed a similar line of argument, but using
graphical techniques, to explain why a ‹rm with complementary products might
charge subzero prices, which leads to the conclusion that a breakup of the ‹rm can
lead to positive prices.
12. It should be pointed out that the ef‹ciency conditions in (7) are not practi-
cally possible since they call for prices to be less than marginal cost (zero) and aver-
age cost until period T.
Chapter 6
This chapter is a substantially revised and extended discussion of the authors’ work
published in the Southern Economic Journal (Lee and McKenzie 1998).
1. Of course, as noted in the last chapter, a producer of a network good might
lower its current price in order to boost future demand and charge a higher, even
monopoly price in the future. The higher future monopoly price can be welfare
enhancing because it can induce network good producers to lower their current
prices by more than otherwise and can give rise to a faster-than-otherwise devel-
opment of the network.
2. It has also been argued (Bittlingmayer 1985) that the necessity for some
Notes to Pages 98–112 251
cooperation between ‹rms in high-‹xed-cost/low-marginal-cost industries ex-
plains why enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act (in particular court decisions
against price ‹xing) led to the merger wave of 1898 through 1902.
3. We ignore concerns such as those that the shipment of unstable explosives
or deadly poisons might arouse in the owners of other cargo.
4. The Juniper Island Club, a private club located off the Florida coast, illus-
trates the value people can place on associating with what they consider a preferred
set of people while at leisure. The club is one of the country’s most exclusive
resorts, and although this exclusivity has been achieved primarily by a highly
restrictive admissions policy, it is reinforced with a steep admissions charge. And
although the club’s amenities are nice, the Wall Street Journal (Parcelle 1995, A7)
pointed out that “the lure of the club has never been swank facilities. Its chief
appeal is in its exclusivity.”
5. We don’t want to overemphasize the difference between the cost of provid-
ing a package of extras (or frills) at expensive hotels and the value of those extras to
guests. Because of competition, hotels are strongly motivated to provide those
extras that, for any given cost, provide as much real value to their guests as possi-
ble. But this is consistent with a hotel being able to realize a competitive advantage
by increasing the supply of extras into the range where the extras themselves are
worth less to the guests than they are paying for them because of the screening
bene‹t provided by the extra charge.
6. The quantity and quality of the facility and amenities obviously in›uence the
demand (and therefore the average revenue, with respect to the number of guests,
the hotel can generate) and the average cost of accommodating guests (which in
equilibrium equals average revenue). A hotel with a facility of a given physical
quantity and quality may not be able to generate enough revenues to cover costs in
an existing location, regardless of how well it responds to higher-income clients.
Such a hotel may, however, become viable by letting its facility decline in quality,
for example, and appealing to a different type of client.
7. As drawn, these demand curves are assumed to be quite price elastic, sug-
gesting a signi‹cant degree of competition between hotels, competition of the type
commonly thought to drive prices down to marginal cost in periods of excess
capacity.
8. Obviously the price intervals associated with these three client-effect
responses to price vary with the quality of the hotel. Even for a very low-quality
hotel, some positive client (demand) effect exists as price increases above zero and
the facility ceases to be an unrationed homeless shelter. But at quite low prices, the
positive client effect from price increases at such hotels will cease because low-
quality hotels aren’t demanded by those able and willing to pay high rates to stay in
luxury hotels with other guests with similar preferences.
9. The approach here is identical to that employed by Leibenstein (1950) in his
development of a demand curve re›ecting what he called the Veblen effect (an
effect caused by a perceived prestige in consuming higher-priced goods that is
independent of the inherent quality of the good). Though the construction of the
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demand curve is formally the same in the case of both the Veblen and client effects,
it should be emphasized that the client effect has a very real in›uence on the inher-
ent quality of the good or service being demanded.
10. Indeed, it is possible that the equilibrium demand curve becomes positively
sloped over some price range. This possibility is developed and discussed by
Leibenstein (1950) in his analysis of the Veblen effect and is an interesting curios-
ity. A positively sloped demand curve is not necessary to the primary conclusion of
this chapter, however, and we note it only in passing.
11. A zero marginal cost up to the hotel’s capacity is obviously unrealistic, but it
strengthens the primary conclusion of the chapter by assuming a cost situation that
makes the temptation to engage in ruinous competition during periods of off-peak
demand as large as possible.
12. This is completely consistent with hotels facing highly elastic demand curves
for any given mix of clienteles. Attempts to capture customers from other hotels by
lowering the room rate aren’t very effective because they alter the clientele mix
adversely. 
13. Although this chapter is not concerned with optimal hotel capacity, the
moderating in›uence of the client effect on price competition is relevant to the
consideration of capacity. If the peak-demand curve applied year round, capacity
would be increased to the level that allowed the maximum pro‹ts to be realized
with this peak demand. Let this level be represented by Cp. But if an off-peak
demand curve applies for part of the year, the optimal capacity is less than Cp. At
some point before capacity Cp is reached, the increase in pro‹ts during the peak
season from a marginal increase in capacity will be less than the resulting decrease
in pro‹ts during the off-peak season. This point will obviously be reached sooner,
if excess capacity results in price competition driving rates down to ruinous levels,
than it will be in the situation described here. Therefore, another implication of the
moderating in›uence of the client effect on hotel rates is that hotel capacity will be
greater than would otherwise be the case.
14. Such screening is far from perfect, as anyone who has attended a convention
knows. Also, lower convention rates may re›ect cost considerations that come from
dealing with a large group through one contact person, the advantages of more
demand certainty, and the extra pro‹ts conventions generate from the use of con-
ference facilities.
15. We want to thank Don Boudreaux for suggesting this implication of the
analysis. It should be noted that some of the Ivy League colleges have been accused
of conspiring to ‹x maximum ‹nancial aid payments (tuition reductions) to stu-
dents. Whether such a conspiracy had a signi‹cant effect on tuition revenues is
subject to some controversy, but it does suggest another explanation for high
tuition payments. We believe, however, that the client effect is a more important
factor behind high tuition payments and one that has received far less attention.
16. What we are calling the client effect is commonly referred to as the peer group
effect when applied to education. Some economists (Summers and Wolfe 1977;
Henderson, Mieskowski, and Sauvageau 1978) have found signi‹cant peer group
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effects in education. Others (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992) are more cautious in
their conclusions, while being careful not to deny the existence of peer-group
effects.
17. Epple and Romano (1998) have developed a model of competition between
private and public schools that incorporates positive peer-group effects.
18. According to one article ( Jennings 1994), passengers can actually ‹nd them-
selves paying more for a full-fare coach ticket than they would for a ‹rst-class ticket
on the same ›ight.
19. The major airlines have attempted to counter price sensitivity with fre-
quent-›yer programs and special promotions for their elite customers. Of course,
these programs have been a factor in reducing the price differential between ‹rst-
class and coach service.
20. The importance of the client effect on international ›ights was brought
home to one of the authors a few years ago when he was ›ying economy class to
Europe on a ›ight containing a large number of very excited and, soon, quite intox-
icated college students.
21. Klein and Lef›er (1981) developed a model that considers a variety of ways,
including high prices, that suppliers can provide a credible signal on the quality of
products. But their model does not consider the client effect nor how high prices
can improve the quality of a product (or service) through that effect.
22. We are grateful to David Haddock for suggesting the soccer example and
providing us with the information just discussed.
23. For reviews of the extensive principal-agent literature, see Milgrom and
Roberts 1992, chap. 5; Rubin 1990; and Roberts 2004, chaps. 3–5.
24. Alternatively put, the pro‹ts reduce the need for ‹rms to incur other costs of
developing bonds or hostages, which means that some of the monopoly pro‹ts can
be seen as cost reductions.
25. For the development of these and other arguments in an underpricing
model, with illustrative examples, see Haddock and McChesney 1994.
26. Becker (1991) also uses his analysis to explain why excess demand for sport-
ing events, plays, concerts, and books is often increased by price increases.
27. This example comes from Landsburg 1993, 12–13.
Chapter 7
1. For those readers new to supply-and-demand curve models, the quantity of
labor supplied would just match the quantity of labor demanded, meaning the mar-
ket would clear. The wage rate goes to Wc because if the wage rate were above Wc in
a competitive market, there would be more labor available than there would be
workers hired, with the resulting labor-market surplus pushing the wage rate down
to Wc. If the wage rate were below Wc, the quantity of workers demanded would be
greater than the quantity of workers available, the effect of which would be to push
the wage rate upward toward Wc.
2. For more details on the development of the monopsony model in graphical
form, see McKenzie and Lee 2006, chap. 13.
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3. The workers who are forced to go elsewhere would earn more than the wage
offered by the monopsony, but their contribution to the value of production (or
their marginal revenue product) would be worth less than their value working for
the monopsony. One has to wonder, however, how the monopsony could get by
without paying the competitive wage if workers are able to move freely among
markets. If the marginal workers could go elsewhere and earn more than the
monopsony wage, then the workers the monopsony hires could, presumably, do
the same, which would force the wages in the alternative markets to fall and the
monopsony wage to rise.
4. Also, the monopsony can do better than the monopsony employment level
by wage discrimination, paying workers hired beyond Qm a wage equal to the com-
petitive wage Wc. Wage discrimination requires, of course, that the wage differ-
ences among workers are kept quiet and/or that workers hired at the monopsony
wage rate cannot leave and be rehired at the higher competitive wage rate.
5. A minimum wage imposed on a monopsony market can actually lead to an
expansion of the monopsony’s employment. Consider a minimum wage imposed at
the intersection of the supply and demand for labor Wc (‹g. 7.1). Because the
monopsony has no control over the wage, Wc is the marginal cost of labor up to Qc.
This means monopsony’s then pro‹t maximization employment will be Qc, and the
marginal value of each additional unit of labor up to Qc will be greater than the mar-
ginal cost of labor, or the minimum wage. Hence, a minimum wage set at Wc can
raise employment from Qm to Qc.
6. We consider monopsonies only in local labor markets because we frankly
can’t imagine private ‹rms that could or would ever be a monopsony in the national
market.
7. For documentation and extensive discussion on the growth in the mobility
of resources on a world scale, see McKenzie and Lee 1991.
Chapter 8
1. Two bills were introduced in the House of Representatives in the 99th Con-
gress to establish a joint congressional committee to advise the Congress on “the
balance between athletics and academics . . . in particular the need for establishing
stricter eligibility and academic requirements for athletes, and less frequent and
fewer competitive events to allow for greater pursuit of academic goals by athletes,
and the role of regulation and enforcement in the areas of athletic recruiting,
‹nancing, and scheduling.” H.R. 5213, 5484, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see 132
Cong. Rec. H4690 (daily ed. July 22, 1986) (statement of Rep. Luken). 
2. See Alchian and Allen 1977, 210–12.
3. Becker concludes, “The NCAA’s efforts to justify its restrictions on compe-
tition for athletes should be viewed with suspicion because of the ‹nancial bene‹ts
colleges receive from football, basketball, and other sports. I would have expected
greater hostility from Congress and the courts to a policy that lowers earnings of
young African-Americans and other athletes with limited opportunities” (1985,
18). We suggest that the critics’ (including Becker’s) case against the NCAA’s
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restrictions should be viewed with suspicion because of the absence of hostility
toward the restrictions by Congress and the courts. One might think that the
courts and Congress would be predisposed to favor the critics’ case, given that
minorities are supposedly harmed most by the restrictions. For additional ways
economists have traditionally criticized the NCAA, see also Becker 1987; Koch
1973, 1983; Fleisher, Goff, Shughart, and Tollison 1988.
4. See also Editorial, New York Times 1985, 22.
5. See also Yoder 1985, A4.
6. Nothing in our argument suggests that the NCAA member colleges should
not make payments over and above tuition as well as room and board. Our thesis is
simply that market forces can be expected to determine the extent of payment. (At
the time the journal article on which this chapter is based was being completed in
the mid-1980s, the NCAA was preparing to consider at its annual meeting a pro-
posal to allow Division 1-A colleges to make modest payments of $50 to $100 a
month to their athletes to cover laundry and similar expenses.) A requirement that
the NCAA be forced to allow payments of any particular amount, or through the
abolition of rules against bidding for athletes, is misguided.
7. To be more precise, in 2004, the United States had over 4,200 degree-grant-
ing institutions, 2,500 of which were four-year colleges and universities and 1,700
of which were two-year granting institutions (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2007,
table 267). Many of the colleges and universities did not have major sports pro-
grams. Only 1,250 of the total colleges and universities are members of the NCAA.
However, they all would be potential competitors for athletes, given that all of them
could develop sports programs if athletes were materially underpaid.
8. For example, Becker (1987) writes, “The NCAA’s efforts to justify its
restrictions on competition for athletes should be viewed with suspicion because
they increase the ‹nancial bene‹ts colleges receive from football, basketball, and
other sports. I would have expected greater hostility from Congress and the courts
to a policy that lowers the earnings of young blacks and other athletes with limited
opportunities.” McCormick (1985, 27) notes: “Some student athletes, especially
blacks, come from very poor families. The NCAA only allows school scholarships
to pay for tuition, room and board, and books, and prohibits students from work-
ing during the school year. One would think that administrators would be ashamed
to prevent these students from being given small sums that would allow them to
dress and socialize like the more well-heeled students. Perhaps it salves the con-
sciences of some university presidents to deplore the plight of black workers in
South Africa because of the exploitation they promote on their campuses.”
9. In technical terms, the labor-market competition results in reciprocal “pecu-
niary externalities” imposed by colleges on each other.
10. See Fleisher, Shughart, and Tollison 1989.
11. Nonathletic members of the colleges’ administrations and faculties are
thought to support the NCAA wages rules because of the presumed transfer of
rents from the athletic programs to the nonathletic programs.
12. Although it may be true that coaches’ winning records affect their salaries, it
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is not at all obvious that a cartelized market for student-athletes should be expected
to lead to compensation packages for coaches that are higher overall than they
would be in absence of the cartelized markets. This is because, presumably, the car-
tel checks how many student-athletes are hired. We can only surmise that such a
curb on employment will curb the demand for coaches, because fewer players and
perhaps fewer games would be available to coach. The concomitant decrease in the
demand for coaches could be expected to translate into lower compensation pack-
ages for coaches. The NCAA critics have never argued, to our knowledge, that the
coaches have responded by monopolizing their market, although such an argument
could be implicit in their presumption that coaches’ compensation packages are
elevated by the restrictions on the student-athletes’ labor market. However, what
happens to coaches’ compensation packages is not clear. We suppose that the
NCAA critics could argue that the coaches have control over the distribution of
their universities’ share of the NCAA’s cartel rents. Perhaps. But maybe not. Uni-
versity presidents and faculties, as a matter of organizational structure of the
NCAA, have ultimate control over what the NCAA does, which, according to the
NCAA critics, explains the widespread support of university presidents and facul-
ties for the NCAA rules. If presidents and faculty have ultimate control, the critics
have to expand their arguments to include an explanation for why presidents and
faculty would be more inclined to share their rents with coaches whose overall
labor-market demand is suppressed by NCAA rules. Such a line of argument has
not been made.
13. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison write only about the “violence” prevalent in
football. They do not say whether the deaths and injuries in 1905 were the results
of on-the-‹eld or off-the-‹eld ‹ghts, the use of approved or unapproved weapons
in games, or the consequences of poorly constructed equipment (1992, 38–39).
14. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison write, “Once an association is organized, given
that the initial organizational costs are borne, the marginal costs of agreeing to
extend the scale and scope of the association are low” (1992, 21). Perhaps this is
true of the “marginal costs of agreeing to extend the scale and scope” (emphasis
added). However, Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison explain at some length how the
expansion of any organization designed to restrict output and increase rents leads
to an increase in the incentive of members to cheat and the actual occurrences of
cheating. The increase in the potential for cheating can dramatically increase the
enforcement costs (1992, chap. 5).
15. See also Greenspan 1988, nn. 125, 158, 199, 308, the source of much of the
Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison data on sports attendance and television contracts.
16. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison write, “As cartel theory suggests, the return to
producers from collusion on inputs and outputs is greater as the demand for the
‹nal product grows. The demand growth for college sports over this period
increased the bene‹ts of an effective enforcement mechanism across institutions”
(1992, 51).
17. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison write, “In effect, these schools grandfathered
themselves into control of the enforcement apparatus and over time have remained
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in control of NCAA committees.” This means that enforcement actions will “gen-
erally be directed against schools which show an improvement in winning percent-
age and thereby threaten the status and rents of the traditional football powers”
(1992, 133).
18. The presumption of a ‹rst-mover advantage in collegiate athletics may be
no more correct than was the presumption of a ‹rst-mover advantage in a host of
other industries. Tellis and Golder (2002) found in their study of sixty-six indus-
tries that the ‹rst movers in sixty-two industries had been long replaced by second
and third movers. That is to say, being a ‹rst mover does not provide ‹rms with
secured locks on their markets.
19. Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison write that in spite of all the oppression they cite
in college athletics, “yet the NCAA as a cartel does not receive any air or press time.
Without a theory of media behavior, we simply must conclude that the answer to
the media’s paradoxical behavior in the case of the NCAA lies elsewhere” (1992,
152). As an aside, if the analysis in the Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison book is truly
meant to be exclusively “positive,” as opposed to “normative” (1992, 144), we must
wonder how the media behavior can be deemed “paradoxical.”
20. Schumpeter explained what he meant by the original “Vision,” “Though
prescienti‹c, it [the perception of a set of related phenomena] is not preanalytic. It
does not simply consist of perceiving facts by one of our senses. These facts must
be recognized as having some meaning or relevance that justi‹es our interest in
them and they must be recognized as related—so that we might separate them from
others—which involves some analytic work by our fancy or common sense” (1949,
350). This “mixture” of perceptions and prescienti‹c separation of related from
unrelated observations is what he meant by “Vision” (350). 
21. In the case of Adam Smith and his immediate followers, the original “vision”
was more or less informal. In the case of modern economics extending from
Schumpeter’s time to the present, the original vision has been captured in more
formal “model building,” which “consists in picking out certain facts rather than
others, in pinning them down by labeling them, in accumulating further facts in
order not only to supplement but in part also to replace those originally fastened
upon, in formulating and improving the relations perceived—brie›y, in ‘factual’
and ‘theoretical’ research that go on in an endless chain of give and take, the facts
suggesting new analytic instruments (theories) and these in turn carrying us toward
the recognition of new facts” (1949, 350).
22. In Schumpeter’s words, “For ideologies are not simply lies; they are truthful
statements about what a man thinks he sees. Just as the medieval knight saw him-
self as he wished to see himself and just as the modern bureaucrat does the same
and just as both fail to see whatever may be adduced against their seeing themselves
as defenders of the weak and innocent and the sponsors of the Common Good, so
every other social group develops a protective ideology which is nothing if not sin-
cere. Ex hypothesi we are not aware of our rationalizations—how then is it possible
to recognize and guard against them?” (1949, 349; emphasis in the original).
23. For the purpose of emphasizing here Schumpeter’s concern over the alle-
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giance economists show monopoly as a theoretical construct, we repeat one of our
favorite passages from Schumpeter’s “Science and Ideology.”
A majority of economists would subscribe to Molina’s dictum: monopolium est
injustum et rei publicae injuriosum [a monopoly is an injustice and a real public
injury]. But it is not this value judgment which is relevant to my argument—
one may dislike modern largest-scale business exactly as one may dislike many
other features of modern civilization—but the analysis that leads up to it, and
the ideological in›uence this analysis displays. Anyone who has read Mar-
shall’s Principles . . . should know that among the innumerable patterns that are
covered by those terms are many of which bene‹t and not injury to economic
ef‹ciency and the consumer’s interest ought to be predicated. More modern
analysis permits to show still more clearly that no sweeping or unquali‹ed
statement can be true for all of them; and that the mere fact of size, single-sell-
ership, discrimination, and cooperative price setting are in themselves inade-
quate for asserting that the resulting performance is, in any relevant sense of
the word, inferior to the one which could be expected under pure competition
in conditions attainable under pure competition—in other words, that the
analysis offers no material in support of indiscriminate “trust busting” and that
such material must be looked for in the particular circumstances of each indi-
vidual case. Nevertheless, many economists support indiscriminate “trust bust-
ing” and the interesting point is that enthusiastic sponsors of the private-
enterprise system are particularly prominent among them. Theirs is the
ideology of a capitalist economy that would ‹ll its social functions admirably
by virtue of the magic of pure competition were it not for the monster of
monopoly or oligopoly that casts a shadow on an otherwise bright scene. No
argument avails about the performance of largest-scale business, about the
inevitability of its emergence, about the social costs involved in destroying
existing structures, about the futility of the hallowed ideal of pure competi-
tion—or in fact ever elicits any response other than most obviously sincere
indignation. (1949, 357–58; emphasis in the original)
24. Clearly, an ongoing interest remains among NCAA members in marginal, if
not substantive, revisions in NCAA restrictions and rules, given a variety of social,
economic, and academic forces afoot over time. However, the disinterest that
Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison cite as paradoxical really pertains to their obvious
interest in seeing practically all, if not in fact all, labor market results in college and
university sports markets be market driven, with little or no guidance from meta-
market NCAA restrictions and rules.
25. We can grant that the reputation of the education that many, if not most,
athletes at the majority of NCAA schools now get suffers from the generally low
admissions requirements for athletes and from many media and gossip-based sto-
ries of the weaknesses in athletes’ courses of study and the easy grading accorded
them by professors all too eager to further the interests of their schools’ athletic
conquests. However, our purpose here is to talk about the theoretical foundation of
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what the NCAA seeks to accomplish with its pay restrictions and academic require-
ments, not the problems it has in accomplishing those objectives. Our point is that,
in spite of the problems encountered, the NCAA’s requirements could elevate the
reputations of the athletes’ education over and above what it could be in the
absences of the established requirements, or in the explicit pursuit of what are
offered as (and presumed to be) alternative, market-based educational require-
ments. We can only imagine that the “reputational capital” of athletes could very
well suffer generally and substantially if athletes were allowed to major in football
and basketball (concentrations in their sports specialties, e.g., ‹eld goals or free-
throw shots, as one economist-critic of the NCAA has wholeheartedly advocated)
(Shughart 1990b).
26. Indeed, the value of college experience to athletes is clearly indicated by the
number of high school athletes who could follow the lead of basketball player
Moses Malone and try out for the professional ranks directly out of high school.
Admittedly, there are few high school athletes who could successfully make the
transition, but that is, again, only a way of asserting the value of college athletics.
27. Herschel Walker, for example, played his junior year at the University of
Georgia when he could have turned professional and earned several hundred thou-
sand dollars, if not more than a million. Because he stayed at Georgia his junior
year, he must have expected the nonmonetary bene‹ts of an extra year in college
(including the prospects of receiving the Heisman Trophy, which he did receive)
and the added lifetime income from the greater experience to exceed the profes-
sional salary he would have received had he turned professional.
For athletes with less talent than Herschel Walker, the years of college experi-
ence may be more valuable because they offer more opportunities for improvement
of skills, media exposure, and education. The increase in the present discounted
value of the less-talented athletes’ future income may be greater than for many of
the more talented athletes.
28. Assuming a limit of 95 football players and 12 basketball players on college
teams, the total number of athletes at the 107 Division I schools at any point in time
is 11,449. The one or two dozen athletes who go into professional sports without
going to college or ‹nishing their years of eligibility is a minor fraction of 1 per-
cent.
29. Granted, we are making an unsubstantiated claim here about the impact of
the restrictions on demand. However, this hardly makes our analytics inferior to
the analytics of the NCAA’s critics, given that underlying their static analysis of
monopsony is an equally unsubstantiated claim, that the restrictions have no effect
on demand for either the ‹nal sports products or the demand for athletes. At least
our argument is supported by what the critics see as mysterious widespread support
for the restrictions among virtually all constituencies of colleges and universities,
fans, donors, faculty, administrators inside and outside of sports departments,
media, as well as possibly many (if not most) student-athletes.
30. Admittedly, McDonald’s does not restrict wage payments made by fran-
chisees to their employees. However, it may in›uence the prices charged.
31. Exactly why the member colleges believe that the NCAA will further the
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interests of the colleges through a joint venture is of no consequence to the argu-
ment. Different schools may actually receive various types of bene‹ts, just as the
different McDonald’s franchises receive various types of bene‹ts. The critical
requirement is that bene‹ts from a joint venture are perceived.
32. As would be true of all ventures in which joint action results in bene‹ts to all
that have some durability (e.g., through the creation of a “reputation” for amateur
sports), individual participants—for example, players—have an additional short-
term incentive to a free ride by cheating. Athletes can reason that if they accept side
payments, such payments may never be uncovered and, even if they are uncovered,
may have no detectable effect on athletes’ own expected income over the expected
relatively short time involved in a college education. The reputation bene‹ts for
amateur sports in college may evaporate with rampant cheating; athletes can rea-
son, however, that they will have long completed their college career when the
joint venture bene‹ts do evaporate. Tensions inevitably exist between the short-
term interests of athletes (and coaches and, for that matter, all others whose stay at
colleges is perceived to be short term) and the long-term interests of colleges as
institutions. This is not to say, however, that the athletes themselves don’t have
good reasons to want the NCAA rules in place, as we will explain.
33. Even Gary Becker (1971, 99–100) acknowledges the legitimacy of the incen-
tive to cheat on cartels: “Since collusion, even if by merger, is the only way to inter-
nalize and thus incorporate these effects, one might expect every industry to evolve
into an effectively monopolized one. But just as all ‹rms together have a strong
incentive to depart from the competitive solution, each separately has an equally
strong incentive to depart from monopoly solution. . . . Since all ‹rms want to
expand output, collusion has a tendency to break down because of ‘chiseling’ by the
members. Each ‹rm, in effect, hopes that all others act monopolistically while it
acts competitively.” Becker recognizes that the effectiveness of a cartel depends on
the costs imposed on violators for departing from the cartel agreement. In the
sports market, this means that the NCAA would have to have a means of imposing
suf‹cient costs on colleges for seceding from the NCAA and setting up their own
sports association that would allow for payment of athletes to more than cover the
bene‹ts of secession.
34. Economists Robert McCormick and Maurice Tinsley (1987) included 150
schools in their study. In 1971, 63 of these schools were declared to have “big-time
athletic programs” by virtue of their membership in “big-time athletic conferences:
Atlantic Coast Conference, Southwest Conference, Southeastern Conference, Big
Ten, Big Eight, Paci‹c Athletic Conference, and major independents.” In various
regression equations with the schools’ 1971 SAT scores as the independent vari-
able, their dummy variable for “big-time athletic programs” was always statistically
signi‹cant and positive, after adjusting for such factors as faculty pay, tuition, age
of the schools, faculty/student ratios, schools’ endowments, and the size of the stu-
dent bodies (1105). McCormick and Tinsley determined that having a big-time
program increased schools’ SAT scores by an average of 3 percent (1106, n. 5).
35. The NAIA and the NLCAA could, of course, expand their sports programs
considerably by allowing for payments.
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36. It would appear that of‹cials of the NCAA or athletic associations in other
countries would also take advantage of their experience with running sports associ-
ations and understanding of the exploitative rules of the NCAA and seek to orga-
nize alternative sports associations by enlisting the support of colleges, if not their
conferences.
37. Proponents of the cartel thesis might reply, as they have replied in private
conversations with the authors, that if member colleges are capable of cohering
over the long run within the NCAA to produce a joint product, they are every bit
as capable of cohering within the NCAA to cartelize the market for the purpose of
suppressing athletes’ wages. This argument doesn’t necessarily follow, mainly
because of the brand-name bene‹ts of being associated with the NCAA. Member-
ship in the NCAA would collapse if no brand-name bene‹ts—no demand-enhanc-
ing bene‹ts—were associated with membership. Few schools would long endure
the penalties, which run into the millions of dollars, imposed by the NCAA for
infraction of rules.
38. Of course, Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison never entertain the prospect that
restrictions can improve the quality of the product, which means they might never
concede that the elimination of the restrictions could have a detrimental impact on
schools’ reputations.
39. Much of the growth in the count of NCAA members can be chalked up to
factors such as the growth in population and the count and size of colleges and uni-
versities, growth factors not considered by Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison.
40. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
41. Id. at 1179.
42. The very fact that critics of NCAA payment restrictions on athletes have
never, to our knowledge, advocated allowing coaches to tender bribes to referees in
the middle of games to change calls suggests that they understand the validity of the
legal point made here, including that some payment restrictions are necessary (or
just bene‹cial) to create the type of game that they want to play.
43. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff ’d, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
44. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff ’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
45. 29 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
46. 30 Id. at 1179.
47. The court ultimately held that the player draft was an unreasonable restraint
of trade because of its anticompetitive impact on the market for players’ services.
Id. at 1189. See also Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976); Weistart and Lowell (1979, 114–18; and supp. 1985, 128); and Robinson
1980.
48. Even though employment may be restricted to some level below the ideal-
ized competitive level, the employment level and the payments the employees
receive can be greater than they otherwise would have been. Moreover, consumer
surplus on the product end can be enhanced by the restrictions.
49. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
50. Id. at 2954.
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51. Id.
52. Id. at 2959.
53. Id. at 2961, 2959. See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
Continental TV. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
54. 104 S. Ct. at 2969 (citing Bork 1978, 278).
55. 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
56. Id.
57. Id. The Court struck down the NCAA’s television contracts, ‹nding that
they restricted output and demand without producing offsetting procompetitive
bene‹ts. For an analysis of output as the key factor in balancing the competitive
effects, see Sullivan 1984, 771.
58. 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2969.
61. Id. The Court rejected Justices White and Rehnquist’s argument that the
NCAA regulations were noneconomic in nature (nonmarket goods) that produced
a social bene‹t in promoting amateur athletics. Instead, the majority said antitrust
laws permit an examination only into the competitive impact of the restraints, not
into whether those restraints promote public interest or other values. See National
Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Sullivan 1982.
62. 104 S. Ct. at 2971.
63. Id. See also Gunter Hartz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Assoc., Inc., 665 F.2d 222,
223 (8th Cir. 1981); Neeld v. NHL, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298–1300 (9th Cir. 1979);
Weistart and Lowell 1979, 757.
64. See, e.g., Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1151–53 (5th Cir. 1977); see
Note, Antitrust and Nonmarket Goods, The Supreme Court Fumbles Again, 60
Wash. L. Rev. 721, 729 (1985); Note, Antitrust and Nonpro‹t Entities, 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 802 (1981); Haveman and Knopf 1966, 209.
65. This might include more severe collective restraints if the NCAA were faced
with “intrabrand competition from other products, produced by another associa-
tion or league as may be developing with the College Football Association (CFA)
whose purpose is to promote the interest of major college football schools.” 104 S.
Ct. at 2968 n.55. See generally Weistart and Lowell 1979, 760–62, 768–69.
66. 104 S. Ct. at 2963–64; Sullivan 1984.
67. 104 S. Ct. at 2966.
68. Id. at 2965. See also FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009
(1986).
69. See, e.g., U.S. v. Grif‹th, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); U.S. v.
Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff ’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); Sul-
livan and Hovenkamp 1984; Hovenkamp 1985.
70. See also Areeda and Turner 1978, 271 (reduced output by the monopolist
will be offset by expanded output by other competitors); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
The analysis should not differ for monopsony as compared with monopoly. A
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monopoly buyer, a monopsonist, is one who has the ability to reduce demand by
forcing the seller to sell at a lower price. The contention is that the NCAA is a
monopsonist that forces the athlete to sell his or her service at a lower wage than
that prevailing in a competitive market, resulting in a deadweight loss similar to
that achieved by a monopoly seller (H. Hovenkamp 1985, 17–18). For reasons dis-
cussed herein, the monopsony theory is contrary to actual practice found by the
Supreme Court in NCAA. Questions also exist as to whether the Sherman Act cov-
ers buyer cartels or monopsony power. During the debates, Senator Sherman said:
“There is nothing in the bill to prevent a refusal by anyone to buy something. All
that it says is that people producing or selling a particular article shall not make
combinations to advance the price of the necessaries of life.” 20 Cong. Rec. 1458
(1889), quoted in Hovenkamp 1985, 18. More recent authority is to the contrary.
See, e.g., In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigations, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
71. 104 S. Ct. at 2969.
72. Id. at 2954. The CFA was formed during the same period that the NCAA’s
power to regulate was on the increase. To be sure, the CFA, made up of ‹ve major
conferences that emphasize football, was created to increase the in›uence of the
major football colleges within the NCAA structure.
73. The economies might include (1) operation at an ef‹cient scale, (2) avoiding
high market costs, (3) reducing market costs or improving market opportunities,
and (4) avoiding the free-rider problems such as in the advertising of the product. 
74. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Appalachian Coals,
Inc. v. U.S., 268 U.S. 344 (1933); Chicago Board of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231
(1918); Buffalo Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. American Society of Composers, 744 F.2d 917
(2d Cir. 1984).
75. See also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Paci‹c Stationery and Printing
Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S.
Ct. 2847 (1985); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731
(1984).
76. 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740–43 (1984).
77. Id. at 2741. The Court held that a parent corporation is incapable of con-
spiring with its wholly owned subsidiary under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
78. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
79. Id. at 2621.
80. See, e.g., Kior’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fash-
ion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
81. 105 S. Ct. at 2620–22.
82. Id. at 2620.
83. 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985). See also Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951) (the right to refuse to deal not unquali‹ed).
84. See generally Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 698 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d
894 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
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85. 105 S. Ct. at 2857.60.
86. Id. at 2860. See also Sullivan and Hovenkamp 1984, 85.
87. 105 S. Ct. at 2859. The Court accepted the Areeda and Turner analysis that
“‘exclusionary’ [conduct] ‘comprehends at the most behavior that not only 1) tends
to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also 2) either does not further competition
on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.’” Id. at 2859 n.32.
88. Defenders of the cartel thesis seem to imagine that the NCAA has been able
to maintain its monopsony stranglehold over member colleges through academic
accreditation controls that require NCAA approval of the member colleges’ ath-
letic programs. For example, Alchian and Allen (1977) write, “The answer [to the
question of how the NCAA maintains control] is that any college violating the ath-
letic ‘code’ could ‹nd its academic credentials threatened.” Suf‹ce it to say that the
imagined controls simply do not exist.
89. Indeed, to the extent that the NCAA is successful in increasing the demand
for college athletics, we would expect athletes’ wages to rise. Given the increase in
the price of attending college relative to the prices of other goods, the wages of ath-
letes have effectively risen over time.
Chapter 9
1. By taking this position on the role of the entrepreneur, Kirzner is clearly
denying the validity of the sweeping, unquali‹ed claim of the economist, “there’s
no such thing as a free lunch.” Perhaps the dictum applies to nonentrepreneurs, but
certainly not to entrepreneurs (as Kirzner’s “pure entrepreneurs”). Providing free
lunches is the restricted role of the entrepreneur in Kirzner’s view of the economic
world.
2. As does Kirzner, Baumol recognizes the prominent role of the manager in
the theory of the ‹rm.
We may de‹ne the manager to be the individual who oversees the ongoing
ef‹ciency of continuing processes. It is his task to see that the available
processes and techniques are combined in proportions appropriate for current
output levels and for the future outputs that are already in prospect. He sees to
it that inputs are not wasted, that schedules and contracts are met, he makes
routine pricing and advertising outlay decisions, etc., etc. In sum, he takes
charge of the activities and decisions encompassed in our traditional models.
(1968, 64–65)
3. The absence of an entrepreneurial role in standard monopolist models pre-
cludes any return in such models for entrepreneurial alertness, thereby implying
that “normal pro‹ts” are insuf‹cient to provide adequate incentive to encourage
the alertness that is so crucial to the development of a truly dynamic and progress-
‹lled market economy. Real-world ‹rms must therefore earn more than the nor-
mal pro‹ts of economic models, which in turn means that not all monopoly rents
(usually identi‹ed as earnings above normal pro‹ts) are the unproductive income
transfers they have been made out to be.
4. The monopolist’s marginal cost curve is assumed to be the same as the mar-
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ket supply curve, if the market is organized as a perfectly competitive market, even
though the incentive structure of operatives within a monopoly can be radically dif-
ferent from the incentives of operatives within perfectly competitive markets. As
argued in chapter 3, perfect competition’s market supply curve cannot be identical
to the monopolist’s marginal cost curve, simply because the assumption of incen-
tives remaining the same under both market structures is untenable.
5. In the ‹rst twenty-four hours after it was released, the sixth volume of the
Harry Potter series sold 6.9 million copies in the United States alone, as reported
by Reuters (July 18, 2005).
6. Accordingly, Locke argued in the Second Treatise that private property had a
moral as well as practical foundation: “ ’tis labour indeed that puts the difference of
value on every thing; and let anyone consider, what the difference is between an
acre of land planted with tobacco, or sugar, sown with wheat or barley; and an acre
of the same land lying in common, without husbandry upon it, and he will ‹nd, that
the improvement of the labour makes the far greater part of the value” (1953, 314).
Karen Vaughn, a Locke scholar, maintains that “the implication [of the preceding
quote] is that unassisted nature provides little that is useful to mankind” (1980, 85).
Indeed, she points out that Locke himself estimates that 90 percent of all that is
“useful to the life of man” is the result of labor (85).
7. Granted, Ricardo and all following economists have recognized that
resources differ in their productivity, which means that perfect competitors need
not be identical in their production costs and that “Ricardian (inframarginal) rents”
can be captured by producers who have access to the exceptionally productive or
well-placed resources. Even then, it must be acknowledged that at the margin, a
producer realizes no net gains under such a construction of perfect competition. In
addition, if there are identi‹able units of resources that are exceptionally produc-
tive or well placed, then their Ricardian rents will be capitalized in their prices,
which suggests that the perfect competitors that use those specialized resources will
have the exact same overall cost structure as the marginal cost producer. They will
either have to buy those specialized resources at prices in›ated by their Ricardian
rents, or they will incur the opportunity cost of not selling their resources at prices
in›ated by the Ricardian rents.
8. Trade secrets can be no less of an entry barrier than patents and copyright.
Indeed, trade secrets can be more formidable entry barriers than legal protections
since they do not have to be on ‹le for inspection in public agencies and can, poten-
tially, last longer, which, of course, means that monopoly rents can be garnered for
a longer time.
9. This statement has to be quali‹ed to recognize that we are talking about a
positive externality on the marginal unit. In other words, the additional unit pro-
vided has to provide a bene‹t that is not completely captured by those providing it.
There could be positive externalities, but unless they are positive at the margin,
there is no inef‹ciency. For example, even though the passersby place a positive
value on the garden as it is, they might not bene‹t further if it were expanded or
improved in some other way. In this case the gardener provides the ef‹cient
amount of garden in response to his or her own enjoyment. But this is never the
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case with a textbook-case monopoly. Because the price is always greater than the
marginal revenue, the positive externality created by the textbook monopolist is
always positive at the margin. Our discussion continues under the assumption that
the externality created by the gardener is also positive at the margin.
10. Probably the most famous article by Nobel Prize–winning economist
Ronald Coase (1960) considers the implications of zero transaction costs. It pro-
vided important insight into the implications of the positive transaction costs of the
real world for the ef‹ciency of law and public policy over a wide range of issues.
Many readers of this article conclude that Coase was arguing that transaction costs
could be ignored. Quite the opposite. Coase wrote his article to explain the impor-
tance of transaction costs.
11. Of course, you might just download your favorite band’s music into your
computer and pay nothing. This possibility has some profound and interesting
implications for monopoly pricing that we discuss later.
12. Methods by which ‹rms price-discriminate abound in a variety of industries.
Grocery stores are well known for their price discrimination through the distribu-
tion of coupons. Those customers who redeem coupons can be thought to have
more elastic demands than other customers. Movie theaters charge moviegoers in
various age groups different prices for their tickets. Fast-food restaurants discrimi-
nate on the prices of different quantities of sodas by selling sodas in different size
cups. Computer chip manufacturers discriminate with chips of different speeds.
Colleges and universities price-discriminate through the use of scholarships. Air-
lines sell different priced seats with ‹rst-class ticket holders not only getting meals,
they are treated to shorter check-in lines and security check lines. Similarly, Dis-
neyland sells “premium” passes for rides that allow holders to effectively break line.
Many producers of electronic gadgets and appliances introduce their products at
relatively high prices, only to gradually lower their prices over time, only after the
consumers with inelastic demands (because of their interest in having the “latest
and greatest” version of gadgets and appliances) have bought all they want at high
prices.
13. We have indicated Schumpeter’s main three reasons: First, monopoly
pro‹ts were a source of investment funds essential to the development of new prod-
ucts and technologies (1942, 88), as well as necessary to offset inevitable losses on
failed products and business ventures (89–90). In making this point, Schumpeter
argued, “Enterprise would in most cases be impossible if it were not known at the
outset that exceptionally favorable situations are likely to arise which if exploited by
price, quality and quantity manipulation will produce pro‹ts adequate to tide over
exceptionally unfavorable situations provided these are similarly managed. Again
this requires strategy that in the short run is often restrictive” (89–90).
Second, monopolies that act like restrictive monopolies would likely be short-
lived precisely because they attract competitors and can’t long survive “unless but-
tressed by public authority” (99). The pressure from the advent of new producers
with new products and production technologies would likely cause many existing
monopolies to innovate as well as hold their prices and short-run pro‹ts in check,
leading any existing monopolist to shift its production “optimum toward or beyond
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the competitive cost price . . . , thus doing the work—partly, wholly, or more than
wholly—of the competitive mechanism” (101).
Third, as an empirical matter, when economists have assessed the sources of
economic progress over stretches of time, “the trail leads not to the doors of those
‹rms that work under conditions of comparatively free competition but precisely to
the doors of the large concerns,” which necessarily leads to the “shocking suspi-
cion” (contrary to economic “ideology”) that “big business may have had more to
do with creating that standard of life than with keeping it down” (82).
14. See Gould and Eldridge 1977; Kuhn 1970; Gersick 1991; Tushman and
Romanelli 1985; Tushman, Newman, and Romanelli 1986.
15. For example, in the early 1980s, Advertising Age reported that of the twenty-
‹ve market leaders of identi‹ed markets (e.g., in toothpaste, chewing gum, and
bacon) in 1923, nineteen were market leaders in the year the study was published
(1983).
16. The tipping argument is endemic to the work of several scholars, including
Carpenter and Nakamoto 1989, Bass and Pilon 1980, and Lal and Padmanabhan
1995.
17. Tellis and Golder use a large number of case studies to debunk the ‹rst-
mover advantage argument. They also present summary statistics. For example, as
of 2000, the failure rate of ‹rst movers in the sixty-six industries they studied was
high: 64 percent. The failure rate for high-tech industries was 50 percent, whereas
that for traditional industries was 71 percent (with ‹rst movers in traditional indus-
tries having more time to fail). The market share of ‹rst movers in all sixty-six
industries was a mere 6 percent (2002, 43, table 3.1, 44, table 3.2). Tellis and
Golder conclude, “Market pioneers rarely endure as leaders. Most of them have
low market share or fail completely. Actually, market pioneering is neither neces-
sary nor suf‹cient for enduring success” (41).
Chapter 10
1. We recognize that the de‹nition of property is subject to considerable
debate among legal scholars and has varied over time. For example, see Under-
kuf›er 2003 and Penner 1997 to appreciate the fullness of the legal debate over
the conception of property. This debate revolves around the nature of things and
rights, as well as the exact relationship of people to things. However, because the
intricacies of this debate are not relevant to the purpose of this chapter, we adopt
here a commonly understood de‹nition of property that has been repeated among
legal scholars. C. B. Macpherson argues that “in law and in the writers, property
is . . . rights, rights in or to things” (1978, 2). Similarly, the American Law Institute
de‹nes property as establishing “legal relations between persons with respect to 
. . . things” (2001, 2).
2. Just about everything written in property right theory has to be quali‹ed.
We write that faced with new regulation, the market value of land can fall for a
good reason: Whether the market value actually does fall depends on whether the
regulations were anticipated before they were enacted and imposed on the landown-
ers. If the regulations were anticipated, the consequences of the regulations would
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have already been capitalized into the value of the property by the time the regula-
tions are enacted and/or enforced. Then again, what happens to the value of the
land depends upon the exact nature of the regulation. If the regulation prevents all
landowners from externalizing their use costs and imposing the costs on surround-
ing landowners (that is, the regulation forces, for example, pollution abatement),
the regulations can force all landowners to internalize their own costs and seek a
more ef‹cient use of their land, causing their property values for the more limited
array of use rights to rise. In a similar manner, an extension of the copyright term
for a book can be expected to affect the market value of only those books that are
expected to be in demand beyond the previous term limits. Also, an extension of the
term limit beyond some here-unspeci‹ed limit can cause the present discounted
value of any greater income stream received in some remote future period to be so
low that the current market value of the copyrighted work is affected very little or
is unaffected.
3. Proudhon’s ‹rst published work in 1840 carried the question What Is Prop-
erty? as its title. His answer was sharp: “Property is theft.”
4. As quoted (with emphasis) by Bastiat (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 35). 
5. As quoted (with emphasis) by Bastiat (1850, chap. 9, ¶ 68).
6. Knight continued,
It is manifest that this is an exceedingly crude way of rewarding invention. Not
merely do the consumers of the product pay, which is doubtless fair, but large
numbers of other persons suffer who are prevented from using the commod-
ity by the arti‹cially high price. And as the thing works out, it is undoubtedly
a very rare and exceptional case where the really deserving inventor gets any-
thing like a fair reward. If any one gains, it is some purchaser of the invention
or at best an inventor who adds a detail or ‹nishing touch that makes an idea
practicable where the real work of pioneering and exploration has been done
by others. It would seem to be a matter of political intelligence and adminis-
trative capacity to replace arti‹cial monopoly with some direct method of
stimulating and rewarding research. (1921, pt. 3, chap. 12, ¶ 43)
Von Mises wrote in his Human Action,
Patents and copyrights are results of the legal evolution of the last centuries.
Their place in the traditional body of property rights is still controversial.
People look askance at them and deem them irregular. They are considered
privileges, a vestige of the rudimentary period of their evolution when legal
protection was accorded to authors and inventors only by virtue of an excep-
tional privilege granted by the authorities. They are suspect, as they are lucra-
tive only if they make it possible to sell at monopoly prices. Moreover, the fair-
ness of patent laws is contested on the ground that they reward only those who
put the ‹nishing touch leading to practical utilization of achievements of many
predecessors. These precursors go empty-handed although their contribution
to the ‹nal result was often much more weighty than that of the patentee.
(1949, pt. 4, chap. 23, ¶ 4)
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7. The extended passage of Macaulay’s remarks on the then proposed exten-
sion of the copyright term in Britain from twenty-eight years to the life of the
author plus sixty years (1841) follows. 
The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most innocent and
most salutary of human pleasures; and never let us forget, that a tax on inno-
cent pleasures is a premium on vicious pleasures. I admit, however, the neces-
sity of giving a bounty to genius and learning. In order to give such a bounty,
I willingly submit even to this severe and burdensome tax. Nay, I am ready to
increase the tax, if it can be shown that by so doing I should proportionally
increase the bounty. My complaint is, that my honorable and learned friend
doubles, triples, quadruples, the tax, and makes scarcely a perceptible addition
to the bounty. Why, Sir, what is the additional amount of taxation which
would have been levied on the public for Dr. Johnson’s works alone, if my
honorable and learned friend’s bill had been the law of the land? I have not
data suf‹cient to form an opinion. But I am con‹dent that the taxation on his
Dictionary alone would have amounted to many thousands of pounds. In reck-
oning the whole additional sum which the holders of his copyrights would
have taken out of the pockets of the public during the last half century at
twenty thousand pounds, I feel satis‹ed that I very greatly underrate it. Now,
I again say that I think it but fair that we should pay twenty thousand pounds
in consideration of twenty thousand pounds worth of pleasure and encourage-
ment received by Dr. Johnson. But I think it very hard that we should pay
twenty thousand pounds for what he would not have valued at ‹ve shillings.
Deriding the extension of the copyright beyond the life of the author, Macaulay
observed,
The evil effects of the monopoly are proportioned to the length of its dura-
tion. But the good effects for the sake of which we bear with the evil effects are
by no means proportioned to the length of its duration. A monopoly of sixty
years produces twice as much evil as a monopoly of thirty years, and thrice as
much evil as a monopoly of twenty years. But it is by no means the fact that a
posthumous monopoly of sixty years gives to an author thrice as much plea-
sure and thrice as strong a motive as a posthumous monopoly of twenty years.
(1841)
Macaulay actually favored an extension of the copyright term. He felt that the 1841
bill made too great an extension. In 1842, he proposed an extension of the copy-
right term to forty-two years, or an increase of fourteen years (1842).
8. Through what he considered to be illustrative costs in book publication for
a print run of ‹ve thousand copies of a book, Breyer roughly estimates that copiers
have a 24 percent cost advantage of the “‹rst publisher” (1970, 294–95).
9. However, it needs to be said that of the eleven extensions of the copyright
term passed between 1962 and 1998, seven extensions were for one- and two-year
periods to allow Congress more time to devise a copyright bill that could pass both
Houses.
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10. For the ‹rst discussion of the “tragedy of the anticommons,” see Heller
1998. See also Buchanan and Yoon 2000.
11. For example, when the Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the
copyright term of all copyrighted works another twenty years, was signed into law
in late 1998, Richard Epstein opined in the Wall Street Journal, “This was no
Mickey Mouse extension but a gift of billions of dollars in future revenues. Thanks
to Congress’s giveaway, its happy gang of cartoon characters—Mickey, Donald,
Goofy, and Snow White—won’t soon slip into the public domain” (1998). How-
ever, in his review of the literature on copyright term extensions, Yeshiva Univer-
sity law professor Marci Hamilton found, “There is an embarrassing lack of empir-
ical research on the issue of the mechanism by which copyright law furthers the end
of the public welfare designated in the Constitution. There is much talk in the lit-
erature and the cases of the ‘incentive’ nature of copyright law. But there is no fac-
tual study that shows how much incentive is enough to further creative activity, or
what kinds of incentives work: money, control, or time. The fact is that we do not
really know what difference twenty extra years would make. A survey of the testi-
mony before Congress on duration extension reveals no support for the many fac-
tual claims made about extension [Karjala 1994]. Rather, conclusions are based on
hypotheses built on hypotheses” (1996). 
12. Over the last two centuries, book sales have risen exponentially with the rel-
ative price of books falling. The book industry has all the signs of being a highly
competitive, robust industry, not exactly what you would expect if copyright laws
created harmful monopoly power. Moreover, when the Library of Congress was
‹rst established, it had no books in its collection. It bought Thomas Jefferson’s col-
lection of 6,500 books in 1815. In 1851, it had only 55,000 volumes. In 2007, it
boasts more than 29 million books (and more than 100 million other items) in its
collection, covering 530 miles of bookshelves. Its collection has clearly grown at a
far faster pace than has the population.
13. James Buchanan and Yong Yoon (1994) revisit Adam Smith’s treatment of
economies of specialization in his classic example, the nail factory (Smith 1776, bk.
1, chap. 1). They argue that he was trying to make a little-appreciated point, that an
expansion of markets (via the elimination of tariffs and lower transportation costs)
permits greater specialization within and across local markets, thus giving rise to
increasing returns to the scale of markets.
14. Even Frank Knight, a legendary proponent of markets, adds to the confu-
sion of the role of monopolies.
A monopoly, of the category described, is evidently “productive” in the eco-
nomic or mechanical causality sense. It may be viewed either as a separate pro-
ductive element, in which case it is property in perfectly good business stand-
ing, and may be exchanged for other property on an income basis. Allowance
will be made for the security of the income, but this allowance is perhaps as
likely to be in favor of the monopoly as against it. Or we may take the view that
the monopoly of a consumption good confers superior productivity on the
agencies producing it, above physically identical agencies in other uses. As
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long as these are debarred in any way from producing the monopolized good
the effect is the same as that of a physical incapacity to do so, and they are,
like the branded article, economically differentiated, however similar physi-
cally. If the monopoly is of the character of a patent, and freely salable sepa-
rately from the plant producing the goods, it is better to treat it as a produc-
tive agency on its own account. (1921, pt. 2, chap. 6, ¶ 17)
Chapter 11
1. We understand that some economists might develop in class versions of
monopoly theory that represent improvements over conventional treatments (per-
haps containing one or more points developed in this book). However, we have
consistently directed our criticisms at conventional or textbook versions of monop-
oly theory because of its pervasiveness in theoretical and policy discussions and
because it is the version most in error and in need of revision.
2. We noted in chapter 2 Buchanan’s argument (1973) that organized crime,
which can cartelize, if not monopolize, the hit-man market, can be socially
bene‹cial to the extent that the count of hits would be reduced by the centralized
control of the market.
3. We need to insert a caveat here. If heroin is considered a “bad,” then it fol-
lows that monopolization of the heroin market can lead to fewer sales of heroin,
which can be construed as good. However, if the monopoly heroin seller causes
total expenditures on heroin to rise with the price hike, then heroin addicts might
have to commit more crimes (muggings) in order to feed their habits. Whether
there is social improvement with lower sales of heroin and higher other crimes is,
of course, debatable.
4. We concede that faced with the threats that came with worldwide terrorism,
the plight of the American airline industry in the early part of the twenty-‹rst cen-
tury looks ominous without some form of lower limit to price competition. But
whether this can be done properly is a serious concern, and one that likely makes
the attempt ill conceived.
5. The problem of past uses of antitrust laws to further the interests of com-
petitors has been discussed at length by Bork (1978); Baxter (1980); Fisher,
McGowan, and Greenwood (1983); Baumol and Ordover (1985); Shughart
(1990a); Armentano (1990); Friedman (1999); Crandall and Winston (2003); and
Winston (2006). McKenzie (2000, chaps. 7–9) has reviewed this literature.
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